Mandatory sentences. by unknown
 i 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REPORT 
 
MANDATORY SENTENCES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(LRC 108 - 2013) 
 
© COPYRIGHT 
Law Reform Commission 
 
FIRST PUBLISHED 
June 2013 
 
ISSN 1393-3132    
  
ii 
LAW REFORM COMMISSION’S ROLE 
The Law Reform Commission is an independent statutory body established by the Law Reform 
Commission Act 1975. The Commission’s principal role is to keep the law under review and to make 
proposals for reform, in particular by recommending the enactment of legislation to clarify and modernise 
the law. Since it was established, the Commission has published over 180 documents (Working Papers, 
Consultation Papers and Reports) containing proposals for law reform and these are all available at 
www.lawreform.ie. Most of these proposals have led to reforming legislation. 
 
The Commission’s law reform role is carried out primarily under a Programme of Law Reform. Its Third 
Programme of Law Reform 2008-2014 was prepared by the Commission following broad consultation and 
discussion. In accordance with the 1975 Act, it was approved by the Government in December 2007 and 
placed before both Houses of the Oireachtas. The Commission also works on specific matters referred to 
it by the Attorney General under the 1975 Act.  
 
The Commission’s Access to Legislation project makes legislation in its current state (as amended rather 
than as enacted) more easily accessible to the public in the form of Revised Acts, as well as providing 
electronically searchable indexes of amendments to legislation and important related information. The 
Commission provides online access to selected Revised Acts. The indexes include the Legislation 
Directory of primary and secondary legislation and the Classified List of Legislation in Ireland. The 
Classified List is a separate list of all Acts of the Oireachtas that remain in force organised under 36 major 
subject-matter headings; work is underway to add in-force secondary legislation to this List. 
 
iii 
MEMBERSHIP 
The Law Reform Commission consists of a President, one full-time Commissioner and three part-time 
Commissioners. 
 
The Commissioners at present are: 
 
President: 
Mr. Justice John Quirke 
Former Judge of the High Court  
 
Full-time Commissioner: 
Finola Flanagan, Barrister-at-Law 
 
Part-time Commissioner: 
Marie Baker, Senior Counsel  
 
Part-time Commissioner: 
Professor Donncha O’Connell 
 
Part-time Commissioner: 
 Thomas O’Malley, Barrister-at-Law 
 
iv 
LAW REFORM RESEARCH STAFF 
Director of Research: 
Raymond Byrne BCL, LLM (NUI), Barrister-at-Law 
 
Legal Researchers: 
Joseph Harrington LLB (Ling Franc) (Dub), BCL (Oxon), Barrister-at-Law 
Colm Kitson BCL (NUI), LLM (QUB), Barrister-at-law 
Kate McGovern LLB (Dub), LLM (Edin), Barrister-at-Law 
  Emma Roche-Cagney BCL (Clinical) (NUI), LLM (NUI)  
  Denise Roche BCL (Int.), Solicitor  
 
ACCESS TO LEGISLATION RESEARCH STAFF 
Project Manager: 
Alma Clissmann BA (Mod), LLB, Dip Eur Law (Bruges), Solicitor 
 
Assistant Project Manager: 
[Vacant at time of writing] 
 
Legal Researchers: 
Aileen O’Leary BCL (NUI), LLM (NUI), AITI, Solicitor 
Morgan Harris LLB (UKC), Barrister-at-Law 
 
  
v 
ADMINISTRATION STAFF 
Head of Administration: 
Ciara Carberry 
 
Executive Officer: 
Deirdre Bell  
 
Staff Officer: 
Annmarie Cowley  
 
Clerical Officers:  
Ann Browne 
 Joe Cooke  
Liam Dargan 
 
Library and Information Manager: 
Órla Gillen, BA, MLIS 
 
PRINCIPAL LEGAL RESEARCHERS FOR THIS REPORT 
Tara Murphy BCL (Law with French Law), LLM (Essex), Barrister-at-Law 
Emma Roche-Cagney BCL (Clinical) (NUI), LLM (NUI) 
 
The Commission also wishes to thank legal research intern Lianne Meagher Reddy LLB, LLM (NUI) for 
her contribution to this Report.   
vi 
CONTACT DETAILS 
Further information can be obtained from: 
 
Head of Administration 
Law Reform Commission 
35-39 Shelbourne Road 
Ballsbridge 
Dublin 4 
 
Telephone: 
+353 1 637 7600 
 
Fax: 
+353 1 637 7601 
 
Email:  
info@lawreform.ie 
 
Website:  
www.lawreform.ie 
 
vii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The Commission would like to thank the following people who provided valuable assistance: 
 
Ms Eileen Creedon, Chief State Solicitor 
Mr Brian Davison 
Ms Valerie Fallon, Department of Justice and Equality 
Ms Áine Flynn, KOD/Lyons Solicitors 
Ms Mary Rose Gearty, SC 
Mr Liam Herrick, Director of Irish Penal Reform Trust 
Ms Liz Howlin, Chief Prosecution Solicitor 
Mr Richard Humphreys, SC 
Ms Claire Loftus, Director of Public Prosecutions 
Mr Justice Patrick McCarthy, Judge of the High Court 
Mr Michael McDowell, SC 
Dr Anthony McGrath 
Ms Jane Mulcahy, Irish Penal Reform Trust 
Ms Úna Ní Raifeartaigh, SC 
Mr David O’Donovan 
Mr Robert Purcell, M E Hanahoe Solicitors 
Mr Luigi Rea, BL 
Mr Dara Robinson, Sheehan and Partners Solicitors 
Lord Justice Colman Treacy, Judge of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales and  
Member of the Sentencing Council for England and Wales 
Mr Justice Barry White, Judge of the High Court 
 
 
Full responsibility for this publication lies, however, with the Commission. 
 
 
  
viii 
 
  
ix 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF LEGISLATION    xiii 
TABLE OF CASES    xix 
INTRODUCTION    1 
A Background:  Request by the Attorney General on Mandatory Sentences 1 
B Scope of the Attorney General’s Request:  “Sentences,” “Offences” and  
 General Principles of Sentencing    1 
C Scope of the Attorney General’s Request:  “Mandatory Sentences”  2 
D Outline of the Report    3 
CHAPTER 1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR CRIMINAL SANCTIONS AND 
 SENTENCING    5 
A Introduction    5 
B Overview of the Aims of the Criminal Justice System and Principles of 
 Sentencing    5 
C Aims of the Criminal Justice System and Sanctions    11 
(1) Deterrence    11 
(2) Punishment    12 
(3) Reformation and Rehabilitation    12 
(4) Reparation    13 
(5) Incapacitation    13 
(6) Discussion    14 
D Principles of Sentencing and Justice    14 
(1) Consistency    14 
(2) Proportionality    16 
(3) Discussion    32 
E Towards a Principles-Based Structured Sentencing System   32 
(1) The Problem of a Lack of Structure and Inconsistent Approaches 33 
(2) Improved Structure and Greater Consistency in Sentencing  35 
(3) Conclusions and the Commission’s General Approach   40 
(4) Structured Sentencing in the Context of Mandatory and Presumptive 
 Regimes    41 
CHAPTER 2 HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF MANDATORY SENTENCES  43 
A Introduction    43 
B Historical Evolution of Entirely Mandatory Sentences    43 
(1) United Kingdom    43 
(2) Ireland    59 
C Historical Evolution of Presumptive Minimum Sentences   70 
x 
(1) Mandatory Sentences for Drugs Offences    70 
(2) Mandatory Sentences for Firearm Offences    82 
D Historical Evolution of Mandatory Sentences for Second or Subsequent 
 Offences    90 
(1) United States    90 
(2) England and Wales    91 
(3) Ireland    96 
CHAPTER 3 ENTIRELY MANDATORY SENTENCES    103 
A Introduction    103 
B The Mandatory Life Sentence for Murder    103 
(1) The Mandatory Life Sentence    103 
(2) The Mandatory Life Sentence and Temporary Release   103 
C Comparative Analysis    107 
(1) Northern Ireland    107 
(2) England and Wales    109 
(3) Scotland    112 
(4) Canada    112 
(5) Australia    113 
(6) New Zealand    115 
(7) United States of America    115 
(8) Summary    116 
D The Mandatory Life Sentence and the Conceptual Framework  116 
(1) The Mandatory Life Sentence and the Aims of Sentencing  116 
(2) The Mandatory Life Sentence and the Principles of Justice  117 
(3) Discussion    119 
CHAPTER 4 PRESUMPTIVE MINIMUM SENTENCES    127 
A Introduction    127 
B Presumptive Minimum Sentences under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 127 
(1) Elements of the Offences    127 
(2) Penalties    133 
(3) Early Release    139 
(4) Drug Mules    141 
C Presumptive Minimum Sentences under the Firearms Acts   141 
(1) Elements of the Offences    141 
(2) Penalties    145 
(3) Early Release    148 
D Comparative Analysis    148 
E Presumptive Minimum Sentences an d the Conceptual Framework  174 
xi 
(1) Presumptive Minimum Sentences and the Aims of Sentencing  174 
(2) Presumptive Minimum Sentences and the Principles of Justice  178 
(3) Discussion    180 
CHAPTER 5 MANDATORY SENTENCES FOR SECOND OR SUBSEQUENT  
 OFFENCES    185 
A Introduction    185 
B Presumptive Sentence for a Second or Subsequent Offence under the  
Criminal Justice Act 2007    185 
(1) Elements which Trigger the Presumptive Minimum Sentence  185 
(2) Penalty for Subsequent Scheduled Offence    187 
(3) Early Release    187 
C Mandatory Sentence for a Second or Subsequent Offence under the  
 Misuse of Drugs Act 1977    188 
(1) Operation of the Mandatory Sentencing Regime under section 27(3F)  
 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977    188 
D Mandatory Sentence for a Second or Subsequent Offence under the  
 Firearms Acts    188 
(1) Operation of the Mandatory Sentencing Regime under the  
 Firearms Acts    188 
E Comparative Analysis    189 
F Mandatory and Presumptive Sentences for Second or Subsequent Offences 
  and the Conceptual Framework    207 
(1) Mandatory and Presumptive Sentences for Second or Subsequent 
 Offences and the Aims of Sentencing    207 
(2) Mandatory Sentences for Second or Subsequent Offences and the 
 Principles of Justice    209 
(3) Discussion    211 
CHAPTER 6 SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS    215 
 
 
 
 
 xiii 
 
TABLE OF LEGISLATION 
   Pg 
N
o
. 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act 1986 Pub. L. No. 99- 
570 
US 72 
Bail Act 1997 No 16 of 1997 Irl 183 
Baume's Law 1926  US 89 
Boggs Act 1951 Ch 66, 65 Stat  
767 
US 70 
Children and Young Persons Act 1908 c 67 UK 42 
Children and Young Persons Act 1933 c 12  Eng 42 
Competition Act 2002 No. 14 of 2002 Irl 8 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control  
Act 1970 
Pub. L. No. 91- 
513 
US 71 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act  SC 1996, c 19 Can 158 
Controlled Substances Act  21 USC 841 US 195 
Controlled Substances Import and Export Act 21 USC 960 US 195 
Convention Rights (Compliance) Scotland Act 2001 2001 asp 7 Scot 57 
Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) No. 29 of 2006 Aus 114 
Courts of Justice Act 1924 No 10 of 1924 Irl 18 
Courts of Justice Act 1929 No 37 of 1929 Irl 129 
Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 c 43 Eng 49 
Crime and Punishment (Scotland) Act 1997 c 48 Scot 57 
Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT) No. 59 of 2005 Aus 113 
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) No 92 of 1999 Aus 37 
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Amendment  
(Standard Minimum Sentencing) Act 2002 (NSW) 
No 90 of 2002 Aus 165 
Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) No 58 of 2005 Aus 113 
Crimes Act 1900 (ACT)  Aus 112 
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) No 40 of 1900 Aus 112 
Crimes Act 1914 (CW) No 12 of 1914 Aus 37 
Crimes Act 1958  No. 6231 of 1958 Vic 112 
Crimes Amendment (Murder of Police Officers) Act  
2011 (NSW) 
No 20 of 2011 Aus 112 
Criminal Appeal Act 1968 c 19 E,W,S 48 
Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996 No 31 of 1996 Irl 85 
xiv 
   Pg 
N
o
. 
Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld)  Aus 113 
Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) No 69 of 1924 Aus 112 
Criminal Code Act 1995 (CW) No 12 of 1995 Aus 112 
Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act 1996 No 29 of 1996 Irl 77 
Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 No 1216 of 2008  
(NI 1) 
NI 56 
Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act 1994 No 2 of 1994 Irl 88 
Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 2003 asp 7 Scot 57 
Criminal Justice (Temporary Release of Prisoners)  
Act 2003 
No 34 of 2003 Irl 103 
Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act  
2001 
No 50 of 2001 Irl 9 
Criminal Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 1966 c 20 NI 55 
Criminal Justice Act 1948 c 58  Eng 91 
Criminal Justice Act 1951 No 2 of 1951 Irl 103 
Criminal Justice Act 1960 No 27 of 1960 Irl 103 
Criminal Justice Act 1964 No 5 of 1964 Irl 59 
Criminal Justice Act 1967 c 80 Eng 91 
Criminal Justice Act 1988 c 33 Eng 150 
Criminal Justice Act 1990 No 16 of 1990 Irl 10 
Criminal Justice Act 1991 c 53 Eng 73 
Criminal Justice Act 1999 No 10 of 1999 Irl 30 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 c 44 Eng 51 
Criminal Justice Act 2006 No 26 of 2006 Irl 79 
Criminal Justice Act 2007 No 29 of 2007 Irl 80 
Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 asp 13 of 2010 Scot 152 
Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act 1990 No 32 of 1990 Irl 9 
Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA)  Aus 201 
Criminal Law Act 1997 c 14 Irl 96 
Criminal Law Amendment (Homicide) Act 2008  
(WA) 
No 29 of 2008 Aus 112 
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) No 2252 of 1935 Aus 113 
Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 c 46 Scot 57 
Criminal Reform Amendment Act (No 2) 2006 (NT)  No 34 of 2006 Aus 113 
Defence Act 1954 No 18 of 1954 Irl 59 
xv 
   Pg 
N
o
. 
Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007 (NT)  No 34 of 2007 Aus 199 
Drug Trafficking Act 1994 c 37 Eng 75 
Euro Changeover (Amounts) Act 2001 No 16 of 2001 Irl 78 
European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 No 20 of 2003 Irl 64 
Fair Sentencing Act 2010 Pub. L. No. 111- 
220 
US 73 
Felony Firearm Law 1975 (Florida)  US 82 
Felony Firearm Statute 1977 (Mich)  US 82 
Firearms (Amendment) (Northern Ireland) Order  
2005 
No 1966 of 2005  
(NI 16) 
NI 146 
Firearms (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 No 3267 of 1992 NI 147 
Firearms (Northern Ireland) Order 2004 No 702 of 2004  
(NI 3) 
NI 146 
Firearms Act 1925 No. 17 of 1925 Irl 3 
Firearms Act 1964 No 1 of 1964 Irl 86 
Firearms Act 1968 c 27 UK 84 
Firearms and Offensive Weapons Act 1990 No 12 of 1990 Irl 86 
Gun Control Act 1968 Pub. L. No. 90- 
618 
US 81 
Habitual Criminals Act 1869 c 69 UK 90 
Habitual Felony Offender Act (Alabama)  US 153 
Harrison Act 1914 Ch 1, 38 Stat  
785 
US 70 
Health and Safety etc at Work Act 1974 c 37 UK 27 
Homicide Act 1957 c 11 UK 44 
Human Rights Act 1998 c 42 UK 55 
Human Rights Commission Act 2000 No 9 of 2000 Irl 98 
Infanticide Act 1922  c 18 UK 42 
Infanticide Act 1938 c 36  Eng 42 
International Criminal Court Act 2006  No. 30 of 2006 Irl 42 
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders  
Act 2012 
c 10 UK 94 
Life Sentences (Northern Ireland) Order 2001 No 2564 of 2001  
(NI 2) 
NI 55 
Migration Act 1958 (CW) No. 62 of 1958 Aus 165 
Misuse of Drugs Act (NT)  Aus 168 
xvi 
   Pg 
N
o
. 
Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 c 38 UK 75 
Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 No 12 of 1977 Irl 10 
Misuse of Drugs Act 1984 No 18 of 1984 Irl 76 
Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965 c 71 UK 45 
Narcotics Control Act 1956 Ch 629, s 103,  
70 Stat 567 
US 70 
Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997 No 26 of 1997 Irl 9 
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 c 53 NI 55 
Northern Ireland Act 1998 c 48 UK 56 
Northern Ireland Act 1998 (Devolution of Policing  
and Justice Functions) Order 2010 
No 976 of 2010 NI 56 
Offences Against the Person Act 1861 c 100  Irl 9 
Offences Against the State Act 1939 No 13 of 1939 Irl 16 
Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act 1988  US 72 
Parole Act 2002 No 10 of 2002 NZ 114 
Penal Servitude Act 1857 c 3  UK 90 
Penal Servitude Act 1864 c 47  UK 90 
Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) No 48 of 1992 Aus 37 
Persistent Offender Accountability Act 1994 c 1 US 89 
Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 c 6 Eng 75 
Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 c 62 Eng 92 
Prevention of Crime Act 1908 c 59 UK 91 
Prevention of Crime Act 1953 c 14 E,W,S 150 
Prevention of Crimes Act 1871 c 112  UK 91 
Prevention of Crimes Act 1879 c 55 (42 & 43  
Vict) 
UK 90 
Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act  
1993 
c 9 Scot 57 
Probation of Offenders Act 1907 7 Edw. 7. Ch.17 UK 2 
Proceeds of Crime Act 1996 No 30 of 1996 Irl 77 
Road Traffic Act 1961 No 24 of 1961 Irl 140 
Safe Streets and Communities Act  SC 2012, c 1 Can 158 
Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 1989 No 7 of 1989 Irl 26 
Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005 No 10 of 2005 Irl 26 
Scotland Act 1998 c 46 Scot 58 
xvii 
   Pg 
N
o
. 
Sentencing (Amendment) Act 2007 No 27 of 2007 NZ 37 
Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) No 49 of 1991 Aus 201 
Sentencing Act 1995 (NT)   Aus 37 
Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) No 76 of 1995 Aus 37 
Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas)  No 59 of 2007 Aus 113 
Sentencing Act 2002 No 9 of 2002 NZ 37 
Standing up for Victims of White Collar Crime Act  SC 2011, c 6 Can 164 
Transfer of Sentenced Persons Act 1995 No 16 of 1995 Irl 1 
Treason Act 1939 No 10 of 1939 Irl 59 
Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act 1976  US 82 
Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006 c 38 UK 146 
 
 
 
xix 
TABLE OF CASES 
   Pg 
N
o
. 
Attorney General for Northern  
Ireland v Gallagher 
[1962] NI 122 NI 55 
Caffrey v Governor of  
Portlaoise  Prison 
[2012] IESC 4 Irl 63 
Cox v Ireland [1992] 2 IR 503 Irl 16 
Deaton v Attorney General [1963] IR 170 Irl 62 
DPP v Smith [1961] AC 290 NI 55 
Dunne v Judge Coughlan High Court 25 April 2005 Irl 21 
Heaney v Ireland [1994] 3 IR 593 Irl 16 
HM Advocate v Al Megrahi High Court of Justiciary 24 November  
2003 
UK 111 
HM Advocate v Boyle and  
Others 
[2009] HCJAC 89 UK 57 
Hussain v United Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR 1 ECHR 48 
In re the Employment Equality  
Bill 1996 
[1997] 2 IR 321 Irl 16 
Kafkaris v Cyprus (2009) 49 EHRR 35 ECHR 65 
Locke v HM Advocate 2008 SLT 159 UK 111 
Lockyer v Andrade 583 US 63 (2003) US 192 
Minister for Justice and  
Equality v Nolan 
[2012] IEHC 249 Irl 13 
Minister for Posts and  
Telegraphs v Campbell 
[1966] IR 69 Irl 126 
Nascimento v Minister for  
Justice, Equality and Law  
Reform 
[2011] 1 IR 1 Irl 64 
Practice Statement (Crime:  
Life Sentences) 
[2002] 3 All ER 412 UK 56 
Pudlizsewski v Judge  
Coughlan 
[2006] IEHC 304 Irl 18 
R (on the application of  
Westlake) v Criminal Cases  
Review Commission 
[2004] EWHC 2779 (Admin) UK 43 
R (Smith) v Secretary of State  
for the Home Department 
[2006] 1 AC 159 UK 49 
xx 
   Pg 
N
o
. 
R v Bieber [2009] 1 WLR 223 UK 52 
R v Candless [2004] NI 269 NI 56 
R v Dalton [1995] 2 Cr App R 340 UK 48 
R v Dobson and Norris Central Criminal Court 4 January 2012 UK 110 
R v Ellis [2003] EWCA Crim 3556 UK 44 
R v F Howe & Sons  
(Engineers) Ltd 
[1999] 2 All ER 249 Eng 27 
R v Howell [2010] NICC 48 NI 108 
R v Howells  [1999] 1 WLR 307 UK 19 
R v Jones and Others [2006] 2 Cr App R (S) 19 UK 53 
R v Kelly [2011] 4 All ER 687 UK 109 
R v King (1986) 82 Cr App R 120 Eng 31 
R v Latimer [2001] 1 SCR 3 Can 12 
R v M(CA) [1996] 1 SCR 500 Can 12 
R v Oliver (2003) 1 Cr App R 28 Eng 28 
R v Secretary of State for the  
Home Department ex  
parte Bentley 
[1993] EWHC QB 2 UK 44 
R v Stewart [2011] NICC 10 NI 108 
R v Veregrin [1933] 2 DLR 362 Can 103 
R v Walsh [2004] NI 269 NI 108 
Re Royal Prerogative of Mercy  
upon Deportation Proceedings 
[1933] SCR 269 Can 103 
Stafford v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 32 ECHR 50 
State (C) v Frawley [1976] IR 365 Irl 7 
State (Healy) v Donoghue [1976] IR 325 Irl 61 
State (P Woods) v Attorney  
General 
[1969] IR 385 Irl 178 
The People (AG) v  
O'Callaghan 
[1966] IR 501 Irl 13 
The People (Attorney General)  
v O’Driscoll 
(1972) 1 Frewen 351 Irl 17 
The People (Attorney General)  
v Poyning 
[1972] IR 402 Irl 7 
The People (DPP) v Alexiou [2003] 3 IR 513 Irl 133 
The People (DPP) v Anderson [2010] IECCA 46 Irl 133 
xxi 
   Pg 
N
o
. 
The People (DPP) v Barry Court of Criminal Appeal 23 June  
2008 
Irl 142 
The People (DPP) v Benjamin Court of Criminal Appeal 14 January  
2002 
Irl 133 
The People (DPP) v Black [2010] IECCA 91 Irl 25 
The People (DPP) v Botha [2004] 2 IR 375 Irl 131 
The People (DPP) v Brodigan Court of Criminal Appeal 13 October  
2008 
Irl 133 
The People (DPP) v Byrne [2012] IECCA 72 Irl 133 
The People (DPP) v Carmody [1988] ILRM 370 Irl 13 
The People (DPP) v Charles Portlaoise Circuit Court 13 July 2004 Irl 79 
The People (DPP) v Clail  [2009] IECCA 13 Irl 141 
The People (DPP) v Cleary  
and Brown 
[2012] IECCA 32 Irl 134 
The People (DPP) v Colclough [2010] IECCA 15 Irl 20 
The People (DPP) v Coles   [2009] IECCA 144 Irl 133 
The People (DPP) v Connolly  [2011] IESC 6 Irl 128 
The People (DPP) v Costelloe  Court of Criminal Appeal 2 April 2009 Irl 132 
The People (DPP) v Crowe [2010] 1 IR 129 Irl 19 
The People (DPP) v Curtin [2010] IECCA 54 Irl 141 
The People (DPP) v Davis [2008] IECCA 58 Irl 134 
The People (DPP) v Deans  [2012] IECCA 11 Irl 136 
The People (DPP) v Delaney [2010] IECCA 57 Irl 133 
The People (DPP) v Delaney Court of Criminal Appeal 28 February  
2000 
Irl 137 
The People (DPP) v Dermody [2007] 2 IR 622 Irl 133 
The People (DPP) v Dillon Court of Criminal Appeal 17  
December 2008 
Irl 21 
The People (DPP) v Ducque [2005] IECCA 92 Irl 131 
The People (DPP) v Duffy [2009] 3  IR 613 Irl 8 
The People (DPP) v Duffy Court of Criminal Appeal 21  
December 2001 
Irl 131 
The People (DPP) v Dunne [2003] 4 IR 87 Irl 138 
The People (DPP) v Dwyer Court of Criminal Appeal 9 February  
2009 
Irl 142 
The People (DPP) v Farrell  [2010] IECCA 116 Irl 132 
xxii 
   Pg 
N
o
. 
The People (DPP) v Finn [2001] 2 IR 25 Irl 138 
The People (DPP) v  
Finnamore 
[2008] IECCA 99 Irl 130 
The People (DPP) v Fitzgerald [2010] IECCA 53 Irl 142 
The People (DPP) v Foley [1995] 1 IR 267 Irl 126 
The People (DPP) v Gallagher [2006] IECCA 110 Irl 126 
The People (DPP) v Galligan  Court of Criminal Appeal 23 July 2003 Irl 132 
The People (DPP) v Gilligan  
(No 2)  
[2004] 3 IR 87 Irl 135 
The People (DPP) v Gilloughly Court of Criminal Appeal 7 March  
2005 
Irl 131 
The People (DPP) v GK [2008] IECCA 110 Irl 13 
The People (DPP) v Godspeed  Court of Criminal Appeal 13 July 2009 Irl 133 
The People (DPP) v Goulding  [2010] IECCA 85 Irl 126 
The People (DPP) v H [2007] IEHC 335 Irl 18 
The People (DPP) v Halligan Court of Criminal Appeal 15 February  
2010  
Irl 19 
The People (DPP) v Hanley [2010] IECCA 99 Irl 127 
The People (DPP) v Harding [2011] IECCA 20 Irl 136 
The People (DPP) v Harty  Court of Criminal Appeal 19 February  
2008 
Irl 18 
The People (DPP) v Heelan [2008] IECCA 73 Irl 142 
The People (DPP) v Heffernan Court of Criminal Appeal 10 October  
2002 
Irl 178 
The People (DPP) v Henry Court of Criminal Appeal 15 May 2002 Irl 132 
The People (DPP) v Hogarty Court of Criminal Appeal 21  
December 2001 
Irl 131 
The People (DPP) v Howard  
and McGrath 
Court of Criminal Appeal 29 July 2005 Irl 133 
The People (DPP) v Jackson Court of Criminal Appeal 26 April 1993 Irl 13 
The People (DPP) v Keane [2008] 3 IR 177 Irl 18 
The People (DPP) v Kelly [2005] 1 ILRM 19 Irl 18 
The People (DPP) v Kelly Court of Criminal Appeal 28 June  
2010 
Irl 142 
The People (DPP) v Kelly Court of Criminal Appeal 9 November  
2009 
Irl 142 
xxiii 
   Pg 
N
o
. 
The People (DPP) v Kelly Court of Criminal Appeal 24  
November 2008 
Irl 143 
The People (DPP) v Keogh [2009] IECCA 128 Irl 133 
The People (DPP) v Kinahan [2008] IECCA 5 Irl 133 
The People (DPP) v Kirwan [2010] IECCA 43 Irl 135 
The People (DPP) v Lernihan [2007] IECCA 21 Irl 133 
The People (DPP) v Long [2008] IECCA 133 Irl 135 
The People (DPP) v Long [2006] IECCA 49 Irl 135 
The People (DPP) v Loving [2006] 3 IR 355 Irl 19 
The People (DPP) v M [1994] 3 IR 306 Irl 12 
The People (DPP) v Maguire [2008] IECCA 56 Irl 19 
The People (DPP) v Malric [2011] IECCA 99 Irl 133 
The People (DPP) v McCann [2008] IECCA 129 Irl 143 
The People (DPP) v  
McDonnell 
 [2009] IECCA 16 Irl 137 
The People (DPP) v McGinty [2007] IR 633 Irl 137 
The People (DPP) v McGrane [2010] IECCA 8 Irl 133 
The People (DPP) v McGrath [2008] IECCA 27 Irl 20 
The People (DPP) v McMahon [2011] IECCA 94 Irl 99 
The People (DPP) v Murphy  [2010] IECCA 44 Irl 136 
The People (DPP) v Murray [2012] IECCA 60 Irl 20 
The People (DPP) v Nelson Court of Criminal Appeal 31 July 2008 Irl 132 
The People (DPP) v O’Dwyer [2005] 3 IR 134 Irl 18 
The People (DPP) v O'C Court of Criminal Appeal 15  
November 2009 
Irl 18 
The People (DPP) v Ormonde [2011] IECCA 46 Irl 133 
The People (DPP) v Pakur  
Pakurian 
[2010] IECCA 48 Irl 22 
The People (DPP) v Power [2007] 2 IR 509 Irl 79 
The People (DPP) v Princs [2007] IECCA 142 Irl 19 
The People (DPP) v Purcell [2010] IECCA 55 Irl 136 
The People (DPP) v Redmond [2001] 3 IR 390 Irl 26 
The People (DPP) v Renald Court of Criminal Appeal 23  
November 2001 
Irl 131 
The People (DPP) v Roseberry  
Construction Ltd and McIntyre 
[2003] 4 IR 338 Irl 26 
xxiv 
   Pg 
N
o
. 
The People (DPP) v Rossi and  
Hellewell 
 Court of Criminal Appeal 18  
November 2002  
Irl 132 
The People (DPP) v Ryan [2008] IECCA 63 Irl 136 
The People (DPP) v Sheedy [2000] 2 IR 184 Irl 18 
The People (DPP) v Shekale  [2008] IECCA 28 Irl 133 
The People (DPP) v Spratt [2007] IECCA 123 Irl 135 
The People (DPP) v Sweeney  Court of Criminal Appeal 12 March  
2009 
Irl 134 
The People (DPP) v Tiernan [1988] IR 251 Irl 18 
The People (DPP) v  
Vardacardis 
Court of Criminal Appeal 20 January  
2003 
Irl 136 
The People (DPP) v Wall [2011] IECCA 45 Irl 135 
The People (DPP) v Walsh  Court of Criminal Appeal 17  
December 2009 
Irl 142 
The People (DPP) v Ward Court of Criminal Appeal 16 January  
2012 
Irl 100 
The People (DPP) v WC [1994] 1 ILRM 321 Irl 18 
The People (DPP) v WD [2008] 1 IR 308 Irl 21 
The People (DPP) v  
Whitehead  
[2008] IECCA 123 Irl 135 
The People (DPP) v Woods Court of Criminal Appeal 10  
December 2010 
Irl 18 
Thynne, Wilson and Gunnell v  
United Kingdom 
(1991) 13 EHRR 666 ECHR 47 
V and T v United Kingdom  (2000) 30 EHRR 121 ECHR 49 
Vinter, Bamber and Moore v  
United Kingdom 
European Court of Human Rights 17  
January 2012 (Application Nos  
66069/09, 130/10 and 1396/10 
ECHR 51 
Walker v HM Advocate 2003 SLT 130 UK 111 
Weeks v United Kingdom (1988) 10 EHRR 293 ECHR 47 
Whelan and Lynch v Minister  
for Justice, Equality and Law  
Reform 
[2007] IEHC 374, [2008] 2 IR 142;  
[2010] IESC 34, [2012] 1 IR 1 
Irl 16 
Wynne v United Kingdom (1995) 19 EHRR 333 ECHR 47 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
A Background:  Request by the Attorney General on Mandatory Sentences 
1. This Report, which follows the publication of the Commission’s Consultation Paper on Mandatory 
Sentences,
1
 arises from a request made to the Commission by the then Attorney General under section 
4(2)(c) of the Law Reform Commission Act 1975 which requested the Commission: 
“to examine and conduct research and, if appropriate, recommend reforms in the law of the State, 
in relation to the circumstances in which it may be appropriate or beneficial to provide in 
legislation for mandatory sentences for offences.”  
2. As the Commission noted in the Consultation Paper, the Attorney General’s request is clearly 
wide-ranging in scope.  It requires the Commission, firstly, to determine the scope of the term “mandatory 
sentences.”  In addition, the Commission is requested to consider mandatory sentences in general terms, 
although the Commission notes that existing legislation that already provides for mandatory sentences in 
connection with specific offences provides a valuable reference point for the analysis required in 
response to the request.  The Commission’s third task is to assess whether provision in legislation for 
such sentences is “appropriate and beneficial.”  In order to reach conclusions on that aspect of the 
Attorney General’s request, the Commission has examined the aims of criminal sanctions and relevant 
sentencing principles in the State.  The Report therefore begins in Chapter 1 with a discussion of those 
aims and objectives before progressing to a detailed review of the existing legislation on mandatory 
sentences.  
B Scope of the Attorney General’s Request:  “Sentences,” “Offences” and General 
Principles of Sentencing 
3. The first matter addressed by the Commission in preparing this Report was to determine the 
scope of the term “sentences” in the Attorney General’s request.  In this respect, the Commission 
considers that it is important to note that the Oireachtas, the Judiciary and the Executive each play a role 
in the sentencing process defined in a broad sense.  The Oireachtas, which has the sole and exclusive 
law-making authority in the State,
2
 is primarily responsible for the creation and definition of criminal 
offences through enacted legislation.  It also specifies the relevant sentence, which usually consists of 
setting out a maximum sentence for an offence, but in some instances it also sets out a mandatory 
sentence (notably, life imprisonment for murder) or a presumptive sentence (that is, a mandatory 
sentence to be applied save in exceptional circumstances).  The Judiciary is responsible for the 
determination, based on the aims of the criminal justice system and relevant sentencing principles, of the 
specific sentence to be imposed in a particular case, unless the offence carries a mandatory sentence.  
The Executive is responsible for the implementation of sentences imposed and this includes the exercise 
of statutory powers to commute or remit any sentence imposed by the courts and to grant temporary 
release to prisoners (which broadly corresponds to a parole system).  
4. The term “sentence” has also been given a narrow or a broad interpretation in terms of the 
sanctioning outcome or outcomes envisaged.  Thus, section 1(1) of the Transfer of Sentenced Persons 
Act 1995 defines “sentence” narrowly to mean “sentence of imprisonment.”  This may be contrasted with, 
for example, section 106 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006, which defines “sentence” to include not just a 
sentence of imprisonment but also other orders of the court made on conviction, such as a restriction on 
movement order.  This therefore envisages that a “sentence” covers both custodial and non-custodial 
sanctions; indeed, it is notable that section 99 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006 regulates the non-
custodial suspended sentence.  Other important non-custodial sentences include community service 
orders and fines.  An even wider concept of “sentence” would include a probation order made by the 
District Court under the Probation of Offenders Act 1907 (one of the most commonly-used sanctions in 
                                                     
1
  Consultation Paper on Mandatory Sentences (LRC CP 66-2011).  This is referred to as the Consultation 
Paper in the remainder of this Report.  
2
  Article 15.2.1° of the Constitution of Ireland. 
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the criminal justice system in Ireland), which can be made without recording a conviction.
3
  The 
Commission notes that this wide definition of “sentence”, covering both custodial and non-custodial 
sanctions and including orders made even where a conviction has not been recorded, is consistent with 
the general literature on sentencing.
4
   
5. The Attorney General’s request refers to “offences” without any apparent limitation.  In the 
context of this Report and in particular the request to consider whether mandatory sentences are 
“appropriate or beneficial”, the Commission understands that the Attorney General was not requesting 
that this be considered in relation to all criminal offences.  The Commission notes that various terms have 
been used to distinguish between the most significant criminal offences and those which are less serious.  
Thus, the term “arrestable offence” refers to offences punishable by a term of imprisonment of 5 years or 
more;
5
 indictable offences are those for which the accused is entitled as of right to a trial by jury; and 
summary offences are those heard in the District Court, without a jury, and for which the maximum term 
of imprisonment permissible is generally 12 months (and/or a fine). 
6. On the issue of the sentences and offences envisaged by the Attorney General’s request, 
therefore, the Commission has concluded that it is required to assess whether mandatory sentences 
“may be appropriate or beneficial” in general terms and should not confine its review of the law to a very 
small group of specific offences.  At the same time, bearing in mind the very wide potential scope of an 
examination of all “offences” and all “sentences”, the Commission has also concluded that it should 
restrict the scope of its review to offences at the higher end of the criminal calendar (such as murder), or 
which by their nature pose major risks to society (such as organised drugs offences or firearms offences), 
or which involve specific aspects that merit special attention (for example, consecutive offences 
committed by the same person).  While the examples given here reflect the types of offences for which 
mandatory sentences, as described below, are currently prescribed in Ireland, the Commission has not 
confined its analysis to these examples. 
7. Indeed, the need to look beyond existing examples is directly connected to the Commission’s 
conclusion, already mentioned, that it should examine and review the general principles of sentencing.  
This involved the Commission reviewing relevant developments in the literature on sentencing since its 
1996 Report on Sentencing
6
 in order to provide a framework for analysing a selection of offences, 
including those for which mandatory sentences are currently provided.  This framework of principles 
would in turn allow it to determine whether such mandatory sentencing provisions had been “appropriate 
or beneficial” and, as a consequence, allow it determine whether such provisions would be “appropriate 
or beneficial” in other settings.   
C Scope of the Attorney General’s Request:  “Mandatory Sentences” 
8. In addition to focusing on certain offences, the Commission also considered that in preparing this 
Report it was necessary to determine the scope of the term “mandatory sentences.”  As with the other 
aspects of the Attorney General’s request already mentioned, the term could be given a narrow or a 
broad interpretation.  It could be limited to “entirely” mandatory sentences, such as the provision in Irish 
law of a mandatory life sentence for murder.  Alternatively, it could encompass provisions that impose 
significant sentencing constraints in respect of certain offences or certain types of offender behaviour.  
Thus, it may be taken to include current statutory provisions that stipulate:  presumptive minimum 
sentences subject to specific exceptions (such as for certain drugs and firearms offences); consecutive 
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  See generally:  Law Reform Commission Report on Court Poor Box: Probation of Offenders (LRC 75-2005). 
4
  See, for example, Ashworth Sentencing and Criminal Justice 3
rd
 ed (Butterworths, 2000), Chapter 3, and 
O’Malley Sentencing Law and Practice 2
nd 
ed (Thomson Round Hall, 2006), Chapter 2. 
5
  Section 2(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1997 defines an “arrestable offence” as “an offence for which a person of 
full capacity and not previously convicted may, under or by virtue of any enactment, be punished by 
imprisonment for a term of five years or by a more severe penalty and includes an attempt to commit any such 
offence.” 
6
  Law Reform Commission Report on Sentencing (LRC 53-1996). 
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sentences for offences committed while on bail; and mandatory sentences for second or subsequent 
offences.  In some jurisdictions, the term could include those provisions that indicate a defined “tariff” (the 
minimum term of imprisonment that must be served before the prisoner can be considered for release) 
based on binding sentencing guidelines, as had been the case at one time at federal level in the United 
States of America. 
9. The Commission has concluded that it should not confine its examination to “entirely” mandatory 
sentences but should review legislative provisions that set down a fixed sentence, or a minimum 
sentence, following conviction for a particular type of offence.  Within that broad definition, a variety of 
mandatory sentences are already in use in Ireland.  
10. The first and clearest example of a mandatory sentence is the entirely mandatory life sentence 
for murder (and treason).
7
   In the case of a person convicted of “capital murder” (the form of murder for 
which the death penalty formerly applied), a mandatory minimum sentence of 40 years’ imprisonment 
applies.  In the case of an attempt to commit capital murder, a minimum sentence of 25 years’ 
imprisonment applies.
8
    
11. A second type of mandatory sentence is probably more accurately described as a “presumptive” 
minimum sentence.
9
  This is the type that applies to certain drugs offences
10
 and firearms offences.
11
 
These sentencing regimes require that a court must ordinarily impose a prescribed minimum term of 
imprisonment.  However, it allows the court to impose a sentence below the prescribed minimum term 
where this is justified by exceptional and specific circumstances.  Another example of a presumptive 
minimum sentence is that which applies to an individual who commits a second or subsequent serious 
offence within a prescribed period, having previously received a sentence of at least five years’ 
imprisonment for a first serious offence.
12
   
12. A third example of a mandatory sentence is the mandatory minimum sentence which applies 
where an offender commits a second or subsequent specified drugs or firearms offence.
13
  This 
particularised treatment of recidivist offenders is also evident in the statutory provisions mandating 
consecutive sentences for offenders who have, for instance, committed an offence while on bail. 
D Outline of the Report 
13. In Chapter 1, the Commission outlines a conceptual framework within which current Irish 
mandatory sentencing regimes may be analysed.  This chapter suggests that these regimes may be 
evaluated by reference to three key concepts:  1) the overarching purpose of the criminal justice system 
(the reduction of criminal conduct); 2) the specific aims of criminal sanctions (deterrence, punishment, 
reform and rehabilitation, reparation, and incapacitation); and 3) the fundamental principles of justice (the 
principles of consistency and proportionality).  The chapter describes these concepts, and their 
interaction, in detail.  It emphasises, in relation to the two principles of justice, that the courts have sought 
                                                     
7
  Section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1990.  
8
  Section 4 of the Criminal Justice Act 1990.  
9
  The Irish Penal Reform Trust considers that these sentences are not strictly speaking mandatory sentences 
but are a type of presumptive sentence, in that there is a presumption that these sentences would apply 
unless the court considers that they should not apply in a given case:  see Irish Penal Reform Trust, Position 
Paper on Mandatory Sentencing (Position Paper 3, May 2009), available at www.iprt.ie.  The Commission 
considers, nonetheless, that such sentences come within the parameters of the Attorney General’s request.  
10
  Sections 15A, 15B and 27 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, as inserted by sections 4 and 5 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1999 and further amended by section 33 of the Criminal Justice Act 2007.  
11
  Under the Firearms Act 1925, as amended by section 42 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006.  
12
  Section 25 of the Criminal Justice Act 2007.  
13
  Section 27(3CCCC) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, as inserted by section 84 of the Criminal Justice Act 
2006, and re-numbered by section 33 of the Criminal Justice Act 2007. 
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to enhance consistency and proportionality in sentencing through the formulation of general guidance 
regarding:  (i) points of departure in the sentencing of certain serious offences; (ii) sentencing ranges for 
serious offences; and (iii) factors that aggravate and mitigate the gravity of an offence and severity of a 
sentence.  The Commission notes, however, that the Irish sentencing system does not always adhere to 
a consistent approach in terms of the application of key sentencing aims and principles.  It observes that 
improved structure and consistency in sentencing is desirable and, in turn, assesses various potential 
options for realising this aim.   
14. In Chapter 2, the Commission outlines the historical evolution of the three forms of mandatory 
sentence under review.  As noted in Part C above, these are the entirely mandatory life sentence for 
murder; minimum sentences for drugs and firearms offences; and minimum sentences for repeat 
offences.  The chapter begins by tracing the historical development of the mandatory life sentence in the 
United Kingdom, the United States of America, and Ireland.  It proceeds to describe the historical 
evolution of minimum sentences for drugs offences in these countries, before addressing the extension of 
these sentencing regimes to firearms offences.  Chapter 2 then details the development of mandatory 
sentencing regimes for repeat offences in the United States of America, England and Wales, and Ireland.  
The chapter concludes by drawing a number of conclusions from the manner in which these sentencing 
regimes have evolved.  These conclusions provide material relevant to the analysis contained in the 
remaining chapters.   
15. Chapter 3 assesses whether the mandatory life sentence for murder complies with the 
conceptual framework outlined in Chapter 1.  The Commission begins by outlining the practical operation 
of this mandatory sentencing regime.  This discussion includes a description of the applicable early 
release mechanisms and the roles played by the Minister for Justice and the Parole Board in relation to 
these mechanisms.   The chapter then undertakes a comparative analysis of the sentencing regimes that 
certain other common law countries apply in respect of murder.  The Commission concludes by 
evaluating the mandatory life sentence for murder against the sentencing aims of deterrence and 
punishment (those which tend to feature most heavily in the continued use of the mandatory life 
sentence), and the two principles of justice, namely, the principles of proportionality and consistency.      
16. Chapter 4 assesses whether presumptive minimum sentences for drugs and firearms offences 
comply with the conceptual framework outlined in Chapter 1.  The Commission begins by examining the 
practical operation of the presumptive minimum sentencing regimes under: (i) section 15A and section 
15B of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, and (ii) the Firearms Acts.  This discussion details, among other 
things, the elements of these offences, the relevant penalties and the applicable early release provisions.  
Chapter 4 then undertakes a comparative analysis of presumptive and mandatory minimum sentencing 
regimes enacted in other common law countries.  The Commission concludes by evaluating presumptive 
minimum sentences for drugs and firearms offences against the particular sentencing aims of deterrence, 
punishment and rehabilitation (those most closely associated with these regimes), and the two principles 
of justice.  
17. Chapter 5 assesses whether presumptive and mandatory sentences for repeat offences comply 
with the conceptual framework outlined in Chapter 1.  The Commission begins by examining the practical 
operation of: (i) the presumptive minimum sentencing regime prescribed by section 25 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 2007 for serious repeat offences; (ii) the mandatory sentencing regime prescribed by section 
27(3F) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 for repeat section 15A and section 15B offences; and the 
mandatory sentencing regime prescribed for certain repeat firearms offences under the Firearms Acts.  
This discussion details, among other things, the elements of these provisions, the relevant penalties and 
the applicable early release provisions.  The chapter then undertakes a comparative analysis of 
presumptive and mandatory minimum sentencing regimes prescribed in other common law countries for 
repeat offences.  The Commission concludes by evaluating the Irish presumptive and mandatory 
sentencing regimes for repeat offences against the aims and principles of sentencing outlined in Chapter 
1. 
Chapter 6 contains a summary of the recommendations made in this Report.        
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1  
CHAPTER 1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR CRIMINAL SANCTIONS AND 
SENTENCING 
A Introduction 
1.01 In this chapter, the Commission outlines a conceptual framework within which current Irish 
mandatory sentencing regimes may be analysed.  It suggests that these regimes may be evaluated by 
reference to three key concepts: 1) the purpose of the criminal justice system; 2) the specific aims of 
criminal sanctions; and 3) the fundamental principles of justice.  In Part B, the Commission begins by 
providing an overview of the general aims of the criminal justice system.  It identifies the reduction of 
crime as the overarching aim of the justice system.  It notes that each of the component parts of this 
system, including the sentencing process, contributes to this aim.  In this Part, the Commission observes 
that the sentencing process may have different attributes (discussed in the next Part), each of which 
seeks to facilitate crime-reduction.  It proceeds to discuss the Court of Criminal Appeal decision in The 
People (Attorney General) v Poyning
1
 which illustrates how these attributes may feature in the sentencing 
process.      
1.02 In Part C, the Commission discusses in detail the following aims of the criminal justice system: 
deterrence, punishment, reformation and rehabilitation, reparation and incapacitation.  It notes that while 
crime-reduction (the core purpose of the justice system) is a constant concern, the specific aims of 
criminal sanctions may be differently prioritised in individual cases.  This Part outlines what each of these 
aims entails and notes that the extent to which mandatory sentencing regimes further these goals 
requires consideration. 
1.03  In Part D, the Commission discusses the key principles of sentencing, namely that: (a) there 
should be a consistent approach to sentencing so that like cases should be treated alike, and (b) the 
criminal sanction should be proportionate to the circumstances of the particular offence and the particular 
offender.  This Part identifies as another key matter that requires consideration, the extent to which 
mandatory sentencing regimes comply with these principles. 
1.04 In Part E, the Commission notes that while the Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeal 
have sought to increase consistency and proportionality in sentencing, commentators and surveys of 
sentencing practice call into question whether the aims and principles discussed in Parts C and D are 
being realised.  The Commission discusses proposals to develop a more structured sentencing system in 
order to address this, including the development of sentencing guidance or guidelines under the auspices 
of a proposed Judicial Council.  The discussion in this chapter thus provides the conceptual framework 
against which the Commission examines the mandatory and presumptive sentencing regimes that are 
analysed in Chapters 3 to 5 of the Report.  The Commission concludes the chapter by outlining the 
relevance of the discussed aims and principles to the analysis contained in the remaining chapters.  
B Overview of the Aims of the Criminal Justice System and Principles of Sentencing 
1.05 A key aim of the criminal justice system is to reduce crime, that is, prohibited and unwanted 
conduct that is detrimental or harmful to society.
2
  The criminal justice system comprises several 
                                                     
1
  [1972] IR 402. 
2
  The Commission acknowledges that there are many other factors at play in terms of the causes of criminal 
activity in society, and that the criminal justice system is merely one aspect of how society, including the State, 
attempts to reduce such activity.  These include other policy-related matters such as general economic policy, 
education policy and employment policy.  This Report is confined primarily to a discussion of the role of the 
criminal justice system. The Commission discusses at paragraph 4.199ff, below, the research of the Health 
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component parts, each of which contributes to this aim.  These parts include the substantive criminal law, 
which contains a list of prohibited or unwanted conduct that is graded or labelled according to the 
seriousness with which it is associated, including in terms of the sanctions to be imposed on conviction.  
The other important component parts of the criminal justice system include the relevant processes and 
services connected with the system as a whole, notably the Garda Síochána (who operate both as a 
peace-keeping prevention-based component of the system and also as an investigative force), the 
prosecutorial process, the trial process, and (in the event of a conviction) the sentencing process and the 
probation and prisons service.  While the system as a whole is intended to reduce crime (including by 
clearly stating what constitutes criminal activity) and to have in place mechanisms that are at least in part 
aimed at the prevention of such conduct, many of the components listed operate as salutary after-the-
event processes where a crime has been committed. 
1.06 The preventive aspect of the criminal justice system is that aspect which seeks to prevent people 
from becoming offenders in the first place.
3
  The extent to which the criminal justice system is succeeding 
in this aim is difficult to establish in so far as statistics are more concerned with those who come in 
contact with the criminal justice system than those who do not.  However, an examination of the numbers 
of people prosecuted in any year suggests that the vast majority of the Irish population does not offend 
the criminal law in a serious way.
4
  This suggests that the criminal justice system (in tandem with inherent 
and cultivated values that influence human behaviour) is, for the most part, working.  While some people 
may be more influenced by the fact that certain behaviour has been labelled “criminal”, others may be 
more influenced by the fact that they feel that certain behaviour is morally wrong.  Thus, for instance, a 
person driving home late at night might stop for a red traffic light even in the absence of any apparent risk 
of detection or punishment or, indeed, of causing an accident.  He or she may accept that this behaviour 
is morally appropriate as well as being in compliance with the law.  
1.07 In this Report, the primary focus of the Commission is on a specific aspect of the criminal justice 
system, namely, the sentencing process and, in particular, mandatory sentences.  (As outlined above at 
paragraphs 8 to 11, a mandatory sentence is one which applies in all cases regardless of the particular 
circumstances, whereas a presumptive sentence is one which applies in all cases except where there are 
specific and exceptional circumstances).  The sentencing process is that aspect of the criminal justice 
system concerned with the determination and application of criminal sanctions to those who have been 
convicted of offending the substantive criminal law.  In the context of reducing prohibited or unwanted 
conduct, these sanctions are necessarily endowed with deterrent and punitive attributes.
5
   
1.08 Even taking what are regarded as low level sanctions, such as fines or community service orders, 
it is clear that these are intended to have a salutary effect and to bring home to the offender that harm 
has been done to society.  Of course, it is also clear that such sanctions are imposed as an alternative to 
the other most common sanction, imprisonment, and that a community service order is also intended to 
convey to the offender that he or she is being “given a chance” because, for example, this was a first time 
offence or was relatively minor in the scale of criminality.  It is therefore intended to mark the seriousness 
of the past behaviour but also to reflect the expectation that future behaviour can be adjusted positively.    
A sentence of imprisonment is clearly intended to be a more punitive sanction.  However, even so, there 
is a general expectation that not all criminals convicted of the same offence will receive the same 
sentence of imprisonment and that, for example, the experienced leader of a group of robbers will receive 
a longer sentence than the young, first-time member of that same group.  While each might receive a 
custodial sentence, the first-time offender may still be “given a chance” with a shorter term of 
imprisonment (perhaps even suspended) while the leader may be given a lengthy term.  Thus, even when 
a sentence of imprisonment is imposed, many different attributes are at play; the punitive element arising 
                                                                                                                                                 
Research Board and the British-Irish Council on the link between drugs and crime with a view to informing the 
development of effective policy responses. 
3
  McAuley and McCutcheon Criminal Liability (Round Hall, Sweet and Maxwell, 2000) at 103. 
4
  Courts Service Annual Report 2010 at 57-64. 
5
  McAuley and McCutcheon Criminal Liability (Round Hall, Sweet and Maxwell, 2000) at 104ff; and O’Malley 
Sentencing Law and Practice (Thomson, Round Hall, 2006) at 31ff. 
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from loss of liberty is clearly evident, but there are also reformative, rehabilitative, reparative and 
incapacitative attributes involved. 
1.09 In pursuing the general preventive aim of the criminal justice system, the sentencing process 
must also comply with what can be described as external constraints that emanate from fundamental 
principles of justice.
6
  Many of these constraints arise from national constitutional requirements and 
international or regional human rights standards.  Thus, as a member state of the Council of Europe,
7
 
Ireland accepts that the death penalty is forbidden as a sanction.
8
  Similarly, other former sanctions such 
as whipping have been abolished on the basis that they would amount to torture or inhuman and 
degrading treatment.
9
  In addition, Article 15.5 of the Constitution provides that the Oireachtas is 
prohibited from declaring acts to be infringements of the law which were not so at the date of their 
commission.  This reflects the fundamental principle that a person must have done something wrong to 
warrant the imposition of a sanction, and that the list of wrongs must have been signalled in advance to 
the offender, not after the event.
10
  Also of importance in this respect is Article 40.1 of the Constitution, 
which provides that all citizens shall, as human persons, be held equal before the law.  This equality 
principle requires that there should be a consistent approach to sentencing so that like cases are treated 
alike, the corollary being that different cases should be treated differently.
11
  In the literature on 
sentencing, there is also reference to the principle of proportionality, ie. the requirement that “the 
punishment must fit the crime and the criminal”.    
1.10 The application of many of these features of the criminal justice system and the sentencing 
process can be seen in one of the leading Irish cases on sentencing, the 1972 decision of the Court of 
Criminal Appeal in The People (Attorney General) v Poyning.
12
  In Poyning, the defendant was charged 
with a number of offences related to a single incident, including armed robbery and taking a motor car 
without authority.  He pleaded guilty to both counts and was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment for 
armed robbery and six months’ imprisonment for the motor car offence.  Along with the defendant, two 
other men were charged in respect of the armed robbery.  They also pleaded guilty but were sentenced 
by a different judge.  While that sentencing judge imposed a sentence of six years’ imprisonment on the 
other two defendants, the sentence of imprisonment was suspended on condition that the defendants 
enter into a bond to keep the peace for five years.  As both entered into this bond, they were released.  In 
those circumstances the defendant appealed against the sentences imposed on him. 
1.11 At the hearing of the appeal, counsel for the defendant argued that the result was “a gross 
inequality of treatment for his client”.  Giving its judgment, the Court of Criminal Appeal stated: 
 “The law does not in these cases fix the sentence for any particular crime, but it fixes a maximum 
sentence and leaves it to the court of trial to decide what is, within the maximum, the appropriate 
sentence for each criminal in the particular circumstances of each case.  Not only in regard to 
each crime but in regard to each criminal the court of trial has the right and the duty to decide 
whether to be lenient or severe.  It is for these reasons and with these purposes in view that, 
before passing sentence, the court of trial hears evidence of the antecedents and character of 
every convicted person.  It follows that when two persons are convicted together of a crime or of 
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  McAuley and McCutcheon Criminal Liability (Round Hall, Sweet and Maxwell, 2000) at 105-106.  See also: 
Walker The Aims of a Penal System (The James Seth Memorial Lecture 1966) (Edinburgh University Press, 
1966).  
7
  See:  Article 1 of the Sixth Protocol and Article 2 of the Thirteenth Protocol to the European Convention on 
Human Rights. 
8
  See:  Article 15.5.2° and Article 28.3.3° of the Constitution, which prohibit the imposition of the death penalty. 
9
  See:  Article 40.3.1° of the Constitution; and State (C) v Frawley [1976] IR 365. See also: Article 3 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights 
10
  See also:  Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
11
  See also:  Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
12
  [1972] IR 402. 
8 
a series of crimes in which they have been acting in concert, it may be (and very often is) right to 
discriminate between the two and to be lenient to the one and not to the other.  The background, 
antecedents and character of the one and his whole bearing in court may indicate a chance of 
reform if leniency is extended; whereas it may seem that only a severe sentence is likely to serve 
the public interest in the case of the other, having regard both to the deterring effect and the 
inducement to turn from a criminal to an honest life.  When two prisoners have been jointly 
indicted and convicted and one of them receives a light sentence, or none at all, it does not follow 
that a severe sentence on the other must be justified.”
13
 (emphasis added) 
The Court also added: 
 “Of course, in any particular case the Court must examine the disparity in sentences where, if all 
other things were equal, the sentences should be the same; it must examine whether the 
differentiation in treatment is justified.  The Court, in considering the principles which should 
inform a judge’s mind when imposing sentence and having regard to the differences in the 
characters and antecedents of the convicted person, will seek to discover whether the 
discrimination was based on those differences.”
14
    
The Court of Criminal Appeal held that while it appeared that Poyning’s co-defendants had been treated 
more leniently, the sentence of penal servitude was an appropriate one and should not be reduced.   
1.12 Therefore, Poyning reflects the equality and proportionality principles discussed above, which 
require sentencing to be individualised in so far as the criminal sanction must be proportionate to the 
particular circumstances of both the offence and the offender.  Thus even where, as in this case, each 
defendant has committed the same crime, the criminal sanction for each may be different because the 
individual circumstances of each defendant (“background, antecedents and character”) are different.  
Poyning also illustrates that a number of the other factors discussed above are at issue, including “the 
public interest,” “the deterring effect” and “a chance of reform.”  Thus, marking the seriousness of the 
offence is not simply a matter of ensuring a proportionate sentence for the offender; it is also required to 
serve the public interest by seeking to reduce prohibited and unwanted conduct in society, as well as 
inducing the individual offender to reform, whether by a relatively lenient sentence or a relatively severe 
sentence.  As a result, the courts will generally include as part of their deliberations the possibility that 
through a combination of interventions such as education, therapy and, in some instances, non-custodial 
sanctions such as community service, the offender will be induced to refrain from committing prohibited or 
unwanted conduct in the future.  The sentencing process also relies, as discussed, on the severity of the 
sanction imposed to dissuade the particular offender from re-offending and other would-be offenders from 
offending in the first place. 
1.13 As illustrated by Poyning, the operation of the sentencing process may therefore be described in 
the following terms:  
1. Sentencing should mark the seriousness of the criminal conduct that has occurred.  In general 
therefore, the more serious the criminal conduct, the more severe the sanction that is likely to be 
imposed.   
2. The seriousness of the conduct is determined by reference to three interlinking factors: (a) the 
harm caused; (b) the culpability of the offender; and (c) the behaviour of the offender in relation to 
the offence.  This reflects the proportionality requirement that the punishment should fit the 
individual crime and the individual offender. 
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  [1972] IR 402 at 408. 
14
  Ibid.  The approach described was adopted in The People (DPP) v Duffy [2009] 3 IR 613, where the defendant 
had been convicted of an offence under the Competition Act 2002 arising from his participation in a price 
cartel.  The Central Criminal Court (McKechnie J) imposed a suspended sentence on the defendant “solely on 
the basis... of keeping some alignment” with the suspended sentences which had been imposed upon two 
members of the same cartel whose level of culpability was comparable to that of the accused.  The Court 
considered that it would be contrary to the principle of equality to require the defendant to serve a custodial 
sentence against that background. 
9 
3. Criminal conduct will, in general, be considered more serious in terms of harm caused where it 
has caused death or serious injury and will, in general, be considered less serious where it has 
caused property damage or financial loss.  In general, physical harm to other humans is ranked 
more seriously than property damage or financial loss.  Clearly, of course, there are cases where 
financial loss arising from, for example, fraud may be on such a large scale that it will be 
regarded as having caused more harm than, for example, a once-off assault.   
4. Criminal conduct will be considered more serious in terms of culpability where the offender 
intended to behave in a particular way, and less serious where he or she was reckless or 
negligent. 
5. Criminal conduct will be considered more serious in terms of the offender’s behaviour where 
he or she has aggravated the situation, for example, by using a weapon, targeting a vulnerable 
person, breaching a position of trust or being involved in a group or gang. 
6. The absence of these aggravating factors does not necessarily amount to a mitigating factor, 
but the sentencing court may take into account, as mitigating factors, other individual offender 
behaviour, whether before or after the offence itself, such as whether the case involves a first-
time offender (as part of their “background, antecedents and character”) or whether the offender 
pleads guilty (thus avoiding, for example, a potentially difficult cross-examination for the victim or 
the cost to the public of a long trial).  
7. In addition to ensuring a proportionate sentence for the offence and the offender, the 
sentencing process also involves the general public interest aim of reducing prohibited or 
unwanted conduct in society.  For the individual offender, the sentencing court will consider (with 
the benefit of a probation report) whether interventions such as education, therapy or non-
custodial sanctions such as community service will induce the offender to refrain from committing 
prohibited or unwanted conduct in the future.  The sentencing court will also take into account 
whether the severity or leniency of the sanction imposed will dissuade would-be offenders from 
offending in the first place.   
1.14 This summary of the sentencing process, as illustrated in the Poyning case, reflects the reality 
that, in respect of virtually all criminal offences, the sentencing court has a wide discretion as to the 
sentence to be imposed in a specific case.  Thus, for most criminal offences, the Oireachtas provides for 
a range of sentences, from zero to a maximum, leaving to the sentencing judge the specific sentence to 
be imposed.  Some examples are: 
 Manslaughter: maximum sentence:  life imprisonment (section 5 of the Offences against the 
Person Act 1861) 
 Rape: maximum sentence: life imprisonment (section 4 of the Criminal Law (Rape) 
(Amendment) Act 1990) 
 Assault causing serious harm: maximum sentence:  life imprisonment (section 4 of the Non-
Fatal Offences against the Person Act 1997) 
 Assault causing harm: maximum sentence:  five years’ imprisonment (section 3 of the Non-
Fatal Offences against the Person Act 1997) 
 Assault: maximum sentence:  six months’ imprisonment (section 2 of the Non-Fatal Offences 
against the Person Act 1997) 
 Robbery: maximum sentence:  life imprisonment (section 14 of the Criminal Justice (Theft 
and Fraud Offences) Act 2001) 
 Theft: maximum sentence:  10 years’ imprisonment (section 4(6) of the Criminal Justice 
(Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001) 
1.15 In the case of each of these offences, which are clearly among the most serious in the criminal 
calendar, the Oireachtas has legislated to set the maximum sentence but it has left it to the trial judge to 
decide the actual sentence to be imposed, applying the sentencing principles described above. 
10 
1.16 The Commission has been requested by the Attorney General to examine the small number of 
instances in which the Oireachtas has prescribed mandatory or presumptive sentences.  These include: 
  The mandatory life sentence for murder (section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1990); 
  The presumptive minimum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment for the possession or importation 
of drugs with a certain market value, with intent to sell or supply (section 27 of the Misuse of 
Drugs Act 1977, as amended); 
  The presumptive minimum sentences of five years’ imprisonment
15
 or 10 years’ imprisonment
16
 
for certain offences under the Firearms Acts; 
  The mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment for a second or subsequent 
offence of possessing or importing drugs with a certain market value, with intent to sell or supply 
(section 27(3F) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977); 
  The mandatory minimum sentences of five years’ imprisonment
17
 or 10 years’ imprisonment
18
 for 
second or subsequent specified offences under the Firearms Acts; and 
  The presumptive minimum sentence of three-quarters of the maximum term provided by law - or 
10 years’ imprisonment where the maximum term is life imprisonment - for a second or 
subsequent “serious” offence
19
 under the Criminal Justice Act 2007 (section 25 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 2007). 
1.17 The key question addressed by the Commission in this Report, therefore, is the extent to which 
mandatory or presumptive sentences contribute to a general aim of the criminal justice system: that of 
reducing prohibited or unwanted conduct.  This in turn requires the Commission to examine to what 
extent such mandatory or presumptive sentencing regimes are consistent with the conceptual framework 
for criminal sanctions and sentencing, as described already in general terms, and discussed in more 
detail below in this chapter.   
1.18 As a preliminary observation, the Commission notes that, unlike ordinary sentencing provisions 
which require an examination of the culpability of the offender, the harm caused, and the behaviour of the 
offender in relation to the particular offence, mandatory and presumptive sentencing provisions tend to 
focus primarily on the harm caused ahead of culpability and offender behaviour.  The extent to which the 
harm caused may take primacy over other factors depends on whether the sentence is entirely 
mandatory or presumptive and subject to exceptions.  Where the sentence is presumptive, it is more 
likely that the courts will be able to consider individual factors such as culpability and behaviour. 
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  The offences which attract a five-year presumptive minimum sentence are:  (i) possession of a firearm while 
taking a vehicle without authority (section 26 of the Firearms Act 1964, as substituted); (ii) possession of a 
firearm or ammunition in suspicious circumstances (section 27A of the Firearms Act 1964, as substituted); (iii) 
carrying a firearm or imitation firearm with intent to commit an indictable offence or resist arrest (section 27B of 
the Firearms Act 1964, as substituted); and (iv)  shortening the barrel of a shotgun or rifle (section 12A of the 
Firearms and Offensive Weapons Act 1990, as substituted).    
16
  The offences which attract a 10-year presumptive minimum sentence are:  (i) possession of firearms with 
intent to endanger life (section 15 of the Firearms Act 1925, as substituted by section 42 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 2006); and (ii) using a firearm to assist or aid in an escape (section 27 of the Firearms Act 1964, 
as substituted by section 58 of the Criminal; Justice Act 2006).   
17
  The offences listed above at note 15 attract a mandatory minimum five-year sentence where committed on a 
second or subsequent occasion. 
18
  The offences listed above at note 16 attract a mandatory minimum 10-year sentence where committed on a 
second or subsequent occasion.  
19
  For the purposes of this sentencing regime, “serious offences” are those listed under Schedule 2 to the 
Criminal Justice Act 2007.  Among others, these include: murder, certain non-fatal offences against the 
person, specified firearms and explosives offences, and aggravated burglary.  
11 
1.19 In the context of preventing future criminal conduct, mandatory sentencing provisions may also 
be contrasted with other types of sentencing provision in so far as mandatory sentencing provisions tend 
to rely more heavily on the severity of the sentence to dissuade future offending, rather than on other 
mechanisms such as education, therapy or community service.  Again, the extent to which the sentencing 
system relies more heavily on the severity of the sentence to dissuade future offending depends on 
whether the sentence is entirely mandatory or presumptive and subject to exceptions.  As discussed in 
detail in subsequent chapters, some presumptive sentencing provisions permit sentence reviews where, 
for instance, the offender is addicted to drugs. 
C Aims of the Criminal Justice System and Sanctions 
1.20 As noted at paragraphs 1.07 and 1.08, criminal sanctions pursue the following key aims: 
deterrence, punishment, reformation and rehabilitation, reparation and incapacitation.   
(1) Deterrence 
1.21 Criminal sanctions are deterrent in so far as they seek to dissuade the particular offender from re-
offending (specific deterrence) and would-be offenders from offending in the first place (general 
deterrence), by signalling the painful consequences that will otherwise result.
20
  In this regard, it has been 
asserted that there is a necessary link between punishment and deterrence in so far as you cannot have 
the former without the latter.
21
  In its 1993 Consultation Paper on Sentencing,
22
 the Commission noted 
that it was the certainty of punishment rather than the severity of punishment that gave rise to a deterrent 
effect.
23
  However, it has since been noted that there are other factors, such as the nature of the crime, 
the target group of the particular sanction, the extent to which the offending behaviour attracts moral 
condemnation, the extent to which the public has knowledge of the criminal sanction, and the swiftness of 
the punishment, which may also affect the extent to which a particular criminal sanction deters.
24
  
1.22 The Commission observes that deterrence features strongly in the debate on mandatory and 
presumptive sentences in so far as it is often advanced as a justification for the enactment of such 
provisions.  It is unclear, however, to what extent (if any) mandatory or presumptive sentences actually 
deter.  Some writers assert that entirely mandatory sentences are ineffective as deterrents.  It has been 
noted, for instance, that countries which retain the death penalty for murder often have high murder 
rates.
25
  Other writers note, however, that crimes like murder are exceptional in so far as they are often 
committed in the heat of the moment when the perpetrators are in not in the frame of mind to contemplate 
the legal consequences.
26
  In its 1993 Consultation Paper on Sentencing,
27
 the Commission stated that it 
found no evidence to suggest that mandatory minimum sentences acted as a deterrent.
28
  Tonry cites 
research which, he asserts, establishes that mandatory sentences have either no demonstrable deterrent 
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  O’Malley Sentencing Law and Practice (Thomson Round Hall, 2
nd
 ed, 2006) at 33ff;  McAuley and 
McCutcheon Criminal Liability (Round Hall, Sweet & Maxwell, 2000) at 104ff;  and Department of Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform White Paper on Crime, Discussion Document No.2: Criminal Sanctions (February 
2010). 
21
  McAuley and McCutcheon Criminal Liability (Round Hall Sweet and Maxwell, 2000) at 104. 
22
  Law Reform Commission Consultation Paper on Sentencing (LRC CP 2-1993). 
23
  Ibid at paragraph 4.42. 
24
  Gabor and Crutcher “Mandatory Minimum Penalties: Their Effects on Crime, Sentencing Disparities, and 
Justice System Expenditures” rr2002-1e (Research and Statistics Division, Canadian Department of Justice, 
2002) at paragraph 4.3.1. 
25
  O’Malley Sentencing Law and Practice (Thomson Round Hall, 2
nd
 ed, 2006) at 34. 
26
  Ibid at 34-35; Walker and Padfield Sentencing: Theory, Law and Practice (Butterworths, 2
nd
 ed, 1996) at 97. 
27
  Law Reform Commission Consultation Paper on Sentencing (LRC CP 2-1993). 
28
  Ibid. at paragraph 10.26.  
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effects or short-term effects that are quickly extinguished.
29
  He further observes that there has been little 
impact on the crime rates in American states in which mandatory sentences have been introduced.
30
   
(2) Punishment 
1.23 Criminal sanctions are also punitive in so far as they seek to punish the offender for his or her 
wrong-doing (retribution)
31
 and give formal expression to society’s condemnation of his or her behaviour 
(denunciation).
32
  The retributive aspect of punishment should be distinguished from vengeance in so far 
as retribution relates to an action between the State and the offender, rather than the victim and the 
offender, and is concerned with proportionate punishment determined by reference to objective criteria, 
rather than emotion or anger.
33
  That the punishment should be proportionate to the offence (and the 
offender) is often associated with “just deserts” theory.
34
  The denunciatory aspect of punishment, on the 
other hand, may (as indicated by the Commission in its 1996 Report on Sentencing
35
) be described as a 
“safety-valve” for victims who might otherwise be tempted to take the law into their own hands.
36
  
1.24 The Commission observes that punishment, comprising retribution and denunciation, is an 
important aspect of the debate on mandatory and presumptive sentences.  The offences for which 
mandatory sentencing provisions have been enacted tend to be those offences which have a particularly 
deleterious impact on society, such as murder, drug trafficking, firearms offences and certain repeat 
offences.  It is thus understandable that the Oireachtas should wish to increase the severity of the 
applicable sanctions through the enactment of mandatory and presumptive sentencing provisions.  It is 
equally understandable that this might also serve a denunciatory aim by affording individual members of 
society, who might otherwise feel victimised and powerless, an opportunity to express their condemnation 
of such offences.   
(3) Reformation and Rehabilitation 
1.25 Criminal sanctions may seek to reform and/or rehabilitate an offender with a view to re-integrating 
him or her into society.
37
  Indeed, it has been noted that rehabilitation is an “essential ingredient for 
consideration in the sentencing of a person”
38
 and may justify the imposition of a lighter sentence where 
this would, for instance, facilitate the offender’s participation in a rehabilitative programme.  Reformative 
and rehabilitative programmes seek to address factors which may have contributed to the offender’s 
criminal behaviour and include programmes such as alcohol and drug treatment programmes, counselling 
                                                     
29
  Tonry Sentencing Matters (Oxford University Press, 1996) at 135ff.  Tonry suggests that the real reason for 
enacting mandatory sentencing provisions is not deterrence: “Supporters of mandatory penalties in anxious 
times are concerned with political and symbolic goals.” (at 159-160).    
30
  Ibid at 137-139.  
31
  Walker Why Punish? (Oxford University Press, 1991) at 69ff; O’Malley Sentencing Law and Practice 
(Thomson Round Hall, 2
nd
 ed, 2006) at 31ff; and Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform White 
Paper on Crime, Discussion Document No.2: Criminal Sanctions (February 2010). 
32
  O’Malley Sentencing Law and Practice (Thomson Round Hall, 2
nd
 ed, 2006) at 43ff; and R v M(CA) [1996] 1 
SCR 500 at paragraph 81, cited with approval by the court in R v Latimer [2001] 1 SCR 3 at 41. 
33
  The People (DPP) v M [1994] 3 IR 306, 317; and R v M (CA) [1996] 1 SCR 500, paragraph 80. 
34
  O’Malley Sentencing Law and Practice (Thomson Round Hall, 2
nd
 ed, 2006) at 31. 
35
  Law Reform Commission Report on Sentencing (LRC 53-1996). 
36
  Ibid at paragraph 2.13. 
37
  Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform White Paper on Crime, Discussion Document No.2: Criminal 
Sanctions (February 2010). 
38
  The People (DPP) v M [1994] 3 IR 306 at 314. 
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and vocational programmes.
39
  Support for the reformative and/or rehabilitative aspects of criminal 
sanctions is not, however, universal.
40
 
1.26 The Commission observes that reform and rehabilitation are rarely, if ever, advanced as 
justifications for mandatory or presumptive sentencing provisions.  On the contrary, reform and 
rehabilitation are often submitted as “exceptional and specific circumstances” justifying a sentence lower 
than the sentence prescribed by presumptive sentencing provisions (such as those in the Misuse of 
Drugs Act 1977 and the Firearms Acts).   
(4) Reparation 
1.27 Criminal sanctions may be reparative in so far as they require an offender to do something to 
repair the damage that his or her wrong-doing has inflicted on society.
41
  This may take the form of 
directly or indirectly compensating the victim of the offence.  Alternatively, if there is no individual or 
identifiable victim or, indeed, if the victim is unwilling to accept it, reparation can be made to the 
community as a whole, for example, through the performance of community service or the payment of a 
fine into public funds.  In this way, reparation may contribute to policies aimed at the reintegration of 
offenders.  It has been noted, however, that a sentencer who discriminates between an offender who can 
afford to make monetary reparation and an offender who cannot, particularly where the alternative is 
imprisonment, may be regarded as acting inequitably.
42
 
1.28 Reparation is rarely, if ever, asserted as a justification for mandatory or presumptive sentencing 
provisions.  This may be due to the fact that criminal sanctions which are predominantly reparative in 
nature are usually proposed as an alternative to a sentence of imprisonment.   
(5) Incapacitation  
1.29 Criminal sanctions may be incapacitative in so far as they deprive the offender of the opportunity 
to commit another offence.
43
  While this may be the effect of certain criminal sanctions, the Commission 
observes that there is a constitutional objection to introducing a criminal sanction in order to deprive an 
offender of his or her liberty on the basis of anticipated rather than proven offending.
44
  Aside from the 
practical issues (including that it is notoriously difficult to make accurate predictions regarding future 
behaviour
45
 and that the incapacitative effects of imprisonment are, at best, modest
46
) the courts have 
clarified that an incapacitative rationale would run counter to the constitutionally protected right to 
personal liberty and the presumption of innocence.
47
  As will be discussed below, it would also run 
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Citizens? Readings in Rehabilitation (Willan, 2010) at 245. 
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  McAuley and McCutcheon Criminal Liability (Round Hall Sweet and Maxwell, 2000) at 102-103; Law Reform 
Commission Consultation Paper on Sentencing (LRC CP 2-1993) at paragraph 10.26; and Priestley and 
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nd
 ed, 2006) at 42.  
45
  Ibid; Ashworth Sentencing and Criminal Justice (Butterworths, 3
rd
 ed, 2000) at 69; and Law Reform 
Commission Consultation Paper on Sentencing (LRC CP 2-1993) at paragraph 4.46. 
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  Cavadino and Dignan The Penal System - An Introduction (Sage Publications, 3
rd
 ed, 2002) at 39. 
47
  The People (Attorney General) v O’Callaghan [1966] IR 501 at 508-509; The People (DPP) v Carmody [1988] 
ILRM 370 at 372; The People (DPP) v Jackson Court of Criminal Appeal 26 April 1993; The People (DPP) v 
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counter to the principle that a criminal sanction should be proportionate to the circumstances of the 
particular offence and the particular offender. 
1.30 The Commission observes that the issue of incapacitation carries some weight in the debate on 
mandatory and presumptive sentences.  The need to take and keep certain offenders off the streets is 
often cited in support of these sentencing provisions.  While such an argument may carry political weight, 
it would appear, in light of the foregoing analysis, to be unconstitutional. 
(6) Discussion 
1.31 It is thus clear that criminal sanctions and sentencing are motivated by a number of factors 
including the overarching aim of the criminal justice system (the reduction of prohibited or unwanted 
conduct) and the various aims of criminal sanctions (deterrence, punishment, reform and rehabilitation, 
reparation and incapacitation).  Whereas the overarching aim of the criminal justice system will remain 
the same in every case, sentencing courts may give priority to one or more of the aims of criminal 
sanctions depending on the particular circumstances of the individual case.  Thus, for instance, the aims 
of deterrence, punishment and incapacitation will generally feature in cases involving more serious 
offences which attract more severe sanctions such as a term of imprisonment.  As discussed, these aims 
are therefore often raised as justifications for mandatory and presumptive sentencing provisions which 
are generally enacted to deal with offences which have a particularly harmful effect on society.  By 
contrast, the aims of reform and rehabilitation and reparation usually feature in cases involving less 
serious offences which attract less severe sanctions such as a non-custodial sentence.  As discussed 
therefore, these aims are not usually raised in favour of mandatory or presumptive sentencing provisions. 
D Principles of Sentencing and Justice  
1.32 As noted at paragraph 1.09, in pursuing the general aim of the criminal justice system, the 
sentencing process must comply with external constraints that emanate from fundamental principles of 
justice.  To begin with, the use of certain criminal sanctions is prohibited because the sanctions are 
considered to be inhumane under current constitutional and international human rights standards.  
Likewise, the use of certain other criminal sanctions is not feasible because they would be too costly.  
The remaining criminal sanctions (in other words, those criminal sanctions which are not considered to be 
inhumane or too costly) must comply with the two fundamental principles of justice. These are that: (a) 
there should be a consistent approach to sentencing so that like cases are treated alike, and (b) the 
criminal sanction should be proportionate to the particular offence (and the particular offender).  These 
principles of consistency and proportionality are closely connected in so far as a consistent approach to 
sentencing is necessary to ensure that proportionate sentences are imposed in all cases.   
(1) Consistency 
1.33 The principle of consistency has traditionally been explained in terms of like cases being treated 
alike and different cases being treated differently.
48
  The corollary of this is that inconsistency arises 
where like cases are treated differently and different cases are treated alike.  It should be reiterated, 
however, that when we refer to consistency, we are referring to consistency of approach rather than 
consistency of outcomes.
49
  In the Halliday Report, it was observed that consistency could be viewed as 
like cases resulting in like outcomes but: 
“The variety of circumstances in criminal cases... makes this an incomplete definition, and one 
which can result in undesirable priority being given to apparently uniform outcomes, regardless of 
the circumstances.  A better approach is to seek consistent application of explicit principles and 
                                                                                                                                                 
GK [2008] IECCA 110; Caffrey v. Governor of Portlaoise Prison [2012] IESC 4; and Minister for Justice and 
Equality v Nolan [2012] IEHC 249. 
48
  O’Malley Sentencing Law and Practice (Thomson Round Hall, 2
nd
 ed, 2006) at 49-50. 
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  Making Punishments Work - Report of a Review of the Sentencing Framework for England and Wales (Home 
Office, 2001) at paragraph 2.21. 
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standards, recognising that these may result in justifiably disparate outcomes.”
50
 [Emphasis 
added] 
In this regard, it has been observed that the challenge posed by the principle of consistency is “to 
eliminate undue disparity without replacing it with excessive uniformity.”
51
 
1.34 In its 2004 Consultation Paper on Prosecution Appeals from Unduly Lenient Sentences in the 
District Court,
52
 the Commission took a similar approach by distinguishing between sentencing disparity 
and sentencing inconsistency: 
“While sentencing disparity may be justified, given the nature of the offence and the individual 
circumstances of the offender, sentencing inconsistency is not acceptable, such as where 
individual judges may differ widely in dealing with similar offenders for similar offences.”
53 
 
1.35 The need for a consistent approach becomes obvious when one considers the numerous factors 
which may influence sentencers.
54
  Ashworth asserts that these factors fall into four broad categories.  
The first category relates to the views that sentencers may have regarding the facts of the case.  The 
second category relates to the views that sentencers may have regarding the principles of sentencing.  In 
this category, Ashworth includes views regarding the gravity of offences; the aims, effectiveness and 
relative severity of the available types of sentence; the general principles of sentencing; and the relative 
weight of aggravating and mitigating factors.  The third category relates to views regarding crime and 
punishment.  In this category, Ashworth includes views regarding the aims of sentencing; the causes of 
crime; and the function of courts passing sentence.  The final category relates to the demographic 
features of sentencers.  In this category, Ashworth lists age, social class, occupation, urban or rural 
background, race, gender, religion, and political allegiance.  While sentencers are expected to have 
developed a high level of resistance to outside influences, the Commission observes that no-one can be 
entirely immune. 
1.36 It has been observed that sentencing is not an exact science so the principle of consistency 
cannot be applied in absolute terms and some degree of variation is inevitable.
55
  It has been argued that 
this is a small price to pay for a justice system which guarantees individualised punishment.
56
  However, 
this argument should not be taken too far as a system which tolerates gross inconsistency is manifestly 
unfair and risks losing public confidence.
57
  Whereas the normal approach of the Oireachtas to ensuring 
consistency is to prescribe a maximum sentence only, it might, in such circumstances, feel compelled to 
circumscribe judicial discretion further by establishing mandatory sentences or rigid sentencing 
guidelines.
58
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(2) Proportionality 
1.37 In Whelan and Lynch v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform,
59
 the High Court (Irvine J) 
distinguished between two types of proportionality: (a) constitutional proportionality, and (b) 
proportionality in the context of sentencing.  On appeal, this distinction was upheld by the Supreme 
Court.
60
  Citing the judgment of Costello J in Heaney v Ireland,
61
 Murray CJ observed in Whelan and 
Lynch that the constitutional doctrine of proportionality: 
“...is a public law doctrine with specified criteria, according to which decisions or acts of the State, 
and in particular legislation, which encroach on the exercise of constitutional rights which citizens 
are otherwise entitled freely to enjoy, are scrutinised with regard to their compatibility with the 
Constitution or the law.” 
By contrast, “proportionality” in the context of sentencing is a term which is descriptive of the manner in 
which judicial discretion should, as a matter of principle, be exercised within particular proceedings.   
(a) Constitutional Proportionality 
1.38 Constitutional proportionality is thus applicable to Acts of the Oireachtas.  In the decision of the 
High Court in Heaney v Ireland,
62
 Costello J pronounced the test for constitutional proportionality as 
follows: 
“The objective of the impugned provision must be of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a 
constitutionally protected right.  It must relate to concerns pressing and substantial in a free and 
democratic society.  The means chosen must pass a proportionality test.  They must:- 
(a) Be rationally connected to the objective and not be arbitrary, unfair or based on 
irrational considerations, 
                    (b)  Impair the right as little as possible, and 
(c) Be such that their effects on rights are proportional to the objective... .”
63
 
1.39 The Supreme Court adopted a similar test in In re the Employment Equality Bill 1996:
64
 
“In effect a form of proportionality test must be applied to the proposed section.  (a) Is it rationally 
designed to meet the objective of the legislation?  (b) Does it intrude into constitutional rights as 
little as is reasonably possible?  (c) Is there a proportionality between the section and the right to 
trial in due course of law and the objective of the legislation?”
65
 
1.40 Heaney and In re the Employment Equality Bill 1996 were preceded by the Supreme Court 
decision in Cox v Ireland.
66
  Cox v Ireland has been identified as an important landmark in modern judicial 
thinking on mandatory sentences.
67
  The plaintiff challenged section 34 of the Offences Against the State 
Act 1939, which provided that any person convicted by the Special Criminal Court of a scheduled offence 
would forfeit any office or employment remunerated from public funds and be disqualified from holding 
any such office or employment for a period of 7 years from the date of conviction.  The plaintiff, a teacher 
at a community school, was convicted by the Special Criminal Court of a scheduled offence.  As a result, 
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he lost his post, pension and pay-related social insurance rights and became ineligible to work in a similar 
post for a period of 7 years.   
1.41 Both the High Court and the Supreme Court found section 34 to be unconstitutional.  The High 
Court (Barr J) held that the penalties imposed by section 34 were patently unfair and capricious in nature 
and that they amounted to an unreasonable and unjustified interference with the personal rights of the 
plaintiff.  The Supreme Court observed that the State was entitled to impose onerous and far-reaching 
penalties for offences threatening the peace and security of the State but that it must, as far as 
practicable, protect the constitutional rights of the citizen.  It found that the State had failed in this regard 
as the provisions of section 34 were “impermissibly wide and indiscriminate”.  The mandatory penalties 
contained in section 34 applied to all scheduled offences which included less serious offences and 
offences of the utmost gravity.  Furthermore, there was no way to escape the mandatory penalties even if 
a person could show that his or her intention or motive in committing the offence bore no relation to 
considerations of the peace and security of the State. 
1.42 More recently, in Whelan and Lynch v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform,
68
 the 
Supreme Court applied the Heaney proportionality test to section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1990 which 
imposes a mandatory life sentence for murder.  Confirming that the Oireachtas was empowered to enact 
legislation setting mandatory penalties, Murray CJ observed that such legislation might be 
unconstitutional if “there was no rational relationship between the penalty and the requirements of justice 
with regard to the punishment of the offence specified”.  
1.43 The decision in Cox may, however, be contrasted with the decision in Whelan and Lynch.  In 
Cox, the Supreme Court found that the mandatory provision concerned was impermissibly wide and 
indiscriminate in so far as it applied to all scheduled offences without distinction as to their gravity.  In 
Whelan and Lynch, however, the Supreme Court rejected the appellants’ argument that the mandatory 
provision concerned was unconstitutional in so far as it prevented the judge from exercising his or her 
discretion to treat differently, different types of murder case.  The unique nature of murder was found to 
justify treating all cases of murder, irrespective of the degree of moral blameworthiness, in the same way. 
1.44 As mandatory sentencing provisions have the potential to infringe the rights of the accused to a 
greater extent than discretionary sentencing provisions, the Commission observes that the doctrine of 
constitutional proportionality should be stringently applied to all mandatory sentencing provisions.  The 
doctrine of constitutional proportionality thus requires, first, that the mandatory sentencing provision 
should be rationally connected to the objective it seeks to achieve and should not be arbitrary, unfair or 
based on irrational considerations.  Second, the mandatory provision should impair the rights of the 
accused as little as possible.  Third, there should be proportionality between the mandatory provision and 
the right to trial in due course of law and the objective of the legislation.   
(b) Sentencing Proportionality 
1.45 Proportionality in the context of sentencing operates quite differently from constitutional 
proportionality.  Here, proportionality requires that a sentence be proportionate to the gravity of the 
offence and (as is generally accepted) the circumstances of the offender.
69
  The Irish courts have 
reaffirmed this aspect of proportionality on numerous occasions, including, as already discussed, in the 
leading case on sentencing in Ireland, The People (Attorney General) v Poyning.
70
  In The People 
(Attorney General) v O’Driscoll,
71
 for instance, the Court of Criminal Appeal stated:   
“It is… the duty of the Courts to pass what are the appropriate sentences in each case having 
regard to the particular circumstances of that case – not only in regard to the particular crime but 
in regard to the particular criminal.”
72
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1.46 To the same effect, in The People (DPP) v Tiernan,
73
 the Supreme Court was asked to consider a 
point of law of exceptional public importance,
74
 namely, the guidelines applicable to sentences for the 
crime of rape.  While the Supreme Court refrained from formulating any such guidelines, Finlay CJ 
observed that “in every criminal case a judge must impose a sentence which in his opinion meets the 
particular circumstances of the case and of the accused person before him.”
75
  
1.47 In The People (DPP) v M,
76
 the Supreme Court considered the severity of sentences imposed for 
a number of counts of buggery, indecent assault and sexual assault.  During the course of its 
consideration, Denham J indicated that sentences should be proportionate in two respects: 
“Firstly, they should be proportionate to the crime.  Thus, a grave offence is reflected by a severe 
sentence... 
However, sentences must also be proportionate to the personal circumstances of the appellant.  
The essence of the discretionary nature of sentencing is that the personal situation of the 
appellant must be taken into consideration by the court.”
77
 
1.48 There are numerous other examples where this principle is applied by the Irish courts.
78
 
1.49 For the purpose of formulating proportionate sentences, the courts have adopted a three-tiered 
approach by which they first identify the range of applicable penalties.  Then they locate where on the 
range of applicable penalties a particular case should lie and finally, they consider the factors which 
aggravate and mitigate the sentence.
79
  Thus, in the Supreme Court decision in The People (DPP) v M,
80
 
Egan J stated: 
“It must be remembered also that a reduction in mitigation is not always to be calculated in direct 
regard to the maximum sentence applicable.  One should look first at the range of penalties 
applicable to the offence and then decide whereabouts on the range the particular case should 
lie.  The mitigating circumstances should then be looked at and an appropriate reduction made.”
81
 
Egan J considered the following mitigating factors: (i) the appellant’s guilty plea, (ii) the likelihood of him 
reoffending, (iii) the appellant’s age, and (iv) the possibility of rehabilitation.  It is clear that “mitigating 
circumstances”, in this regard, is a reference to circumstances which would mitigate a sentence rather 
than circumstances which would mitigate the seriousness of an offence.
82
 
1.50 The Commission notes therefore, that Egan J’s approach involves three inter-related steps:
83
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 (i) Identifying the range of applicable penalties; 
 (ii) Locating the particular case on that range; and 
 (iii) Applying any factors which mitigate or aggravate the sentence. 
Each of these steps will be considered in turn. 
(i) Identifying the Range of Applicable Penalties 
1.51 To determine the range of penalties applicable to the particular offence, the courts consider 
whether the Oireachtas has provided any guidance by means of, for instance, a statutory maximum or 
minimum sentence.
84
  Thus, for example, section 14 of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) 
Act 2001 provides that robbery is subject to a maximum penalty of life imprisonment.  As a result, a 
person convicted of robbery may expect to receive a sentence ranging from zero years to life 
imprisonment, depending on the circumstances of the case and the offender.  The fact that robbery is 
subject to a maximum sentence of life imprisonment also indicates how seriously robbery should be 
considered, as does the statutory direction that an accused charged with robbery should be tried on 
indictment.
85
  It is thus fair to assume that robbery, for which an offender is “liable on conviction on 
indictment to imprisonment for life”,
86
 is a serious offence.  
1.52 For some serious offences, excluding those to which entirely mandatory and mandatory minimum 
sentences apply, the courts have established points of departure regarding the sentence to be imposed.  
Thus, in the Supreme Court decision in The People (DPP) v Tiernan,
87
 Finlay CJ made the following 
remark regarding the sentence for rape: 
“Whilst in every criminal case a judge must impose a sentence which in his opinion meets the 
particular circumstances of the case and of the accused person before him, it is not easy to 
imagine the circumstances which would justify departure from a substantial immediate custodial 
sentence for rape and I can only express the view that they would probably be wholly 
exceptional.”
88
 [emphasis added] 
Thus a person convicted of rape would ordinarily expect to receive a substantial custodial sentence save 
where it is shown that there are “wholly exceptional” circumstances. 
1.53 Similarly, in the Court of Criminal Appeal decision in The People (DPP) v Princs
89
 regarding the 
sentence for manslaughter, the Court observed: 
“[T]he offence of manslaughter, particularly voluntary manslaughter where an unlawful act of 
violence is involved, should normally involve a substantial term of imprisonment because a 
person has been killed.  Only where there are special circumstances and context will a moderate 
sentence or in wholly exceptional circumstances, a non-custodial sentence, be warranted.  Those 
circumstances are more likely to arise in cases [of] involuntary manslaughter... .” (emphasis 
added) 
Thus a person convicted of manslaughter would ordinarily expect to receive a substantial custodial 
sentence save where “special circumstances” would justify a moderate sentence or “wholly exceptional 
circumstances” would justify a non-custodial sentence. 
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1.54 In considering the range of penalties applicable in manslaughter cases, the Court of Criminal 
Appeal has, on occasion, had regard to statistical information concerning sentences previously imposed 
for this offence.
90
  In The People (DPP) v Kelly,
91
 the Director of Public Prosecutions provided the Court 
with two lists detailing 50 recent sentences specified on foot of pleas to, or convictions for, manslaughter.  
The Court confirmed that “a trial judge is entitled to request information of this sort and we are glad to 
have it”.
92
  It also emphasised, however, that such statistical information “is of limited value because it 
does not give information on the individual crimes or what aggravating or mitigating factors there may 
have been in any case.”
93
  The Court further noted that these particular lists related only to cases tried in 
the Central Criminal Court and, as such, concerned instances where the accused was originally charged 
with murder and either a plea to manslaughter was accepted by the Director of Public Prosecutions or the 
accused was acquitted of murder but convicted of manslaughter.  The Court acknowledged, therefore, 
that the statistics supplied were not “a guide to the practice in the Circuit Court where it may be that the 
manslaughter cases are of a less aggravated kind.”94  This statistical information was also taken into 
account by the Court of Criminal Appeal in The People (DPP) v Colclough.
95
 
1.55 In The People (DPP) v Murray,
96
 the Court of Criminal Appeal considered an appeal against the 
severity of a sentence of 12 and a half years’ imprisonment for 25 counts of social welfare fraud.  
Observing that social welfare fraud should not be considered a victimless crime, the Court stated: 
 “Quite the contrary: offences of this kind strike at the heart of the principles of equity, equality of 
treatment and social solidarity on which the entire edifice of the taxation and social security 
systems lean.  This is especially so at a time of emergency so far as the public finances are 
concerned.” 
1.56 Emphasising the particular importance of maintaining social solidarity through deterrent 
measures, the Court indicated that: 
 “We therefore suggest for the future guidance of sentencing courts that significant and systematic 
frauds directed upon the public revenue - whether illegal tax evasion on the one hand or social 
security fraud on the other - should generally meet with an immediate and appreciable custodial 
sentence, although naturally the sentence to be imposed in any given case must have 
appropriate regard to the individual circumstances of each accused.” (emphasis added) 
1.57 Noting, however, that the sentence of 12 years’ imprisonment for the particular offences would 
infringe the totality principle,
97
  the Court substituted a sentence of 9 years’ imprisonment with the final 
year suspended.  Nevertheless, the message of the Court of Criminal Appeal is clear in so far as it states 
that a person convicted of an offence against the public purse, in the current economic climate at least, 
may expect to receive “an immediate and appreciable custodial sentence”. 
                                                     
90
  For further discussion, see:  Lynch “Analysis of Manslaughter Sentencing 2007 - 2012” (Judicial Researchers’ 
Office, 2013) at 9ff.  Available at:  www.irishsentencing.ie/en/ISIS/Pages/WP09000222 [Last accessed: 22 
May 2013]. 
91
  The People (DPP) v Kelly [2005] IR 321. 
92
  Ibid at 331.  
93
  Ibid.  
94
  Ibid. 
95
  The People (DPP) v Colclough [2010] IECCA 15. 
96
  The People (DPP) v Murray [2012] IECCA 60. 
97
  In The People (DPP) v McGrath [2008] IECCA 27, for example, the Court of Criminal Appeal stated that the 
totality test requires the sentencing court, when imposing consecutive sentences for individual offences, to 
consider whether, overall, the sentences are proportionate in their totality. 
21 
1.58 In general, however, the courts have emphasised that they should not constrain their discretion in 
sentencing by following a fixed policy where none has been prescribed by law.  In The People (DPP) v 
WC,
98
 the Central Criminal Court indicated that: 
“It is not open to a judge in a criminal case when imposing sentence, whether for a particular type 
of offence, or in respect of a particular class of offender, to fetter the exercise of his judicial 
discretion through the operation of a fixed policy, or to otherwise pre-determine the issue.”
99
 
1.59 Thus, in The People (DPP) v Kelly,
100
 where the trial judge had indicated that on the basis of a 
policy of deterrence he would impose a sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment in cases involving death and 
serious injury caused by the use of knives, the Court of Criminal Appeal found that he had erred in 
principle.
101
 
1.60 In some cases, the courts have gone further than establishing points of departure by formulating 
the ranges of penalties applicable to various combinations of facts.  In The People (DPP) v WD,
102
 for 
instance, the Central Criminal Court considered cases of rape over a three-year period in which lenient, 
ordinary, severe and condign punishments had been imposed.
103
   
1.61 In the category of lenient punishments, the Court considered cases in which a suspended 
sentence had been imposed.
104
  It noted that a suspended sentence could only be contemplated where 
the circumstances of the case were “so completely exceptional as to allow the court to approach 
sentencing for an offence of rape in a way that deviates so completely from the norm established by 
law.”
105
 
1.62 In the category of ordinary punishments, the Court considered cases in which a sentence range 
of three to 8 years had been applied.
106
  It noted that a sentence at the upper end of the scale, a sentence 
of 8 years or more, for which the courts took into account aggravating factors, could be imposed even on 
a plea of guilty.  An offender could expect a sentence at the upper end of the scale where there had been 
“a worse than usual effect on the victim, where particular violence has been used or where there are 
relevant previous convictions, such as convictions for violence of some kind.”
107
  An offender could expect 
a sentence of five years’ imprisonment where he or she had pleaded “guilty to rape in circumstances 
which involve no additional gratuitous humiliation or violence beyond those ordinarily involved in the 
offence,”
108
 whereas he or she could expect a sentence of six or 7 years’ imprisonment where there was 
no early admission, remorse or early guilty plea.
109
 
1.63 In the category of severe punishments, the Court considered cases in which a sentence range of 
9 to 14 years’ imprisonment had been applied.
110
  The Court observed that five of the cases involved 
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individual offences of a single count of rape; 9 involved a single attack that generated more than one 
conviction; and four involved multiple counts.
111
  It noted that previous convictions for a sexual offence 
were an aggravating factor which would normally result in the imposition of a severe sentence.
112
  A 
sentence of 10 or 11 years’ imprisonment was unusual, even after a plea of not guilty, unless there were 
circumstances of unusual violence or premeditation.
113
  A sentence range of 9 to 14 years’ imprisonment 
was more likely where the degree to which the offender chose to violate and humiliate the victim 
warranted it.
114
 
1.64 In the category of condign punishments,
115
 the Court considered cases in which a sentence range 
of 15 years’ imprisonment to life imprisonment had been imposed.
116
  The Court observed that 9 involved 
a single incident that lasted for a considerable number of hours; two involved gang rape; and 11 involved 
multiple incidents or multiple victims or both.
117
  It noted that factors such as the nature of the victim 
(being very young or very old), the effect of the attack and the especial nature of the violence or 
degradation were characteristic of sentences within this most serious category.
118
  A life sentence had 
been imposed where there had been a need to protect the community and where very serious, vicious 
and degrading sexual crimes had been committed against a victim over a period of years.
119
  An abuse of 
trust
120
 and the pursuit of a campaign of rape against prostitutes,
121
 for instance, were also seen as 
aggravating factors. 
1.65 In The People (DPP) v H,
122
 the Court of Criminal Appeal considered the more significant cases 
in which lenient, ordinary and serious sentences had been imposed for sexual offences which had been 
committed between 10 and 40 years before prosecution. 
1.66 In The People (DPP) v Pakur Pakurian,
123
 the Court of Criminal Appeal considered the range of 
punishments that might apply to robbery: 
“...[I]n a very well planned commercial robbery one might be looking at eighteen years for the 
most culpable people, or twelve years for those less culpable, and one might also find that there 
are cases where because of the particular circumstances such as a mugging which was caused 
by heroin addiction which has been cured or where the person has entered rehabilitation, or 
matters of those nature, that the sentence might be significantly less than the seven years 
sentence, even perhaps a suspended sentence.  But in between one finds a range of sentences 
and the Court is sure there are even ones of more than eighteen years, but a range of sentences 
which are appropriate.”
124
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Thus, depending on the presence of various factors, a person convicted of robbery might expect to 
receive a sentence in one of the ranges outlined above up to the statutory maximum sentence of life 
imprisonment.
125
 
1.67 The Commission notes that these decisions support the view that it is appropriate that certain 
offences at the highest end of the scale of gravity should attract an immediate, substantial custodial 
sentence, save in exceptional circumstances. 
(ii) Locating the Particular Case on the Range of Applicable Penalties: culpability, harm 
caused and offender behaviour 
1.68 Having identified the range of applicable penalties, the courts must then locate the particular case 
on that range.  In order to do this, the courts must first determine the seriousness or gravity of the 
particular case.  In The People (DPP) v GK,
126
 the Court of Criminal Appeal attempted to identify the 
factors that must be considered in order to assess the gravity of a particular case: 
“Having regard to the jurisprudence of this Court and of the Supreme Court the matters which 
determine the gravity of a particular offence are the culpability of the offender, the harm caused 
and the behaviour of the offender in relation to the particular offence.”
127
 [emphasis added] 
(I) Culpability 
1.69 Regarding culpability, it is useful to have regard to the nature of the mental element or mens rea 
which the offender is found, or appears, to have had when committing the offence:
128
   
“Intention to cause harm clearly represents the highest level of culpability and the more harm 
intended, the greater the blameworthiness.  Recklessness, in the sense of a conscious disregard 
of an unjustifiable risk, comes next, and again the greater and more dangerous the risk, the 
greater the culpability.  Negligence would rank as the lowest form of culpability, which is not to 
say that it should be met with impunity if it has produced serious harm.”
129
 
Thus, on a scale of culpability, intention ranks highest, negligence ranks lowest and recklessness ranks 
somewhere in between. 
1.70 In The People (DPP) v O’Dwyer,
130
 for example, which  concerned careless driving, the Court of 
Criminal Appeal made the following observation regarding culpability: 
“The concept of careless driving covers a wide spectrum of culpability ranging from the less 
serious to the more serious.  It covers a mere momentary inattention, a more obvious 
carelessness, a more positive carelessness, bad cases of very careless driving falling below the 
standard of the reasonably competent driver and cases of repeat offending.  However, since even 
a mere momentary inattention in the driving of a mechanically propelled vehicle can give rise to a 
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wholly unexpected death, the court has always to define the degree of carelessness and 
therefore culpability of the driving.”
131
 
Thus, for any given offence, the sentencing court must look at the particular circumstances of the case 
(and the offender) to determine the level of culpability. 
1.71 In the same case, the Court considered whether the fact that a death had occurred as a result of 
the careless driving could be considered an aggravating factor.  In this regard, it distinguished between 
cases in which death had been an unfortunate consequence and cases in which there had been a high 
risk of death:  
“[T]here is a world of difference between a mere momentary inattention in the driving of a 
mechanical (sic) propelled vehicle, which unexpectedly and tragically causes a loss of a life, and 
grossly careless driving, which, though still short of dangerous driving, hardly surprisingly results 
in a fatal collision.  A rigid adherence in sentencing to an approach which excludes any reference 
to the death in itself as an aggravating factor, despite the many and various differences in the 
degrees of careless driving, would not be proportionate. 
While the fact of death occurring may be a separate factor in itself, it should not be so in every 
case where there is a death.  The occasions on which it becomes a factor must depend upon the 
finding of the court on the primary issue of the degree of carelessness and therefore of the 
culpability of driving.”
132
 
In the particular circumstances of the case, where the primary issue of carelessness revolved around the 
fact that the applicant had driven with bald tyres, the Court found that it would be disproportionate to 
regard the death as an aggravating factor in itself.  Nevertheless, this case clearly highlights the close 
connection between: (a) the culpability of the offender, and (b) the harm caused (which will be considered 
in the next section) in determining the seriousness of the offence. 
(II) Harm 
1.72 Regarding harm, the greater the harm caused, the more serious the offence is likely to be 
considered.
133
  However, harm alone would be an unreliable indicator of seriousness.
134
  An offender 
might cause more harm than he or she intended or, through some form of diminished capacity, might not 
have fully appreciated the likely consequences of his or her actions.  Equally, a person might cause less 
harm than he or she intended or risked.  It has thus been asserted that the test should be the harm that 
the offender intended to cause or risked causing where the harm is a reasonably foreseeable 
consequence.
135
  Thus, as noted at paragraph 1.71, “harm and culpability are inextricably linked”.
136
 
1.73 In The People (DPP) v WD,
137
 the Central Criminal Court considered the harm caused by a rape 
in terms of its effect on the victim (which was “somewhat worse than is usual”) in concluding that a 
sentence at the upper end of the normal range would be appropriate:
138
 
“[T]he victim impact statement indicates that the victim had difficulty sleeping at first and suffered 
panic attacks.  Her concentration went as to her studies and she began to panic about all 
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matters.  She lost interest in study and almost dropped out and left her part time job.  She 
suffered a big character change from being outgoing into being closed with family and friends.  
Now she is uncomfortable in the presence of men and wary while out particularly at night and 
looking over her shoulder.”
139
 
1.74 In The People (DPP) v GK,
140
 the Court of Criminal Appeal referred to the “serious harm” done to 
the victim in concluding that the particular aggravated sexual assault lay in “the mid to upper range of 
seriousness on the scale of gravity of such assaults”: 
“Though the victim did not receive any psychological or psychiatric treatment, it is clear from the 
Victim Impact Statement that the effect of this sexual assault on her was very grave.  She was 
unable to work for four weeks.  The cost of treatment to her damaged teeth is €2,900.  Her 
enjoyment of life has been permanently impaired in that her sense of security in society has been 
lost and she has become overcautious in moving about during daylight hours and is afraid to go 
out at night unaccompanied.  This is a very great imposition in the case of a single lady of twenty 
five years of age.” 
1.75 There are a number of general propositions that may be of assistance in determining the extent 
of the harm caused in a particular case.
141
  On any hierarchy of protected rights and interests, life and 
bodily integrity should rank highest.  In addition, personal dignity and autonomy are increasingly 
recognised as important interests that merit strong legal protection.  Similarly, personal liberty should also 
rank highly.
142
  While private property ordinarily ranks next after life, liberty and bodily integrity, for 
sentencing purposes the important question is not whether the law should protect private property as an 
institution, but rather the degree of hardship or harm caused by the offence.  In other words, the 
seriousness of a property offence should not be assessed solely by reference to the amount taken but 
also by reference to the suffering or hardship which the offence caused to the victim.  Serious offences 
involving the violation of fundamental rights may carry a broad presumption in favour of a custodial 
sentence, but no more than that as mitigating factors may justify the imposition of a more lenient 
sentence.
143
 
(III) Offender Behaviour 
1.76 Regarding offender behaviour, an offence will be considered more serious where there are 
aggravating factors arising from the offender’s behaviour when committing the offence.
144
  These include 
the use of a weapon (and the more dangerous the weapon, the more serious the factor);
145
 the deliberate 
procurement of a weapon to commit the offence;
146
 the targeting of vulnerable victims;
147
 intrusion into a 
victim’s home;
148
 premeditation and planning;
149
 participation in a criminal gang;
150
 abuse of trust or 
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power;
151
 infliction of deliberate and gratuitous violence or degradation over and above that needed to 
commit the offence;
152
 commission of the offence for profit or other personal gain; or evidence of hostility 
towards the victim on racial, religious or other grounds. 
1.77 Thus, for example, in The People (DPP) v Tiernan
153
 (a case concerning sentencing for rape) the 
Supreme Court identified the following aggravating factors: 
 “(1) It was a gang rape, having been carried out by three men. 
 (2) The victim was raped on more than one occasion. 
 (3) The rape was accompanied by acts of sexual perversion. 
(4) Violence was used on the victim in addition to the sexual acts committed against her. 
(5) The rape was performed by an act of abduction in that the victim was forcibly removed from a 
car where she was in company with her boyfriend, and her boyfriend was imprisoned by being 
forcibly detained in the boot of the car so as to prevent him assisting her in defending herself. 
(6) It was established that as a consequence of the physical trauma involved in the rape the 
victim suffered from a serious nervous disorder which lasted for at least six months and rendered 
her for that period unfit to work. 
 (7) The appellant had four previous convictions, being:- 
  (a) for assault occasioning actual bodily harm, 
  (b) for aggravated burglary associated with a wounding, 
  (c) for gross indecency, and 
  (d) for burglary. 
Of this criminal record, particularly relevant as an aggravating circumstance to a conviction for 
rape are the crimes involving violence and the crime involving indecency.”
154
 
In light of these factors, the Supreme Court concluded that this was a particularly serious case of rape. 
1.78 This approach was applied by the Court of Criminal Appeal in The People (DPP) v Roseberry 
Construction Ltd and McIntyre,
155
 in which the first defendant was a building company and the second 
defendant was its managing director.  The defendants pleaded guilty to charges under the Safety, Health 
and Welfare at Work Act 1989 (since replaced by the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005) 
related to the death of two persons on the building site for which the company had overall responsibility 
as main contractor.  The defendant company was fined €254,000 (£200,000) for failure to have a safety 
statement under section 12 of the 1989 Act (since replaced by section 20 of the 2005 Act) and the 
managing director was fined €50,800 (£40,000) for managerial neglect under section 48(19) of the 1989 
Act (since replaced by section 80(1) of the 2005 Act).  
1.79 The company appealed against the severity of the fines imposed on it, but the Court of Criminal 
Appeal dismissed the appeal.  The Court applied the general sentencing principle set out in The People 
(DPP) v Redmond
156
 that a fine is neither lenient nor harsh in itself but only in regard to the circumstances 
                                                                                                                                                 
149
  The People (DPP) v GK [2008] IECCA 110; and The People (DPP) v Maguire [2008] IECCA 56. 
150
  The People (DPP) v Tiernan [1988] IR 250; and The People (DPP) v Maguire [2008] IECCA 56. 
151
  The People (DPP) v M [1994] 3 IR 306.  
152
  The People (DPP) v Tiernan [1988] IR 250; and The People (DPP) v WD [2008] 1 IR 308. 
153
  The People (DPP) v Tiernan [1988] IR 250. 
154
  Ibid at 253-254. 
155
  The People (DPP) v Roseberry Construction Ltd and McIntyre [2003] 4 IR 338. 
156
  The People (DPP) v Redmond [2001] 3 IR 390. 
27 
of the person who must pay it.  In this case, the Court noted that the somewhat unusual approach had 
been taken of stating that the company could pay the fine (it was not going to drive it out of business or 
anything of that sort) without giving any indication of the level of business which the company conducted.  
The information which the Court had was the same as the trial judge, namely that it was a medium to 
large company and that at the time of the fatality it was conducting the building of 90 houses at the 
building site.  The Court concluded that the company “was a substantial, relatively complex and profitable 
enterprise.” 
1.80 The Court of Criminal Appeal then went on to consider the detailed principles it should apply.  It 
approved of the list of aggravating and mitigating factors set out by the English Court of Appeal in R v F 
Howe & Son (Engineers) Ltd,
157
 to be taken into account in considering the level of fines to be imposed in 
prosecutions under the equivalent British Health and Safety at Work Act 1974.
158
  The aggravating factors 
included: death resulting from a breach of the Act or Regulations; failure to heed warnings; and risks run 
specifically to save money.
159
 The mitigating factors included: prompt admission of responsibility and a 
timely plea of guilty; steps to remedy the deficiencies; and a good safety record.
160
  
1.81 The Court in Roseberry also quoted the following comment of the English Court of Appeal in the 
Howe case:
161
 
“Next it is often a matter of chance that death or serious injury results from even a serious 
breach.  Generally where death is the consequence of a criminal act it is regarded as an 
aggravating feature of the offence, the penalty should reflect public disquiet at the unnecessary 
loss of life.”
162
 
1.82 The Court in the Roseberry case commented that what had occurred at the building site 
“undoubtedly was an unnecessary loss of life.”  The Court also rejected the suggestion that the company 
could in any substantial way mitigate its liability by saying, in effect, “[w]ell the sub-contractor and not 
myself and not my company, was directly in charge of digging the trench where the fatality occurred.”  On 
this aspect, the Court concluded that it was “perfectly plain… that control of the site had been retained by 
Roseberry Construction Ltd.”  The Court added that its failure to have a Safety Statement and the other 
failures significantly contributed to what occurred; if the Safety Statement had been prepared, the risk 
would have been formally considered and no doubt something done about it.  The Court added: 
“It was the failure of any party to take the simple remedial measures that gave rise to the 
substantial legal and moral guilt which must be regarded as attaching in the circumstances of this 
case.”
163
 
1.83 On this basis, the Court concluded that there had been no error in the fine which had been 
imposed in the Circuit Criminal Court and that, since the defendant was a successful company, the 
penalty was not excessive in the circumstances.  A significant feature of the decision in the Roseberry 
case was the reference to the specific aggravating and mitigating factors identified in the English Howe 
case.  
1.84 Similarly, in The People (DPP) v Loving,
164
 a child pornography case, the Court of Criminal 
Appeal referred approvingly to the categorisation of child pornography by the English Court of Appeal in R 
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v Oliver.
165
  In that case, the court suggested the following graduated levels of seriousness in respect of 
images of child pornography:  
 1. Images depicting erotic posing with no sexual activity;  
 2. Sexual activity between children solo or masturbation as a child;  
 3. Non-penetrative sexual activity between adults and children;  
 4. Penetrative sexual activity between children and adults;  
 5. Sadism or bestiality.
166
 
1.85 The Court in Loving also cited with approval the following comments of Rose LJ in the Oliver 
case,
167
 where he suggested the following elements as being relevant to the offender's proximity to, and 
responsibility for, the original abuse: 
“Any element of commercial gain will place an offence at a high level of seriousness.  In our 
judgment, swapping of images can properly be regarded as a commercial activity, albeit without 
financial gain, because it fuels demand for such material.  Wide-scale distribution, even without 
financial profit, is intrinsically more harmful than a transaction limited to two or three individuals, 
both by reference to the potential use of the images by active paedophiles and by reference to 
the shame and degradation to the original victims.  
Merely locating an image on the internet will generally be less serious than down-loading it.  
Down-loading will generally be less serious than taking an original film or photograph of indecent 
posing or activity ...”
168
   
These examples indicate the influence of developments in other jurisdictions concerning sentencing 
principles and the appropriate grading of sentences within an offence. 
1.86 In its 1996 Report on Sentencing,
169
 the Commission identified a number of factors which would 
aggravate the seriousness of an offence:
170
 
 “Aggravating factors 
 (1)  Whether the offence was planned or premeditated; 
(2)  Whether the offender committed the offence as a member of a group organised for crime; 
 (3)  Whether the offence formed part of a campaign of offences; 
(4)  Whether the offender exploited the position of a weak or defenceless victim or exploited 
the knowledge that the victim's access to justice might have been impeded; 
(5)  Whether the offender exploited a position of confidence or trust, including offences 
committed by law enforcement officers; 
(6)  Whether the offender threatened to use or actually used violence, or used, threatened to 
use, or carried, a weapon; 
(7)  Whether the offender caused, threatened to cause, or risked the death or serious injury of 
another person, or used or threatened to use excessive cruelty; 
(8)  Whether the offender caused or risked substantial economic loss to the victim of the 
offence; 
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 (9)  Whether the offence was committed for pleasure or excitement; 
(10)  Whether the offender played a leading role in the commission of the offence, or induced 
others to participate in the commission of the offence; 
 (11)  Whether the offence was committed on a law enforcement officer; 
 (12)  Any other circumstances which: 
  (a) increase the harm caused or risked by the offender, or 
  (b) increase the culpability of the offender for the offence.” 
1.87 The Commission also identified a number of factors which would mitigate the seriousness of an 
offence:
171
 
 “Mitigating factors 
(1)  Whether the offence was committed under circumstances of duress not amounting to a 
defence to criminal liability; 
 (2)  Whether the offender was provoked; 
(3)  Whether the offence was committed on impulse, or the offender showed no sustained 
motivation to break the law; 
(4)  Whether the offender, through age or ill-health or otherwise, was of reduced mental 
capacity when committing the offence; 
(5)  Whether the offence was occasioned as a result of strong temptation; 
(6)  Whether the offender was motivated by strong compassion or human sympathy; 
(7)  Whether the offender played only a minor role in the commission of the offence; 
 (8)  Whether no serious injury resulted nor was intended; 
(9)  Whether the offender made voluntary attempts to prevent the effects of the offence; 
(10)  Whether there exist excusing circumstances which, although not amounting to a defence 
to criminal liability, tend to extenuate the offender's culpability, such as ignorance of the 
law, mistake of fact, or necessity; 
 (11)  Any other circumstances which: 
  (a) reduce the harm caused or risked by the offender, or 
  (b) reduce the culpability of the offender for the offence.” 
1.88 The Commission is of the view that it would be useful to set out the factors which aggravate and 
mitigate the seriousness of an offence for the purposes of any arrangements that may be put in place to 
develop sentencing guidance and guidelines, such as those discussed in more detail below in this 
Chapter.   
(iii) Applying any Factors which Aggravate or Mitigate the Severity of a Sentence 
1.89 The factors which aggravate or mitigate the severity of a sentence, as opposed to the 
seriousness of an offence, are those factors which are likely to affect an otherwise proportionate 
sentence.  In its 1996 Report on Sentencing,
172
 the Commission explained, and underlined the 
importance of, the distinction: 
“The most important distinction drawn is that between factors which mitigate offence seriousness 
and factors which mitigate sentence. 
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Factors which aggravate or mitigate the offence arise for consideration when the sentencer is 
deciding the seriousness of the offending conduct for which the offender is to be held 
responsible.  Although this may include a consideration of the state of mind or the culpability of 
the offender during the commission of the offence, the sentencer is, at this stage, primarily 
concerned with the offending behaviour rather than with the offender personally. 
Factors which mitigate sentence arise later.  When the sentencer considers these factors, he or 
she has decided the seriousness of the offending conduct for which the offender is responsible, 
but now asks if there is any reason why the offender should not suffer the full punishment which 
should attach to such responsibility or blameworthiness.  Mitigation of sentence is the making of a 
concession: the sentencer is saying: ‘although you are undoubtedly responsible for the offending 
conduct and should be punished for it, I am letting you off a little because of your personal 
circumstances.’ 
If there is confusion between the two types of factors a problem arises.  If the confused sentencer 
takes factors which mitigate sentence into account at the ‘determination of seriousness’ stage 
then the offender will be found to be less responsible or blameworthy than he or she actually is 
and the sentence may well give rise to controversy.”
173
 
1.90 The Commission identified four factors which would ordinarily mitigate the severity of a sentence:  
 “1. The offender has pleaded guilty to the offence; 
2. The offender has assisted in the investigation of the offence or in the investigation of other 
offences; 
3. The offender has attempted to remedy the harmful consequences of the offence; 
4. The sentence, whether by reason of severe personal injury suffered by the offender in 
consequence of the offence, age, ill-health, or otherwise, would result in manifest hardship or 
injustice to the offender or his or her dependents.”
174
 
To this list could be added factors such as “previous good character” and “the possibility of 
rehabilitation”. 
1.91 The Oireachtas has provided limited guidance regarding the effect of a guilty plea and 
cooperation with law enforcement authorities.  Section 29 of the Criminal Justice Act 1999 provides that 
the courts may take a guilty plea into account when sentencing.  In this regard, the courts should 
consider: (a) the stage at which the person indicated an intention to plead guilty, and (b) the 
circumstances in which this indication was given.  Notwithstanding a guilty plea, however, the courts may, 
in exceptional circumstances, impose the maximum sentence prescribed by law.  In Chapter 4, the 
Commission will consider in greater detail the provisions of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 and the 
Firearms Acts which provide that the courts may have regard to: (i) whether the person pleaded guilty, 
and (ii) whether the person materially assisted in the investigation of the offence in determining whether 
to impose a presumptive minimum sentence. 
1.92 The courts have provided more detailed guidance regarding the factors which mitigate the 
severity of a sentence.  In The People (DPP) v Tiernan,
175
 for instance, the Supreme Court indicated that 
the stage at which a plea of guilty was entered was a relevant consideration: 
“[I]n the case of rape an admission of guilt made at an early stage in the investigation of the crime 
which is followed by a subsequent plea of guilty can be a significant mitigating factor.  I 
emphasise the admission of guilt at an early stage because if that is followed with a plea of guilty 
it necessarily makes it possible for the unfortunate victim to have early assurance that she will not 
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be put through the additional suffering of having to describe in detail her rape and face the ordeal 
of cross-examination.”
176
 
1.93 In the English case R v King,
177
 Lord Lane CJ indicated that the extent to which cooperation with 
law enforcement authorities may mitigate the severity of a sentence will depend on a number of factors: 
“The quality and quantity of the material disclosed by the informer is one of the things to be 
considered, as well as the accuracy and the willingness or otherwise of the informer to give 
evidence against them in due course if required by the court.  Another aspect to consider is the 
degree to which he has put himself and his family at risk by reason of the information he has 
given; in other words the risk of reprisal.  No doubt there will be other matters as well.  The 
reason behind this practice is expediency.”
178
 
1.94 The extent to which an attempt to remedy the harmful consequences of an offence may mitigate 
the severity of a sentence will also depend on the circumstances of the case.
179
  In The People (DPP) v 
Princs,
180
 a case concerning the sentence for manslaughter, it was argued in mitigation of the sentence 
that the respondent had attempted to save the deceased by stemming the flow of blood with towels or 
bandages.  The Court of Criminal Appeal indicated that this merited limited credit as the respondent 
“never called for outside medical assistance even though he told the Gardaí that the deceased was alive 
after the stabbing for ten or fifteen minutes.” 
1.95 In the same case, the Court of Criminal Appeal indicated that the trial judge had been right to 
taken into account the fact that imprisonment would be particularly difficult for the offender, who was a 
foreign national.
181
  Similarly, in The People (DPP) v H,
182
 a case concerning the sentence for sexual 
offences which had been committed 30 years before, the Court of Criminal Appeal indicated: 
“The age and health of the offender should be looked at.  If the offender is so elderly, or so 
unwell, then prison will be a special burden to bear, the sentence should reflect how a particular 
term may punish him as much [as] a longer term for a younger offender in reasonable health.” 
1.96 In The People (DPP) v GK,
183
 the Court of Criminal Appeal distinguished between the effect of 
“previous good character” and the effect of previous convictions: 
“This court is satisfied that while previous good character is relevant to the character and 
circumstances of the accused which may be mitigating factors in terms of sentence previous 
convictions are relevant not in relation to mitigation of sentence but in aggravation of offence.” 
1.97 In The People (DPP) v Kelly,
184
 a case concerning the sentence for manslaughter, the Court of 
Criminal Appeal indicated that it would have to “give considerable weight to the absence of previous 
convictions.”
185
  However, in The People (DPP) v Duffy,
186
 the Central Criminal Court emphasised that the 
weight to be attached to an absence of previous convictions, and to other potential mitigating factors, 
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must relate not only to the person convicted but to the offence at issue.  Thus, McKechnie J observed that 
in the context of competition law infringements arising from the operation of a price cartel, an absence of 
previous convictions would “in general have less weight because of the type of individual likely to be 
involved and the type of conduct maintained.”
187
  In more specific terms, the Court explained that the 
“generally pernicious nature [of these offences], the fact that the perpetrators knew that their conduct was 
illegal, and the level of detailed planning and concealment involved in both the network and the activity” 
meant that an absence of previous convictions would be “of limited application”.
188
 
1.98 Regarding the possibility of rehabilitation, the Supreme Court in The People (DPP) v M
189
 stated: 
“As was stated in the judgments of the Court of Criminal Appeal... an essential ingredient for 
consideration in the sentencing of a person upon conviction, in any case in which it is reasonably 
possible is the chance of rehabilitating such person so as to re-enter society after a period of 
imprisonment...”
190
 
Having regard to the accused’s age, the stage at which he would re-enter society, the age he would be at 
that time and the period of life remaining to him, the Court thus concluded that an overall sentence of 18 
years’ imprisonment should be reduced to 12 years’ imprisonment. 
(3) Discussion 
1.99 It is thus clear that in addition to the aims of sentencing, criminal sanctions and sentencing are 
also framed by the justice principles of consistency and proportionality.  It is also clear that the courts 
have been striving to improve consistency in sentencing by formulating general guidance regarding: (i) 
points of departure for certain serious offences such as manslaughter (Princs), rape (Tiernan) and social 
welfare fraud (Murray); (ii) sentencing ranges for offences such as rape (WD), sexual offences (H) and 
robbery (Pakur Pakurian); (iii) the factors relevant to the determination of the seriousness of an offence 
(GK); and (iv) the factors that are likely to aggravate or mitigate the seriousness of an offence and the 
severity of a sentence.  This is a significant development because, as noted at paragraph 1.32, a 
consistent approach to sentencing is necessary to ensure that a sentence that is proportionate to the 
circumstances of the particular offence and the particular offender is imposed in all cases. 
1.100 On the basis of this analysis, the Commission considers that a principles-based sentencing 
system which reflects the importance of consistency and proportionality would lead to sentencing 
outcomes in which:  (1) the most severe sanctions, including lengthy prison sentences, are reserved for 
the most serious crimes; (2) less severe sanctions, including medium range prison sentences, are 
reserved for less serious crimes; and (3) the least severe sanctions including fines, probation orders and 
community service orders are reserved for the least serious crimes. 
1.101 In the next Part of this Chapter, the Commission notes, however, that the current Irish sentencing 
system does not always, in practice, lead to the sentencing outcomes that might be expected in light of 
the described principles-based approach. 
E Towards a Principles-Based Structured Sentencing System 
1.102 In Parts B to D, the Commission summarised the key elements of the sentencing system.  In this 
Part, the Commission notes that while the Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeal have been 
striving to improve the level of consistency and proportionality in sentencing, commentators and surveys 
of sentencing practice call into question whether these key elements are, in fact, being realised.  The 
Commission also notes that significant proposals to develop a more structured sentencing system have 
been put forward in order to address this issue, including the development of sentencing guidance or 
guidelines under the auspices of a proposed Judicial Council.  The Commission discusses to what extent 
such proposals would be of benefit in the context of mandatory and presumptive sentences. 
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(1) The Problem of a Lack of Structure and Inconsistent Approaches 
1.103 It has been noted that Ireland, by contrast with most common law jurisdictions, has a largely 
unstructured sentencing system
191
 in which the courts exercise a relatively broad sentencing discretion.
192
 
Commentators have also referred to the “regional organisation of the lower courts, the dearth of formal 
contact between them and the undoubted duty of all judges to act independently”
193
 and to the 
individualised sentencing system, the multiplicity of sentencing aims, and judicial variability.
194
 While it 
has been correctly noted that “[a]vailable data are insufficient to support any reliable conclusion on the 
existence or extent of sentencing disparity in Ireland”,
195
 two studies appear to support the view that this 
lack of structure may lead to inconsistency in the sentencing process. 
(i) 2007 Study 
1.104 In a 2007 study,
196
 a number of District Court judges were interviewed and asked to respond to 
several sentencing vignettes.
197
  The purpose of the study was to explore: (i) judicial views on sentencing 
and consistency in sentencing; (ii) the degree of consistency in sentencing between individual judges; 
and (iii) the reasons for inconsistency, if any, in sentencing practices of individual judges.   
1.105 The study made several findings regarding judicial views on sentencing.  The judges’ descriptions 
of sentencing appeared to correspond with the “instinctive synthesis” approach to sentencing.
198
  While 
most judges indicated that there was no tariff or “going rate”,
199
 some indicated that judges developed 
their own views of things or their own particular approaches to certain types of cases and penalties.
200
  
Some judges rejected the idea that consistency in sentencing was possible in an individualised system.
201
  
It would appear, however, that “consistency” in this context referred to consistency of outcomes rather 
than consistency of approach. 
1.106 The study also made several findings regarding the degree of consistency in sentencing between 
individual judges.  Overall, there were high levels of inconsistency when the sentencing outcomes of the 
different District Court judges were compared.
202
  The degree of inconsistency in sentencing outcomes 
varied according to the seriousness of the offence.
203
  The sentencing outcomes were most consistent for 
the most serious case whereas they were least consistent for the least serious case.  Inconsistency was 
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most pronounced in relation to the type of penalty judges would impose, and was particularly apparent in 
relation to the choice between different non-custodial sanctions.
204
  The less serious the case the more 
likely the judges were to agree that it warranted a non-custodial sanction, and the more likely they were to 
disagree about which non-custodial sanction to impose.  The more serious the case the more likely the 
judges were to impose a custodial sanction and the more likely they were to agree about the type of 
custodial sanction.  Even when judges agreed about the type of penalty to impose in a particular case, 
they disagreed, in some cases quite significantly, about the quantum of penalty to impose.   
1.107 At the same time, several general patterns in sentencing were identified.
205
  In relation to the 
assault vignette, for instance, one group comprised those who would impose some form of financial 
penalty; a second group comprised those who would either impose a financial penalty or a more severe 
penalty such as community service, prison or a suspended sentence; and a third group comprised those 
who would impose either a community service order, prison sentence or suspended sentence.  A general 
pattern also emerged in respect of sentencing heroin-addicted offenders.
206
  Most judges indicated that 
they would offer the offender an opportunity to get drug treatment in order to avoid a prison sentence.  In 
general, if the offender was successful and complied with all the requirements the court had imposed, the 
judges indicated that he or she should face a non-custodial penalty.  However, if the offender was 
unwilling to engage in drug treatment, the majority of judges indicated that they would impose a prison 
sentence.
207
  In addition, a uniform rationale emerged in respect of the imprisonment of persistent 
offenders.
208
  Many judges indicated that they would impose an immediate prison sentence principally 
because the offender had had previous chances yet had refused to change. 
1.108 The study concluded that inconsistencies in the sentencing outcomes could be traced back to 
several discrete factors, all of which related to inconsistency in approach.  These included differences in 
how judges interpreted the facts of the case, especially the seriousness of the offence; differences in the 
weight they attached to certain factors, in particular aggravating and mitigating factors; differences in 
judicial views regarding the appropriateness of different penalties for certain offenders and offences; and 
differences in the sentencing objectives prioritised.
209
  Maguire thus asserts that reducing inconsistency in 
Ireland will require “addressing the incoherency of current sentencing policy and law, as well as trying to 
mitigate the worst effects of judicial variability”.
210
   
(ii) 2003 Study 
1.109 In 2003, the Irish Penal Reform Trust undertook a study into sentencing patterns in the Dublin 
District Court.
211
  The study was carried out over an 8-week period by two IPRT researchers who 
observed proceedings in the Dublin District Court.  The purpose of the study was to: (i) identify how 
judges use the sentencing options open to them and the patterns, if any, in their choices; and (ii) 
determine how often reasons are given for sentences.  The study found that judges rarely made explicit 
connections between custodial sanctions and rationales for imprisonment.  When they did speak of 
rationales, however, they demonstrated no coherent policy.  Thus there was little consistency in 
approach.  Researchers also witnessed very different outcomes for cases with very similar factual 
matrices.  For the same minor offence, the penalty ranged from a simple reprimand to a fine to a recorded 
                                                     
204
  Ibid at 43. 
205
  Ibid at 44. 
206
  Ibid at 45. 
207
  The author observes, however, that at the time of the research there was only one dedicated Drug Treatment 
Court in Dublin’s North Inner City and so, in reality, very few of the judges who participated in the research 
would have been able to refer offenders to this court.  Maguire “Consistency in Sentencing” [2010] JSIJ 14 at 
45. 
208
  Maguire “Consistency in Sentencing” [2010] JSIJ 14 at 45-46. 
209
  Ibid at 47. 
210
  Ibid at 52. 
211
  Hamilton “Sentencing in the District Court: ‘Here be Dragons’” (2005) 15(3) ICLJ 9a. 
35 
conviction that restricted employment opportunities and might expose an impecunious offender to the risk 
of imprisonment.  Thus, there was little consistency in outcomes. 
(b) Discussion 
1.110 As noted at paragraph 1.36, there are certain important advantages to the current system of 
sentencing, in particular, judicial independence and discretion.  Without these vital aspects there would 
be little justice in sentencing and the Commission thus observes that they should be preserved.  The 
studies discussed, however, suggest that the unstructured nature of the current sentencing system may 
(in spite of guidance provided by the Oireachtas, the Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeal) 
give rise to a degree of inconsistency in the application of sentencing aims and principles.  This may 
suggest that the guidance provided is not taking hold and/or is not transmitting down to the lower courts, 
such as the Dublin and Cork District Courts surveyed in those studies.  In addition, it suggests that the 
reasons for the apparent inconsistencies may not be dealt with either on a once-off basis, such as where 
the Oireachtas prescribes a mandatory, presumptive or maximum sentence, or on an ad-hoc basis, such 
as where the Supreme Court or the Court of Criminal Appeal formulates guidance in specific cases.  For 
these reasons, the Commission next considers the option of building on the existing level of structure to 
improve consistency in sentencing. 
(2) Improved Structure and Greater Consistency in Sentencing 
1.111 The Commission acknowledges the progress that has been made by the courts and the Irish 
Sentencing Information System (ISIS) with regard to improving the structure of sentencing.  Given the 
level of inconsistency which remains in the system, however, the Commission observes that the work 
undertaken by the courts and ISIS might be usefully supplemented and/or supported by a dedicated 
body, such as a Judicial Council, empowered to formulate sentencing guidance on an ongoing basis.   
(a) Judicial Guidance 
1.112 Regarding the courts, the Commission observes that the courts have developed their thinking 
since the decision of The People (DPP) v Tiernan,
212
 in which the Supreme Court showed an initial 
reluctance towards sentencing guidance, at least in respect of the rigidity that sentencing standards or 
tariffs might entail.  As illustrated in Part D above, the Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeal 
are responsible for much of the judicial guidance on sentencing today.  In particular, the Court of Criminal 
Appeal, through its appellate review power, is uniquely situated to offer effective guidance on many key 
aspects of sentencing.
213
  
1.113  Despite its advantageous position, however, the reach of the Court of Criminal Appeal is limited 
in a number of respects.  First, the capacity of the Court to formulate sentencing principles is restricted by 
the range of offences within its jurisdiction.
214
  Typically, it is confined to dealing with appeals against 
sentence for serious offences and will have little opportunity to consider sentencing practice in the courts 
of summary jurisdiction.
215
  Second, the Court lacks a sufficient volume of sentencing appeals from which 
to develop considered and principled sentencing guidance.
216
  Third, even when the opportunity does 
arise to develop sentencing guidance, it is limited to a case-by-case consideration.
217
  Where guidance is 
delivered on this basis, sometimes over many years by differently constituted courts, there is a risk that 
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the resulting judgments may be internally consistent, yet inconsistent with each other.
218
  The sentencing 
ranges specified for one offence may thus be higher than those specified for another offence that would 
usually be regarded as less grave.
219
  Fourth, the Court of Criminal Appeal operates in an information 
vacuum
220
 in so far as it is, by and large, dependent on the information submitted by counsel and any pre-
sentence reports.  Finally, it is difficult to compile a comprehensive record of the guidance formulated by 
the Court of Criminal Appeal as the dissemination of appellate decisions is somewhat unstructured.
221
  
(b) Irish Sentencing Information System 
1.114 In addition to the Court of Criminal Appeal, the Irish Sentencing Information System (ISIS) was 
established on a pilot basis.  The results of the pilot project, which was completed in 2010, have been 
made available on a dedicated website (www.irishsentencing.ie).  ISIS, which is broadly similar to 
information systems in New South Wales and Scotland,
222
 is a searchable database of the sentencing 
decisions of the Dublin, Limerick, and Cork Circuit Criminal Courts.
223
  It is hoped that ISIS will be 
established on a permanent basis, perhaps as part of a Judicial Council,
224
 and that it will assist judges to 
form preliminary views as to appropriate sentences; to deal with unusual features of cases; and to locate 
offences on the spectrum of sentences.
225
  At the moment, however, the potential of ISIS is limited in a 
number of respects.  The database, which has not been updated since 2010, provides access to a limited 
selection of sentencing decisions from the Circuit Criminal Court in Dublin and, to a lesser extent, Cork 
and Limerick.
226
  In addition, the database does not provide any formal analysis of the sentencing 
decisions.  
1.115 The Commission notes, however, the announcement by the ISIS Committee, in January 2013, of 
three new initiatives designed to advance its work in providing sentencing information.
227
  Firstly, the 
Committee has confirmed that ISIS has received the necessary resource support to recommence its work 
in gathering and providing sentencing information through its online database.  Secondly, the Committee 
has signalled its intention to recommence providing sentencing information in relation to specific issues 
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and to hold public seminars on matters relevant to sentencing.
228
  Thirdly, ISIS has also published three 
recent analyses,
229
 prepared by the Judicial Researchers’ Office, of sentencing in cases of:  (i) rape, (ii) 
manslaughter, and (iii) robbery.   
(c) Judicial Council 
1.116 The Commission observes that a Judicial Council may now be added to this list.  In 2011, the 
Chief Justice established a Judicial Council on an interim basis.
230
  This followed the publication in 2010 
of the Scheme of a Judicial Council Bill.
231
  This was inspired by the 2000 Report of the Committee on 
Judicial Conduct and Ethics (the Keane Committee) which recommended the establishment of a Judicial 
Council which would have “functions similar in some respects to those of the judicial commission 
established in New South Wales.”
232
  Head 4 of the Scheme of a Judicial Council Bill proposes that the 
members of the Judicial Council would be the Chief Justice, the President of the High Court, the 
President of the Circuit Court and the President of the District Court.  Head 12 proposes the 
establishment of a Judicial Studies Institute as a committee of the Judicial Council.  It also proposes that 
the functions of the Institute would include the preparation and distribution of Bench Books and the 
dissemination of information on sentencing.
233
 
1.117 By contrast with the courts and ISIS, it is likely that such a Judicial Studies Institute would be in a 
position to formulate guidance on a regular and on-going basis.  This guidance could be informed by wide 
ranging research and made available to all the courts and the public.  Furthermore, as a Judicial Council 
would be led by members of the judiciary, this process of developing guidance should not take away from 
the need to preserve judicial independence or judicial discretion.  
(d) Developments in Northern Ireland 
1.118 The Commission observes that Ireland is somewhat behind the majority of its common law 
counterparts regarding the development of structured sentencing mechanisms which have, by and large, 
taken the form of statutory sentencing frameworks.
234
  However, in respect of Northern Ireland (a legal 
jurisdiction which closely resembles our own), Ireland seems to have reached a similar stage in its 
consideration of how best to achieve a more structured sentencing system. 
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1.119 Traditionally, the courts of Northern Ireland have been guided by the guideline sentencing 
judgments of the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal and, to a lesser extent, by comparable guidelines from 
England and Wales.  In 2010, the Hillsborough Agreement,
235
 which provided for the devolution of justice 
matters to the Northern Ireland Executive and Northern Ireland Assembly, contained a proposal to 
establish a sentencing guidelines council. This followed the establishment in 2009 by the Northern Ireland 
Lord Chief Justice of a Sentencing Working Group, which reported in June 2010.
236
  In its report, the 
Working Group recommended the establishment of a Sentencing Group which would be chaired by a 
Lord Justice of Appeal and would comprise representatives of the judiciary.  The functions of the Working 
Group would be to: (a) take views on priority areas in which sentencing guidelines were needed, (b) put 
arrangements in place for guidance to be delivered in those areas, and (c) consider Court of Appeal and 
first instance sentencing cases which might merit inclusion in the Northern Ireland Sentencing Guidelines 
and Guidance Case Compendium on the Judicial Studies Board website.
237
  Following this, the Lord Chief 
Justice launched a public consultation on what should be included in a priority list of areas for which 
sentencing guidelines were needed.
238
  As a result of this consultation process, a First Programme of 
Action on Sentencing was developed.  This set out the following categories of offence: 
 Domestic violence; 
 Serious sexual offences; 
 Human trafficking; 
 Attacks on public workers, including police officers; 
 Attacks on vulnerable people, including the elderly; 
 Duty evasion and smuggling; 
 Environmental crime in the Crown Court; 
 Honour-based crime; 
 Tiger kidnapping; 
 Intellectual property crime; 
 Road traffic offences; 
 Hate crime; 
 Health and safety offences causing death; 
 Manslaughter; and 
 Child cruelty and neglect and serious assaults on children. 
1.120 Parallel to this, the Northern Ireland Minister for Justice published a Consultation Document on a 
Sentencing Guidelines Mechanism in 2010.
239
  This set out three options for a sentencing guidelines 
mechanism: 
 A Sentencing Guidelines Council with responsibility for producing guidelines; 
 A Sentencing Advisory Panel with responsibility for drafting guidelines for the approval of the 
Court of Appeal; and  
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 A mechanism based on measures being introduced by the Lord Chief Justice to enhance 
procedures for monitoring and developing sentencing practice. 
The results of the consultation process seemed to suggest that amongst those who responded the first 
option was the preferred option, the second option was the second most popular and the third option was 
the least favoured option.
240
   
1.121 The issue of structured sentencing (and, more particularly, the issue of mandatory sentencing) 
has arisen on a number of occasions in the Northern Ireland Assembly.  In November 2011, a private 
member’s motion, which called for the introduction of mandatory minimum prison sentences for those 
convicted of violent crimes against older or vulnerable people, was introduced.
241
  In response, the 
Northern Ireland Minister for Justice expressed the view that sentencing in individual cases was a matter 
for judicial discretion guided by sentencing guidelines.
242
  Those guidelines indicated that the courts 
should include issues such as the vulnerability of the victim as a factor which aggravated the sentence to 
be imposed.  By contrast, mandatory minimum sentences left no room for discretion and thus no 
allowance for the exceptional case.  The Minister also referred to the work being undertaken by the 
Northern Ireland Department of Justice and the Lord Chief Justice regarding the development of a 
sentencing guidelines mechanism. 
1.122 In June 2012, following the sentencing of those who had been convicted of the murder of Police 
Constable Stephen Carroll, a private member’s motion, which called for the introduction of a 30-year 
minimum sentence for the murder of PSNI officers, was introduced.
243
  In addition, a proposed 
amendment to the motion called for the establishment of an independent sentencing guidelines council 
for Northern Ireland.
244
  In response, the Northern Ireland Minister for Justice indicated that once the 
Court of Appeal had time to consider an appeal against the sentence imposed on one of the accused, the 
Department of Justice would launch a review of the legislation governing the determination of tariffs 
where the court has passed a life sentence.
245
  Regarding the establishment of an independent 
sentencing guidelines council, the Minister responded that such a model would be too costly to establish 
and too costly to maintain in the current economic climate.
246
  He indicated that, instead, the Lord Chief 
Justice’s initiative would deliver everything a formal sentencing guidelines council could without the 
unnecessary expenditure.
247
  In addition, he noted that the Lord Chief Justice, in the interest of 
community engagement, had agreed to include two lay members in the Sentencing Group.
248
  He also 
stated that he would be developing a community engagement strategy to ensure a two-way flow of 
information on sentencing issues.
249
  He concluded by indicating that these mechanisms would be 
reviewed within two years to assess their effectiveness and that if a case existed for a formal sentencing 
guidance council, he would be prepared to reconsider it at that point.
250
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(3) Conclusions and the Commission’s General Approach 
1.123 In this Chapter, the Commission has considered the general aim of the criminal justice system 
(namely, the reduction of prohibited or unwanted conduct) as well as the attributes of criminal sanctions 
and the principles of justice, in order to provide a conceptual framework for the analysis of the different 
forms of mandatory sentences to be reviewed in Chapters 3 to 5.  In this regard, the Commission 
identified four main aims of criminal sanctions, namely: (a) deterrence, (b) punishment, (c) reform and 
rehabilitation, and (d) reparation.  The Commission also identified two key aspects of the justice principle, 
namely: (a) consistency, and (b) proportionality (including constitutional and sentencing proportionality). 
1.124 The Commission notes the particular importance of proportionality which requires an 
individualised approach to sentencing whereby the court has regard to the circumstances of both the 
offence and the offender.  In this context, the Commission fully appreciates (based on the review of the 
relevant case law in this Chapter) that the Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeal have 
developed general guidance and, in some instances, specific guidelines, such as the strong presumption 
in favour of a custodial sentence on conviction for manslaughter, rape and social welfare fraud.  These 
are clearly intended to provide principle-based clarity around likely sentencing outcomes and to reflect 
comparable developments in many other jurisdictions.  The Commission notes the importance of such 
guidance and guidelines, bearing in mind that the Oireachtas has provided for a very wide discretion as to 
the actual sentence to be imposed for the majority of criminal offences, including some of the most 
serious offences, such as manslaughter, rape and fraud, for which the sentence can range from no 
custodial sentence to a maximum of life imprisonment. 
1.125 The Commission has also discussed in this Chapter, the extensive case law in Ireland which 
indicates that sentencing courts are also conscious of the need to consider a wide range of aggravating 
and mitigating factors, set out in the Commission’s 1996 Report on Sentencing,
251
 as well as the 
individual circumstances of the offender. It is equally clear that since 1996, the courts have also had 
regard to comparable case law and developments in other jurisdictions concerning the ongoing 
development of such factors. 
1.126 The Commission also notes, however, that in spite of the development and recognition of the 
general aim of the criminal justice system and the principles of justice, there remain deficiencies in the 
sentencing system in Ireland.  The Commission has discussed the recommendations made in 2000, and 
reiterated in 2011, that sentencing guidance and guidelines should be developed in an even more 
structured manner by a proposed Judicial Council.  The Commission fully supports those 
recommendations and notes that such guidance and guidelines could build on the framework provided by 
the general aims of criminal sanctions, and principles of sentencing, discussed in this Chapter.  They 
would also have the benefit of the guidance and guidelines available from decisions of the Supreme Court 
and the Court of Criminal Appeal, including those discussed in this Chapter.  Such guidance could also 
build on the growing importance of the Irish Sentencing Information System (ISIS) which, as already 
discussed, has the potential to provide a significant database of sentencing information for the courts.  In 
this respect, the Commission agrees with the view that ISIS could in time be regarded as a leading model 
of its type.
252
 
1.127 In conclusion therefore, the Commission supports the recommendations made in 2000, and 
reiterated in 2011, that a Judicial Council be empowered to develop and publish suitable guidance or 
guidelines on sentencing, which would reflect the general aim of the criminal justice system and the 
principles of sentencing discussed in this Report.  The Commission has also concluded, and 
recommends, that such guidance or guidelines should have regard to: (i) the sentencing guidance and 
guidelines available from decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeal (including 
those discussed in this Report); (ii) the aggravating and mitigating factors, and individual offender 
characteristics, identified in the Commission’s 1996 Report on Sentencing and developed by the courts 
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since 1996; and (iii) information in relevant databases including, in particular, the Irish Sentencing 
Information System (ISIS). 
1.128 The Commission supports the recommendations made in 2000, and reiterated in 2011, that a 
Judicial Council be empowered to develop and publish suitable guidance or guidelines on sentencing, 
which would reflect the general aims of criminal sanctions and the principles of sentencing discussed in 
this Report.  The Commission also recommends that such guidance or guidelines should have regard to: 
(i) the sentencing guidance and guidelines available from decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court 
of Criminal Appeal  (including those discussed in this Report); (ii) the aggravating and mitigating factors, 
and individual offender characteristics, identified in the Commission’s 1996 Report on Sentencing and 
developed by the courts since 1996; and (iii) information in relevant databases including, in particular, the 
Irish Sentencing Information System (ISIS). 
(4) Structured Sentencing in the Context of Mandatory and Presumptive Regimes  
1.129 The Commission acknowledges the importance of a structured sentencing system because, in 
general terms, such a system is more likely to lead to outcomes that reduce the risk of an inconsistent 
application of key principles.  In particular, a structured system would be more likely to ensure that the 
principles-based appellate guidance discussed above would be applied in practice.  This is important in 
the context of the general discretion that the Oireachtas has conferred on the courts in respect of such 
serious offences as manslaughter, rape and fraud, and which the appellate courts have recognised (in the 
discussed Princs, Tiernan and Murray cases) should be reflected in the general approach to be taken in 
determining individual sentencing outcomes. 
1.130 In Chapter 2, the Commission discusses in detail the history of the development of mandatory 
and presumptive sentences.  This Chapter notes that the development of the mandatory life sentence for 
murder evolved as a replacement for the death penalty and thus has a very different narrative and can be 
considered sui generis.  Bearing in mind that unique history, the Commission makes specific proposals in 
Chapter 3 in connection with the sentencing regime for murder, which are informed by the principles 
discussed in this Chapter and the proposed development of a more structured sentencing system. 
1.131 The Commission also notes in Chapter 2 that the development of presumptive sentences, notably 
for certain drugs and firearms offences, differed from that of the mandatory life sentence for murder.  The 
Commission notes that, both internationally and nationally, these sentences were introduced against 
specific backgrounds, notably the emergence of organised crime.  The Commission acknowledges that, 
to some extent, these sentencing regimes emerged in Ireland against the backdrop of a growing 
recognition of the significant harm caused to society by such offences, and a wish on the part of the 
Oireachtas to mark the gravity of these offences by placing severe constraints on sentencing discretion.   
1.132 The Commission considers that, in these contexts, the nature of the constraints imposed on 
sentencing discretion may also have been influenced by the relatively unstructured nature of the 
sentencing system and the resulting risk of inconsistency identified in the surveys discussed above.  In 
that respect, the Commission considers that the proposals for a principles-based structured sentencing 
system (as outlined in this Chapter and supported by the Commission) would assist in ensuring that, in 
practice, there is an appropriate application of relevant sentencing principles.  In that respect also, the 
specific recommendations in Chapter 4 regarding drugs and firearms offences have been influenced by 
these proposed developments.  
1.133 As to mandatory and presumptive sentencing regimes for habitual offenders, the Commission 
acknowledges in Chapter 2 the much longer history of these statutory interventions.  The Commission’s 
specific recommendations in Chapter 5 regarding repeat offences have also been influenced by the 
discussion of sentencing principles in this Chapter, and by the proposals for a more structured sentencing 
regime. 
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2  
CHAPTER 2 HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF MANDATORY SENTENCES 
A Introduction 
2.01 In this Chapter, the Commission traces the historical evolution of the three types of mandatory 
sentence discussed in this Report.  Part B outlines the historical evolution of entirely mandatory 
sentences (specifically, the mandatory life sentence for murder) in the United Kingdom and Ireland.  In 
Part C, the Commission discusses the development of presumptive and mandatory minimum sentences 
for drugs and firearms offences in the United States of America, the United Kingdom and Ireland.  Part D 
considers the evolution of mandatory sentences for repeat offenders in the United States of America, 
England and Wales, and Ireland.  In Part E, the Commission draws a number of conclusions from the 
manner in which these sentencing regimes developed.   
B Historical Evolution of Entirely Mandatory Sentences 
2.02 An entirely mandatory sentence is a mandatory sentence that permits of no exceptions.  In 
Ireland, an entirely mandatory life sentence is prescribed for the offences of: (a) murder;
1
  (b) the murder 
of a designated person such as a member of An Garda Síochána;
2
 and (c) treason.  In this section, the 
Commission considers the historical evolution of the mandatory life sentence for murder in Ireland in 
comparison to contemporaneous developments in England and Wales.  
(1) United Kingdom 
(a) England and Wales 
(i) Abolition of the Death Penalty 
2.03 While capital punishment had been progressively abolished throughout the first half of the 19
th
 
century, section 2 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 retained the death penalty as the penalty 
for murder.
3
  Section 2 provided that “Upon every Conviction for Murder the Court shall pronounce the 
Sentence of Death”.  The provision applied to all persons convicted of murder but, in reality, the death 
penalty was commuted to imprisonment or some other form of detention in most cases. 
2.04 During the first half of the 20
th
 century, several statutes were enacted which further reduced the 
circumstances in which the death penalty applied.
4
  In 1908, the death penalty was abolished in respect 
of children under 16 years of age
5
 and in 1933 the statutory age limit was raised to 18 years.
6
  In 1922, 
the death penalty was abolished in respect of the killing of a baby by its mother
7
 and in 1938 it was 
abolished in respect of the killing of a one-year-old child.
8
  There were also a number of high-profile cases 
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which captured adverse public attention,
9
 including the case of Edith Thompson and her lover, Frederick 
Bywaters, in 1923
10
 and the case of George Stoner and his lover, Alma Rattenbury, in 1935.
11
   
2.05 A number of attempts were made to abolish the death penalty.  In 1929, a Select Committee on 
Capital Punishment recommended the suspension of the death penalty for a trial period of five years.
12
  In 
1938, the House of Commons carried an amendment to the abortive Criminal Justice Bill 1938 which 
sought to abolish the death penalty entirely.
13
  In 1948, the House of Commons carried an amendment to 
the Criminal Justice Bill 1948 which again sought to suspend the death penalty for a period of five 
years.
14
  This was reversed by the House of Lords and, at report stage, a back-bencher, Sydney 
Silverman, tabled an amendment to the same effect.
15
  Each attempt failed.  
2.06 In 1949, a Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, the Gowers Commission, was established 
to consider whether liability to suffer capital punishment for murder should be limited or modified and, if 
so, to what extent or by what means.
16
  In its 1953 Report,
17
 the Gowers Commission made a number of 
recommendations including that the statutory age limit for the death penalty should be raised from 18 to 
21 years; that discretion should be given to the jury to decide whether to impose the death penalty or a 
life sentence; that degrees of murder should not be established; and that the M’Naghten rules governing 
the insanity defence should be reformed.
18
  It has been asserted that the report had a limited impact on 
policy-makers as its most significant recommendations were subsequently rejected by the government.
19
   
2.07 In spite of this setback, those in favour of abolition continued to campaign.  They were spurred on 
not least by three controversial cases which raised considerable doubt about the fairness and infallibility 
of the law relating to murder.
20
  The first case was that of Timothy Evans who was hanged in 1950 for the 
murder of his baby daughter, Geraldine, while a count relating to the murder of his wife, Beryl, was left on 
file.
21
  It later transpired that a neighbour turned Crown Prosecution witness, John Christie, was 
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responsible for the deaths.  The second case was that of Derek Bentley who was sentenced to death in 
1952 for the murder of Police Constable Sidney Miles during a robbery.
22
  Bentley was 19 years of age at 
the time but had the mental capacity of an 11-year-old.  His co-accused, 16-year-old Christopher Craig, 
who had fired the fatal shot, was sentenced to detention during Her Majesty’s pleasure.  Notwithstanding 
a jury recommendation for mercy, Bentley was hanged in 1953.
23
  The third case was that of Ruth Ellis 
who was hanged in 1955 for the murder of her former lover, David Blakely.
24
  Ellis was a young mother of 
two, who led a “life that left much to be desired by suburban standards of morality”.
25
  While she did not 
deny the killing, it was argued on her behalf that she had shot Blakely after he had caused her to miscarry 
their baby by punching her repeatedly in the abdomen.  This did not, however, persuade the court to 
amend the charge to one of manslaughter.   
2.08 In 1956, a motion to retain the death penalty but change the law on murder was defeated in the 
House of Lords, as was a Death Penalty (Abolition) Bill introduced by Sydney Silverman.
26
  As a 
compromise, the government introduced a Homicide Bill which was later enacted as the Homicide Act 
1957.
27
   
2.09 The Homicide Act 1957 implemented some of the recommendations made by the Gowers 
Commission.
28
  It limited the scope of murder by abolishing the doctrine of “constructive malice” and 
extending the defence of provocation to cover words as well as deeds.  The Act also provided that in 
cases involving suicide pacts, a surviving party should be liable only for the manslaughter (as opposed to 
murder) of the victim.  While it did not extend the defence of insanity under the 1843 M’Naghten Rules, 
the Act did introduce the concept of “diminished responsibility”.  Furthermore, contrary to the 
recommendation of the Gowers Commission, it introduced degrees of murder.  Certain types of murder, 
designated “capital murder,” would continue to attract the death penalty
29
 while other types of murder 
would in future attract a mandatory life sentence.  It has been noted that this proved to be an unstable 
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compromise which failed to achieve the support of the senior judiciary and did little to diminish anxieties 
about the possibility of mistake in capital cases.
30
   
2.10 In 1964, Peter Anthony Allen and Gwynne Owen Evans,
31
 who were hanged for the murder of 
John West during a robbery, became the last people to suffer the death penalty before abolition in 1965.
32
   
2.11 In 1965, Sydney Silverman introduced the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Bill as a private 
member’s Bill.
33
  The Bill completed its passage through Committee Stage in the House of Commons with 
one amendment that limited its period of operation to five years, unless Parliament by affirmative 
resolution of both Houses determined otherwise.
34
  At Committee Stage in the House of Lords, Lord 
Parker proposed an amendment to the Bill that would replace the mandatory life sentence with a 
discretionary life sentence.
35
  While this proposal received some support, it was ultimately defeated.  Lord 
Parker proposed a further amendment that would enable the court to recommend a minimum period 
which should elapse before the Secretary of State ordered the release of the prisoner on licence.
36
  This 
proposal met with greater success. 
2.12 The Bill was enacted as the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965.  Section 1(1) provided 
that persons convicted of murder who were aged 18 years or more at the time of the offence would 
receive an automatic life sentence whereas persons aged less than 18 years would continue to be 
detained at Her Majesty’s Pleasure.  Section 1(2) provided that the court could, in imposing a life 
sentence for murder, recommend a minimum period which should elapse before the Secretary of State 
ordered the release of the offender on licence.  In 1969, Parliament, by affirmative resolution of both 
Houses, determined that the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965 should remain in force without 
time limit.
37
   
2.13 While the mandatory life sentence remains the penalty for murder in England and Wales, the 
enactment of the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965 did not mark the end of the debate.  Over 
time, public dissatisfaction with the life sentence grew as it came to be understood that those who 
received a life sentence would, in fact, serve a much shorter period in prison, specifically, in the region of 
9 years.
38
  This led to a reference to the Criminal Law Revision Committee in England and Wales to 
review the penalty for homicide.
39
  In its 1973 Report,
40
 the Committee recommended the retention of the 
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mandatory life sentence for murder and a number of procedural clarifications.  It expressed the view that 
the courts should not be required to recommend a minimum term in every case;
41
 that any 
recommendation should not be binding;
42
 that any recommendation should be considered part of the 
sentence and, therefore, appealable;
43
 and that the court should not be required to give reasons for its 
recommendation.
44
  It also expressed the view that the deterrent value of the life sentence would be 
enhanced and a number of misunderstandings removed if the pronouncement of the court were to reflect 
the fact that the prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment might be released but would remain liable to 
imprisonment for the rest of his or her life.
45
   
2.14 Subsequently, the Butler Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders
46
 and the Advisory Council 
on the Penal System
47
 recommended, for different reasons, the abolition of the mandatory life sentence 
and its replacement with a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.
48
  The Advisory Council disliked the 
life sentence because it was wholly indeterminate.  This, it asserted, would have a detrimental effect on 
the prisoner and place a severe burden on an already pressurised prison system.  The Butler Committee, 
on the other hand, was dissatisfied with the operation of the defence of “diminished responsibility” which, 
it thought, would be rendered obsolete if the mandatory life sentence was abolished.  The Criminal Law 
Revision Committee returned to consider the mandatory life sentence in its Report on Offences against 
the Person in 1980.
49
  This time, however, the Committee members were almost equally divided between 
those who favoured the mandatory sentence and those who preferred a discretionary sentence.    
(ii) European Convention on Human Rights 
2.15 The life sentence for murder in England and Wales has been considered on numerous occasions 
by the European Court of Human Rights.  These cases are primarily concerned with Article 5(1) and 
Article 5(4) of the European Convention on Human Rights.  Two key principles regarding Article 5 have 
been extracted from the resultant jurisprudence: 
“First, the underlying purpose of Article 5 is to protect individuals from being deprived of their 
liberty arbitrarily:  in the context of life sentence prisoners a decision to continue their detention 
should not be taken arbitrarily.  The required protection is achieved through the review 
mechanism prescribed by Article 5(4).  Second, it may be inferred from the jurisprudence that 
prolonged detention can be justified on the limited grounds of risk and dangerousness.”
50
 
[Emphasis added.] 
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2.16 It may be recalled that the mandatory life sentence in the United Kingdom is composed of two 
parts:  a punitive part and a preventative part.  (This may be contrasted with the Irish sentencing system 
which considers life sentences to be wholly punitive.)  Once the punitive part of a sentence is served, the 
continued detention of a prisoner under the preventative part can only be justified on the ground that the 
prisoner continues to represent a risk or danger to the public.  Thus, while the imposition of a life 
sentence may be lawful under Article 5(1), the continued detention of a prisoner may become unlawful 
where the punitive part of the sentence has been served and the prisoner no longer represents a risk or 
danger to the public.   
2.17 Thus, the European Court of Human Rights established the principle that the continued detention 
of a prisoner under the preventative part of a life sentence must be periodically reviewed in accordance 
with Article 5(4) of the European Convention on Human Rights.  In Weeks v United Kingdom,
51
 the 
applicant had received a discretionary life sentence for armed robbery on the basis that he was a 
dangerous offender.  He had been subsequently released on licence which was revoked when he 
committed a further offence.  The applicant contended that his detention subsequent to the revocation of 
his licence was contrary to Article 5(1) and that he had not been able to have his continued detention 
reviewed in accordance with Article 5(4).
52
  The Court acknowledged that the freedom enjoyed by a 
prisoner on licence was “more circumscribed in law and more precarious than the freedom enjoyed by the 
ordinary citizen” but held that it qualified as “freedom” for the purpose of Article 5(1).
53
  The applicant was 
thus entitled to invoke Article 5(1).  Referring to the disturbed and aggressive behaviour of the applicant, 
the Court found, however, that the decision to revoke his licence and re-detain him had been neither 
arbitrary nor unreasonable and was, therefore, compatible with Article 5(1).
54
  Once returned to custody 
and at reasonable intervals thereafter, however, the Court ruled that the applicant was entitled to have his 
continued detention reviewed in accordance with Article 5(4).
55
 
2.18 The European Court of Human Rights initially drew a distinction between discretionary life 
sentences and mandatory life sentences.
56
  Whereas the discretionary life sentence was composed of 
both a punitive and a preventative part, the mandatory life sentence was wholly punitive.  Thus, periodic 
review of detention under a mandatory life sentence was not required.  In Wynne v United Kingdom,
57
 the 
applicant had received a mandatory life sentence for murder.  He had been subsequently released on a 
life licence during which time he killed a woman.  The applicant was convicted of manslaughter and the 
domestic court imposed a discretionary life sentence and revoked his life licence.  Once the punitive part 
of the discretionary life sentence was served, the applicant contended that he was entitled to have his 
continued detention reviewed.
58
  The European Court of Human Rights dismissed his claim, holding that 
his conviction for manslaughter did not affect the continued validity of the mandatory life sentence or its 
reactivation on his recall.  The conviction or, more particularly, the discretionary life sentence merely 
provided a supplementary legal basis for his detention.  Citing Thynne, Wilson and Gunnell v United 
Kingdom,
59
 the Court held that in the context of mandatory life sentences, the guarantee of Article 5(4) 
was satisfied by the original trial and appeal proceedings.
60
  It thus conferred no additional right to 
challenge the lawfulness of continuing detention or re-detention following the revocation of a licence.  In 
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the course of its judgment, the Court distinguished between discretionary life sentences and mandatory 
life sentences: 
“[T]he fact remains that the mandatory sentence belongs to a different category from the 
discretionary sentence in the sense that it is imposed automatically as the punishment for the 
offence of murder irrespective of considerations pertaining to the dangerousness of the 
offender... .  That mandatory life prisoners do not actually spend the rest of their lives in prison 
and that a notional tariff period is also established in such cases ... does not alter this essential 
distinction between the two types of life sentence.”
61
 
2.19 In Thynne, Wilson and Gunnell v United Kingdom,
62
 the applicants were convicted sex offenders 
who had been sentenced to discretionary terms of life imprisonment.  Having served the punitive parts of 
their sentences, the applicants complained that they had not been able to have their continued detention 
periodically reviewed in accordance with Article 5(4).
63
  Each of the applicants had been found to be 
suffering from a mental or personality disorder and to be dangerous and in need of treatment.  Since the 
factors of mental instability and dangerousness were susceptible to change over the passage of time, the 
Court found that new issues of lawfulness could arise during the course of their detention.
64
  Thus, the 
applicants were entitled to have their continued detention reviewed by a court-like body. 
2.20 As a result of this decision, section 34 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 introduced a procedure to 
review the preventive part of a discretionary life sentence.
65
  It also formalised the sentencing procedure 
so that a judge imposing a discretionary life sentence was now required to specify in open court the 
punitive part of the sentence.  In the 2002 Practice Direction (Criminal Proceedings: Consolidation),
66
 it is 
indicated that it is only in very exceptional circumstances that a judge would be justified in not specifying 
a tariff.  This might occur where the judge considers that the offence is so serious that detention for life is 
justified by the gravity of the offence alone, irrespective of any risk to the public.  In such a case, the 
judge should state this when imposing the sentence.  The tariff is a sentence for the purposes of the 
Criminal Appeal Act 1968 and may thus be subject to appeal.
67
   
2.21 Over time, the European Court of Human Rights began to question the distinction between 
discretionary life sentences and mandatory life sentences.
68
  This initially occurred in several cases 
concerned with juvenile offenders who had been convicted of murder and sentenced to detention during 
Her Majesty’s Pleasure.  In Hussain v United Kingdom,
69
 the applicant contended that he was entitled to 
have his continued detention periodically reviewed under Article 5(4).
70
  The Court considered whether a 
sentence of detention during Her Majesty’s Pleasure was more akin to a discretionary life sentence or a 
mandatory life sentence.
71
  The Court observed that the sentence was mandatory in terms of being fixed 
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by law and applicable in all cases where persons under the age of 18 years were convicted of murder.
72
  
The Court stated, however, that the decisive issue was whether the nature and purpose of the sentence 
were such as to require the lawfulness of the detention to be periodically reviewed in accordance with 
Article 5(4).
73
  The Court considered that an indeterminate term of detention for a convicted young 
person, which might be as long as that person’s life, could only be justified by considerations based on 
the need to protect the public.
74
  The Court thus concluded that the applicant’s sentence, after the 
expiration of his tariff, was more comparable to a discretionary life sentence.
75
  The decisive ground for 
the applicant’s detention had been and continued to be his dangerousness to society.
76
  As this was a 
characteristic which could change over time, the Court held that the applicant was entitled to have his 
continued detention periodically reviewed by a court-like body in accordance with Article 5(4).
77
 
2.22 As a result of this decision, section 28 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 extended to juvenile 
offenders sentenced to detention at Her Majesty’s Pleasure, the same right as offenders sentenced to 
discretionary life imprisonment, to have the preventive part of their sentences periodically reviewed by the 
Parole Board.
78
 
2.23 The European Court of Human Rights also began to question the role of the Home Secretary in 
setting the tariff for sentences such as detention at Her Majesty’s Pleasure.
79
  In V and T v United 
Kingdom,
80
 the Court ruled that the fixing of a tariff was a sentencing exercise and that the applicants 
were thus entitled to the safeguards of Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights,
81
 which 
required that the determination of civil rights and obligations be conducted by an “independent and 
impartial tribunal”.
82
  As the Home Secretary could not be considered “independent” of the Executive, the 
Court found that there had been a violation of Article 6(1).
83
 
2.24 As a result of this decision, the Home Secretary relinquished his power to set the tariff for 
sentences of detention at Her Majesty’s Pleasure and this is now set by the trial judge.
84
  The Lord Chief 
Justice issued a Practice Direction
85
 setting out the various factors which judges should take into account 
when setting tariff periods for murder by offenders of all ages.  It is interesting to note, however, that the 
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51 
Home Secretary retains a duty to keep the minimum term of every child detained during Her Majesty’s 
Pleasure under review, and may still use the prerogative of mercy to shorten it.
86
   
2.25 The distinction between discretionary life sentences and mandatory life sentences finally 
collapsed in Stafford v United Kingdom
87
, when the European Court of Human Rights assimilated the 
various regimes applicable to discretionary life sentences, mandatory life sentences and sentences of 
detention during Her Majesty’s Pleasure.
88
  The applicant had received a mandatory life sentence for 
murder.  He had been subsequently released on licence and this was revoked when he was convicted of 
a number of fraud offences.  Having served his sentence for the fraud offences, the Parole Board 
recommended that the applicant be released on licence but this was rejected by the Secretary of State on 
the ground that there was a risk that the applicant would commit further fraud offences.   
2.26 The applicant contended that his continued detention was in breach of Article 5(1).
89
  In this 
regard, he argued that it was arbitrary to justify indefinite imprisonment by reference to a risk of future 
non-violent offending, which involved no physical harm to others and bore no relationship to the criminal 
conduct which had resulted in the mandatory life sentence.
90
  For its part, the Government contended that 
the mandatory life sentence for murder satisfied Article 5(1) and continued to provide a lawful basis for 
the applicant’s detention.
91
  It argued that the mandatory life sentence could be distinguished from the 
discretionary life sentence as it was imposed as punishment for the seriousness of the offence and was 
not governed by factors, such as risk and dangerousness, which could change over time.
92
  The applicant 
further contended that as the basis for his continued detention was the risk of future offending, he was 
entitled to have his detention reviewed under Article 5(4).
93
  He argued that, since Wynne, the courts in 
the United Kingdom had so altered their approach to, and understanding of, the mandatory life sentence, 
that it was no longer possible to argue that the requirements of Article 5(4) were satisfied by the original 
trial.
94
  The Government, on the other hand, insisted that where mandatory life sentences were 
concerned, the requirements of Article 5(4) were met by the original trial and appeal proceedings and that 
no new issues of lawfulness could arise requiring review.
95
   
2.27 The Court held that there was no causal connection between the risk of future non-violent 
offending and the original mandatory life sentence for murder.
96
  The applicant’s re-detention was thus in 
breach of Article 5(1).  The Court referred to legal developments in the United Kingdom and concluded 
that it could no longer be maintained that where mandatory life sentences were concerned, the 
requirements of Article 5(4) were satisfied by the original trial and appeal proceedings.
97
  Thus, detention 
beyond the expiry of the tariff period could only be justified by considerations of risk and dangerousness 
associated with the objectives of the original sentence for murder.
98
  As these elements could change 
over time, the Court held that the applicant was entitled to have his detention reviewed by a court-like 
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body under Article 5(4).  As the Secretary of State was not a court-like body, his exclusive power to grant 
release violated Article 5(4). 
2.28 In Stafford, the European Court of Human Rights was influenced by legal developments in the 
United Kingdom regarding life sentences.  Having regard to these legal developments, the Court came to 
the conclusion that the distinction between discretionary life sentences, mandatory life sentences and 
sentences of detention during Her Majesty’s Pleasure could no longer be maintained in respect of tariff-
fixing: 
“The Court considers that it may now be regarded as established in domestic law that there is no 
distinction between mandatory life prisoners, discretionary life prisoners and juvenile murderers 
as regards the nature of tariff-fixing.  It is a sentencing exercise.  The mandatory life sentence 
does not impose imprisonment for life as a punishment.  The tariff, which reflects the individual 
circumstances of the offence and the offender, represents the punishment.  The Court concludes 
that the finding in Wynne that the mandatory life sentence constituted punishment for life can no 
longer be regarded as reflecting the real position in the domestic criminal justice system of the 
mandatory life prisoner.”
99
 
While the Court did not expressly confine this statement to the situation pertaining to the United Kingdom, 
the fact that it followed its consideration of the legal developments in the United Kingdom suggests that 
this was the intention.  It is thus arguable that Stafford is not (as some might suggest) an authority for 
imposing review requirements on mandatory life sentences in countries, such as Ireland, which do not 
have a tariff system.  This argument gains support in the decision of Kafkaris v Cyprus,
100
 which will be 
discussed at paragraph 2.96ff. 
2.29 The European Court of Human Rights did not have to consider whether the setting of the tariff by 
the Home Secretary was compatible with Article 6 of the Convention but did note that the role of the 
Home Secretary had “become increasingly difficult to reconcile with the notion of the separation of powers 
between the executive and the judiciary.”
101
  In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte 
Anderson,
102
 however, the House of Lords ruled that Article 6(1) required the tariff to be fixed by an 
independent and impartial tribunal.  As the Home Secretary was not an independent and impartial 
tribunal, he should not fix the tariff of the mandatory life sentence for murder. 
2.30 The life sentence was again considered in Vinter, Bamber and Moore v United Kingdom.
103
  In 
that case, the applicants were British nationals who had each received a “whole life” order in respect of a 
mandatory life sentence for murder.  The applicants had been sentenced prior to the entry into force of 
the Criminal Justice Act 2003 when the practice had been for the Secretary of State, having received 
recommendations from the trial judge and Lord Chief Justice, to determine the minimum term to be 
served by a life sentence prisoner.  The fact that a whole life order had been imposed meant that the 
applicants could not expect to be released other than at the discretion of the Secretary of State on 
compassionate grounds.  In general, however, the Secretary of State would review a whole life order 
once the prisoner had served 25 years’ imprisonment.  The Criminal Justice Act 2003 was introduced to 
implement a finding by the House of Lords that it was contrary to Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights for the Secretary of State to determine minimum terms.
104
  Under section 269 of the 2003 
Act, it became the responsibility of the trial judge, in accordance with Schedule 21, to determine the 
minimum term to be served by life sentence prisoners.  Under section 276 and Schedule 22, persons 
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serving mandatory life sentences, who had received minimum terms under the old system, were entitled 
to apply to the High Court to have their sentences reviewed.  The practice whereby whole life orders were 
reviewed after 25 years was discontinued.   
2.31 The applicants’ whole life orders were upheld by the High Court and they applied to the European 
Court of Human Rights, alleging violations of Article 3, Article 5(4) and Article 7 of the Convention.  
Regarding Article 3, the applicants made a number of submissions.  First, citing Kafkaris v Cyprus,
105
 they 
argued that it was clear that the European Court of Human Rights considered that an irreducible life 
sentence would not merely raise an issue under Article 3, but would in fact violate Article 3.  Second, they 
argued that the English Court of Appeal had erred in R v Bieber
106
 by distinguishing between irreducible 
mandatory life sentences and irreducible discretionary life sentences.  There was no proper basis in 
Kafkaris for the Court of Appeal to conclude that only an irreducible mandatory life sentence could raise 
an issue under Article 3.  Such a conclusion would, in any case, lead to inconsistent findings where some 
irreducible life sentences would violate Article 3 because they were mandatory, whereas others would not 
violate Article 3 because they were discretionary, even though both types of sentence would entail the 
same hopelessness regarding release.  Third, they argued that the Court of Appeal had erred in finding 
that a violation of Article 3 could not arise at the moment of the imposition of a sentence.  They submitted 
that a violation arose because of the imposition of hopelessness that came with such a sentence.  Finally, 
they argued that the Secretary of State’s power of compassionate release was not sufficient to make a life 
sentence reducible.  The second applicant further relied on the fact that he had been promised reviews at 
various stages of his sentence, and that an irreducible sentence imposed on a young man was very 
different to one imposed on a much older man, which served to underline the inequality, cruelty and 
illogicality of irreducible life sentences. 
2.32 The Court stated that it was first necessary to consider whether a grossly disproportionate 
sentence would violate Article 3 and, second, at what point in the course of a life sentence or other very 
long sentence an Article 3 issue might arise.  In relation to the first issue, the Court stated that it was 
prepared to accept that a grossly disproportionate sentence could amount to ill-treatment contrary to 
Article 3 at the moment of its imposition.  It observed, however, that “gross disproportionality” was a strict 
test and that it would only be on “rare and unique occasions” that the test would be met.
107
   
2.33 In relation to the second issue, the Court indicated that, subject to the general requirement that a 
sentence should not be grossly disproportionate, it was necessary to distinguish between three types of 
life sentence: (i) a life sentence with eligibility for release after a minimum period has been served; (ii) a 
discretionary sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole; and (iii) a mandatory 
sentence of life imprisonment.  The Court indicated that the first type of sentence was clearly reducible 
and thus no issue could arise under Article 3.   
2.34 Regarding the second type of sentence, the Court indicated that if a discretionary life sentence 
was imposed by a court after due consideration of all relevant mitigating and aggravating factors, an 
Article 3 issue could not arise at the moment it was imposed.  Rather, it would only arise when it could be 
shown that: (i) the applicant’s continued imprisonment could no longer be justified on any legitimate 
penological grounds (such as punishment, deterrence, public protection or rehabilitation); and (ii) the 
sentence was irreducible de facto and de iure.   
2.35 Regarding the third type of sentence, the Court indicated that a mandatory sentence of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole would require greater scrutiny.  The Court observed that the 
“vice of any mandatory sentence is that it deprives the defendant of any possibility to put any mitigating 
factors or special circumstances before the sentencing court”.  This was especially true in respect of a 
mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole, a sentence which, in effect, condemned a 
defendant to spend the rest of his or her days in prison, irrespective of his or her level of culpability and 
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irrespective of whether the sentencing court considered the sentence to be justified.  These 
considerations did not mean that a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole was per se 
incompatible with the Convention, although the trend in Europe was clearly against such sentences, but 
that such a sentence was much more likely to be grossly disproportionate than any other type of life 
sentence.  In the absence of any such gross disproportionality, an Article 3 issue would arise for a 
mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole in the same way as for a discretionary life 
sentence, that is when it could be shown that: (i) the continued imprisonment of the applicant could no 
longer be justified on any legitimate penological grounds; and (ii) the sentence was irreducible de facto 
and de iure. 
2.36 The Court observed that in the present cases, the whole life orders were, in effect, discretionary 
life sentences without parole.  Regarding de iure reducibility, the Court noted that once imposed, such 
sentences were not subject to later review and release could only be obtained from the Secretary of State 
on compassionate grounds.  The policy of the Secretary of State regarding compassionate release 
appeared to be much narrower than the Cypriot policy on release, which had been considered in Kafkaris.  
First, the policy could conceivably mean that a prisoner would remain in prison even if his continued 
imprisonment could not be justified on any legitimate penological grounds, as long as he or she did not 
become terminally ill or physically incapacitated.  Second, it was of some relevance that the practice of a 
25-year review, which existed prior to the introduction of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, had not been 
included in the reforms introduced by the 2003 Act.  No clear explanation had been given for the 
omission, even though it appeared that a 25-year review, supplemented by regular reviews thereafter, 
would be one means by which the Secretary of State could satisfy himself that the prisoner’s 
imprisonment continued to be justified on legitimate penological grounds.  Third, the Court stated that it 
doubted whether compassionate release for the terminally ill or physically incapacitated could really be 
considered release at all, if all that it meant was that a prisoner died at home or in a hospice rather than 
behind prison walls. 
2.37 However, the Court considered that the issue of de facto reducibility did not arise for examination 
in the present cases.  First, the applicants had not sought to argue that their whole life orders were 
grossly disproportionate.  Given the gravity of the murders of which they had been convicted, the Court 
was satisfied that the whole life orders were not grossly disproportionate.  Second, none of the applicants 
had demonstrated that their continued incarceration served no legitimate penological purpose.  For each 
case, the Court was satisfied that detention served the legitimate purposes of punishment and 
deterrence.  The Court thus concluded that there had been no violation of Article 3. 
2.38 Regarding Article 5(4), the applicants submitted that the imposition of whole life orders without 
the possibility of regular review by the courts violated Article 5(4) of the Convention. 
2.39 The Court indicated that while continued detention might violate Article 3 if it was no longer 
justified on legitimate penological grounds and the sentence was irreducible de facto and de iure, it did 
not follow that the applicants’ detention had to be reviewed regularly in order for it to comply with the 
provisions of Article 5.  Moreover, it was clear from the remarks of the trial judge in respect of the first 
applicant and the remarks of the High Court in respect of the second and third applicants, that whole life 
orders had been imposed on them to meet the requirements of punishment and deterrence.  Citing a 
decision of the English Court of Appeal,
108
 the Court observed that the practice in England was to impose 
a whole life order where the offence was so exceptionally serious that just punishment required the 
offender to be kept in prison for the rest of his or her life.  The present applicants’ sentences were thus 
different from the life sentence considered in Stafford v United Kingdom,
109
 which the Court found was 
divided into a tariff period (imposed for the purpose of punishment) and the remainder of the sentence 
(under which continued detention was determined by considerations of risk and dangerousness).  
Consequently, the Court was satisfied that the lawfulness of the applicants’ detention was incorporated in 
the whole life orders imposed by the domestic courts and no further review was required by Article 5(4).  
The Court thus found that the applicants’ complaints were manifestly ill-founded. 
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2.40 Regarding Article 7,
110
 the second applicant submitted that the trial judge had recommended a 
minimum term of 25 years but had been overruled by the Secretary of State in 1988.  This was 
incompatible with Article 6 of the Convention and should have played no part in the sentencing process.  
The High Court review, which confirmed the whole life order, thus imposed a more severe penalty than 
the sentence which had been passed at the time of the offence.  The applicant also asserted that it was 
clear that, in the High Court review, Schedule 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (which sets out the 
means by which a minimum term is to be calculated) had been relied on, even though it established a 
harsher sentencing regime than that which was applicable when the applicant had been convicted.  In 
order to be compatible with Article 7, the applicant asserted that Schedule 22 of the Criminal Justice Act 
2003, which provides for the High Court review, should have prohibited the imposition of a minimum term 
that was higher than the trial judge’s recommendation rather than that imposed by the Secretary of State.  
2.41 The third applicant conceded that the whole life term was technically available in 1996 when his 
offences were committed.  However, it was very exceptional for whole life orders to be imposed at the 
time.  The whole life order for the murder of two or more persons involving premeditation and/or sexual or 
sadistic conduct had effectively been introduced by Schedule 21.  The High Court had specifically 
rejected the trial judge’s recommendation of 30 years because of Schedule 21.  Therefore, he asserted 
that he too had been sentenced under a harsher statutory framework than existed at the time of the 
offences. 
2.42 The Court observed that the setting of a minimum term was a sentencing exercise and thus 
attracted the protection of Article 7.  However, the Court indicated that it was unable to accept that the 
process by which the second and third applicants’ current whole life orders were imposed had infringed 
Article 7.  First, paragraph 3(1)(a) of Schedule 22 expressly protected against the imposition of a longer 
minimum term than was initially imposed.  Second, there was no evidence that, in practice, this statutory 
protection had been circumvented by the need to consider the principles in Schedule 21.  Schedule 21 
might well reflect a stricter sentencing regime than was previously applied for the crime of murder and, if it 
were determinative of the minimum term to be imposed for offences committed prior to its enactment, 
might well have violated Article 7.  However, this was not the case.  In conducting its review under 
Schedule 22, the High Court was to have regard to both Schedule 21 and the previous recommendations 
made in respect of a life sentence prisoner by the trial judge and the Lord Chief Justice.  The Court 
indicated that there was nothing objectionable in directing the High Court in this way. 
2.43 In a joint partly dissenting opinion, however, three of the judges concluded that there had been a 
procedural infringement of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.  This was by reason 
of the absence of some mechanism that would remove the hopelessness inherent in a life sentence, from 
which there was no possibility of release while the prisoner was still well enough to have any sort of life 
outside prison. 
(b) Northern Ireland 
2.44 It has been noted that until the enactment of the Homicide Act 1957 in England and Wales, which 
did not extend to Northern Ireland, the law on murder had been the same in Northern Ireland as in 
England and Wales.
111
  As there were few murder cases, there was little public demand for the law in 
Northern Ireland to be changed along the lines of the 1957 Act.
112
  However, this changed in the 1960s 
when there were two hangings in circumstances which, it has been asserted, would not have resulted in 
the death penalty had the offences been committed in England.
113
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2.45 In Attorney General for Northern Ireland v Gallagher,
114
 the defendant was convicted of the 
murder of his wife.  A plea of insanity failed where there was evidence that he suffered from a 
psychopathic condition; that he was liable to explosive outbursts which could be induced by drink; and 
that he had been drunk at the time of committing the offence.  The Northern Ireland Court of Criminal 
Appeal referred a point of general public importance to the House of Lords which ruled that a psychopath 
who goes out to kill knowing that it is wrong, and does kill, cannot escape the consequences by making 
himself drunk before carrying out the killing.   
2.46 In DPP v Smith,
115
 the House of Lords decided that murder could be committed even though the 
defendant had not possessed the actual intent to kill.  It was enough that grievous bodily harm was the 
natural and probable result of the defendant’s actions and that the ordinary, responsible man would have 
known that.  By contrast to the limiting effect of the Homicide Act 1957 in England, the effect of the Smith 
decision was to expand the concept of murder.
116
 
2.47 Following a campaign by the Northern Ireland Association for the Reform of the Law on Capital 
Punishment, a private member’s bill was introduced into the Stormont Parliament.
117
  The Homicide and 
Criminal Responsibility Bill proposed a number of reforms, including the abolition of capital punishment.  
The Bill did not receive a second reading.
118
 
2.48 In 1963, a Bill was introduced to abolish the death penalty in its entirety.
119
  The 1963 Bill was 
later enacted as the Criminal Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 1966.  In its final form, however, the 1966 Act 
followed the Homicide Act 1957 in drawing a distinction between capital and non-capital murder.
120
  This 
was subsequently repealed by the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973.
121
 
2.49 Section 1(1) of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 abolished the death 
penalty for murder and replaced it with a mandatory life sentence.  Article 5 of the Life Sentences 
(Northern Ireland) Order 2001 provides that where a court imposes a life sentence, it must specify the 
minimum period that must be served by the offender “to satisfy the requirements of retribution and 
deterrence”, before he or she becomes eligible for parole.
122
  Where the offence warranting the life 
sentence is particularly serious, the court may order a “whole life tariff” if it considers that the offender 
should be detained for the remainder of his or her natural life.
123
   
2.50 A review of Northern Ireland’s criminal justice system was conducted
124
 prior to the 
commencement of the United Kingdom Human Rights Act 1998, and a review of Northern Ireland’s 
sentencing framework was conducted
125
 following the enactment of the United Kingdom Criminal Justice 
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Act 2003 in England and Wales.  As a result of the recommendations contained in these reviews,
126
 the 
Life Sentences (Northern Ireland) Order 2001 was adopted to ensure that the punitive or tariff period of 
life sentences was judicially determined
127
 and that the suitability of prisoners for release was assessed 
by an independent body of judicial character.  For this purpose, Part II of the Life Sentences (Northern 
Ireland) Order 2001 established the “Life Sentence Review Commissioners”, which were renamed the 
“Parole Commissioners for Northern Ireland” in 2008.
128
  
2.51 Article 5 of the Life Sentences (Northern Ireland) Order 2001 provides that where a court passes 
a life sentence it must specify a period to be served by the offender “to satisfy the requirements of 
retribution and deterrence”.  Once this period has been served, the offender may be considered for 
release by the Parole Commissioners.  The Parole Commissioners may only direct the release of the 
prisoner if the prisoner’s case has been referred to them by the Secretary of State and if they are satisfied 
that the prisoner’s continued detention is not necessary for the protection of the public from serious 
harm.
129
  Release is “on licence” and may be revoked by the Secretary of State where this has been 
recommended by the Parole Commissioners or where the Secretary of State considers it expedient in the 
public interest to do so.
130
 
2.52 As to how to calculate a minimum term, the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal, in R v Candless,
131
 
directed the courts to have regard to the guidance provided by Lord Woolf CJ in his 2002 Practice 
Statement (Crime: Life Sentences).
132
  The Practice Statement sets out the starting points and the 
circumstances in which each starting point applies.  The starting points range from the “normal starting 
point” of 12 years’ imprisonment, through the “higher starting point” of 15-16 years, up to 30 years.
133
  It 
also sets out the factors which tend to aggravate or mitigate the duration of the minimum term.
134
   
2.53 Section 23 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998, as amended,
135
 provides that the royal prerogative of 
mercy is exercisable on the Queen’s behalf by the Northern Ireland Minister for Justice.  The royal 
prerogative of mercy has been mostly superseded by statutory provisions.
136
 
(c) Scotland 
2.54 The Murder (Abolition of the Death Penalty) Act 1965 also applied to Scotland.
137
  Section 1(1) of 
the 1965 Act abolished the death penalty and replaced it with the mandatory life sentence, for a period of 
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five years.  This was made permanent by a resolution of the UK Parliament on 31 December 1969.  
Section 205 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 provides that a person convicted of murder 
must be sentenced to life imprisonment. 
2.55 As in England and Wales, the sentencing court must specify a minimum term to be served by the 
offender before he or she may be considered for release.  Section 3 of the Prisoners and Criminal 
Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993, as amended,
138
 provides that the sentencing court must specify a 
“punishment part” to be served by the offender “to satisfy the requirements of retribution and 
deterrence”.
139
  Once this punishment part has been served, the offender may be considered for release 
by the Parole Board.  The Parole Board may only direct the release of the prisoner if the prisoner’s case 
has been referred to it by the Secretary of State and if it is satisfied that the prisoner’s continued detention 
is not necessary for the protection of the public.
140
  If the Parole Board considers this to be the case, the 
Secretary of State must release the prisoner on licence.
141
 
2.56 It is interesting to note that the earliest precursor to section 3 of the 1993 Act was also section 
1(2) of the Murder (Abolition of the Death Penalty) Act 1965.  In 1972, prior to the publication of the report 
of the Criminal Law Revision Committee in England and Wales, the Lord Emslie Committee published a 
report in which it reviewed section 1(2) and made a number of recommendations.
142
  It concluded that the 
courts should be required, save in exceptional circumstances, to declare a minimum term;
143
 that any 
recommendation should be appealable;
144
 and that the courts should be required to provide reasons for a 
particular recommendation or for refraining from making a recommendation.
145
   
2.57 The superior courts in Scotland have provided guidance regarding the calculation of the 
punishment part of a life sentence.
146
  In HM Advocate v Boyle and Others,
147
 for instance, the High Court 
rejected the suggestion made by earlier case law that the “virtual maximum” duration of the punishment 
part was 30 years.
148
  It noted that some cases, for example “mass murders by terrorist action,” might 
warrant a punishment part of more than 30 years.
149
  The High Court agreed with earlier case law, 
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however, in so far as it indicated that certain murder cases might be of such gravity (such as where the 
victim was a child or a police officer acting in the course of his or her duty, or where a firearm was used) 
that the punishment part should be approximately 20 years.
150
  The High Court rejected the suggestion 
that the starting point for the punishment part in most murder cases was 12 years.
151
  In cases where the 
offender had armed himself or herself with a sharp weapon, the High Court indicated that, in the absence 
of exceptional circumstances, a starting point of 16 years would be more appropriate.
152
 
2.58 In Scotland, the responsibility for recommending the exercise of the royal prerogative of mercy is 
devolved to Scottish Ministers by virtue of section 53 of the Scotland Act 1998.
153
  The royal prerogative 
of mercy has been superseded in many instances by statutory provisions.
154
  The effect of a pardon is to 
free the convicted person from the effects of the conviction, but it does not quash the conviction.
155
  
Pardons are only granted in exceptional circumstances where no other remedy is open to the convicted 
person. 
(2) Ireland 
(a) Abolition of the Death Penalty 
2.59 Section 2 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 applied in Ireland when it was enacted 
and was carried over into Irish law on the establishment of the State in 1922.  As in England and Wales, 
the death penalty applied to all persons convicted of murder but was commuted to imprisonment or some 
other form of detention in many cases.  In 1925, Annie Walsh became the last woman to be executed 
when she and her nephew, Michael Talbot, were hanged for the murder of her elderly husband, Edward 
Walsh.
156
 
2.60 From the 1930s onwards, mounting concern regarding the continued presence of the death 
penalty on the statute books became evident in both Houses of the Oireachtas.
157
  The 1937 Constitution 
of Ireland, however, clearly envisaged the retention of the death penalty as it vested the power to 
commute a sentence in the President, subject to the advice and consent of the Government.
158
  In 1951, 
Seán MacBride tabled a motion in the Dáil proposing that a Select Committee be appointed to examine 
the desirability of abolishing the death penalty.
159
  The motion was defeated.
160
  In 1956, Professor 
Stanford tabled a motion in the Seanad proposing that the Government consider abolishing the death 
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penalty or suspending it for an experimental period.
161
  The motion does not appear to have instigated 
further action.  
2.61 In 1954, Michael Manning became the last man to be executed, when he was hanged for the 
murder of Catherine Cooper.
162
  Some months later, Brendan Behan’s “The Quare Fellow”, a play based 
on Behan’s experience in Mountjoy Prison, opened at the Pike Theatre Club in Dublin.
163
  The “quare 
fellow” of the title is believed to represent a former prison mate of Behan’s, Bernard Kirwan, who was 
awaiting execution for the murder of his brother.  Subsequently, the play was performed at the Theatre 
Royal Stratford East in 1956.  The play has since been described as “an overwhelming indictment of 
capital punishment”
164
 and been credited with contributing to the international debate on capital 
punishment.
165
 
2.62 In 1963, the Minister for Justice introduced in the Dáil a Criminal Justice Bill which proposed to 
abolish the death penalty for all crimes except treason, certain military offences and capital murders.
166
  In 
support of the Bill, the Minister referred to international research which had shown that the death penalty 
was not a strong deterrent in respect of ordinary murder.  He observed that many other European 
countries had already abolished or virtually abolished the death penalty.  He indicated that the 
Government considered that it would be undesirable to retain the death penalty when it was so frequently 
commuted.  In this regard, he observed that there had not been an execution since the execution of 
Michael Manning in 1954.  He noted, however, that these considerations were “not fully valid” in respect 
of certain political murders as politically motivated offenders would not be deterred by the prospect of 
imprisonment.  The death penalty would thus be retained for this category of murder.  The Bill was 
enacted as the Criminal Justice Act 1964. 
2.63 Section 1 of the Criminal Justice Act 1964 abolished the death penalty for all crimes except 
treason,
167
 “capital murder”, and certain offences subject to military law.
168
  Capital murder consisted of: 
(i) murder of a member of An Garda Síochána acting in the course of his duty; (ii) murder of a prison 
officer acting in the course of his duty; (iii) murder done in the course or furtherance of an offence under 
section 6, 7, 8 or 9 of the Offences Against the State Act 1939 or in the course or furtherance of the 
activities of an unlawful organisation within the meaning of section 18 (other than paragraph (f)) of that 
Act; and (iv) murder, committed within the State for a political motive, of the head of a foreign State or of a 
member of the government of, or a diplomatic officer of, a foreign State.  In respect of non-capital murder, 
section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1964 imposed a mandatory sentence of penal servitude for life. 
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2.64 During the 1980s, there were a number of unsuccessful attempts to remove the remaining traces 
of capital punishment.  In May 1981, a Criminal Justice Bill was introduced in the Dáil, which sought to 
abolish the death penalty for all crimes.
169
  The Government opposed the Bill on the grounds that it was 
not an appropriate time to abolish the death penalty given that there had been much violence directed at 
members of An Garda Síochána and prison officers in recent years and that it would increase pressure to 
arm the Gardaí.
170
  The Bill was ultimately defeated.  Subsequently, in October 1981, the Minister for 
Justice introduced a Criminal Justice Bill in the Seanad, which sought to replace the death penalty with a 
life sentence and introduce a minimum term of 40 years’ imprisonment for treason and capital murder.
171
  
The Bill was passed by the Seanad but before it could get to the Dáil, the Government fell.
172
  In 1984, an 
identical Bill, the Criminal Justice (Abolition of Death Penalty) Bill, was introduced in the Seanad.
173
  The 
Bill was passed in the Seanad but does not appear to have proceeded any further. 
2.65 In 1990, the Minister for Justice moved a motion that a similar Bill, the Criminal Justice (No 2) Bill, 
be read a second time.
174
  The Minister prefaced the debate by observing that the death penalty had been 
all but abolished in Ireland and that even though it had been retained for treason and capital murder 
under the Criminal Justice Act 1964, it had not been used since 1954.
175
  He thus argued that it could no 
longer be maintained that the death penalty had a deterrent effect or that in the “unique security situation 
which has prevailed in this country for the last 20 years”, it protected the unarmed members of An Garda 
Síochána from violence.
176
  He also noted that, by abolishing the death penalty, Ireland would be joining 
the vast majority of “western developed nations” which had already done so.
177
  The Criminal Justice (No 
2) Bill was enacted as the Criminal Justice Act 1990.  
2.66 Section 1 of the Criminal Justice Act 1990 abolished the death penalty for all crimes, while 
section 2 replaced it with a mandatory life sentence.
178
  While the 1990 Act abandoned the classification 
of “capital murder”, it continues to distinguish certain types of murder, including the murder of a 
designated person such as a member of An Garda Síochána.
179
  In this regard, section 4 provides that 
such murders are punishable by a mandatory life sentence and minimum term of 40 years’ imprisonment 
or, in the case of an attempt, a mandatory life sentence and minimum term of 20 years’ imprisonment.  
The rationale for the Oireachtas selecting a period of 40 years as the minimum term of imprisonment was 
explained by the then Minister for Justice as follows: 
“In deciding what penalty to propose in the Bill to replace the death penalty I was guided by a 
number of concerns.  One, by the fact that the offences in question represent... an attack on the 
institutions of the State.  Two, that we have a largely unarmed Garda Force whose only 
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protection from those with murderous intent is the statutory protection we can afford them by way 
of a penalty with deterrent effect.  Three, the security situation which exists in this country where 
there are armed subversive groups operating which represent a particular threat to our 
democratic institutions.  Four, very heavy maximum penalties are already prescribed for the types 
of crimes which might give rise to the circumstances where a Garda’s life is put in danger.  For 
example, the maximum penalty for armed robbery is life imprisonment.  An ordinary sentence of 
life imprisonment for the murder of a Garda is very unlikely, therefore, to have any deterrent 
effect on an armed robber who is trying to evade capture.  Five, what has for many years past 
been effectively the penalty for capital offences, namely, 40 years imprisonment.”
180
 
2.67 In addition, the Criminal Justice Act 1990 limits the power to grant early release to offenders 
convicted of such murders.  It precludes the possibility of commuting or remitting the sentence until the 
minimum period has expired.
181
  However, it permits the grant of standard remission for good behaviour 
under the Prison Rules.
182
  Thus, the minimum period ordered to be served might be reduced by one-
fourth.  It also permits a limited form of temporary release for “grave reasons of a humanitarian nature”.
183
   
2.68 The enactment of the 1990 Act “was widely viewed as having brought the debate on sentencing 
for murder to a satisfactory conclusion”.
184
  However, it was inevitable in some ways that there would be 
some public disquiet surrounding the fact that the penalty for murder would no longer be equal to the 
offence in fact or in effect.  As Hardiman J noted in The People (DPP) v Kelly,
185
 a manslaughter case: 
“In cases where there has been a death and especially a death caused by an intentional as 
opposed to negligent act, unhappiness with the sentence is often expressed in the reflection that 
even the longest sentence will end at some point, probably while the defendant is still quite 
young, whereas the suffering and deprivation of the deceased person’s family will be permanent.  
This is very sadly true.  But it ignores the fact that under our present sentencing regime, 
sentences must be proportionate not only to the crime but to the individual offender.”
186
   
In its 1996 Report,
187
 the Constitution Review Group recommended that the Constitution should be 
amended so as to preclude the possibility of the death penalty ever being re-introduced.  In 2001 the 
Constitution was amended at Article 15.5.2 to impose a constitutional ban on the death penalty.
188
   
(b) Constitutionality 
(i) Constitutionality of the Mandatory Life Sentence 
2.69 The constitutionality of section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1990 was upheld by the Supreme 
Court in Whelan and Lynch v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform.
189
  The appellants argued 
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that section 2 offended the constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers as it amounted to a 
sentencing exercise on the part of the Oireachtas in so far as it mandated that a life sentence be imposed 
for murder.  In addition they argued that the imposition of a mandatory life sentence in every murder case 
offended the constitutional principle of proportionality as it deprived the trial judge of discretion as to the 
sentence to be imposed.   
2.70 Addressing the separation of powers argument, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the 
High Court that it was constitutionally permissible for the Oireachtas to specify the maximum, minimum or 
mandatory sentence to be imposed following conviction. Citing Deaton v Attorney General,
190
 the 
Supreme Court held that: 
“[T]he Oireachtas in the exercise of its legislative powers may choose in particular cases to 
impose a fixed or mandatory penalty for a particular offence.  That is not to say that legislation 
which imposed a fixed penalty could not have its compatibility with the Constitution called in 
question if there was no rational relationship between the penalty and the requirements of justice 
with regard to the punishment of the offence specified.”
191
 [Emphasis added.] 
2.71 Regarding the proportionality argument, the Supreme Court conceded that the crime of murder 
could be committed in a “myriad of circumstances” and that the “degree of blameworthiness [would] vary 
accordingly”.  It nevertheless upheld the decision of the High Court that the Oireachtas was entitled to 
promote respect for life by concluding that any murder, even at the lowest end of the scale, was so 
abhorrent and offensive to society that it merited a mandatory life sentence.  In this regard, the Supreme 
Court observed that the “sanctity of human life and its protection [was] fundamental to the rule of law in 
any society”.  Murder was thus a crime of profound and exceptional gravity: 
“In committing the crime of murder the perpetrator deprives the victim, finally and irrevocably, of 
that most fundamental of rights, the right ‘to be’ and at the same time extinguishes the enjoyment 
of all other rights inherent in that person as a human being.  By its very nature it has been 
regarded as the ultimate crime against society as a whole.  It is also a crime which may have 
exceptional irrevocable consequences of a devastating nature for the family of the victim.”
192
 
2.72 As an alternative to the constitutionality argument, the appellants argued that section 2 of the 
1990 Act should be given an interpretation that would accord with the Constitution.  They asserted that 
such an interpretation would require the sentencing court to make a non-binding recommendation as to 
the minimum term to be served by the offender before he or she would become eligible for temporary 
release.   
2.73 The Supreme Court rejected this argument to the extent that it was asserted that such an 
interpretation was required by the Constitution.  However, it did not reject outright the potential benefits 
and possibility of introducing such a system: 
“Whether the making of any such recommendation would have some advantages from a policy 
point of view is not obviously a matter for the Court but such a process would not change the 
existing position in principle.”
193
 
2.74 Thus, while it might be outside the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to introduce a system 
whereby the sentencing court would be encouraged or required to recommend a minimum term to be 
served by an offender convicted of murder, it would not, it seems, be outside the jurisdiction of the 
Oireachtas. 
2.75 The view of the Supreme Court was supported by two recent decisions.  In Caffrey v Governor of 
Portlaoise Prison,
194
 the Supreme Court considered an appeal against a High Court decision
195
 to refuse 
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an application for release under Article 40.4.4° of the Constitution.  In 2005, the appellant had been 
transferred to Ireland to serve the remainder of a mandatory life sentence for murder which had been 
imposed on him in England in 1999.  The trial judge had recommended that the appellant should serve a 
minimum term of 12 years for the purposes of punishment and deterrence, before being considered for 
parole.  The position in England was that imprisonment beyond the point at which the minimum term 
expired could only be justified if it was preventative detention.  As the minimum term had expired in March 
2010, the appellant argued that his continued detention in Ireland had no legal basis as preventative 
detention was not permitted in Ireland. 
2.76 The Supreme Court began by considering section 7 of the Transfer of Sentenced Persons 
(Amendment) Act 1997 and, in particular, what was meant by the “legal nature” of a sentence.  Section 
7(1) stated that a reference to the legal nature of a sentence did not include a reference to the duration of 
such a sentence.  The Supreme Court thus observed that it was necessary to consider the nature of a 
sentence and not merely its duration.   
2.77 The Supreme Court stated that the nature of the sentence in issue was imprisonment for life, 
which meant that even when a person was released from prison the sentence continued to exist.  It 
indicated that the English system of setting tariffs related to the management of life sentences and thus 
did not affect the nature of the life sentence.  Once the appellant was transferred to Ireland, the 
management of his sentence became the responsibility of the Irish authorities and was governed by Irish 
law.  As a result, the English system of setting tariffs and the 12-year tariff in the particular case were no 
longer relevant.   
2.78 In a dissenting judgment,
196
 Fennelly J formulated the core legal issue as being whether the 
“legal nature” of the life sentence was confined to its duration or whether it extended to include the fact 
that the trial judge had imposed a minimum tariff of 12 years, the balance of the sentence being justified 
solely by preventative considerations relating to public protection.  Fennelly J observed that: 
 “The expression legal nature is one of the [sic] broad import.  It is clear and is common case that 
it is distinct from the duration of the sentence.  The fact that it is a life sentence relates to its 
duration, not its nature.  It seems clear, beyond any doubt or argument, that the sentence of life 
imprisonment which was imposed on the appellant is comprised of two distinct elements well-
established and recognised in English law.  There is a first period, 12 years in this case, called 
the tariff, which was imposed by way of retribution and general deterrence.  That is the punitive 
element of the sentence.  Following the expiry of the tariff period, a prisoner such as the appellant 
is, when detained in England, serving a part of the sentence which is justified exclusively on 
grounds of public protection, i.e. to prevent him from committing further crimes during the period 
of detention. 
  That, it seems to me, relates to the ‘legal nature’ of the sentence...” 
He thus concluded that there was no legal basis for the appellant’s continued imprisonment, which was 
justified by reference to preventative considerations which were not recognised by Irish law.   
2.79 In Nascimento v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform,
197
 the High Court considered an 
application for judicial review.  The applicant, a Portuguese national, had been convicted of murder and 
received a mandatory life sentence under section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1990.  He had then applied 
to the Minister to be transferred to Portugal, under the provisions of the Transfer of Sentenced Persons 
Acts 1995 to 2006.  There was no equivalent of a life sentence in Portugal and the Portuguese 
authorities, in converting the sentence, proposed a sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment, the maximum 
sentence permissible in Portugal.  Following the expiry of this sentence, the applicant would be subject to 
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no further conditions in respect of his release.  The Minister refused the applicant’s transfer request on 
the ground that the 25-year sentence was not appropriate given the gravity of the crime. 
2.80 The applicant sought an order of certiorari quashing the Minister’s decision to refuse his transfer 
request and a declaration that the refusal was ultra vires.  He argued that once the conditions set out in 
section 4(3) of the Transfer of Sentenced Persons Act 1995 were met, the Minister was obliged to effect a 
transfer.  He further argued that the effect of the Minister’s decision was to prevent any transfer, unless 
there was equivalence of sentence, and this was ultra vires his powers under section 4.  The applicant 
also sought declarations that the decision regarding the length of sentence required was properly a 
judicial decision, and that section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1990 was unconstitutional, in that it 
contravened the doctrine of proportionality, and (or alternatively) that it was incompatible with section 5 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003.  Furthermore, the applicant submitted that the 
Minister’s decision was unreasonable, given that 25 years was the maximum sentence under Portuguese 
law and was longer than the sentence that would be served by most prisoners convicted of murder in 
Ireland.  He also argued that a more rigorous test of anxious scrutiny should apply because of the human 
rights issues involved, including the applicant’s right of access to his family. 
2.81 In refusing the reliefs sought, the High Court (Dunne J) made a number of findings which are 
relevant to the issue of sentencing.  First, it held that the power to release a prisoner through a system of 
temporary or early release was an executive function that did not involve the determination of sentence.  
The exercise of this power was subject to supervision by the courts, which would only intervene if it could 
be established that it was being exercised in a capricious, arbitrary or unjust manner.   
2.82 Second, the Minister’s discretion under section 4 of the 1995 Act could not be exercised without 
regard to the function of the executive to give effect to sentences imposed by the judiciary.  In considering 
the converted sentence, the Minister could look to its effect to see if it met that obligation and, in doing so, 
he was not determining sentence contrary to the doctrine of separation of powers as he was not making a 
decision in relation to the length of time to be served by the applicant in custody.   
2.83 Third, section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1990 was not unconstitutional.  The doctrine of 
proportionality did not curtail the right of the Oireachtas to prescribe a mandatory sentence in respect of 
the offence of murder, which was of the utmost gravity.  It was open to the Oireachtas to prescribe a 
sentence that recognised the gravity of the offence and in doing so, the Oireachtas properly balanced the 
competing rights involved, namely, the right to life of the victim, society’s need for a sentence that 
reflected that murder was the gravest crime, and the rights of the person convicted.  Due regard was had 
by the Oireachtas to the doctrine of proportionality in only prescribing a mandatory sentence in the most 
serious case of wrongful killing.   
2.84 Fourth, the concept of a mandatory life sentence was not incompatible with the European 
Convention on Human Rights.  A life sentence imposed on a person convicted of murder in Ireland was 
one imposed by the court and prescribed by the Oireachtas and was not a sentence determined by the 
Minister.  The sentence did not comprise a punishment part and a preventative part which would operate 
after the expiry of a fixed tariff.   
2.85 Finally, a challenge to the regime by which temporary release was granted to those serving life 
sentences did not come within the scope of section 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights Act 
2003 as what was at issue was the exercise of a discretion, not a statutory provision or rule of law. 
(ii) Constitutionality of Temporary Release 
2.86 In Whelan and Lynch v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform,
198
 the appellants 
challenged the constitutionality of the Executive’s power to grant temporary release.  They argued that 
the Minister’s power to grant temporary release to prisoners serving life sentences amounted to a 
sentencing exercise as it determined the actual length of imprisonment.  This, they asserted, was 
incompatible with the constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers. 
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2.87 The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court that the Minister’s power to grant 
temporary release did not offend the Constitution.  Citing a number of precedents, the Supreme Court 
confirmed that the power to grant temporary release rested exclusively with the Executive.  It emphasised 
that the grant of temporary release was not an indication that the punitive part of the life sentence had 
been served.  It was, instead, the grant of a privilege which was subject to conditions such as an 
obligation to keep the peace and observe the law.  As the mandatory life sentence subsisted for life, 
temporary release could be terminated at any stage of the prisoner’s life for good and sufficient reason, 
such as a breach of the temporary release conditions.  The Supreme Court thus concluded: 
“In all these circumstances the Court does not consider that there is anything in the system of 
temporary release which affects the punitive nature or character of a life sentence imposed 
pursuant to s. 2.  In particular a decision to grant discretionary temporary release does not 
constitute a termination let alone a determination of the sentence judicially imposed.  Any release 
of a prisoner pursuant to the temporary release rules is, both in substance and form, the grant of 
a privilege in the exercise of an autonomous discretionary power vested in the executive 
exclusively in accordance with the constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers.”
199
 
(c) European Convention on Human Rights 
(i) Irish Case Law 
2.88 In Whelan and Lynch v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform,
200
 the plaintiffs also sought 
a declaration
201
 that the Irish system of imposing mandatory life sentences for murder was incompatible 
with the European Convention on Human Rights on three grounds.   
2.89 Their first submission relied on Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights which 
provides that no one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
They argued that section 2 of the 1990 Act was incompatible with Article 3 in so far as it imposed a 
mandatory life sentence for all murder convictions.  They further argued that they had been subjected to 
inhuman and degrading treatment in so far as they knew that they would probably be released at some 
point during their lives but had no way of assessing how or when that release would occur.   
2.90 In response, the Supreme Court cited the European Court of Human Rights decision of Kafkaris v 
Cyprus
202
 and observed that: 
“(a) a mandatory life sentence imposed in accordance with law as punishment for an offence is 
not in itself prohibited by or incompatible with any Article of the Convention and, 
(b) will not offend against Article 3 of the Convention ‘when national law affords the possibility of 
review of a life sentence with a view to its commutation, remission, termination or conditional 
release of the prisoner’ and, 
(c) this requirement may be met even if that prospect of release is limited to the exercise of an 
executive discretion.”
203
 
Since the Irish system of imposing mandatory life sentences carried with it a prospect of release in the 
form of an executive discretion, namely, temporary release, the Supreme Court dismissed the appellants’ 
Article 3 submission. 
2.91 The applicants’ second submission relied on Article 5 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.  The appellants asserted that the role of the Parole Board and the exercise of the Minister of his 
power to commute or remit sentence or to direct the temporary release of prisoners serving mandatory 
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life sentences was incompatible with Article 5(1)
204
 and Article 5(4).
205
   They argued that the manner in 
which the Minister, on the advice of the Parole Board, could grant temporary release amounted to a 
sentencing exercise on the part of the Executive contrary to Article 5(1).  They further argued that they 
had been denied an appropriate mechanism to have their continued detention reviewed on a regular and 
frequent periodic basis in breach of Article 5(4).
206
   
2.92 Addressing the Article 5(1) submission, the Supreme Court reiterated that the power of the 
Minister to grant temporary release was an executive function rather than a sentencing exercise.  The life 
sentence subsisted notwithstanding the grant of temporary release which was, in any case, subject to 
conditions.  Thus, the prisoner might be required to continue serving the life sentence if good and 
sufficient reason, such as a breach of the temporary release conditions, was found to exist.  Citing the 
European Court of Human Rights decision in Kafkaris v Cyprus,
207
 the Supreme Court observed that for 
detention to be lawful, Article 5(1) required that there be a causal connection between the conviction and 
the deprivation of liberty.  In Kafkaris, the European Court had found that a causal connection existed 
between a conviction for murder and a mandatory life sentence which was wholly punitive.
208
  Such a 
connection would not exist where the punitive part of a life sentence which was comprised of both a 
punitive part and a preventative part had been served, and the prisoner remained in custody under the 
preventative part.  As life sentences in Ireland were wholly punitive, the Supreme Court ruled that a 
causal connection existed between a conviction for murder and the mandatory life sentence.  The 
Supreme Court thus dismissed the appellants’ Article 5(1) submission. 
2.93 Regarding Article 5(4), the Supreme Court accepted that the European Court of Human Rights 
had ruled that in certain circumstances persons in custody and serving life sentences were entitled to 
regular reviews of their sentences by a court-like body.  It observed, however, that much of the case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights related to the United Kingdom system of sentencing which was 
different to the Irish system.  In the United Kingdom, life sentences contained two parts.  The first part of 
the sentence, the punitive or tariff part, was fixed to reflect the punishment of the offender for the offence.  
The second part of the sentence, the preventative part (which was served after the first part had been 
served) was calculated having regard to the risk that an offender might pose to the public if released.  The 
European Court of Human Rights had held that under Article 5(4), a prisoner was entitled to have the 
preventative part of his or her detention regularly reviewed to assess whether he or she posed (or 
continued to pose) such a risk.  As life sentences in Ireland were “wholly punitive”, the Supreme Court 
held that Article 5(4) was not applicable to prisoners serving life sentences in Ireland.  The Supreme 
Court thus dismissed the appellants’ Article 5(4) submission. 
2.94 The applicants’ third submission relied on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.  The appellants asserted that the role of the Parole Board and the process whereby the Minister 
considered the continued detention of an offender serving a mandatory life sentence contravened their 
rights under Article 6(1).
209
  They argued that such continued detention should only be decided by an 
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independent judicial body which would conduct a hearing in public and at which hearing the plaintiffs 
would be afforded (among other things) adversarial rights. 
2.95 Regarding Article 6(1), the Supreme Court observed that no issue had been taken with the 
procedures before the trial court which had originally sentenced the appellants to life imprisonment.  It 
stated that since the subsequent detention of the appellants was at all times referable to, and a 
consequence of, the punitive sentence so imposed, no issue arose concerning the compatibility of section 
2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1990 with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.  The 
Supreme Court thus dismissed the appellants’ Article 6(1) submission. 
(ii) Case law of the European Court of Human Rights  
2.96 The mandatory life sentence for murder under Irish law has not been considered by the European 
Court of Human Rights.  However, in Kafkaris v Cyprus,
210
 the European Court of Human Rights 
considered the Cypriot sentencing system which, like Ireland, does not employ a tariff system.  The 
applicant had received a mandatory life sentence for murder.  The domestic courts had ruled that a “life 
sentence” subsisted for the natural life of the prisoner and not 20 years as had been provided by prison 
regulations.  The applicant argued that his rights had been breached under Article 3 and Article 5. 
2.97 Regarding Article 3, the applicant contended that his detention after the date at which he would 
have qualified for ordinary remission had the sentence been one of 20 years, violated Article 3.
211
  In this 
regard, the applicant argued that the punitive purpose of the life sentence coupled with its mandatory 
nature constituted inhuman and degrading treatment.  He also argued that his detention beyond the date 
at which he would have otherwise qualified for ordinary remission had left him in a state of distress and 
uncertainty over his future.  For its part, the Government contended that there had been no violation of 
Article 3 as the applicant had sufficient hope of release having regard to the President’s power to remit, 
suspend or commute sentences and to order conditional release.
212
 
2.98 The Court emphasised that treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it was to fall 
within the scope of Article 3.
213
  In this regard, it noted that any suffering or humiliation must exceed the 
level of suffering and humiliation inherent in legitimate punishment.
214
  The Court stated that while the 
imposition of a life sentence was not in itself contrary to Article 3, the imposition of an irreducible life 
sentence might be.
215
  Thus, a life sentence would not be considered irreducible where national law 
afforded the possibility of review with a view to commuting, remitting or terminating the sentence or 
ordering conditional release.
216
  The Court thus ruled that while a life sentence without a minimum term 
would entail anxiety and uncertainty regarding prison life these were inherent in the nature of the 
sentence imposed.
217
  Furthermore, while there was no parole board, the President could suspend, remit 
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or commute any sentence and order conditional release.
218
  As these constituted prospects for release, 
the Court found that there had been no inhuman or degrading treatment contrary to Article 3.
219
 
2.99 Regarding Article 5(1), the applicant contended that he had exhausted the punitive part of his 
sentence on the date at which he would otherwise have qualified for ordinary remission.
220
  His detention 
beyond that date was thus arbitrary and disproportionate as there was no evidence to suggest that he 
represented a danger to the public.  The Government submitted that as the mandatory life sentence in 
Cyprus was not composed of a punitive part and a preventative part, detention was not subject to factors 
such as risk and dangerousness to the public.
221
  
2.100 The Court accepted that the mandatory life sentence had been imposed “as the punishment for 
the offence of premeditated murder irrespective of considerations pertaining to the dangerousness of the 
offender”.
222
  It thus held that there was a clear and sufficient causal connection between the conviction 
and the applicant’s continuing detention.
223
  There was thus no breach of Article 5(1). 
2.101 Regarding Article 5(4), the applicant contended that the mandatory nature of life imprisonment 
coupled with the absence of a parole system violated Article 5(4).
224
  The Government submitted that the 
requirements of Article 5(4) had been incorporated in the original sentence.
225
 
2.102 The Court found that the Article 5(4) complaint was inadmissible and thus refrained from ruling on 
the matter.
226
  This is unfortunate as it would have been a useful opportunity for the Court to clarify 
whether the judicial statements in Wynne or Stafford should apply in countries which do not have a tariff 
system.  It will be recalled that, in Wynne, the Court indicated that where a mandatory life sentence was 
concerned, the requirements of Article 5(1) were satisfied by the original trial and appeal proceedings 
whereas, in Stafford, the Court indicated that this could no longer be considered the case. 
2.103 The Court emphasised that in the absence of “a clear and commonly accepted standard amongst 
the member States”,
227
 it is within the margin of appreciation of each Member State to choose its own 
“criminal justice system, including sentence review and release arrangements”.
228
  However, Judge 
Bratza, in a concurring opinion, expressed the view that the principles outlined in Stafford should apply to 
all Member States, regardless of whether or not they had a tariff system: 
“[E]ven in the absence of a tariff system, it appears to me that the Court’s reasoning in the 
Stafford case may not be without relevance to a system such as exists in Cyprus where there is 
an express power of conditional release which is applicable even in the case of a mandatory life 
prisoner.  The question whether conditional release should be granted in any individual case 
must ... principally depend on an element of punishment for the particular offence and, if so, 
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whether the life prisoner poses a continuing danger to society.  As the Stafford judgment makes 
clear, the determination of both questions should in principle be in the hands of an independent 
body, following procedures containing the necessary judicial safeguards, and not of an executive 
authority.”
229
 
2.104 In sum, therefore, it would appear from Kafkaris that the Irish approach to the life sentence is 
broadly consonant with the principles of the European Convention on Human Rights.  Like the Supreme 
Court, the European Court of Human Rights distinguished between countries, such as the United 
Kingdom, which had a tariff system and countries, such as Cyprus and Ireland, which did not.  It 
emphasised that in the absence of a discernible trend amongst Member States, it was still within the 
margin of appreciation of each Member State to decide on the system to be adopted in respect of life 
sentences.  This system must still be within the bounds of the Convention, however.  The Court stated 
that a mandatory life sentence would not in itself give rise to issues under Article 3, provided that there 
was a de facto and de jure possibility of release.  And, in respect of Article 5(1), it stated that where a 
mandatory life sentence was concerned, there was a sufficient causal connection between the conviction 
for murder and the continued detention.  The position regarding Article 5(4) is, however, less clear.   
2.105 Even in the absence of a definitive ruling regarding Article 5(4), a number of observations may be 
made.  As noted at paragraph 2.15, the general purpose of Article 5 is to prevent arbitrariness.  In this 
regard, the position of the European Court of Human Rights is to query the absence of: (i) any judicial 
involvement in determining the actual length of the term to be served in prison; and (ii) any involvement 
by a body independent of the Executive in the release decision.   
C Historical Evolution of Presumptive Minimum Sentences  
2.106 Certain sentencing provisions prescribe a minimum sentence subject to exceptions in specified 
circumstances.  In Ireland, there are two examples of this type of provision.  One provides the penalty for 
certain offences under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 and the other provides the penalty for certain 
offences under the Firearms Acts.  In this section, the Commission considers the historical evolution of 
this type of mandatory sentence, primarily, as it applies to drugs and firearms offences.  It would appear 
that the modern practice of prescribing mandatory sentences for drugs and firearms offences originated in 
the United States of America and, in turn, influenced sentencing practices in England and Wales, and 
Ireland. 
(1) Mandatory Sentences for Drugs Offences 
(a) United States of America 
2.107 Drug addiction became a significant issue for legislative consideration in the United States of 
America at the turn of the 20
th
 century.
230
  There were a number of reasons for this.  First, as morphine 
had been freely dispensed to the wounded during the Civil War, there were now thousands of veterans, 
along with members of their families and friends, who had become addicted to the drug.  Second, the 
practice of smoking opium, which had been popular among Chinese immigrants who had been employed 
to help build the American railroads, had spread beyond the Chinese population.  Third, it had been 
discovered that heroin, which had been introduced as a cure for morphine addiction in 1898, caused even 
greater problems than morphine.  Fourth, opium and cocaine had been common ingredients in many 
patented medicines and sodas which were marketed widely throughout the United States prior to the 
1900s.   
2.108 By the early 20
th
 century, drug addiction had become a widespread problem.
231
  This led to the 
enactment of federal laws aimed at controlling the drug problem.  Over time, the federal response to the 
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worsening drug problem became more repressive.
232
  This began with the imposition of ever-increasing 
taxes on imported opium, followed by an outright ban on imported opium not required for medical use, 
and culminated in the enactment of the Harrison Act 1914. 
2.109 The Harrison Act sought to control domestic traffic in narcotics regulating the legal traffic in 
narcotics and providing criminal sanctions for any illegal trafficking.
233
  It has been noted, however, that 
an unintended consequence of the Harrison Act was the closure of legitimate sources of supply to the 
addict and a consequential growth in the black market.
234
  With the repeal of Prohibition, organised 
criminal gangs became more involved in the illegal distribution of drugs.  The result was an expanding 
drug problem between 1946 and 1960.  In particular, a dramatic increase in drug use amongst minors 
was a major inspiration for the enactment of the Boggs Act 1951.
235
 
2.110 The Boggs Act 1951 changed the penalty structure in two ways.
236
  First, it made penalties for all 
drugs offences uniform, no matter how trivial or serious the offence.  Second, it made the penalties more 
severe by introducing mandatory minimum prison sentences and increasing the maximum sentences.  A 
first offence became punishable by a sentence of not less than two or more than five years and a 
maximum fine of $2,000.  A second offence became punishable by a sentence of not less than five or 
more than 10 years and a maximum fine of $2,000.  A third or subsequent offence became punishable by 
a sentence of not less than 10 or more than 20 years.  In addition, the Act denied suspension of sentence 
and any form of probation to a second or subsequent offender. 
2.111 In 1956, Congress passed the Narcotics Control Act 1956 which further modified the sentencing 
regime for drugs offences.  It increased the severity of the sentences applicable to drugs offences
237
 but, 
unlike the Boggs Act 1951, it distinguished between serious and less serious offences.
238
  In addition, it 
provided for enhanced penalties for offences exhibiting certain characteristics.
239
  Thus, for example, the 
sale of narcotics to a person under 18 years of age became punishable by a minimum sentence of 10 
years and a maximum sentence of life imprisonment or death.  Furthermore, it provided that suspension 
of sentence, probation and parole would be denied to even the first-time offender convicted of a serious 
drugs offence.
240
  
2.112 During the 1960s, high levels of drug use and experimentation led to large numbers of people 
being imprisoned for long periods of time.
241
  As a result, mandatory minimum sentences for drugs 
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offences became extremely unpopular.
242
  In response, Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug 
Abuse Prevention and Control Act 1970 which repealed virtually all of the mandatory sentencing 
provisions applicable to drugs offences.
243
   
2.113 It has been noted, however, that this did not reflect a general policy disfavouring mandatory 
sentencing as, in the same year, mandatory sentencing provisions were enacted for certain offences 
involving firearms and explosives.
244
  This might have been due to the fact that the late 1960s and early 
1970s bore witness to diminishing support for the rehabilitative model of imprisonment and a 
corresponding renewal of interest in mandatory sentences.
245
  Under the rehabilitative model, the Parole 
Board, on the basis of an assessment of the offender’s level of rehabilitation, had ultimate discretion 
regarding the grant of release.  Critics observed that, as a consequence, many offenders deemed not to 
have been sufficiently rehabilitated, served sentences that were disproportionately long and/or disparate 
by comparison to the sentences served by others convicted of the same or similar offences.  In addition, 
they observed that the efficacy of rehabilitative treatments was in doubt and that it was thus unfair to 
make release dependent on rehabilitation.  In an effort to address these issues, legislators sought to 
make sentencing more structured by means of mandatory sentencing provisions, among other 
initiatives.
246
   
2.114 On the state level, this trend began in New York with the enactment of the Rockefeller Drug Laws 
in 1973.  This legislation prescribed a mandatory life sentence for the sale or possession of small 
amounts of narcotic drugs along with mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment ranging from one to 25 
years.
247
  In 1978, Michigan enacted harsh mandatory sentences for drugs offences, including the 
notorious “650 Lifer Law”.
248
  This law prescribed a mandatory life sentence without parole for offenders 
convicted of delivering over 650 grammes of heroin or cocaine.
249
  By 1983, 49 out of 50 states had 
enacted similar mandatory sentencing provisions. 
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2.115 In 1986, following public outcry regarding the crack cocaine epidemic and, in particular, the 
spread of AIDS through drug use, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act 1986.
250
  Congress 
expedited the passage of the Act in response to a number of events, including the highly publicized death 
of the Boston Celtics’ player, Len Bias, in 1986.
251
   
2.116 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act 1986 established a new regime of non-parolable, mandatory minimum 
sentences for drug trafficking offences that linked the minimum penalty to the quantity of drugs involved in 
the offence.
252
  The 1986 Act sought to subject larger drug dealers to a 10-year mandatory minimum 
sentence for a first offence and a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence for a subsequent conviction of 
the same offence.  One kilogramme or more of a mixture or substance containing heroin triggered a 10-
year sentence, as did five kilogrammes or more of a mixture or substance containing cocaine.  The Act 
also sought to cover mid-level players by providing for a mandatory minimum sentence of five years 
which was triggered by weights such as 100 grammes or more of a mixture or substance containing 
heroin and 500 grammes or more of a mixture or substance containing cocaine.  A second conviction for 
these offences carried a 10-year minimum sentence.   
2.117 Controversially, the 1986 Act distinguished between powder cocaine and cocaine base, 
commonly known as “crack” cocaine, by treating quantities of cocaine base differently to similar quantities 
of powder cocaine.
253
  At the time, crack cocaine was considered to be more dangerous than powder 
cocaine due to its especially harmful effects on communities where its use had become increasingly 
prevalent.  Thus, for example, under the so-called “100-to-1” ratio, five grammes of crack cocaine 
triggered a mandatory minimum sentence of five years while 500 grammes of powder cocaine were 
required to trigger the same sentence.  In addition, the 1986 Act increased the penalty enhancements 
applicable to offenders who sold drugs to persons under 21 years; who employed persons under 18 
years; and who possessed certain weapons.
254
   
2.118 In 1988, Congress passed the Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act 1988.
255
  The 1988 Act introduced a 
mandatory minimum sentence of five years’ imprisonment for simple possession of more than five 
grammes of crack cocaine.  In addition, the Act doubled the existing 10-year mandatory minimum 
sentence to a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence for engaging in a continuing drug enterprise.  The 
Act also extended the mandatory minimum sentences applicable to completed distribution and 
importation/exportation offences to conspiracies to commit those offences, regardless of the particular 
offender’s level of culpability.
256
  It has been noted that this measure (designed to catch drug kingpins, 
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who rarely had large quantities of drugs in their possession) was more routinely used against low-level 
drug dealers, look-outs and peripheral conspirators.
257
 
2.119 In 2010, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act 2010.
258
  This altered the mandatory minimum 
sentencing regime applicable to offences involving crack cocaine.  It repealed the mandatory minimum 
sentence for possession of crack cocaine and increased the quantities required to trigger the five-year 
and 10-year mandatory minimum sentences, from five to 28 grammes and 50 to 280 grammes 
respectively.  The Act also directs the United States Sentencing Commission to provide for higher 
guideline sentences where certain aggravating factors, such as bribing a law enforcement official, are 
present.  In addition, the Act directs the Sentencing Commission to provide for lower guideline sentences 
for certain offenders who receive a guideline adjustment for a minimum role. 
2.120 It would appear, however, that mandatory sentences for drugs offences are now falling out of 
favour with many state legislators in the United States.  Since 1998, a number of states have either 
relaxed or repealed their mandatory sentencing provisions.
259
  In 1998, Michigan abolished the mandatory 
life sentence for those sentenced after 1998 under the “650 lifer” law and restored parole eligibility for 
offenders sentenced before 1998.
260
  Since then, Michigan has repealed almost all of its mandatory 
minimum sentences for drugs offences.
261
  In 2009, New York amended the Rockefeller Drug Laws by 
repealing most of its mandatory minimum sentences for drug offences and expanding the treatment 
options for drug offenders.
262
  Some other states have also expressed support for alternatives to 
mandatory sentences for drug offences.
263
 
(b) United Kingdom  
2.121 The modern history of mandatory sentences for drug offences, as it relates to the United 
Kingdom, probably starts with the Criminal Justice Act 1991.  The Criminal Justice Act 1991 sought to 
implement proposals contained in the Government’s 1990 White Paper on Crime.
264
  A broad aim of the 
1991 Act had been to promote the principle of proportionality and, through this, achieve greater 
consistency in sentencing.
265
  Ashworth notes that while this objective was set out clearly in the 1990 
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White Paper, the provisions of the 1991 Act were less clear.
266
  Within months of its introduction, parts of 
the 1991 Act had been dismantled and over the years, its provisions, having been rarely cited in 
judgments, faded into the background. 
2.122 In 1993, there was a dramatic change in the penal climate following the murder of James 
Bulger.
267
  In 1996, the Government published another White Paper on Crime
268
 in which it: (i) indicated 
that it would be taking a punitive approach to tackling crime;
269
 (ii) expressed the view that prison 
worked;
270
 and (iii) sought to introduce mandatory sentencing in respect of a number of offences.  In 
particular, it indicated that it was necessary to impose “severe deterrent sentences” on persistent dealers 
in hard drugs
271
 and thus recommended that the courts be required to impose a minimum sentence of 7 
years on those convicted of a third Class A drug trafficking offence.
272
  The fact that this was a significant 
departure from the prevailing penal philosophy can be illustrated by the fact that the same Government 
had, in 1990, stated that prison was just “an expensive way of making bad people worse”.
273
  The 1996 
White Paper was criticised as reflecting the “increasing managerialism and politicisation of sentencing 
policy”.
274
 
2.123 The Crime (Sentences) Bill 1996, which sought to implement the recommendations contained in 
the 1996 White Paper, was introduced in the dying months of the Conservative Government.
275
  The Bill 
was severely criticised by the House of Lords on the ground that its provisions were unwarranted and 
unjustified.
276
  Thomas notes, for instance, the view of Lord Taylor of Gosforth that “never in the history of 
our criminal law have such far-reaching proposals been put forward on the strength of such flimsy 
evidence”.
277
  In March 1996, a General Election was announced.  On the one hand, this eased the 
passage of the 1996 Bill through Parliament by putting the Government under pressure to complete or 
abandon any bills that were before it while, at the same time, the Opposition did not want to be seen as 
“soft on crime” in the run up to an election.  On the other hand, it gave the House of Lords leverage to 
force the outgoing Government to accept certain amendments.
278
  As a result, the Home Secretary 
agreed to retain a House of Lords’ amendment, which gave the sentencing court discretion not to impose 
the mandatory minimum sentence on Class A drug traffickers in specified circumstances,
279
 in return for 
the Opposition’s agreement to support 17 Government Bills. 
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2.124 The Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 received the Royal Assent on 21
st
 March 1997, the day the UK 
Parliament was prorogued prior to the General Election on 1
st
 May.
280
  Its enactment was to mark an 
evolutionary step in sentencing both in terms of its practical and its symbolic effects.  In relation to drugs 
offences, its practical effect comprised a presumptive ‘three-strikes’ rule that required the imposition of a 
7-year sentence - except in specific circumstances - on offenders convicted of a third Class A drug 
trafficking offence.
281
   
2.125 Thomas asserts, however, that the real significance of the 1997 Act was in what it symbolised.
282
  
In his view, it indicated that the Home Secretary, Michael Howard, had little regard for the opinions of the 
senior judiciary and was more interested in the political impact rather than the practical effect of the 
legislation.  Above all, he asserted that the legislation set “a precedent for the introduction of mandatory 
minimum sentences for just about any crime.” 
2.126 The Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 replaced the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 
but, as it was a consolidation Act,
283
 made no changes to the substantive law.
284
  Thus, section 110 of the 
2000 Act now governs the presumptive minimum 7-year sentence which applies in respect of a third 
Class A drug trafficking conviction.
285
  The practical operation of this sentencing regime will be discussed 
in greater detail in Chapter 5.  
2.127 In January 2012, the Sentencing Council for England and Wales published a new sentencing 
guideline on drug offences, which will be used by both the Crown Court and the magistrates’ courts.
286
  
The guideline covers the most commonly sentenced offences including importation, production, supply, 
permitting premises to be used for drug offences, and possession.  The Sentencing Council has indicated 
that, under the new guideline, there are likely to be increased sentence lengths for those guilty of large 
scale production offences and reduced sentence lengths for so-called drug mules.  Sentences for drug 
mules - “who are usually vulnerable and exploited by organised criminals” - will have a starting point of six 
years’ imprisonment.  The guideline also recognises a new aggravating factor in the context of supply 
offences, namely, the dealing of drugs to those under the age of 18 years.  
2.128 The publication of the guideline followed a public consultation on the Sentencing Council’s draft 
proposals.
287
  It was also informed by research into a number of areas including the effects of the draft 
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drug offences guideline,
288 
public attitudes to the sentencing of drug offences,
289 
drug offences
290
 and 
cases involving drug mules.
291 
 
(c) Ireland 
2.129 Drug misuse and drug trafficking have been longstanding and persistent problems in Ireland.
292
  It 
has been noted, however, that the situation deteriorated with the advent of intravenous heroin use in the 
early 1980s.  In addition to the problem of substance addiction, this gave rise to increased criminality and 
a greater incidence of HIV/AIDS and Hepatitis B and C.
293
   
2.130 Initially, the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 provided for the sole offence of possessing a controlled 
drug for the purpose of sale or supply,
294
 for which it prescribed a fine and/or a maximum sentence of 14 
years’ imprisonment.
295
  In an effort to combat the worsening drug problem,
296
 the Oireachtas enacted the 
Misuse of Drugs Act 1984 which, among other matters, increased the maximum sentence to life 
imprisonment.
297
 
2.131 In spite of this, vast quantities of illicit drugs continued to be intercepted at Ireland’s frontiers.  In 
November 1995, An Garda Síochána made a record seizure of cannabis at Urlingford, County 
Kilkenny.
298
  Despite the size of the seizure and a number of arrests, there were no prosecutions.  The 
Government and, indeed, several community groups made numerous attempts to combat the growing 
drugs problem but to no apparent avail.
299
  
2.132 In 1995, the Opposition moved a motion requesting the Government to respond to the “drug 
emergency” by introducing legislation to strengthen the law and penalties for drug importers, distributors 
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78 
and suppliers.
300
  It was proposed that the law should reflect a minimum sentence of 10 years for an 
offence by an importer or pusher.
301
  However, an amended version of the motion proposed by the 
Minister for Justice, which excluded this provision, was adopted. 
2.133 In 1996, the Oireachtas enacted the Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act 1996 which sought to 
respond to the issue of drug trafficking by increasing Garda powers.  During the Oireachtas debates, the 
Opposition proposed that the Bill be amended to provide for a minimum sentence of 10 years for drug 
dealers convicted of possessing, for sale or supply, drugs with a street value of £10,000 or more.
302
  It 
was asserted that this would address a perceived problem of the courts imposing sentences that were 
more lenient than intended by the Oireachtas under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977.
303
  It was observed 
that in 1993, out of 71 convictions, three of the sentences were for less than three months; 20 of the 
sentences were between six and 12 months; 29 of the sentences were between one and two years; four 
of the sentences were between three and five years; three of the sentences were between five and 10 
years; and only one sentence was for more than 10 years.
304
  The proposed amendment was 
nevertheless defeated.   
2.134 In June 1996, Veronica Guerin, an investigative journalist who had written extensively about the 
criminal figures involved in the drug trade, was assassinated.
305
  It was believed that one of the people 
being investigated by Ms Guerin was responsible.  In the period that followed the murder, the 
Government came under increased pressure to tackle the drugs problem.
306
  While not everyone was 
agreed as to the appropriate course of action,
307
 the Oireachtas responded by enacting the Proceeds of 
Crime Act 1996, following which the Criminal Assets Bureau was established on a statutory basis.
308
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2.135 In 1997, the Criminal Justice (No 2) Bill 1997 was introduced.
309
  The Bill proposed to amend the 
Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 by creating a presumptive sentencing regime for a new offence of possessing 
drugs with a value of £10,000 or more with intent to supply.
310
  Elaborating on his rationale for introducing 
the new offence, the Minister highlighted the “unique nature” of the drugs trade and indicated that the 
“harsh punishment” would “send an unequivocal message to those engaged in the illegal drugs trade, and 
to those who might be tempted to engage in it, that we are serious and doing all that we can to eradicate 
this blight.”
311
 
2.136 The 1997 Bill was later enacted as the Criminal Justice Act 1999.  This inserted section 15A
312
 
and amended section 27
313
 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977.  The effect was to create a new offence of 
possessing controlled drugs having a value of £10,000 or more,
314
  for sale or supply, which was 
punishable by a presumptive sentence of 10 years.
315
  Section 27(3C) provided that the presumptive 
sentence would not apply where: 
 “... the court is satisfied that there are exceptional and specific circumstances relating to the 
offence, or the person convicted of the offence, which would make a sentence of not less than 10 
years (sic) imprisonment unjust in all the circumstances...”  
2.137 It is clear that this language was influenced to a great extent by the language used in the Crime 
(Sentences) Act 1997 in the United Kingdom.  Section 3 of the 1997 Act, which prescribes a presumptive 
minimum sentence for a third class A drug trafficking offence, provides: 
 “The court shall impose a custodial sentence for a term of at least seven years except where the 
court is of the opinion that there are specific circumstances which -  
  relate to any of the offences or to the offender; and 
 would make the prescribed custodial sentence unjust in all the circumstances.”
316
  
It will be recalled that there was a parallel debate regarding the use of mandatory minimum sentences 
taking place in the United Kingdom at the time the Criminal Justice (No 2) Bill 1997 (enacted as the 
Criminal Justice Act 1999) was first proposed in Ireland.   
2.138 In 2001, the Department of Justice commissioned a report on the criteria applied by the courts in 
sentencing offenders under section 15A of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977.
317
  The report concluded that 
the courts showed a marked reluctance to impose the mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years for fear 
that it would result in a disproportionate sentence in individual cases.  The report, which examined the 
period between November 1999 and May 2001, observed that a sentence of 10 years or more had been 
imposed in only three out of 55 cases.   
2.139 In 2004, the Government introduced the Criminal Justice Bill 2004.
318
  During the second stage of 
debates, the Government announced that it would be making a series of substantial amendments to the 
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80 
Bill which would, among other matters, strengthen the presumptive sentencing provisions for drug 
offences.
319
  The amendments were finalised in the wake of the fatal shooting of Donna Cleary in March 
2006.  The shooting had led to public outcry not only because of the senselessness of the act but also 
because it transpired that one of those suspected to have been involved had been convicted of an 
offence under section 15A of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1997 in 1999.
320
  Had he been sentenced to the 
“mandatory” term of 10 years rather than a term of six years, he would have continued to serve his 
sentence in 2006.  The amended Bill thus proposed a number of changes to the law regarding drug 
offences,
321
 two of which are relevant to this Report.  First, it proposed to create a new offence of 
importing drugs with a value of €13,000 or more, which would be punishable by a minimum sentence of 
10 years.  Second, it proposed to strengthen the existing mandatory sentencing provisions for certain 
drug trafficking offences by obliging the sentencing court to consider evidence of previous drug trafficking 
convictions.  In its final form, the Criminal Justice Act 2006 made these and other amendments to the 
Misuse of Drugs Act 1977. 
2.140 First, section 81 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006 amended section 15A by inserting subsection 
(3A).  Section 15A(3A) clarified that mens rea regarding the value of the drugs involved was not an 
element of the offence.  Thus, the prosecution needed only to establish that the accused knew that he or 
she was in possession of drugs with intent to sell or supply and not that he or she knew the value of the 
drugs involved.
322
 
2.141 Second, section 82 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006 inserted section 15B and section 84 
amended section 27.  The effect was to create a new offence of importing controlled drugs with a value of 
€13,000 or more, which would be subject to the same penalty provisions as applicable to offences under 
section 15A.  Previously, the offence of importing controlled drugs had attracted a maximum sentence of 
14 years’ imprisonment.
323
  The Minister indicated that it would be strange for this to continue to be the 
case when an offence under section 15A now attracted a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years’ 
imprisonment and a maximum of life imprisonment.
324
 
2.142 Third, section 84 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006 inserted subsection (3CC) into section 27.  
Section 27(3CC)
325
 provided that the court, when deciding whether or not the 10-year minimum would be 
appropriate in a given case, could have regard to: (a) any previous drug trafficking convictions, and (b) 
the public interest in preventing drug trafficking.  While there remained judicial discretion to determine 
whether regard should, in actual fact, be had to these factors and the weight to be attributed to them, the 
intention of the Oireachtas to narrow the aperture through which the judiciary could justify the imposition 
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81 
of more lenient sentences was clear.
326
  In this regard, the Minister observed that in the first five years of 
the operation of the mandatory sentencing provision, the mandatory minimum sentence had only been 
applied in 6 percent of convictions although this figure had increased to 21 percent in 2004.  The Minister 
asserted that subsection (3CC) would act as a “counterweight” to the mitigating factors, which included 
guilty pleas and cooperation, of which the court could take account.
327
  He indicated that this sentencing 
regime would differ from the regular sentencing regime in so far as it would be less bound to the policy of 
individualised sentencing.
328
  A court, when deciding whether or not to impose a 10-year minimum 
sentence in a given case, should have at the forefront of its consideration the social impact of drug 
trafficking and view factors, such as the nature of the drugs and the circumstances of the offender, as 
being of lesser importance.
329
   
2.143 In 2007, the Government introduced the Criminal Justice Bill 2007 which made amendments of a 
technical nature.  Section 33 of the Criminal Justice Act 2007 consolidated the numbering of the 
subsections of section 27 and inserted subsection (3D)(a) which emphasised the social harm caused by 
drug trafficking.  During the second stage of debates, the Minister reiterated the need for consistency in 
sentencing and indicated that since “the policy laid out in 1997 has not been adhered to”, there was a 
need to make this policy more explicit by means of legislation.
330
  It is arguable that this approach did not 
adequately respond to the issue of the minimum term not being applied.  At the end of 2007, it was 
reported that the minimum sentence had been imposed in only three out of 57 cases.
331
 
2.144 These amendments, particularly those introduced by the Criminal Justice Act 1999 and the 
Criminal Justice Act 2006, marked an important turning point in the Irish sentencing regime which had 
until 1999 (with the exception of the sentences for murder, capital murder and treason) accorded primacy 
to judicial discretion in the determination of sentences.  Against the backdrop of an escalating drugs 
problem and a growing realisation that Ireland had become a portal not only to the Irish drugs market but 
also to the British and European drugs markets,
332
 the Oireachtas introduced the presumptive minimum 
sentences to address an apparent rift which had developed between legislative intent and judicial 
execution. 
2.145 It will be recalled that this move towards a more punitive system of sentencing corresponded to a 
similar move in the United Kingdom at the same time.
333
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(2) Mandatory Sentences for Firearm Offences 
(a) United States 
2.146 The practice of prescribing mandatory sentences for firearms offences appears to have originated 
in the United States.  The constitutional right to bear arms in the United States, however, distinguishes 
the relationship which the United States has with firearms, from that of other common law countries.  
Perhaps owing to the constitutional status of this right, it would appear that for many years the primary 
focus of legislative attention in the United States was on the control of firearms (in terms of licensing 
manufacture, trade, ownership and possession) rather than on criminal sanctions for offences involving 
firearms.
334
   
2.147 In the late 1960s, there appears to have been a shift in legislative focus but the reason for this 
shift has not been documented in detail.  There are, however, a number of possible options.  As observed 
at paragraph 2.113, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, mandatory sentences in general became 
more popular as support for the rehabilitative model of imprisonment waned.
335
  In addition, the 1960s 
bore witness to a number of high-profile and, indeed, historically significant assassinations.  In 1963, 
President John F Kennedy was shot dead and in 1968, Martin Luther King and Senator Robert F 
Kennedy were shot dead.  It has been asserted, nonetheless, that these events did not inspire the 
legislative change which occurred but rather put pressure on Congress at crucial points of the process.
336
 
2.148 In 1968 Congress passed the Gun Control Act 1968.
337
  The main objectives of the Act were 
threefold: (i) to eliminate the illicit interstate traffic in firearms and ammunition; (ii) to deny access to 
firearms to certain groups including minors and convicted felons; and (iii) to end the illicit importation of 
surplus military firearms and other guns not certified as suitable for sporting uses.
338
  During the debates, 
however, an alternative to stricter controls on firearms was proposed, namely, mandatory sentences for 
violent crimes committed with guns.
339
  This was reflected in the provision of the Act which mandated 
additional penalties for persons convicted of committing federal crimes with firearms.
340
 
2.149 In 1970 Congress amended the provision to require a mandatory minimum sentence of not less 
than one year for using or carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony and a mandatory 
consecutive sentence of two years for a second or subsequent offence.
341
  In addition, Congress 
introduced a mandatory minimum sentence of one year for using or carrying explosives during the 
commission of certain other crimes.
342
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2.150 In 1984 Congress amended the provision to require a mandatory minimum sentence of five years 
for using or carrying a firearm during a “crime of violence”.
343
  It also established mandatory sentencing 
enhancements for possessing dangerous ammunition during drug and violent crimes.   
2.151 In 1986 Congress expanded the scope of the provision to include using or carrying a firearm 
during the commission of a drug trafficking crime.
344
  In addition, Congress expanded the scope of 
another provision
345
 which prescribes a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years for armed career 
criminals, to cover firearms possession offences committed by persons who have three convictions for 
crimes broadly defined as violent felonies and serious drug offences. 
2.152 In 1998 Congress amended the provision in three ways.
346
  First, it amended the statute to 
require a mandatory minimum sentence of five years if the offender possessed a firearm in furtherance of 
a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.  Second, it established more severe mandatory minimum 
sentences for certain offenders depending on whether, in violating the provision, a firearm was 
“brandished” or “discharged”, requiring mandatory minimum sentences of 7 years and 10 years of 
imprisonment respectively.  Finally, it increased the mandatory minimum sentence for second or 
subsequent convictions under the provision from 20 years to 25 years, to ensure that more serious 
offenders were punishable by progressively higher mandatory minimum sentences. 
2.153 During the 1970s a number of states also introduced mandatory sentencing provisions for 
firearms offences.  In 1975 Massachusetts passed the Bartley Fox Amendment which prescribed a 
mandatory minimum sentence of one year for the offence of carrying a firearm without the appropriate 
permit.
347
  In the same year Florida passed the Felony Firearm Law 1975 which prescribed a mandatory 
minimum sentence of three years for possessing a firearm during the commission of 11 specified 
felonies.
348
  In 1976 California passed the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act 1976 which prescribes 
certain sentence enhancements of one or two years for possession or use of a firearm, respectively, 
during the commission of an offence.
349
  In 1977 Michigan passed the Felony Firearm Statute 1977  
which prescribes an additional two-year sentence for those who possess a firearm while committing a 
felony.
350
  A number of other states, including Missouri, Connecticut and Nebraska, also enacted some 
variant of mandatory sentences for offences involving firearms during this time.
351
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(b) England and Wales 
2.154 In 2002 the Government published a White Paper entitled Justice for All.
352
  The purpose of the 
White Paper was to “send the clearest possible message to those committing offences that the criminal 
justice system is united in ensuring their detection, conviction and punishment.”
353
  It incorporated many 
of the recommendations contained in the 2001 Halliday Report,
354
 which had examined whether the 
sentencing framework in England and Wales could be changed to improve results, especially by reducing 
crime, at justifiable expense.  While neither the 2002 White Paper nor the 2001 Halliday Report referred 
to mandatory sentencing for firearm offences, there was a sense that a public appetite for a stricter 
approach to sentencing existed.
355
   
2.155 During a House of Commons debate in late 2002,
356
 the then Home Secretary was asked 
whether he was aware of the aim of the London Metropolitan Police to get the minimum sentence for 
carrying a weapon raised to five years.  He responded that he was aware of representations having been 
made and commented that “[t]here is good reason for treating the issue seriously and considering 
whether we should add it to the Criminal Justice and Sentencing Bill.”
357
  He was later to rely on this 
statement as having been an indication of his intention to introduce minimum sentences for gun crime 
from December 2002.
358
 
2.156 In the United Kingdom, however, firearms legislation has, for the most part, resulted from 
reactionary responses to specific tragic events.  In a 2006 Home Office Report, for instance, it was noted 
that: 
 “Since the mid-1980s, a number of significant changes have occurred to the legislative and public 
policy responses to gun crime and firearms more generally.  Automatic weapons having been 
banned by the Firearms Act 1937, semi-automatic rifles were banned by the Firearms 
(Amendment) Act 1988 after the massacre of 16 people in Hungerford in 1987.  Then a ban on 
handguns was introduced by the Firearms (Amendment) Act 1997.  This followed the Cullen 
Inquiry … into the 1996 school massacre in Dunblane, Scotland, in which 16 children and a 
teacher were shot and killed.  Both the Hungerford and Dunblane massacres were committed by 
lone gunmen with legally owned firearms.  The UK now has some of the most restrictive firearm 
laws in Europe ...”
359
 
2.157 In January 2003 two teenage girls, Charlene Ellis and Latisha Shakespear, were shot dead as 
they stood outside a New Year’s party in Aston, Birmingham.
360
  The incident was considered to be 
indicative of a rising gun culture in England and Wales.
361
  This was confirmed by Home Office figures 
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released shortly afterward, which showed that there had been a 35 percent increase in gun crime in 
England and Wales during the 12 months up to April 2002.
362
  In advance of these figures being released, 
the Home Secretary confirmed that he would be introducing a mandatory minimum five-year sentence for 
illegal possession and use of firearms.
363
  The announcement met with widespread criticism from the 
judiciary, who argued that they should be allowed to use their discretion in sentencing offenders, and 
opposition parties, who argued that the Home Secretary was engaging in “knee-jerk” politics.
364
  Within a 
day of his initial announcement, the Home Secretary announced that the proposed legislation would be 
modified to permit the judiciary to depart from the minimum sentence where there were exceptional 
circumstances.
365
 
2.158 In 2003 Parliament passed the Criminal Justice Act 2003.  Arguably, the 2003 Act had been 
inspired by the proposals contained in the Government’s 2002 White Paper Justice for All and the 
intervening events.
366
  Section 287 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 inserted section 51A of the Firearms 
Act 1968.  As detailed at paragraph 4.105, section 51A of the Firearms Act 1968, as amended,
367
 
provides for a presumptive minimum sentence of five years for certain firearms offences.   
(d) Ireland 
2.159 In Ireland, there had long been calls to introduce mandatory sentencing for firearms offences.  
Calls for “mandatory minimum” sentences for firearms offences were first heard by the Dáil in 1986
368
 but 
were dismissed by the Minister for Justice on the basis of possible constitutional problems and the lack of 
public appetite.  A general call for more robust measures against firearms offences was also rejected the 
following year.
369
 
2.160 In July 1996, following the shooting dead of Garda Jerry McCabe and Veronica Guerin, the 
Opposition moved a private members’ motion in which they called on the Government to consider, among 
other matters, the introduction of mandatory minimum sentences for the use of illegal firearms.
370
  At that 
time, it was suspected that these offences had been committed by members of subversive and criminal 
organisations.
371
  The notoriety of these criminal organisations had grown as details of their exploits 
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filtered into the public domain.  Their revenue was derived primarily from drug trafficking - a territorial 
business which was guarded both jealously and ruthlessly.  The link between the drugs trade and 
firearms had become evident as a proliferation of illegal firearms meant that tales of a lethal turf-war were 
never far from the headlines.  Competitors, traitors, potential threats and people in the wrong place at the 
wrong time were casually and frequently eliminated.
372
  While the identities of the criminal bosses were 
known or, at very least, suspected, the sophisticated level at which they operated made detection and 
prosecution almost impossible.  The fact that representatives of two democratic institutions (An Garda 
Síochána and the Press) should be targeted within such a short space of time was considered by some to 
be an “attack on democracy” and proof that the crime situation now required a declaration of a “state of 
emergency”.
373
  The climate seemed right to come down heavily on the activities of these organisations.  
The Government declined, however, to introduce mandatory sentencing in respect of either drug 
trafficking or firearms offences, preferring instead to focus on the causes of crime, Garda powers and the 
proceeds of crime.
374
  
2.161 In October 2003, a newly appointed Garda Commissioner, Noel Conroy, addressed the Joint 
Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women’s Rights and explained the extent of the perceived 
problem of offences involving firearms: 
 “I am concerned at the number of homicides and other instances involving the use of firearms.  
Of the 42 deaths this year, 19 involved the use of firearms.  This compares to ten in the year 
2002 and nine in the year 2001.  There are a number of factors which explain this increase.  
Some former paramilitary weapons have found their way into the hands of criminal organisations 
and this has contributed to the general increase in the use of firearms in recent times, in 
particular in so-called gangland style murders and shootings.  There have also been cases where 
former paramilitaries have turned to crime.  Criminal gangs are also known to import firearms with 
their consignments of drugs and cigarettes and so on.”
375
 
Shortly afterwards, the Department of Justice released figures to the Labour Party Spokesperson on 
Justice which indicated that there had been a 500 percent increase in murders involving firearms since 
1998.
376
   
2.162 In April 2004, the then Minister for Justice announced to the Association of Garda Sergeants and 
Inspectors that the laws relating to drugs and firearms offences would be strengthened.
377
  Shortly after 
the Minister’s announcement, two reports were published which lent credence to popular fears.  On 16
th
 
April 2004, the Department of Justice released Garda figures which indicated that there had been a 
substantial increase in firearms offences for the first three months of 2004.
378
  This was followed by the 
publication, on 19
th
 April 2004, of an all-Ireland survey commissioned by the National Advisory Committee 
on Drugs (NACD) in Ireland and the Drug and Alcohol Information and Research Unit (DAIRU) in 
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Northern Ireland, which illustrated the extent to which drug misuse had become a serious problem in 
Ireland.
379
  Commenting on the all-Ireland survey, the Minister for Justice stated that the courts “must 
adopt a tough approach to criminals convicted of drugs or firearms offences, the two of which were 
inextricably linked.”
380
  In an apparent reference to the presumptive sentence for offences under section 
15A of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, he commented: 
 “Our judiciary must understand when the Oireachtas put in place guidelines for the sentencing of 
people convicted for the commercial distribution of drugs that the parliament was serious and 
required deterrent sentences in that area, and did not expect that the system of penalties 
provided was to be regarded as the exception rather than the rule.”
381
 
2.163 In 2004, the Government introduced the Criminal Justice Bill 2004.
382
  As noted at paragraph 
2.139, during the Second Stage debates, the Government announced that it would be introducing a 
number of substantial amendments which would, among other matters, provide presumptive sentences 
for certain firearms offences.
383
  The amendments were finalised following the fatal shooting of Donna 
Cleary in March 2006
384
 and the Criminal Justice Bill was enacted as the Criminal Justice Act 2006. 
2.164 At the same time, the idea that presumptive sentencing could be used to tackle firearms offences 
had gained momentum in the United Kingdom which had introduced similar sentencing provisions in the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003.   
2.165 The Criminal Justice Act 2006 amended the Firearms Acts with the result that many firearms 
offences now carry a presumptive sentence of five or 10 years.  The offences which attract a five-year 
sentence are possession of a firearm while taking a vehicle without authority;
385
 possession of a firearm 
or ammunition in suspicious circumstances;
386
 carrying a firearm or imitation firearm with intent to commit 
an indictable offence or resist arrest;
387
 and shortening the barrel of a shotgun or rifle.
388
  The offences 
which attract a 10-year sentence are possession of firearms with intent to endanger life;
389
 and using a 
firearm to assist or aid in an escape.
390
   
2.166 The Criminal Justice Act 2006, in so far as it continued the trend started by the Criminal Justice 
Act 1999, marked an important development in the evolution of sentencing.  Whereas presumptive 
sentencing had previously been limited to the offence of possessing drugs with intent to sell or supply, it 
                                                     
379
  Drug Use in Ireland and Northern Ireland: 2002/2003 Drug Prevalence Survey (Health Board (Ireland) and 
Health and Social Services Board (Northern Ireland), April 2004); and Lally “Report to Show Drug Trade has 
spread throughout State” Irish Times 19 April 2004. 
380
  Lally “All-Ireland Survey Shows Fast Rise in Use of Cocaine” Irish Times 20 April 2004; and McDaid “Minister 
Vows to Get Tough on Drugs” Irish News 20 April 2004. 
381
  Lally “All-Ireland Survey Shows Fast Rise in Use of Cocaine” Irish Times 20 April 2004. 
382
  Dáil Debates, Criminal Justice Bill 2004: Order for Second Stage, 15 February 2005, Vol 597, No 5. 
383
  Dáil Debates, Criminal Justice Bill 2004, Second Stage, 15 February 2005, Vol 597, No 5. 
384
  Robinson “Calls for Gun-Crime Crackdown as Killings leave Public Reeling” Irish News 8 March 2006; “Time 
for Action, not Words, on Guns” Irish Times 7 March 2006; O’Halloran “Harney says Firearms Laws will be 
Amended” Irish Times 9 March 2006; and McMorrow “Ireland in the Grip of Gun Crime” Sunday Tribune 12 
March 2006. 
385
  Section 26 of the Firearms Act 1964, as substituted by section 57 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006. 
386
  Section 27A of the Firearms Act 1964, as substituted by section 59 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006. 
387
  Section 27B of the Firearms Act 1964, as substituted by section 60 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006. 
388
  Section 12A of the Firearms and Offensive Weapons Act 1990, inserted by section 65 of the Criminal Justice 
Act 2006. 
389
  Section 15 of the Firearms Act 1925, as substituted by section 42 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006. 
390
  Section 27 of the Firearms Act 1964, as substituted by section 58 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006. 
88 
now applied to a range of drug and firearms offences.  As a result, there were now 8 types of offence for 
which judicial discretion regarding sentencing would be constrained.  The Commission observes, 
however, that the fact that presumptive sentencing was limited to such a specific range of offences gives 
rise to the inference that: (a) presumptive sentencing was intended to apply in the relatively narrow 
circumstances of addressing a major challenge to society (such as in the case of certain drugs and 
firearms offences), and (b) general judicial sentencing discretion was accepted as suitable in other cases. 
2.167 In 2007 the Criminal Justice Act 2007 inserted a subsection
391
 emphasising the social harm 
caused by the unlawful possession and use of firearms into the sections
392
 of the Firearms Acts which 
had created the offences to which the presumptive sentences applied.  It has been noted that the purpose 
of this provision was to reduce the number of situations in which the courts could impose sentences 
below the presumptive minimum by making clear the intention of the Oireachtas that the presumptive 
minimum sentence was to be imposed in all but the most exceptional cases.
393
 
(3) Proposals to Extend the Use of Presumptive Minimum Sentences in Ireland  
2.168 The Commission notes that in Ireland recent legislative proposals have sought to extend the use 
of presumptive minimum sentences beyond specified drugs and firearms offences.   
(i) Criminal Justice (Aggravated False Imprisonment) Bill 2012 (Private Member’s Bill) 
2.169 In January 2012 Fianna Fáil published the Criminal Justice (Aggravated False Imprisonment) 
Bill,
394
 the provisions of which are clearly influenced by the presumptive sentencing regimes under the 
Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 and the Firearms Acts.  The Bill would, if enacted, create a statutory offence of 
“aggravated false imprisonment” (otherwise known as “tiger kidnapping”) which would attract a 
presumptive minimum sentence of 10 years.
395
  The presumptive sentence would not apply where there 
were “exceptional and specific circumstances.”  Exceptional and specific circumstances would include: (a) 
whether the person had pleaded guilty and, if so, the stage at which he or she had indicated the intention 
to plead guilty and the circumstances in which the indication had been given, and (b) whether the person 
had materially assisted in the investigation of the offence including by an admission that a criminal 
organisation existed and the identification of other members of the criminal organisation.
396
  The 
presumptive sentence would become a mandatory sentence where the person was convicted of a second 
or subsequent offence of aggravated false imprisonment.
397
   
(ii) Assaults on Emergency Workers Bill 2012 (Private Members’ Bill) 
2.170 In October 2012, Fianna Fáil published the Assaults on Emergency Workers Bill 2012.  This 
Private Members’ Bill sought the introduction of a presumptive minimum sentence of five years’ 
imprisonment for those who: (i) commit an assault causing serious harm to an on-duty emergency worker; 
(ii) threaten to kill or cause serious harm to an on-duty emergency worker; or (iii) injure an on-duty 
emergency worker by piercing his or her skin with a syringe.
398
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2.171 In certain respects, it is again clear that this proposal was influenced by the presumptive 
sentencing regimes under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 and the Firearms Acts.  Notably, the Bill 
provided that a sentencing court would not be required to impose the prescribed minimum penalty where 
it was satisfied that there were exceptional and specific circumstances relating to the offence or the 
offender which would make the application of this penalty unjust in all the circumstances.
399
  In 
determining whether such circumstances existed, the court would be permitted to take into account any 
matters which it considered appropriate, including: (a) whether the person pleaded guilty and, if so, the 
stage at which he or she indicated the intention to plead guilty, and the circumstances in which the 
indication was given, and (b) whether the person materially assisted in the investigation of the offence.
400
  
The proposed sentencing regime did differ from existing presumptive sentencing provisions in so far as it 
would apply to offenders aged at least 16 years, as opposed to those aged 18 years or over.
401
  
2.172 During the Dáil debates, the Government opposed the Bill on three grounds.  First, it asserted 
that there was “already legislation in place which is more appropriate and comprehensive”
402
 in its 
provision of protection to emergency workers.  Specifically, reference was made to the provisions of the 
Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997 which criminalise various forms of assault, threats to kill, 
and attacks involving syringes.
403
  The Government also observed that section 19 of the Criminal Justice 
(Public Order) Act 1994, as amended,
404
 affords express statutory protection to emergency workers in the 
context of offences involving assault or threatened assault.
405
  
2.173 Second, the Government acknowledged that the Commission was, at this time, examining the 
issue of mandatory sentencing and noted that it did not wish to pre-empt the recommendations contained 
in this Report.
406
  Third, the Government contended that there were a number of technical difficulties with 
the proposed Bill.  These related to: (i) the proposed application of the regime to offenders under the age 
of 18 years; (ii) the definition of an “emergency worker” for the purposes of the Bill; and (iii) the absence 
of prescribed maximum penalties under the Bill.
407
  The Assaults on Emergency Workers Bill 2012 was 
ultimately rejected by a margin of 91 votes to 42.  
2.174 The Commission notes that in addition to the legislative proposals discussed above, there have, 
in recent years, been calls to introduce mandatory minimum sentences for various other crimes, including 
assaults against the elderly;
408
 burglary;
409
 car hijacking;
410
 child sex abuse;
411
 dangerous driving;
412
 
gangland murder;
413
 possession of child pornography;
414
 rape;
415
 and violent assault.
416
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D Historical Evolution of Mandatory Sentences for Second or Subsequent Offences 
2.175 The use of mandatory sentences for second or subsequent offences has a much longer pedigree 
than the use of mandatory sentences for drugs and firearms offences.  Indeed, there are examples of 
habitual offender laws dating back to 16
th
 century England and colonial America.
417
  That said, the 
modern practice of using mandatory sentences to deal with repeat offenders seems to originate in the 
United States. 
(1) United States 
2.176 It has been observed that habitual offender legislation flourished in the United States in the 
1920s.
418
  In 1926, for instance, New York state enacted Baume's Law 1926 which prescribed a 
mandatory life sentence for a third felony conviction.  Six other states passed habitual offender legislation 
in the 1920s.  By 1968 23 states had enacted legislation that permitted or mandated life sentences for 
habitual offenders; 9 states prescribed mandatory minimum sentences ranging from five to 20 years for 
habitual felons; and each of the remaining states enacted legislative provisions that permitted habitual 
offenders to be sentenced to extended prison terms. 
2.177 It would appear, however, that the modern “three-strikes” movement began in Washington 
state.
419
  Following the murder of Diane Ballasiotes by a convicted rapist who had been released from 
prison, Washington state enacted the Persistent Offender Accountability Act 1994.  This provides that any 
person convicted for the third time of a specified offence must receive a mandatory life sentence without 
the possibility of parole.
420
 
2.178 It was not long before California became the second state to adopt three-strikes legislation.
421
  
The campaign was led by Mike Reynolds, whose daughter, Kimber Reynolds, had been murdered in 
1992 by an offender with previous convictions.
422
  The reform campaign might not have succeeded had it 
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not been for the murder of Polly Klass in 1993 by an offender who had an extensive prior record of 
violence.
423
  The public outcry that followed the event galvanized the Reynolds campaign. 
2.179 In November 1994, voters in Georgia passed a ballot measure amending the state’s sentencing 
laws to prescribe a mandatory life sentence without parole for a second conviction of an offence specified 
in the measure.
424
  The law supplemented an existing law which permitted the courts to impose the 
maximum sentence for a second felony conviction and required the courts to impose the maximum 
sentence for a fourth felony conviction.    
2.180 By 1997, 24 states and the Federal government had enacted three-strikes legislation.
425
   
(2) England and Wales 
2.181 It was not until transportation was abolished in 1857 that recidivism arose as a significant issue 
for legislative consideration in the United Kingdom.
426
  In 1863 the Royal Commission on Penal Servitude 
concluded that imprisonment was not a sufficient deterrent.
427
  The reason for this, it asserted, was that 
the minimum term of three years’ penal servitude, which had replaced the minimum term of 7 years for 
transportation,
428
 was too short.  This led to the enactment of the Penal Servitude Act 1864 which made 
five years the new minimum for penal servitude and, under pressure, the Government made 7 years’ 
penal servitude the minimum term for anyone with a previous felony conviction.
429
  The 1864 Act was 
criticised as the mandatory minimum terms only applied to those sentenced to penal servitude.
430
  If the 
courts considered it to be too severe a punishment, they were free to impose a sentence of ordinary 
imprisonment, the maximum term of which was two years.  Given the enormous gap between the two 
alternatives, the result was widespread disparity in sentencing by different courts.  In 1879 the minimum 
sentence of 7 years’ penal servitude for a second felony conviction was repealed.
431
 
2.182 In an effort to respond to this loophole, the Habitual Criminals Act 1869 was enacted.
432
  The Bill 
initially included a clause making 7 years’ penal servitude mandatory on a third felony conviction.
433
  This 
was withdrawn when it was conceded that designating the number of convictions as the factor which 
triggered the mandatory sentence could lead to great hardship.  Instead, the 1869 Act provided that all 
those convicted for a second time of a felony or certain misdemeanours be subject to police supervision 
for 7 years after they had served their sentences.  It further provided that those subject to such 
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supervision should be liable to one year’s imprisonment when it was proved summarily before 
magistrates that they had been acting suspiciously or when they were unable to prove that they had been 
earning their livelihood by honest means.
434
  This soon became unworkable.
435
 
2.183 The Prevention of Crimes Act 1871 was thus enacted.
436
  This gave the courts discretion to 
decide whether to make a habitual offender subject to supervision or not.  It provided that a twice-
convicted offender would be liable, at any time within 7 years of release from prison, to one year’s 
imprisonment if proved to be earning his or her livelihood by dishonest means or acting in certain 
suspicious circumstances.  He or she would not, however, be subject to supervision.  The 1871 Act also 
provided that a twice-convicted offender might be placed under police supervision for 7 years or for any 
shorter period subject to the same conditions of good behaviour.
437
 
2.184 In 1895, the Gladstone Committee argued in favour of a special sentencing provision to deal with 
persistent thieves and robbers, who would otherwise serve a succession of short sentences only to be 
released into the community to re-offend.
438
  The Committee’s proposals led to the enactment of the 
Prevention of Crime Act 1908.
439
  Section 10 of the Prevention of Crime Act 1908 empowered the court to 
impose on an offender with three previous felony convictions, a sentence of preventive detention of not 
less than five or more than 10 years in addition to the normal sentence for the crime.  The practical focus 
of the 1908 Act changed when the then Home Secretary issued a circular stating that preventive 
detention should not be imposed for merely repetitive offending but for repetitive offending that is a 
serious danger to society.
440
 
2.185 In 1932, the Dove-Wilson Committee proposed a new type of preventive detention for 
professional criminals.
441
  This led to the enactment of the Criminal Justice Act 1948.  Section 21 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1948 prescribed for persistent offenders a sentence of not less than five or more than 
14 years instead of, rather than in addition to, the normal sentence.  Over time, however, the courts found 
that preventive detention was being imposed for relatively minor offences.  In 1962, the Lord Chief Justice 
issued a Practice Direction to restrict the use of preventive detention.
442
  Following a critical report from 
the Advisory Council on the Treatment of Offenders in 1963, and a number of other reports which 
highlighted the minor nature of many of the offences which had attracted a sentence of preventive 
detention, the sentence fell into disuse. 
2.186 In 1965, a White Paper
443
 proposed the introduction of an extended sentence to deal with 
persistent offenders who constituted a menace to society.
444
  This led to the enactment of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1967.  Section 37 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 empowered the courts to extend a 
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sentence beyond the normal length or, in limited circumstances, beyond the statutory maximum where, 
having regard to the defendant’s record, it was considered that this was necessary to protect the public.  
However, the courts soon found that the extended sentence was being imposed for relatively minor 
offences.  In addition, it has been noted that at no time did the extended sentence play a significant role in 
sentencing.
445
 
2.187 Section 37 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 was replaced by section 28 of the Powers of Criminal 
Courts Act 1973, a statute which consolidated the law on sentencing.
446
  This, in turn, was repealed by 
the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. 
2.188 In 1997, the Crimes (Sentences) Act 1997 was enacted.  Section 2 of the 1997 Act, a provision 
which was severely criticised during its life,
447
 required the imposition of a life sentence, except in 
exceptional circumstances, on offenders who had been convicted of a second serious offence.  Section 2 
was replaced by section 109 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, a statute which 
consolidated the law on sentencing.
448
  In 2000, the Court of Appeal effectively neutralised the “two 
strikes” rule when it ruled that only in exceptional circumstances could judges take into account whether 
the offender presented a danger to the public.
449
   
2.189 In the 2001 Halliday Report, it was observed that the public were frustrated by a criminal justice 
system which it perceived to be treating “dangerous, violent, sexual and other serious offenders” 
leniently.
450
  As noted at paragraph 2.154, the Government’s 2002 White Paper Justice for All
451
 
incorporated many of the recommendations contained in the 2001 Halliday Report.
452
  This, in turn, 
inspired the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
2.190 Section 303 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 repealed 109 of the Powers of Criminal Courts 
(Sentencing) Act 2000.
453
  However, the 2003 Act also established a new sentencing provision for public 
protection.  Section 225 of the 2003 Act required the courts to impose a life sentence for a serious 
offence
454
 where they were of the opinion that there was a significant risk that the offender would commit 
further offences causing serious harm to members of the public if released.  If the offence was one in 
respect of which the offender would, apart from section 225, be liable to life imprisonment, and the court 
considered that the seriousness of the offence, or the offence and one or more offences associated with 
it, was such as to justify the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment, the court was required to 
impose a sentence of life imprisonment.  Where an offence was serious but did not attract a life sentence 
or the current offence was not sufficiently serious, the court was required to impose an indeterminate 
sentence of imprisonment for public protection (IPP sentence).  Section 226 created a similar sentence 
for offenders under 18 years of age. 
2.191 Ashworth and Player were highly critical of section 225 and its neighbouring provisions: 
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 “These are unduly weak provisions to support the severely restrictive sentences that follow.  
There is no hint of recognition of the well-known fallibility of judgments of dangerousness.  There 
is no requirement on courts to obtain relevant reports on the offender: a requirement to consult a 
report if there is one is inadequate.  Moreover, the presumption applies where there is just one 
previous conviction of any of more than 150 specified offences, which vary considerably in their 
seriousness.  It is doubtful whether the presumption is compatible with Article 5 of the 
Convention, insofar as it requires the courts to assume significant risk without investigating the 
particular facts and reports, and (effectively) places the burden on the defence to negative 
this.”
455
 
2.192 In 2008, the Chief Inspector of Prisons and the Chief Inspector of Probation conducted a review 
of the IPP sentence.
456
  They observed that section 225 and section 226 had given rise to a large number 
of new and resource-intensive prisoners being fed into a prison system that was already under strain.
457
  
This, they noted, had not only “increased pressure, and reduced manoeuvrability, within the prison 
system” but had also stretched the Probation Service.
458
  The consequence of this was: 
 “...IPP prisoners languishing in local prisons for months and years, unable to access the 
interventions they would need before the expiry of their often short tariff periods.  A belated 
decision to move them to training prisons, without any additional resources and sometimes to one 
which did not offer relevant programmes, merely transferred the problem.  By December 2007, 
when there were 3,700 IPP prisoners, it was estimated that 13% were over tariff.  As a 
consequence, the Court of Appeal found that the Secretary of State had acted unlawfully, and 
that there had been ‘systematic failure to put in place the resources necessary to implement the 
scheme of rehabilitation necessary to enable the relevant provisions of the 2003 Act to function 
as intended.”
459
 
This was by no means a new revelation.  Similar comments had been made by the media in the years 
preceding the publication of the report.
460
   
2.193 In 2008, section 225 was amended by section 13 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 
2008.  The amendments provided that the courts would have a power, rather than a duty, to impose an 
IPP sentence.  They further provided that this power may only be exercised where either of two 
conditions is met, namely, the immediate offence would attract a notional minimum term of at least two 
years, or the offender had on a previous occasion been convicted of one of the offences listed in the new 
Schedule 15A to the 2003 Act.
461
  Section 14 made similar amendments to section 226. 
2.194 In December 2010, the Government published a Green Paper on sentencing titled Breaking the 
Cycle: Effective Punishment, Rehabilitation and Sentencing of Offenders.
462
  This consultation paper 
acknowledged that there remained a range of problems with the IPP sentencing regime.  Among other 
things, it observed that: (i) the regime had come to be applied on a much wider basis than had originally 
been anticipated; (ii) the release rate was very low because offenders were required to satisfy the Parole 
Board that they did not pose an unmanageable risk to the community and, in practice, this negative 
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criterion was difficult to prove; (iii) the ability to predict future serious offending is limited, thus calling into 
question the entire basis upon which these sentences were imposed;  (iv) the regime confused the 
sentencing framework and may have undermined public confidence in so far as the court, the victim and 
the public had little means of knowing how long an offender would remain in custody; and (v) the larger 
the number of prisoners subject to these sentences, the more difficult it had become to facilitate their 
rehabilitation.
463
   
2.195 On the basis of these deficiencies, the Green Paper proposed the restriction of IPP sentences to 
exceptionally serious cases, specifically, those which would otherwise have merited a sentence of at least 
10 years.
464
  Upon publishing the outcome of the consultation process in June 2011, however, the 
Government went beyond these initial proposals and signalled its intention to urgently review the IPP 
regime with a view to replacing it with a determinate sentencing framework.
465
    
2.196 In December 2012, section 225 and section 226 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 were repealed 
by section 123 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012.  In place of the IPP 
sentence, the 2012 Act introduced a framework which, according to the former Secretary of State for 
Justice, Kenneth Clarke, was intended to “replace a regime that did not work as it was intended to with 
one that gives the public the fullest possible protection from serious, violent and sexual crime.”
466
  Broadly 
speaking, this new regime has three main strands.  First, section 122 of the 2012 Act introduced a 
presumptive life sentence for those described by the then Secretary of State for Justice as “the very 
serious offenders, the ones who are among the worst of the likely inhabitants of Her Majesty’s prisons.”
467
  
As outlined in greater detail at paragraph 5.33, this sentencing regime applies in circumstances where an 
offender has committed on two separate occasions, two prescribed serious sexual or violent offences, 
each of which was serious enough to merit a determinate sentence of at least 10 years.   
2.197 Second, the then Secretary of State for Justice acknowledged that, following the abolition of the 
IPP sentence, the penalty most relevant to serious offenders would again be the discretionary life 
sentence.
468
  He observed that this indeterminate sentence had long been available under the British 
justice system and that it was the appropriate penalty where the maximum penalty for an offence is life 
imprisonment and where the offence is sufficiently serious.
469
   
2.198 Third, any offender who would previously have received an IPP sentence is eligible to receive an 
extended determinate sentence where he or she has not received either the presumptive life sentence or 
the discretionary life sentence.  As detailed at paragraph 5.37, this extended sentence, which is “broadly 
similar”
470
 to that formerly provided by section 227 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 was introduced by 
section 124 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, and consists of a 
custodial sentence plus a further extended licence period set by the court.  The main change effected by 
this reform is that an offender must now serve at least two-thirds of the determinate sentence imposed 
under this regime or, in some particularly serious cases, must apply to the Parole Board for release and 
may be detained in prison until the end of the determinate sentence.  This provision may apply where the 
                                                     
463
  Breaking the Cycle: Effective Punishment, Rehabilitation and Sentencing of Offenders (Ministry of Justice, 
2010) at 55.  
464
  Ibid at 56.  
465
  Breaking the Cycle: Government Response (Ministry of Justice, 2011) at 11.  
466
  Hansard, House of Commons, Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill: 1 November 2011, 
Column 785.   
467
  Hansard, House of Commons, Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill: 1 November 2011, 
Column 788.   
468
  Ibid.   
469
  Ibid.   
470
  Thomas “The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012: The Sentencing Provisions” 
(2012) 8 Criminal Law Review 572 at 575. 
96 
offender is being sentenced for any serious sexual or violent offence, provided that the court considers 
that he or she presents a risk of causing serious harm through future reoffending.   
2.199 Mandatory sentencing regimes have also been established in England and Wales to deal with 
repeat offenders convicted of drugs offences or domestic burglary.  As discussed in detail at paragraph 
5.27ff, section 110 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 obliges the courts to impose a 
minimum sentence of 7 years where the offender has been convicted of a third Class A drug trafficking 
offence. 
2.200 The modern history of mandatory sentences for domestic burglary probably starts with the 
Government’s 1996 White Paper.
471
  One of the proposals in the White Paper concerned the imposition of 
a mandatory minimum sentence of three years on offenders convicted of a third domestic burglary.
472
  In 
the White Paper, the Government observed that burglary, which was a “pernicious and predatory” crime 
which could have particularly disastrous effects for elderly people, was one of the most commonly 
occurring offences.
473
  It noted, however, that in a substantial portion of cases, the courts did not impose 
a custodial sentence: 
“Severe penalties are available for burglary.  The maximum sentence is 14 years for burglary of a 
dwelling, and 10 years in other cases.  In cases of aggravated burglary - where the offender has 
a weapon - the maximum penalty is life imprisonment.  But in a substantial proportion of cases, 
the courts do not impose a custodial sentence on convicted burglars even if they have numerous 
previous convictions... . The average sentence length imposed on a sample of offenders 
convicted for the first time of domestic burglary in 1993 and 1994 and given a custodial sentence 
was only 16.2 months in the Crown Court and 3.7 months in magistrates’ courts.  Even after 3 or 
more convictions, the average sentence imposed on conviction in the Crown Court was only 18.9 
months; and after 7 or more convictions, 19.4 months.  And 28% of offenders convicted in the 
Crown Court with 7 or more convictions for domestic burglary were not sent to prison at all.  At 
magistrates’ courts, 61% of offenders with 7 or more domestic burglary convictions were given a 
non-custodial sentence in 1993 and 1994.”
474
 
2.201 As noted at paragraphs 2.123 and 2.124, the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 was enacted to 
implement the proposals contained in the 1996 White Paper.
475
  Section 4 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 
1997 required the imposition of a three-year sentence, except in specific circumstances, on offenders 
who had been convicted of a third domestic burglary.  Section 4 was replaced by section 111 of the 
Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 which, as it was a consolidation act,
476
 made no 
changes to the substantive law. 
(3) Ireland 
2.202 There are a number of examples of legislative provisions in Irish law which establish a mandatory 
sentencing regime for repeat offenders.  These include provisions in the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, the 
Firearms Acts and the Criminal Justice Act 2007. 
2.203 The Prevention of Crime Act 1908 in England and Wales, which provided that a habitual offender 
should serve no less than five and no more than 10 years in prison, also applied to Ireland.  In The 
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People (DPP) v Carmody,
477
 however, the Court of Criminal Appeal ruled that in the absence of 
appropriate facilities in the State for providing such detention, the Act could not be applied in practice.
478
  
The 1908 Act was subsequently repealed by the Criminal Law Act 1997.
479
 
2.204 It was not until 2004 that the option of imposing mandatory sentences on repeat offenders arose 
again as a significant issue for legislative consideration.  During the 2004 Dáil debates on the Criminal 
Justice Bill 2004,
480
 the Opposition proposed an amendment in respect of the provisions dealing with 
drugs and firearms offences which would remove the power of the judiciary to impose a sentence of less 
than the statutory minimum where the offender had been convicted of a second or subsequent offence.  It 
was stated that the “get-out clause where a person is convicted of a first offence... should not be applied 
in the case of a second offence.”  During Report Stage, this was elaborated on in respect of firearms 
offences: 
 “A person who got away with it, so to speak, under the exceptional circumstances on a first 
offence would have received sufficient warning that he or she was teetering on the edge of a 
minimum mandatory sentence if he or she again had anything to do with firearms”.
481
 
No doubt, this rationale equally applied to drugs offences.  Having consulted the Attorney General, the 
Minister for Justice accepted the amendment.
482
 
2.205 As a result, section 27(3F) was inserted into the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977.  Section 27(3F) 
provides that where a person, aged 18 years or over, is convicted of a second or subsequent offence 
under section 15A or section 15B, the court must impose a sentence of not less than the statutory 
minimum sentence. 
2.206 Similar provisions were also inserted into the Firearms Acts.  These also prescribe a mandatory 
minimum sentence for persons, aged 18 years or over, convicted for a second or subsequent time of a 
firearms offence which attracts a presumptive minimum sentence.
483
 
2.207 In 2007, the Criminal Justice Bill 2007 was presented to the Dáil.  The purpose of the Bill, as 
indicated by the Minister for Justice, was to “send a clear and unambiguous message” that society was 
“not prepared to allow organised criminal gangs set about the destruction of families and communities.”
484
  
The Minister acknowledged that the Bill contained tough measures but indicated that the measures were 
“both necessary and proportionate to the threat [of] organised crime.”
485
  McIntyre observes that, at the 
time, there was also a perception that the criminal justice system had become “unbalanced” in favour of 
the criminal.
486
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2.208 Section 24 of the 2007 Bill provided that a person who committed any one of a list of scheduled 
offences and, within 7 years, committed another of those offences would be subject to a penalty of 
imprisonment equal to at least three quarters of the maximum term laid down by law for that second 
offence.
487
  Where the second offence carried a potential maximum term of life imprisonment, a sentence 
of at least 10 years was mandated.  This provision was enacted as section 25 of the Criminal Justice Act 
2007. 
2.209 Regarding the scheduled offences, the Minister for Justice indicated that these were “among the 
most serious known in criminal law” and included “offences typically associated with gangland crime, 
including, of course, drug-trafficking and firearms offences.”
488
  The Minister stated that, in broad terms, 
these were racketeering offences and that the inspiration for the inclusion of these provisions was the 
“Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization, RICO, legislation in the USA”.
489
  He remarked that 
“these provisions on sentencing are innovative in Irish terms and reflect the need to find new ways to 
meet the challenge that we face from organised crime.”
490
 
2.210 There were a number of events which prompted the introduction of the Criminal Justice Bill in 
2007.  In December 2006, there had been a spate of murders which, the Minister for Justice stated, 
indicated that “some criminal gangs believed they could act with impunity.”
491
  In addition, the Balance in 
the Criminal Law Review Group, which had been established by the Minister in 2006 to examine a wide 
range of criminal justice areas,
492
 had just published its interim report.
493
   The Opposition also referred to 
two recent reports which had ranked Ireland unfavourably in terms of criminal statistics.
494
  In February 
2007, the EU International Crime Survey had published its 2005 report, The Burden of Crime in the EU,
495
 
which found that Ireland ranked highest with regard to the risk of crime, assaults with force, sexual 
assaults and robberies.
496
  At around the same time, the Economic and Social Research Institute of 
Ireland had published crime figures in its 2007 report, The Best of Times? The Social Impact of the Celtic 
Tiger,
497
 which suggested that while the rate of lethal violence in Dublin was not out of line with other 
European capital cities, it had “increased dramatically when the international trend [was] downward.”
498
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Arguably, also, the enactment of the Criminal Justice Act 2006 had exposed a number of criminal justice 
areas which would require further examination.   
2.211 The passage of the 2007 Bill was not without controversy.  Due to the fact that the Government 
had imposed a guillotine on the Dáil debate, the Bill passed through the Dáil and the Seanad by 27
th
 April 
2007.
499
  This, it was argued, did not allow sufficient time for the Bill to be debated.
500
  In particular, it was 
observed that the Irish Human Rights Commission had not had time to examine the Bill,
501
 as it was 
empowered to do by law.
502
   
2.212 In addition, McIntyre notes that the final version of section 25 is a “somewhat watered down” 
version of that originally proposed.
503
  In its original form, section 25 did not permit of any exception to the 
mandatory minimum sentence.  It was felt, however, that this might lead to disproportionate sentencing.  
As a result, section 25 was amended so as to permit the court to disregard the prescribed minimum 
sentence where it would be disproportionate in all the circumstances of the case.
504
  Furthermore, the 
original version of section 25 became operable if a prison term of 12 months or more had been imposed 
for a first offence.  It was felt, however, that this was too low a threshold to trigger the minimum sentence.  
As a result, section 25 was amended so as to raise the threshold to five years’ imprisonment for the first 
offence.  Finally, the original version of section 25 applied to a broader range of scheduled offences, 
which included both burglary and robbery.  It was observed, however, that the range of scheduled 
offences went beyond what might be committed by persons engaged in “gangland activities.”
505
  As a 
result, section 25 and Schedule 2 were amended so as to remove burglary and robbery from the list of 
scheduled offences.
506
 
2.213 These amendments were due in no small part to the fact that the Bill had been widely 
criticised.
507
  The Irish Human Rights Commission, for instance, was of the opinion that the “principles of 
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circumstances; possession of firearm with intent to endanger life; possession of firearms while taking vehicle 
without authority; use of firearms to assist or aid escape; possession of firearm or ammunition in suspicious 
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proportionality and judicial discretion cast some shadow over the constitutionality of section 24”.
508
  In a 
similar vein, the Irish Council for Civil Liberties asserted that section 24 might “impinge upon the 
constitutional duty of judges to ensure that sentences are proportionate to both the gravity of the crime 
and the personal circumstances of the offender.”
509
  The Law Society
510
 and some prominent criminal law 
practitioners were also quick to voice their concerns regarding proportionality and the separation of 
powers.
511
  Having consulted the Council of State, the President decided not to refer the Bill to the 
Supreme Court and signed the Bill into law.
512
 
2.214 Mandatory sentences for repeat offenders have been considered in a number of recent decisions.  
In The People (DPP) v McMahon,
513
 the Court of Criminal Appeal considered an appeal by the DPP 
against the leniency of a 10-year sentence.  The respondent, a psychiatric patient who had stabbed a 
doctor, had been convicted of assault causing serious harm, contrary to section 4 of the Non Fatal 
Offences Against the Person Act 1997, an offence which carries a maximum life sentence.  The 
respondent had a previous conviction for manslaughter for which he had been sentenced to 10 years’ 
imprisonment, which had been reduced to 7 years on appeal.  The respondent had been released 
approximately 8 months before committing the section 4 offence.  The DPP argued that the maximum 
sentence of life imprisonment should have been imposed as the respondent presented a clear danger to 
others. 
2.215 The Court of Criminal Appeal indicated that the case raised an important issue, namely, whether 
sentencing courts were obliged to impose the maximum life sentence where there was evidence that the 
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respondent presented a clear danger to others.  While that could “justify a sentence towards the highest 
end of the appropriate scale”, the Court observed that it was quite a different thing to argue that a court 
“must, go beyond any sentence however severe which might be considered normally appropriate to the 
crime (and the criminal) and impose a life sentence, if it is available”.  The argument had not been 
supported by any Irish case or any jurisdiction in which, in the absence of statutory provision, such orders 
could be made.  In any case, the argument was subject to a number of inherent weaknesses.  First, it 
depended “on the happenstance that the offence before the Court is one which carries a possible life 
sentence”.  Second, a sentence of imprisonment appeared to be an “inappropriately indirect and crude 
way of dealing with [an] offender suffering from a serious psychiatric illness”.  Third, detention of persons 
on the ground that they posed a threat to the public raised issues of constitutionality and compatibility with 
the European Convention on Human Rights.  In particular, the Court noted: 
 “The protection of the public is an appropriate factor in the exercise of the sentencing function, 
but it cannot be extracted from that function to create a self-standing judicially created jurisdiction 
to impose a form of preventive detention.  Whether sentencing courts should have the power to 
order the detention of individuals deemed to pose an immediate threat to the public, over and 
beyond any appropriate sentence for the crime committed, is a matter which should be 
addressed in the first place by detailed legislation by the Oireachtas after appropriate research 
and debate, and subject to Constitutional and Convention review if appropriate.” 
The Court of Criminal Appeal thus dismissed the appeal.   
2.216 In The People (DPP) v Ward
514
 the appellant appealed against the imposition of two life 
sentences, to be served concurrently.  The appellant had been convicted of five offences, namely, assault 
causing harm, possession of a firearm with intent to cause an indictable offence, robbery and two counts 
of possession of a firearm with intent to resist arrest on two separate occasions.  He had been sentenced 
to life imprisonment for counts one and two, and to 12 years’ imprisonment for counts three, four and five.  
The Court of Criminal Appeal indicated that there had been an element of preventative sentencing 
evident in the decision of the trial judge, which amounted to an error of principle.  The trial judge had 
stated that the imposition of a life sentence was to ensure that the defendant would not be released from 
prison until the authorities were satisfied that he no longer posed a threat to the community.  The Court 
found that the appellant’s offending warranted a serious but determinative sentence and thus substituted 
a sentence of 20 years.   
E Concluding Observations Regarding the Historical Evolution of Mandatory Sentences 
2.217  Parts B to D of this Chapter detailed the historical evolution of the three forms of mandatory 
sentence under review.  The Commission considers that a number of conclusions may be drawn from the 
manner in which these sentencing regimes developed.  
2.218 First, the Commission notes that the mandatory life sentence may be regarded as an evolutionary 
anomaly.  This penalty was specifically introduced to replace the death sentence as the most severe 
sanction available for the most serious offences.  The mandatory life sentence was selected for this 
purpose as its imposition ensures that those who commit murder continue (in a symbolic sense at least) 
to pay for the crime with their lives.  The mandatory life sentence is therefore an exceptional penalty and 
one that, in effect, is reserved exclusively for murder. 
2.219 Second, the Commission considers that the historical evolution of presumptive minimum 
sentences may be viewed in two ways.  One view is that these regimes are a relatively recent innovation 
and have largely emerged in response to perceived increases in criminality and particularly egregious 
incidents.  As discussed above, perceived surges in drug-related crime, firearms offences and gangland 
criminality, in particular, as well as individual high-profile offences have often preceded the introduction of 
these measures.  In this light, the enactment of presumptive minimum sentences may be interpreted as a 
relatively contemporary development.  
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2.220 The Commission notes that an alternative view is that these sentencing regimes are, when 
considered in a broader historical context, the product of a long-standing policy approach.  As outlined 
above, presumptive minimum sentences are typically directed at high-risk forms of criminality that have a 
particularly grave societal impact.  In modern times, drugs offences, firearms offences and gangland 
crime fit this mould.  Historically, however, a similar threat was perceived to derive from ‘habitual 
offenders’ - career criminals who specialised in particular forms of crime.  In the 19
th
 century, such 
offenders attracted mandatory sentences under the Habitual Offender Acts.  These regimes were 
essentially the precursors to contemporary ‘three strike laws’ and other sentencing practices directed at 
those considered to be a particular threat to public safety.  In this light, presumptive and mandatory 
minimum sentences for first-time and repeat offenders may be viewed as the continuation of a long-
standing penal policy.  
2.221 The Commission observes that although the policy underlying these sentencing regimes is not 
new, the popularity of this penal approach tends to fluctuate.  As discussed in Chapter 1, mandatory 
sentencing regimes appear to correspond most closely to the aims of deterrence, punishment and 
incapacitation.  Accordingly, these measures generally find favour in a more punitive penal climate in 
which these objectives receive particular legislative emphasis.  It is clear therefore that the various aims 
of sentencing may be differently prioritised at different times and that the challenge for the Oireachtas is 
to determine which goal merits immediate emphasis.  The Commission observes that prioritising one aim 
over another will, in general, lead to specific consequences.  For example, greater emphasis on 
deterrence, punishment and incapacitation, rather than rehabilitation, may facilitate problems such as 
prison over-crowding and may also impair the ability of the justice system to enhance public safety.   
2.222  The Commission notes that this issue was highlighted, in 2013, by the Sub-Committee on 
Penal Reform, established by the Joint Oireachtas Committee on Justice, Defence and Equality.  In its 
Report on Penal Reform,
515
  the Sub-Committee observed that effective rehabilitative programmes cannot 
work in over-crowded prison environments.
516
  It therefore endorsed the view “that a more effective and 
genuinely rehabilitative penal policy could be developed if the prison population were reduced by one-
third over a reasonable period of perhaps ten years… .”
517
  The Sub-Committee observed that this “would 
mean a return to levels of imprisonment in the mid-1990s, before the change in policy which has been 
identified as increasingly punitive during the 1990s, when mandatory minimum sentences were 
introduced for a range of offences, and a prison-building regime was embarked upon”.
518
  
2.223  The Commission also observes that where an emphasis on deterrence, punishment and 
incapacitation leads to problems such as prison overcrowding, this may produce a reaction against the 
cost entailed by a higher rate of incarceration.  A return to a rehabilitative model may in turn coincide with 
an economic cycle that is focused on ensuring the most effective and efficient allocation of resources 
within the general criminal justice system.  This may include a consideration of the manner in which 
limited resources are allocated between, on the one hand, the prison service (which has a more punitive 
purpose) and, on the other hand, the probation service (which has a more rehabilitative purpose).
519
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3  
CHAPTER 3  ENTIRELY MANDATORY SENTENCES 
A Introduction 
3.01 In this chapter, the Commission considers the first type of mandatory sentence identified in the 
Introduction to the Report, namely, the entirely mandatory sentence.  In Ireland, the only entirely 
mandatory sentence is the mandatory life sentence prescribed for the offences of:  (a) murder;
1
 (b) the 
murder of a designated person such as a member of An Garda Síochána;
2
 and (c) treason.
3
  In Part B, 
the Commission begins with an examination of how the mandatory life sentence for murder, in 
conjunction with the Executive power to grant early release, operates in practice.  In Part C, the 
Commission compares the mandatory life sentence in Ireland with similar provisions in other common law 
countries.  In Part D, the Commission concludes by examining the mandatory life sentence against the 
conceptual framework for criminal sanctions and sentencing.   
B The Mandatory Life Sentence for Murder 
(1) The Mandatory Life Sentence 
3.02 Section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1990 prescribes a mandatory life sentence for murder.  
Thus, the court must impose a life sentence in every case in which it is proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant, with an intention to kill or cause serious injury, has unlawfully killed another.
4
  
Section 4 specifies, however, that if the victim is a designated person under section 3, such as a member 
of An Garda Síochána, the perpetrator must serve a minimum term of 40 years’ imprisonment or 20 
years’ imprisonment for an attempted murder.  This means that every person convicted of murder will 
receive a mandatory life sentence but only those who have murdered a designated person will be 
required to spend a minimum term in prison.   
(2) The Mandatory Life Sentence and Temporary Release 
3.03 Not every person convicted of murder will spend the rest of his or her life in prison.  Indeed, a 
person convicted of murder may expect to be released before his or her “life” sentence expires because 
the Executive has at its disposal two mechanisms by which it may grant early release to prisoners serving 
mandatory life sentences.  Thus, in order to fully understand the mandatory life sentence, its examination 
must take place alongside an examination of these early release mechanisms. 
(a) Early Release 
3.04 Before considering the mechanisms by which the Executive may grant a prisoner serving a 
mandatory life sentence early release, it should first be noted that most prisoners, other than those 
sentenced to life imprisonment, are granted early release under the “standard remission” mechanism in 
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the Prison Rules 2007.
5
  This mechanism provides that all prisoners, excluding prisoners serving life 
sentences,
6
 are entitled to earn remission of up to one fourth of their sentences for good behaviour
7
 or up 
to one third of the sentence by engaging in authorised structured activity, such as training or counselling.
8
  
The effect of standard remission is to cause this portion of the sentence to expire.
9
   
3.05 As standard remission is not available to prisoners serving mandatory life sentences, it is thus 
necessary to consider the two other mechanisms by which the Executive may grant early release.  The 
first mechanism (which, in practice, is rarely used) is the power to grant “special remission”.  This power 
is vested in the Executive by Article 13.6 of the Constitution and section 23 of the Criminal Justice Act 
1951, as amended.
10
  The power to grant special remission (which has been described as the modern 
equivalent of the royal prerogative of mercy
11
) is the power to commute or remit any sentence.  Special 
remission may be granted at any time at the discretion of the Executive and prisoners have no legal 
entitlement to it.
12
  The effect of special remission is that the offender is no longer subject to punishment 
for the offence in respect of which he or she was serving the sentence.
13
   
3.06 The second (most frequently used) mechanism is the power to grant “temporary release”.  This 
power is vested in the Executive by section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1960, as amended.
14
  The power 
to grant temporary release, which is broadly equivalent to parole regimes in other jurisdictions, is a 
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discretionary power which may be exercised in favour of prisoners at any time before they qualify for 
standard remission and prisoners serving life sentences (who, as noted at paragraph 3.05, are not eligible 
for standard remission).  Although it was originally envisaged that temporary release would be granted for 
short periods for compassionate reasons or to facilitate integration, temporary release also came to 
function as an early release mechanism for those serving life sentences.
15
  Prisoners serving life 
sentences who are granted temporary release are released for a certain number of years and, unless 
they breach their release conditions or commit a further offence, can expect to remain at large 
indefinitely.
16
 
3.07 There is thus an important distinction to be drawn between early release prisoners who are 
serving life sentences and early release prisoners who are serving determinate sentences.  Prisoners 
serving life sentences are generally considered for early release under the “temporary release” 
mechanism.  As a result, a life sentence prisoner who has been granted early release may expect to be 
recalled to prison if he or she breaches the conditions of the release or commits a further offence.  By 
contrast, prisoners serving determinate sentences are generally considered for release under the 
“standard remission” mechanism which causes the final fourth of the sentence (or, as the case may be, 
the final third of the sentence) to expire.  As a result, a determinate sentence prisoner who has been 
granted early release is free from recall. 
(b) The Parole Board 
3.08 In 2001 the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform established the non-statutory Parole 
Board to review the cases of prisoners serving long-term sentences and to provide advice in relation to 
the administration of those sentences.
17
  The Parole Board may only review cases which have been 
referred to it by the Minister and which generally concern prisoners serving sentences of 8 years or more.  
Prisoners serving mandatory life sentences for ordinary murder may be referred to the Parole Board but 
not prisoners serving sentences for certain offences such as murder contrary to section 3 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1990.
18
   
3.09 The Parole Board advises the Minister for Justice by way of recommendation as to whether the 
prisoner should be released.
19
  These recommendations may be accepted or rejected in whole or in part 
by the Minister for Justice with whom the final decision regarding release lies.
20
  As discussed at 
paragraphs 2.101 to 2.104, it is uncertain whether this arrangement is compatible with Article 5(4) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.  In the absence of a relevant decision of the European Court of 
Human Rights or the Irish High Court or Supreme Court (who interpret the law in light of the European 
Convention on Human Rights), it remains unclear whether Article 5(4) entitles those serving wholly 
punitive life sentences to regular reviews of their detention by an independent, court-like body.  If such a 
review is required, it would appear that the operation of the Parole Board does not satisfy this 
requirement because it is not independent of the Executive.   
3.10 In general, cases are reviewed at the half-way stage of the sentence or after 7 years, whichever 
comes first.  The Commission notes, however, that while the Parole Board has formally indicated that it 
will review detention after 7 years, in 2004 the then Minister for Justice stated that he would not consider 
                                                     
15
  O’Malley “The Ends of Sentence: Imprisonment and Early Release Decisions in Ireland” in Padfield, van Zyl 
Smith and Dunkel, eds, Release from Prison: European Policy and Practice (Willan Publishing, 2010) at 9. 
16
  O’Malley “The Ends of Sentence: Imprisonment and Early Release Decisions in Ireland” in Padfield, van Zyl 
Smith and Dunkel, eds, Release from Prison: European Policy and Practice (Willan Publishing, 2010) at 10. 
17
  Annual Report 2011 (Parole Board, 2012) at 6. 
18
  See: Department of Justice and Equality “Life Sentences”. Available at: 
http://justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/Life_sentences  [Last accessed: 22 May 2013].  
19
  Annual Report 2011 (Parole Board, 2012) at 6. 
20
  See: Department of Justice and Equality “Parole Board”.  Available at: 
http://justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/Parole_Board [Last accessed: 22 May 2013].  
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the case of a prisoner serving a mandatory life sentence until he or she had served 12 to 15 years.
21
  It 
would appear that the average time spent in custody by prisoners serving a life sentence more than 
doubled since the 1970s.  In 2010, the then Minister for Justice indicated that the average time spent in 
custody was 17 years for the period 2004 to 2010.
22
  This compared with an average of 14 years for the 
period 1995 to 2004; 12 years for the period 1985 to 1994; and just over 7 ½ years for the period 1975 to 
1984.
23
 
3.11 While it is not required to take any specific criteria into account when formulating its 
recommendations, the Parole Board has adopted the following list of factors:
24
 
 Nature and gravity of the offence; 
 Sentence being served and any recommendations by the judge;
25
    
 Period of the sentence served at the time of the review; 
 Threat to safety of members of the community from release; 
 Risk of further offences being committed while on temporary release; 
 Risk of the prisoner failing to return to custody from any period of temporary release; 
 Conduct while in custody; 
 Extent of engagement with the therapeutic services; and 
 Likelihood of period of temporary release enhancing reintegration.  
3.12 These factors are broadly similar to those considered by the Minister for Justice in relation to the 
granting of temporary release under section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1960, as amended by section 1 
of the Criminal Justice (Temporary Release of Prisoners) Act 2003.  These are:  
 The nature and gravity of the offence to which the sentence of imprisonment being served by the    
person relates; 
 The sentence of imprisonment concerned and any recommendations of the sentencing court in 
relation to it;
26
 
 The period of the sentence of imprisonment served by the person; 
 The potential threat to the safety and security of members of the public (including the victim of the 
offence to which the sentence of imprisonment being served by that person relates) should the 
person be released from prison; 
 Any offence of which the person was convicted before being convicted of the offence to which the 
sentence of imprisonment being served relates; 
                                                     
21
  See:  McDowell, address at the First Edward O’Donnell McDevitt Annual Symposium - “Sentencing in Ireland” 
28 February 2004. 
22
  Dáil Debates, Written Answers - Crime Levels, 29 April 2010, Vol 707, No 5, Mr Ahern at paragraph 10. 
23
  Ibid. 
24
  Annual Report 2011 (Parole Board, 2012) at 6. 
25
  This may, for example, be relevant where a prisoner has been sentenced for a sexual or drug-related offence 
and the judge has recommended that he or she engage in a treatment programme.  At present, there is no 
provision under Irish law which permits a sentencing judge to recommend the minimum term to be served by 
an offender.  This is discussed further at paragraphs 3.77 to 3.84 below.    
26
  This may, for example, be relevant where a prisoner has been sentenced for a sexual or drug-related offence 
and the judge has recommended that he or she engage in a treatment programme.  At present, there is no 
provision under Irish law which permits a sentencing judge to recommend the minimum term to be served by 
an offender.  This is discussed further at paragraphs 3.77 to 3.84 below.    
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 The risk of the person failing to return to prison upon expiration of any period of temporary 
release;  
 The conduct of the person while in custody or while previously on temporary release (whether 
under the system operated before or after the coming into force of the 2003 Act);  
 Any report of, or recommendation made by -  
(i)  a prison governor or person for the time being performing the functions of governor,  
(ii)  the Garda Síochána,  
(iii)  a probation and welfare officer, or  
(iv)  any other person whom the Minister considers would be of assistance in enabling the 
Minister to make a decision as to whether to grant temporary release to the person concerned; 
 The risk of the person committing an offence during any period of temporary release; 
 The risk  of the person failing to comply with any conditions attaching to his temporary release;  
and  
 The likelihood that any period of temporary release might accelerate the person’s reintegration 
into society or improve his prospects of obtaining employment. 
3.13 It can be seen that the Parole Board and the Minister for Justice both take into account a number 
of factors that are similar, though not identical, to those considered by the judge in the sentencing 
process.  In particular, consideration by the Parole Board and the Minister of the nature and gravity of the 
offence resemble factors at issue in the sentencing process.
27
  While the objective of their analysis is to 
determine whether and when it would be appropriate to release a particular prisoner, where a mandatory 
life sentence is concerned a consequence of that analysis is that the Minister determines how long that 
prisoner should remain in prison.  This is an unavoidable consequence because the Parole Board and the 
Minister for Justice should not be blind in their analysis to the seriousness of the particular offender’s 
offence or to the severity of the sentence that he or she is serving.  The concerns that this overlaps with 
considerations that are more appropriate to the judicial sentencing process will be addressed at 
paragraphs 3.77 to 3.84 below.  
C Comparative Analysis 
3.14 In this section, the Commission considers how the mandatory life sentence in Ireland compares 
with the approach taken by other common law countries.  As a preliminary observation, it may be noted 
that in each of these countries there is some version of the prerogative of mercy whereby the Executive, 
in rare circumstances, may grant the prisoner early release.   
(1) Northern Ireland 
3.15 As discussed in Chapter 2, section 1(1) of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 
provides for a mandatory life sentence for murder.  The 2000 Report on the Review of the Criminal 
Justice System in Northern Ireland
28
 recommended that, in relation to all indeterminate sentence cases, 
including mandatory life sentence cases, sentencing judges should be required to set a period for 
retribution and deterrence (along the lines already in place in England and Wales, discussed below).  The 
Report considered that in most cases the period would be a fixed term of years, although it also 
envisaged that some offences might be so serious that a whole life period would be appropriate.  The 
Report recommended that the period would be announced in court and would be subject to appeal in the 
usual way.  The Report also recommended that once this period had been served, it would be the 
responsibility of an independent body to determine, primarily on grounds of risk, when the prisoner should 
                                                     
27
  O’Malley Sentencing - Towards a Coherent System (Round Hall, 2011) at 222. 
28
  Report on the Review of the Criminal Justice System in Northern Ireland (Northern Ireland Office, 2000), at 
paragraph 12.56.  The 2000 Report comprised a wide-ranging review of the criminal justice system in the 
wake of the 1998 Belfast Agreements. 
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be released.  These recommendations were implemented in the Life Sentences (Northern Ireland) Order 
2001.  In the parliamentary debates on the 2001 Order,
29
 it was noted that in this respect the 2000 Report 
endorsed the conclusions of a review of Northern Ireland prisons legislation conducted by the UK 
Government in anticipation of the coming into effect of the UK Human Rights Act 1998.  The review 
concluded that the existing procedures for discretionary life sentence prisoners and those sentenced to 
detention at the Secretary of State’s pleasure could be deemed inconsistent with the requirements of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).  The procedures were based on advice on the suitability 
of the prisoner for release being given to the Secretary of State by the Life Sentence Review Board, a 
non-statutory body consisting largely of senior officials of the Northern Ireland Office (NIO).  It was 
considered that compliance with the ECHR would require that, once the punitive element of the sentence 
had been completed, each prisoner should have his or her case reviewed periodically by a judicial body.  
To have judicial character, the body would need to be independent of the Executive (and of the parties 
concerned); impartial; and able to give a legally binding direction regarding the prisoner’s release.  These 
considerations are reflected in the 2001 Order. 
3.16 Article 5(1) of the Life Sentences (Northern Ireland) Order 2001 provides that where a court 
imposes a life sentence, it must, unless the case falls within Article 5(3), specify the minimum period that 
must be served by the offender before he or she becomes eligible for parole.  Article 5(2) provides that 
the minimum period specified under Article 5(1) is intended “to satisfy the requirements of retribution and 
deterrence having regard to the seriousness of the offence, or of the combination of the offence and one 
or more offences associated with it.”  Article 5(3) of the 2001 Order provides that where the offence 
warranting the life sentence is particularly serious, the court may order that no minimum period is 
specified at sentencing.  The effect of an order under Article 5(3) is that the offender is subject to a “whole 
life tariff” and is ordered to be detained for the remainder of his or her natural life. Such whole life tariffs 
are rare.
30
  
3.17 Where a minimum period is specified, since 2001 the question as to whether the offender is to be 
released on parole is a matter for the Parole Commissioners for Northern Ireland, who are an 
independent body appointed by the Northern Ireland Department of Justice.
31
  Where the Parole 
Commissioners determine that the offender may be released on licence, they must make an order to that 
effect subject to such conditions as they deem appropriate.  These conditions attach to the offender for 
the rest of his or her life, and the offender may be recalled to prison where the conditions are breached.  
While the formal order of release is made by the Northern Ireland Department of Justice,
32
 the decision of 
the Parole Commissioners to release an offender on licence must be complied with by the Department.  
3.18 As to how a sentencing judge is to calculate a minimum term under Article 5(1) of the 2001 
Order, the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal in R v Candless
33
 held that the courts are to have regard to 
the guidance provided in the English 2002 Practice Statement (Crime: Life Sentences).
34
  The 2002 
Practice Statement issued by the English Lord Chief Justice sets out the starting points and the 
circumstances in which each starting point applies.  The starting points range from the “normal starting 
                                                     
29
  See Hansard HL Deb, 12 July 2001, c1215. 
30
  In R v Hamilton [2008] NICA 27, a whole life tariff had been imposed on the defendant by the trial judge but 
this was overturned by the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal, which substituted a 35 year minimum period 
before he could be considered for parole.   
31
  The Parole Commissioners for Northern Ireland were established under the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) 
Order 2008 and replaced the Life Sentence Review Commissioners who had been established under the Life 
Sentences (Northern Ireland) Order 2001.  
32
  Life Sentences (Northern Ireland) Order 2001, as amended by the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (Devolution of 
Policing and Justice Functions) Order 2010, which transferred the relevant functions from the Secretary of 
State for Northern Ireland to the Northern Ireland Department of Justice.   
33
  R v Candless [2004] NI 269 at 274-275.   
34
  Practice Statement (Crime: Life Sentences) [2002] 3 All ER 412 at 413-415; [2002] 1 WLR 1789 at 1790-1792. 
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point” of 12 years, through the “higher starting point” of 15 to 16 years, up to 30 years.
35
  It also sets out 
the factors which tend to aggravate or mitigate the duration of the minimum term.
36
   
3.19 For the purpose of illustration, it is worth referring to a number of recent sentencing decisions in 
Northern Ireland.  In R v Howell,
37
 Hart J ordered the defendant to serve a minimum term of 21 years in 
prison for the double murder of the defendant’s wife and the husband of Hazel Stewart, the defendant’s 
co-accused (see R v Stewart, below).  Hart J indicated that the defendant had committed a “cold-blooded, 
carefully planned and ruthlessly executed double-murder” of two people he saw as standing in the way of 
his “desire” to be with his co-accused, with whom he was involved at that time in an intimate 
relationship.
38
  Hart J indicated, however, that the defendant’s sentence had been reduced by 7 years 
from 28 years because he had confessed to the murders and had agreed to give evidence against his co-
accused. 
3.20 In R v Stewart,
39
 Hart J ordered the defendant, who had been sentenced to life imprisonment for 
the same double-murder dealt with in R v Howell (above), to serve a minimum term of 18 years.  He 
indicated that the defendant was entitled to some reduction in sentence to reflect the fact that her co-
accused, the defendant in R v Howell, had masterminded the plot and carried out the killings after 
persuading her to take part.  He noted, however, that Howell had admitted his role, confessed and given 
evidence against Stewart during her trial.  He indicated that Stewart’s plea of not guilty was relevant, as 
were her repeated attempts to hide from responsibility.  He also indicated that Stewart had expressed 
little remorse for what she had done. 
3.21 In R v Walsh,
40
 a life sentence was imposed on the defendant for the murder of her elderly 
neighbour, Maire Rankin, in 2008.
41
  Hart J ordered the defendant to serve a minimum term of 20 years in 
prison, highlighting the sexual maltreatment and degradation of Mrs Rankin’s body after the killing as 
aggravating factors which would require the court to increase the minimum term to a figure substantially 
above (the “higher starting point” of) 15 or 16 years. 
(2) England and Wales 
3.22 As discussed in Chapter 2, section 1(1) of the Murder (Abolition of the Death Penalty) Act 1965 
provides for a mandatory life sentence for murder.  The 2002 Practice Statement (Crime: Life Sentences) 
discussed in the Northern Ireland decision R v Candless
42
 (see paragraph 3.18) has been replaced by 
section 269 of the English Criminal Justice Act 2003.  This provides that where a court imposes a life 
sentence, it must make an order regarding the minimum term to be served by the offender before he or 
she may be considered for release by the Parole Board.
43
  Where the court is of the opinion that, because 
of the seriousness of the offence, no such order should be made, it must order that the early release 
provisions are not to apply to the offender.
44
   
3.23 As to how to calculate a minimum term, Schedule 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 sets out the 
starting points and the circumstances which dictate which starting point applies.  Thus, if the court 
                                                     
35
  Paragraphs 10 to 19 of the Practice Statement (Crime: Life Sentences) [2002] 3 All ER 412 at 413-415; [2002] 
1 WLR 1789 at 1790-1792.   
36
  Paragraphs 13 to 19 of the Practice Statement (Crime: Life Sentences) [2002] 3 All ER 412 at 413-415; [2002] 
1 WLR 1789 at 1790-1792.   
37
  R v Howell [2010] NICC 48. 
38
  R v Howell [2010] NICC 48 at para. 15.  
39
  R v Stewart [2011] NICC 10.  
40
  R v Walsh Belfast Crown Court, 28 October 2011. 
41
  Moriarty “Woman Gets 20 Years for Murdering Neighbour” Irish Times 29 October 2011. 
42
  R v Candless [2004] NI 269 at 274-275.   
43
  Section 269(1) and (2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.   
44
  Section 269(4) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.   
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considers that the seriousness of the offence is “exceptionally high”, the starting point is a “whole life 
tariff”.
45
  This starting point may only apply in respect of an offender who was at least 21 years of age 
when he or she committed the offence.
46
     
3.24 If the court considers that the seriousness of the offence is “particularly high”, the starting point is 
30 years.
47
  This starting point may only apply where the offender was at least 18 years of age when he 
or she committed the offence.  If the case does not fall within either of the preceding provisions, 
paragraph 5A of Schedule 21 (discussed below in R v Kelly) provides that the starting point is 25 years if 
the offender took a knife or other weapon to the scene intending to commit any offence (or to have it 
available to use as a weapon) and then used that knife or other weapon in committing the murder.  This 
starting point only applies, however, where the offender was at least 18 years of age when he or she 
committed the offence.
48
  For every other case, where the offender was aged 18 years or over at the time 
of the offence, the starting point is 15 years.
49
  Where the offender is under 18 years of age, the starting 
point is 12 years.
50
  Schedule 21 also sets out the factors which tend to aggravate or mitigate the duration 
of the minimum term.
51
   
3.25 Paragraph 5A of Schedule 21 of the 2003 Act was considered in R v Kelly,
52
 in which the English 
Court of Appeal heard 7 cases where all of the defendants had been convicted of murder involving a 
knife.  The primary issue in the cases was whether the offender “took the knife or other weapon to the 
scene” within the meaning of paragraph 5A.  
3.26  The defendants in the first three cases and the first defendant in the fourth case contended that 
paragraph 5A should not have been applied.  In the first case, K took a knife from the kitchen, went 
upstairs to the bathroom and broke down the door to get to the victim.  He then stabbed him.  In the 
second case, the victim banged on B’s front door and threatened him.  B picked up two knives, went out 
of the house and stabbed the victim who was standing on the pavement.  S, the defendant in the third 
case (the appeal), lived in a bedsit above a factory.  He took a knife from the upstairs kitchen in his own 
premises and went downstairs into the working area of the factory.  He walked through an open door, a 
distance of some 50 metres, and killed the victim.  In the fourth case, to the knowledge of all, one knife 
was taken to the scene by R and a second knife, which was also used, was taken by H from a kitchen 
drawer and carried to where the victim lay in a bedroom, where he was killed.  The Crown accepted that 
the second knife had not been “taken to the scene”.  H submitted that it was unfair to infer from the 
evidence that he was party to a joint enterprise whereby someone else had brought the first knife to the 
house and that taking a knife from one part of the house to the bedroom was not, of itself, sufficient to 
bring the conduct within paragraph 5A. 
3.27 The English Court of Appeal held that the seriousness of an offence falling within paragraph 5A 
was “normally” marginally lower than “particularly high”.  Paragraph 5A thus required flexibility of 
approach.  Schedule 21 did not create a stepped sentencing regime with fixed dividing lines between the 
specified categories.  Paragraphs 4(1) and 5(1) identified not the ultimate decision but the “appropriate 
starting point”, and paragraphs 4(2) and 5(2) specified the cases of murder which would “normally,” but 
not inevitably, trigger a finding of exceptional or particularly high seriousness.  It was also plain from the 
structure of paragraph 5A, particularly by reference to paragraph 5(2)(b) (“a murder involving the use of a 
firearm or explosive”), that it was not the legislative intention that every murder involving the use of a knife 
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  Paragraph 4(1) of Schedule 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.   
46
  Paragraph 4(1) of Schedule 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.   
47
  Paragraph 5(1) of Schedule 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.   
48
  Paragraph 5A(1) - Paragraph 5A(2) of Schedule 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, inserted by the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003 (Mandatory Life Sentence: Determination of Minimum Term) Order 2010.   
49
  Paragraph 6 of Schedule 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.   
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  Paragraph 7 of Schedule 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.   
51
  Paragraph 8 to paragraph 11 of Schedule 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.   
52
  R v Kelly [2011] 4 All ER 687. 
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or other weapon to inflict fatal injury should normally fall within the 25-year starting point.  Thus, 
paragraph 5A did not provide an entirely comprehensive framework to govern the starting point for 
assessment of the determinate term for murders committed with a knife or other weapon.  Paragraph 5A 
was not confined to murders committed with the use of a knife which had been taken out on to, and used 
on, the streets.  Paragraph 5A would also apply to a case where a man walked home, bought a knife on 
the way and killed his partner in the kitchen.  It did not follow that a murder committed with a knife in the 
offender’s home, or in the victim’s house, automatically fell outside the ambit of paragraph 5A. 
3.28 The Court indicated that a knife taken from the kitchen of a home to another room in the same 
home was not “taken to the scene” for the purposes of paragraph 5A, even if a locked door was forced 
open.  Accordingly, the first case did not fall within paragraph 5A, since the knife had not been taken to 
the scene.  However, in the circumstances, it did not make a difference to the eventual determination of 
the minimum term.  In the second case, the knife had been taken to the scene and the judge had been 
correct to choose a starting point of 25 years for the minimum term.  In the third case, S had taken the 
knife to the scene and the judge had been right to find that paragraph 5A applied. 
3.29 The fourth case demonstrated the kind of problems that would arise in the context of murders 
committed with a knife taken to the scene where two or more offenders were convicted of murder on the 
basis of joint enterprise.  Given some of the difficulties which could arise in joint enterprise murders where 
a weapon was used by one, but only one, of the murderers, the difficulties for sentencing judges were 
likely to multiply.  There would continue to be convictions for multi-handed murders where one or more of 
the defendants were not aware that a knife or knives were being taken to the scene but, once violence 
erupted, participated in it and were well aware that the knife would be or was being used with murderous 
intent.  Although guilty of murder, they were not party to the taking of the fatal weapon to the scene.  Their 
offence would be aggravated by the fact that they participated in a knife murder but paragraph 5A would 
not provide the starting point in the sentencing decision.  For those who did take part or were party to the 
taking of a knife to the scene, then paragraph 5A would not provide the starting point in the sentencing 
decision.  For those who did take part, or who were party to the taking of a knife to the scene, then 
paragraph 5A would provide the starting point but care had to be taken not to double count the fact that 
they participated in a knife murder which has already been factored into the normal paragraph 5A starting 
point.  The judge would therefore be required to make the necessary findings of fact to identify the 
appropriate starting point and thereafter to reach the sentencing decision required by the justice of the 
case.  As to the applicability of paragraph 5A in respect of H in the fourth case, there had been ample 
evidence of planning for the attack.  Furthermore, paragraph 5A was not to be analysed by reference only 
to the distance that a knife was carried prior to its lethal use.  Taking a weapon to the scene, and the 
implications of such conduct on the sentence for murder, required a broader consideration than whether 
the attack took place in the kitchen or the bedroom.  In the fourth case, H had known that the knife was in 
R’s possession; it was irrelevant that it was H who had used the knife, rather than R.  That was the very 
essence of joint enterprise.  Accordingly, the applications for leave to appeal were refused, and the 
appeal was dismissed.   
3.30 In R v Dobson and Norris,
53
 the defendants were sentenced for the racially motivated murder of 
Stephen Lawrence in 1993.
54
  As the defendants had been less than 18 years of age at the time of the 
offence, the court (Treacy J) was obliged to sentence them as juvenile offenders and thus impose a 
sentence of detention at Her Majesty’s pleasure.  Given their juvenile status, Treacy J observed that an 
appropriate starting point for the minimum term to be served by each offender was 12 years, which was 
                                                     
53
  See: sentencing remarks of Treacy J, Central Criminal Court, 4 January 2012.  Available at: 
www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Judgments/sentencing-remarks-dobson-norris-120104.pdf 
[Last accessed: 22 May 2013]   
54
  As the offence had been committed before the introduction of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the previous 
sentencing regime applied. This, however, is not a material distinction for the purposes of this discussion. 
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then adjusted to reflect the aggravating and mitigating factors of the case.
55
  In this regard, Treacy J 
indicated that: 
 “The gravity of this case is... of a different order from, for example, a murder committed by one 
individual upon another as a result of some sudden quarrel.  There was a degree of general 
premeditation; it was a racist crime driven by hatred; it involved a gang of like-minded attackers; a 
lethal weapon was employed and known in advance to be carried; the victim was completely 
blameless and helpless.”
56
 
3.31 The first defendant was thus ordered to serve a minimum term of 15 years and two months and 
the second defendant was ordered to serve a minimum term of 14 years and three months.  
(3) Scotland 
3.32 As discussed in Chapter 2, section 1(1) of the Murder (Abolition of the Death Penalty) Act 1965 
provides for a mandatory life sentence for murder.  Section 2 of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings 
(Scotland) Act 1993, as amended, provides that the sentencing court must specify a “punishment part” to 
be served by the offender “to satisfy the requirements of retribution and deterrence”.
57
  Section 2 provides 
that the punishment part may be any period of years and months even if it is likely that the period will 
exceed the remainder of the prisoner’s life.
58
   
3.33  In HM Advocate v Boyle and Others,
59
  the Scottish Court of Appeal rejected the suggestion 
made in previous Scottish case law
60
 that the “virtual maximum” duration of the punishment part was 30 
years.
61
  It noted that some cases, for example, “mass murders by terrorist action”, might warrant a 
punishment part of more than 30 years.
62
  The Court agreed with the previous case law, however, in so 
far as it indicated that certain murder cases might be of such gravity that the punishment part should be 
approximately 20 years, such as where the victim was a child or a police officer acting in the course of his 
or her duty, or where a firearm was used.
63
  The Court rejected the suggestion that the starting point for 
the punishment part in most murder cases was 12 years.
64
  In cases where the offender had armed 
himself or herself with a sharp weapon, the Court indicated that, in the absence of exceptional 
circumstances, a starting point of 16 years would be more appropriate.
65
 
(4) Canada 
3.34 In Canada, section 235(1) of the Criminal Code provides for a mandatory life sentence for 
murder.  Section 745 of the Criminal Code sets out, in some detail, the periods that persons sentenced to 
life imprisonment must serve before they become eligible for parole.  In the case of first degree murder, 
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   Treacy J stated that had the offence been committed by an adult, he or she would have faced a minimum 
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56
  “Lawrence verdict: ‘Neither of you has shown the slightest regret or remorse’: Judge’s statement” The 
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113 
there is an automatic 25-year period of parole ineligibility.
66
  In the case of second degree murder, the 
minimum period of parole ineligibility is 10 years while the maximum is 25 years.
67
  The period of 
ineligibility is determined by the trial judge
68
 who may take into account any jury recommendations on the 
appropriate length.
69
  An offender sentenced to life imprisonment may apply to have the minimum term 
reduced after serving 15 years.
70
  Once the prisoner serves the period of parole ineligibility, he or she 
may apply to the Parole Board for parole.  The Parole Board will consider whether there are any risks to 
the public in releasing the prisoner.  If released, the prisoner is subject to parole conditions and parole 
may be revoked if he or she violates those conditions or commits a new offence. 
(5) Australia 
3.35 In Australia, the penalty for murder varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
71
  In five jurisdictions 
(the Commonwealth of Australia;
72
  the Australian Capital Territory;
73
  New South Wales;
74
 Tasmania,
75
  
and Victoria
76
)  the life sentence is a discretionary maximum rather than a mandatory penalty.  New South 
Wales recognises a limited exception in this regard, prescribing a mandatory life sentence for the murder 
of a police officer, committed while the officer is acting in the course of his or her duty or as a 
consequence of, or in retaliation for, the execution of that duty.
77
   
3.36 In Western Australia, the life sentence is a presumptive penalty for murder.  Under this regime, a 
life sentence need not be applied by the court where: (a) it would be clearly unjust given the 
circumstances of the offence and the offender; and (b) the offender is unlikely to be a threat to the safety 
of the community when released from prison.
78
  Where these criteria are fulfilled, the offender will instead 
be liable to 20 years’ imprisonment.
79
  A sentencing court which declines to impose a life sentence for 
murder must provide written reasons for this decision.
80
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  Section 745(a) of the Criminal Code. 
67
  Section 745(b), section 745(b.1) and section 745(c) of the Criminal Code. 
68
  Section 745.4 of the Criminal Code. 
69
  Section 745.2 of the Criminal Code. 
70
  Section 745.6 of the Criminal Code. 
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  Leader-Elliott “Fault Elements in Murder - A Summary of Australian Law” in The Law of Murder: Overseas 
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  Division 71.2 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (CW).  The life sentence appears to be mandatory for offences 
under divisions 115.1, 268.8 and 268.70 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (CW).   
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  Section 12(2) of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT). 
74
  Section 18(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). 
75
  Section 158 of the Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas). 
76
  Section 3 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). 
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       Section 19B of the Crimes Act 1900, as amended by section 3 of the Crimes Amendment (Murder of Police 
Officers) Act 2011.  Section 19B stipulates that in order for the mandatory life sentence to apply: (a) the 
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  Section 279(4) of the Criminal Code 1913, as replaced by section 10 of the Criminal Law Amendment 
(Homicide) Act 2008.  
79
  Ibid. 
80
  Section 279(6) of the Criminal Code 1913, as replaced by section 10 of the Criminal Law Amendment 
(Homicide) Act 2008. 
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3.37   In three jurisdictions (the Northern Territory;
81
  Queensland;
82
 and South Australia
83
) the life 
sentence is a mandatory penalty for murder.  In all jurisdictions, the sentencing court is permitted or 
required to set a non-parole period that will in normal circumstances result in release before the entire 
sentence is served.
84
   
3.38 The applicable parole system varies from state to state.  In the Commonwealth of Australia, the 
court must fix a non-parole period or make a recognizance release order when it imposes a federal life 
sentence, unless, having regard to the “nature and circumstances of the offence” and the antecedents of 
the offender, it considers that neither is appropriate.
85
  In the Australian Capital Territory, the court must 
set a non-parole period when it imposes a sentence of one year or more, excluding life sentences, 
unless, having regard to the nature of the offence and the antecedents of the offender, it considers this to 
be inappropriate.
86
  An offender serving a life sentence may apply for parole after serving 10 years of his 
or her sentence.
87
  In New South Wales, the standard non-parole period for murder is 20 years, and 25 
years where the victim is a designated person.
88
  Where the victim is a police officer, however, an 
offender must serve the mandatory life sentence “for the term of the person’s natural life.”
89
  In Tasmania, 
the court must order that an offender sentenced to life imprisonment shall either be ineligible for parole in 
respect of that sentence or ineligible for parole before the expiration of such a period as is specified in the 
order.
90
  In Victoria, the court must set a non-parole period where it imposes a life sentence or a sentence 
of two or more years.
91
   
3.39 The system also varies among those states which impose a mandatory life sentence.  In the 
Northern Territory, the court must set a standard non-parole period of 20 years when it imposes a life 
sentence for murder, or 25 years where certain factors are present in the case.
92
  The court may impose 
a longer non-parole period if that is warranted by the seriousness of the offence or a shorter non-parole 
period if there are exceptional circumstances.  The court may refuse to fix a non-parole period if it 
considers that the level of culpability is so extreme that the community interest in retribution, punishment, 
protection and deterrence can only be met if the offender is imprisoned for his or her natural life.  In 
Queensland, the court must set a standard non-parole period of 20 years when it imposes a life sentence 
for murder and 30 years if the offender has a previous conviction for murder.
93
  However, if the victim is a 
police officer performing his or her duty, or if the offender commits the relevant act or omission in 
retaliation for actions taken by the victim or another police officer in the performance of his or her duty, a 
minimum non-parole period of 25 years will apply (unless the individual is granted ‘exceptional 
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  Section 157 of the Criminal Code Act (NT), as amended by section 17 of the Criminal Reform Amendment Act 
(No 2) 2006 (NT). 
82
  Section 305 of the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld). 
83
  Section 11 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA). 
84
  Law Reform Commission Consultation Paper on Mandatory Sentences (LRC CP 66-2011) at paragraph 2.84.   
85
  Section 19AB of the Crimes Act 1914 (CW).   
86
  Section 65 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT).   
87
  Section 288 of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT).   
88
  Table in Division 1A of Part 4 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Procedure Act 1999 (NSW).   
89
  Section 19B(2) of the Crimes Act 1900, as amended by section 3 of the Crimes    Amendment (Murder of 
Police Officers) Act 2011. 
90
  Section 18 of the Sentencing Act 1997 (T).  Section 18 sets out a list of matters which the court may have 
particular regard to in making this determination.  
91
  Section 11 of the Sentencing Act 1991.   
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  Section 53A of the Sentencing Act (NT).   
93
  Section 181 of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld), as amended by section 7 of the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act 2012.  
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circumstances parole’ under the Corrective Services Act 2006).
94
  In South Australia, the court must set a 
standard non-parole period of 20 years when it imposes a life sentence for murder.
95
  The court may 
decline to set a non-parole period if, having regard to the gravity of the offence, the criminal record and 
behaviour of the offender, and any other circumstances, it considers that it would be inappropriate.  In 
Western Australia, the court must set a standard non-parole period of 10 years where the offender has 
been sentenced to life imprisonment for murder.
96
 
(6) New Zealand 
3.40 In New Zealand, section 102 of the Sentencing Act 2002 provides that life imprisonment is the 
presumptive penalty for murder.  Thus, a person convicted of murder must be sentenced to life 
imprisonment unless the circumstances of the offence and the offender would render such a sentence 
“manifestly unjust”.
97
  Section 86E(2) of the 2002 Act provides that the court must impose a life sentence 
where the murder is a stage-2 or stage-3 offence
98
 and must order that the life sentence be served 
without parole unless the circumstances of the offence and the offender would render such a sentence 
“manifestly unjust”.   
3.41 Section 84 of the Parole Act 2002  provides that offenders serving life sentences will become 
eligible for parole once they have served 10 years’ imprisonment, unless the sentencing court has 
ordered a “non-parole period”.
99
  If a non-parole period has been ordered, offenders become eligible for 
parole once they have served that period.  Section 60 of the Parole Act 2002 provides that an application 
may be made to the Parole Board to recall an offender who is on parole or compassionate release.  This 
may be done where the offender poses “an undue risk” to the community, has breached a condition of 
release or has committed an offence punishable by imprisonment.
100
  In addition to parole, section 41 of 
the Parole Act 2002 provides that the Parole Board may grant compassionate release to any prisoner 
who has just given birth or is seriously ill and unlikely to recover.
101
 
(7) United States of America 
3.42 In the United States of America, the majority of states have retained the death penalty for either 
first degree murder or “capital murder”.  All of these states require the jury to find that any mitigating 
factors are outweighed by certain aggravating factors.
102
  In the event that this is not the case or, indeed, 
the death penalty is not sought by the prosecution, these states provide for less severe sanctions such as 
life imprisonment with or without parole.  The few remaining states have abolished the death penalty and 
instead require the imposition of determinate sentences or life sentences with or without parole.
103
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101
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  Finkelstein “Report on Basic Aspects of the Law of Murder in the United States: The Examples of California 
and New York” in The Law of Murder: Overseas Comparative Studies (Law Commission, 2005) at 107.   
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(8) Summary 
3.43 From this survey, it is clear that Ireland’s common law counterparts have not adopted a unified 
response in respect of sentencing for murder.  Certain patterns do, however, emerge.  In the majority of 
common law countries and jurisdictions, the mandatory life sentence for murder has been retained
104
 
whereas in a significant minority, a presumptive or discretionary life sentence has been adopted 
instead.
105
  In all common law countries, apart from Ireland, there is a system whereby a person convicted 
of murder must serve a minimum term before becoming eligible for early release.  In addition, release is 
generally granted through a formal parole system.  In some countries and jurisdictions, the minimum term 
is calculated by the sentencing judge having regard to judicial and/or statutory guidance
106
 whereas, in 
some others, the minimum term is specified by statute.
107
 
D The Mandatory Life Sentence and the Conceptual Framework 
3.44 In this Part, the Commission considers the sentencing system for murder, comprising the 
mandatory life sentence and early release, against the conceptual framework established in Chapter 1.  
Specifically, the Commission considers the system by reference to:  (1) the aims of sentencing, and (2) 
the principles of justice.   
(1) The Mandatory Life Sentence and the Aims of Sentencing   
3.45 In Chapter 1, the Commission observed that, in general, criminal sanctions pursue one or more of 
a number of aims, namely: deterrence, punishment, reform and rehabilitation, reparation, and 
incapacitation.
108
  The Commission also observed that deterrence and punishment (and incapacitation) 
tend to feature more in cases involving more serious crimes and, consequently, where sanctions are 
more severe.  These aims feature most heavily in cases involving murder and the mandatory life 
sentence.  The mandatory life sentence seeks to dissuade by coercive means the perpetrator of the 
murder (and the public at large) from committing another murder and to punish him or her severely for the 
offence. 
3.46 It has been observed, however, that the mandatory life sentence may not adequately meet the 
aims of deterrence and punishment.
109
  Regarding deterrence, it has been noted that some murders are 
committed in the heat of the moment when the perpetrator does not contemplate the legal consequences 
of his or her actions.
110
  In such circumstances, it is unlikely that the prospect of a mandatory life sentence 
will enter into the perpetrator’s mind let alone dissuade him or her from executing his or her intention.  As 
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  Northern Ireland, England and Wales, Scotland, Canada and four Australian jurisdictions (Northern Territory, 
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105
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106
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108
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discussed in Chapter 1, however, when examining the issue of deterrence, one must consider that many 
members of the public may have been inhibited from committing murder by the prospect of a mandatory 
life sentence.  
3.47 Regarding punishment, it has been noted that murder can be committed in a variety of 
circumstances and involve different levels of moral culpability.
111
  From a retributive perspective, a person 
with a lower level of moral culpability does not deserve the same punishment as a person with a higher 
level of moral culpability.  (This is discussed in greater detail below at paragraphs 3.49 to 3.57 in the 
context of consistency and proportionality.)  From a denunciatory perspective, the current mandatory life 
sentence permits society to denounce in uniquely strong terms the offence of murder but leaves little 
room for society to denounce in more or less strong terms the more or less heinous instances of it.  As 
discussed below at paragraphs 3.77 to 3.84, it may, however, be possible to reflect these differences in 
culpability if the sentencing judge were permitted to recommend the minimum term to be served by an 
offender convicted of murder.   
(2) The Mandatory Life Sentence and the Principles of Justice 
3.48 In Chapter 1, the Commission observed that sentencing must comply with a number of external 
constraints that emanate from fundamental principles of justice, namely, the principles of:  (a) 
consistency, and (b) proportionality.  In this section, the Commission considers the mandatory life 
sentence for murder by reference to these principles. 
(a) The Principle of Consistency and the Mandatory Life Sentence 
3.49 In Chapter 1, the Commission observed that the principle of consistency requires a consistent 
application of the aims and principles of sentencing (consistency of approach) rather than uniformity of 
sentencing outcomes (consistency of outcomes).  To reiterate in brief, consistency of approach requires 
that like cases should be treated alike and different cases should be treated differently.  The corollary of 
this is that inconsistency arises where like cases are treated differently and different cases are treated 
alike.  
3.50 As discussed in Chapter 2, the mandatory life sentence for murder occupies a relatively unique 
position in the historical evolution of mandatory sentences in so far as it was introduced as a replacement 
for a more severe sanction, namely, the death penalty.  The mandatory life sentence was considered to 
be an acceptable alternative to the death penalty as every person convicted of murder would continue 
(symbolically at least ) to pay for the offence with his or her life.  Thus from the outset, the focus of the 
sentence for murder has been on the outcome of the sentencing process rather than the approach to the 
sentencing process.  As a result, all persons convicted of murder are treated the same regardless of 
whether there are any distinguishing factors in their circumstances or the circumstances of their offences.  
The Commission observes that this amounts to different cases being treated alike and is not, therefore, 
compatible with the principle of consistency.  As discussed below at paragraphs 3.77 to 3.84, there may, 
however, be scope to distinguish individual cases if the sentencing judge were permitted to recommend 
the minimum term to be served by an offender convicted of murder.  
3.51 Furthermore, as sentencing operates in conjunction with early release, the Commission observes 
that full compliance with the principle of consistency requires that any exacting standard that applies to 
sentencing should also apply to early release.  Arguably, a more consistent approach is taken in respect 
of early release than in respect of sentencing for murder as the Parole Board and the Minister for Justice 
consider each case against broadly the same factors, namely, those listed at paragraphs 3.11 and 3.12.  
This may, however, be jeopardised where, for instance, the Parole Board and the Minister for Justice are:  
(i) dealing with a case in which the sentence has been imposed following the application of an 
inconsistent approach, or (ii) influenced by external events.  Such external events might include media 
attention surrounding the circumstances of a particular case that might militate against release on parole 
or intervening changes in sentencing or early release policy.  This risk may, however, be minimised if the 
Minister for Justice and the Parole Board were to receive guidance from the sentencing judge in the form 
of a recommended minimum term to be served by the offender.   
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(b) The Principle of Proportionality and the Mandatory Life Sentence 
3.52 In Chapter 1, the Commission noted that the principle of proportionality comprises:  (a) 
constitutional proportionality, and (b) proportionality in sentencing.   
(i) Constitutional Proportionality and the Mandatory Life Sentence 
3.53 As discussed in Chapter 2, the Supreme Court in Whelan and Lynch
112
 held that section 2 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1990 was compatible with the principle of constitutional proportionality.  In this 
regard, it stated that the Oireachtas was entitled to promote respect for human life by concluding that any 
murder, even at the lowest end of the scale, was so abhorrent and offensive to society that it merited a 
mandatory life sentence. 
(ii) Proportionality in Sentencing and the Mandatory Life Sentence 
3.54 In Whelan and Lynch,
113
 the Supreme Court made the following remarks regarding proportionality 
in sentencing and the mandatory life sentence for murder: 
 “... [T]he duty to impose the sentence which is proportionate or appropriate to the circumstances 
of the case only arises where a judge is exercising a judicial discretion as to the sentence to be 
imposed within the parameters laid down by law.  It does not arise where a court is lawfully 
imposing a fixed penalty generally applicable to a particular offence as described in Deaton v The 
Attorney General.” 
Thus, where a mandatory sentence is prescribed by statute, the courts are precluded from considering 
whether the sentence is proportionate to the particular circumstances of the individual case. 
3.55 A consequence of prescribing a mandatory sentence is thus to create a system of sentencing in 
which sentencing proportionality plays a limited role.  In Chapter 1, the Commission observed that, for 
most cases, the courts have adopted a three-tiered approach to formulating proportionate sentences.  
This requires the courts to:  (i) identify the range of applicable penalties; (ii) locate the particular case on 
that range (by reference to culpability, harm and offender behaviour); and (iii) apply any factors which 
would mitigate or aggravate the sentence.  Even though the outcome of a sentencing hearing for murder 
is, in general, more severe than the outcome of sentencing hearings for other offences, the sentencing 
process for murder is much less complex.  First of all, there is no need to identify a range of applicable 
penalties; the only applicable penalty is the mandatory life sentence.   Secondly, there is no need to 
consider where on any such range a particular murder case is located as all cases of murder, irrespective 
of their particular circumstances, attract the mandatory life sentence.  Thirdly, there is no need to consider 
whether there are any factors which mitigate or aggravate the severity of the sentence.  As a result, the 
courts do not distinguish between cases at the upper end of the scale and cases at the lower end of the 
scale.   
3.56 This reference to a “scale” is not to suggest that some murders are not serious.  It is undoubtedly 
the case that murder of any description is a very serious offence.  Indeed, by definition, every murder will 
involve a significant degree of culpability, namely, an intention to kill or cause serious injury, and result in 
an irreparable level of harm, namely, the death of the victim.
114
  Once these requirements are met, 
however, there may be other factors which could merit differential treatment.  Some cases may exhibit a 
relatively lower degree of culpability where, for instance, the murder was committed in the heat of the 
moment, whereas other cases may exhibit a relatively higher degree of culpability where, for instance, 
there is evidence of planning and premeditation.  An offender’s behaviour may be less reprehensible 
where, for instance, he or she tried to save the victim, or more reprehensible where, for instance, he or 
she tortured the victim over a prolonged period of time before killing him or her.  Furthermore, there may 
be factors such as a guilty plea or material assistance which in the context of other offences might be 
afforded weight but which cannot be taken into account in murder cases.  As discussed below at 
paragraphs 3.77 to 3.84, there would, however, be scope to reflect the individual circumstances of each 
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case if the sentencing judge were permitted to recommend a minimum term to be served by an offender 
convicted of murder.  
3.57 As with the principle of consistency, the Commission considers that full compliance with the 
principle of proportionality requires that any exacting standard that applies to sentencing should also 
apply to early release.  Arguably, a more proportionate approach is taken in respect of early release than 
in respect of the sentence for murder in so far as the Parole Board and the Minister for Justice consider 
the individual circumstances of each case.  In much the same way as with the principle of consistency, 
this may be jeopardised where, for instance, the Parole Board and the Minister for Justice are:  (i) dealing 
with a case in which the sentence has been imposed following the application of a disproportionate 
approach, or (ii) influenced by external events.  Such external events might include adverse media 
attention surrounding the circumstances of a particular case or intervening changes in policy.  As 
discussed below at paragraphs 3.77 to 3.84, this risk may be minimised if the Minister for Justice and the 
Parole Board were to receive guidance from the sentencing judge in the form of a recommended 
minimum term to be served by the relevant offender.    
(3) Discussion 
3.58 In Chapter 2, the Commission observed that the system comprising the mandatory life sentence 
and early release mechanisms has been considered by the Irish courts and the European Court of 
Human Rights. 
3.59 The constitutionality of the mandatory life sentence was upheld by the Supreme Court in Whelan 
and Lynch v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform.
115
  Regarding section 2 of the Criminal Justice 
Act 1990, the Supreme Court held that it was not contrary to the constitutional doctrine of the separation 
of powers for the Oireachtas to prescribe a mandatory sentence for certain offences provided that there 
was a rational connection between the prescribed sentence and the requirements of justice.  It also held 
that although murder could be committed in a variety of circumstances, it was not contrary to the 
constitutional principle of proportionality for the Oireachtas to prescribe a mandatory life sentence for all 
murders as any murder, even at the lowest end of the scale, is so abhorrent and offensive to society that 
it merits a life sentence.
116
  The Court also held that a constitutional interpretation of section 2 of the 1990 
Act did not require the sentencing courts to make a non-binding recommendation regarding the minimum 
term to be served by an offender before he or she became eligible for release.  It did not, however, reject 
the possibility that the Oireachtas could introduce such a system.  Regarding temporary release, the 
Supreme Court held that the Minister’s power to grant temporary release was not contrary to the 
constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers as the granting of temporary release was not a 
sentencing exercise.
117
 
3.60 The compatibility of a mandatory sentencing system with the European Convention on Human 
Rights was upheld by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Kafkaris v Cyprus.
118
  Regarding 
the mandatory life sentence, the Court ruled that a mandatory life sentence would not in itself give rise to 
an issue under Article 3 provided that there was a de facto and de jure possibility of release.  It also held 
that prolonged detention under an entirely punitive life sentence, irrespective of considerations of risk or 
dangerousness, was compatible with Article 5(1) as there was a clear and sufficient causal connection 
between the conviction and the continued detention.  The Court refrained from ruling on a complaint 
under Article 5(4), which might have clarified whether, in the case of a mandatory life sentence, the 
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requirements of Article 5(1) were satisfied by the original trial and appeal proceedings
119
 or whether a 
review was required.
120
   
3.61 It should be noted, however, that since its decision in Kafkaris the ECtHR appears to have 
modified its position regarding the compatibility of the mandatory life sentence with Article 3.  In Vinter, 
Bamber and Moore v United Kingdom,
121
 the Court indicated that a mandatory life sentence without the 
possibility of parole might in itself give rise to an issue under Article 3 where it was considered to be 
grossly disproportionate.  It noted, however, that “gross disproportionality” was a strict test which would 
rarely be met.  This modified position appears to coincide with the recognition by the Court of a trend 
away from the mandatory life sentence among the Council of Europe Member States.  In Kafkaris, the 
Court indicated that in the absence of a discernible trend amongst Member States it was within the 
margin of appreciation of each Member State to decide on the system it adopted in respect of life 
sentences.  The Court thus concluded that it was acceptable for a Member State such as Cyprus to 
operate a mandatory life sentence without parole.  By contrast, in Vinter, the Court observed that the 
trend in Europe was “clearly against” the mandatory life sentence without parole.  While the Court did not 
conclude that it was no longer acceptable for a Member State to operate a mandatory life sentence 
without parole, the inference is that if the current tide against the mandatory life sentence continues the 
Court might develop further the test of “gross disproportionality.” 
3.62 Nevertheless, as the law currently stands, it would appear that the system comprising a 
mandatory life sentence and early release is, in general terms, compatible both with the Constitution of 
Ireland and with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).  (As discussed above at 
paragraphs 2.101 to 2.104, this is subject to continuing uncertainty as to whether Article 5(4) of the ECHR 
entitles prisoners serving wholly punitive life sentences to regular reviews of their detention by an 
independent, court-like body.)  In light of the Attorney General’s request, however, there remains the 
question of whether the current system should be retained, repealed or reformed.  Accordingly, the 
Commission now turns to the arguments that may be made in favour of each of these options.  In doing 
so, it first discusses the mandatory life sentence itself.  The Commission then discusses related matters 
that arise in the context of the arrangements for early release and the extent to which this aspect of the 
system might be reformed.   
(a) The Mandatory Life Sentence for Murder  
3.63 The Commission acknowledges that a variety of arguments exist in favour of both the retention 
and the abolition of the mandatory life sentence for murder.  During the public consultation and 
roundtable discussion which the Commission conducted after the publication of the Consultation Paper, a 
range of contrasting views were expressed in relation to the persuasiveness of these arguments.  
Similarly, within the Commission itself, differing views have emerged as to which set of arguments carries 
greater weight.  
3.64  In this section, the Commission first outlines the arguments in favour of retaining the 
mandatory life sentence for murder.  These arguments are considered to be persuasive by a majority of 
the Commission, President Quirke and Commissioners Baker and Flanagan.  The arguments in favour of 
replacing the mandatory life sentence for murder with a discretionary life sentence are then outlined in 
turn.  These arguments are considered to be persuasive by a minority of the Commission, 
Commissioners O’Connell and O’Malley.     
(i) Arguments in favour of retaining the mandatory life sentence for murder 
3.65 In the first place, as observed by the Supreme Court in Whelan and Lynch v Minister for 
Justice, Equality and Law Reform:  
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“[i]n committing the crime of murder the perpetrator deprives the victim, finally and irrevocably, of 
that most fundamental of rights, the right ‘to be’ and at the same time extinguishes the enjoyment 
of all other rights inherent in that person as a human being.”
122
   
For this reason, the offence has long “been regarded as the ultimate crime against society as a whole”.
123
 
3.66 Murder is the most serious criminal offence and it is therefore appropriate that it should attract 
the most severe sanction permissible under Irish law.  As discussed at paragraph 2.218 since the 
abolition of the death penalty by the Criminal Justice Act 1990, life imprisonment fits this mould.  It is 
arguable that only this, the most punitive of available penalties, serves to denounce murder as the most 
heinous offence under Irish law.     
3.67 This is not to deny that murder may be committed in a variety of circumstances and that some 
offenders may be more culpable than others.   However, as acknowledged by the Supreme Court in 
Whelan and Lynch, it remains the case that “the crime itself, by its very nature, has always been 
considered at the highest level of gravity among all forms of homicide or other crimes against the person, 
whatever the circumstances”.
124
  It may thus be argued that murder, even in its least culpable form, is so 
repugnant to society that it merits the imposition of a mandatory life sentence.  This was the view adopted 
by the High Court and affirmed by the Supreme Court in Whelan and Lynch.  In the High Court, Irvine J 
notably concluded that “there can be nothing offensive in the Oireachtas promoting the respect for life by 
concluding that any murder even at the lowest end of the scale, is so abhorrent and offensive to society 
that it merits a mandatory life sentence... ”.
125
  As discussed below at paragraphs 3.77 to 3.84, however, 
differences in culpability could be reflected if the sentencing judge were permitted to recommend the 
minimum term to be served by an offender convicted of murder.  
3.68 A closely related argument is that the provision of a discretionary life sentence for murder 
would fail to reflect the unique gravity of this form of homicide.  At present, life imprisonment is the 
discretionary maximum penalty for the offence of manslaughter.  If both murder and manslaughter were 
subject to the same penalty regime, it is considered that this would blur the distinction between these 
offences.   As murder alone involves the killing of a person arising from an intention to kill or cause 
serious injury, it is considered that this should be differentiated by the application of a distinct penalty 
regime.   
3.69 A further argument in favour of retaining the mandatory life sentence for murder is that this 
penalty facilitates the protection of the public against the risk of further violence on the part of a convicted 
murderer.  Although prisoners serving life sentences will rarely remain in prison for the rest of their natural 
lives, the fact that they are serving life sentences means that their release is conditional on their good 
behaviour (as discussed at paragraphs 3.06 and 3.07).
126
  If released, these offenders remain at liberty 
subject to the conditions of their temporary release under the Criminal Justice Act 1960, as amended by 
the Criminal Justice (Temporary Release of Offenders) Act 2003.  In addition, they are monitored by the 
Probation Service of the Department of Justice and can be returned to prison if they breach the terms of 
their temporary release.  By contrast, an individual who has served a determinate sentence cannot, in the 
event that he or she breaches the terms of their temporary release, be returned to prison on the basis of 
the original conviction.   
(ii) Arguments in favour of repealing the mandatory life sentence for murder 
3.70 In the first place, as not all murders are equally heinous, it is considered unjust that an identical 
penalty should apply in every case.  While some murderers may exhibit a level of appalling depravity or 
sadism, the majority of these offences occur in an emotional context.  As the mandatory life sentence 
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cannot reflect these variations in culpability, it is difficult to reconcile this penalty regime with the principles 
of consistency and proportionality in sentencing.   
3.71 A related argument is that if judges had sentencing discretion for both murder and 
manslaughter, sentencing practice could reflect the fact that some instances of murder are very close to 
voluntary manslaughter in terms of culpability.
127
  The Supreme Court noted in The People (DPP) v 
Conroy (No. 2) that:  
“[h]aving regard to the multiple factors which enter into consideration of sentence in the case of a 
homicide, there would not appear to... be any grounds for a general presumption that the crime of 
manslaughter may not, having regard to its individual facts and particular circumstances be in 
many instances, from a sentencing point of view, as serious as, or more serious than, the crime of 
murder.”
128
  
3.72 The provision of sentencing discretion for both murder and manslaughter would also offset the 
possibility that juries may, in some instances, feel tempted to acquit some killers of murder and convict 
them of manslaughter in order to spare the offender the application of the mandatory life sentence.  
3.73 It would not necessarily follow, however, that the substitution of a discretionary life sentence for 
the mandatory life sentence would erode the distinction between murder and manslaughter as the 
elements of these homicide offences would remain the same notwithstanding any reform of the applicable 
punishments.   
3.74 A further argument against the retention of the mandatory life sentence is that there is a lack of 
clarity regarding the consequences of this penalty.  While the sentence endures for life in the sense that a 
released murderer may be recalled to prison for breaching his or her conditions of temporary release, the 
term ‘life sentence’ is nonetheless misleading.  This term suggests that the offender will spend the 
remainder of his or her life in prison.  However, in practice, the sentence specified in court bears no 
relationship to the punishment which a convicted murderer will undergo.  The pronouncement of this 
penalty therefore provides no meaningful information to the offender, the victim’s family, the media or the 
public as to what the sentence really means.  As those convicted of murder do not in reality receive the 
same penalty, the argument that there is only one appropriate punishment for this offence is also 
problematic.   
3.75 Finally, if the mandatory life sentence for murder were replaced with a discretionary life 
sentence, a convicted murderer could still be subjected to ‘life-long’ post-release conditions.  An offender 
who receives a discretionary life sentence is also eligible to be recalled to prison, in the event that he or 
she breaches the conditions attached to temporary release.  In this respect, a discretionary life sentence 
for murder would afford just as much protection to the public as a mandatory life sentence.    
3.76 The Commission, by a majority, recommends that the mandatory life sentence for murder be 
retained. 
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(b) Judicial recommendation at sentencing stage  
3.77  The Commission now turns to consider how the mandatory sentencing regime for murder 
could be reformed by the introduction of a judicial power to recommend a minimum term to be served.   
3.78   As discussed at paragraph 3.15ff, in Northern Ireland, a mandatory life sentence for murder is 
prescribed by section 1(1) of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973.  Article 5 of the Life 
Sentences (Northern Ireland) Order 2001 requires that where a court imposes a life sentence, it must 
specify the minimum period that must be served by the offender “to satisfy the requirements of retribution 
and deterrence,” before he or she becomes eligible for parole.
129
  Where the offence is particularly 
serious, the court may order a “whole life tariff” if it considers that the offender should be detained for the 
remainder of his or her natural life.
130
  In calculating the minimum term to be served by an offender, the 
Northern Ireland Court of Appeal, in R v Candless,
131
 directed the courts to have regard to the guidance 
provided by Lord Woolf LJ in his 2002 Practice  Statement (Crime: Life Sentences).  The Practice 
Statement (as discussed at paragraph 3.18) sets out the starting points, and the circumstances in which 
each starting point applies, and also outlines the factors which tend to aggravate or mitigate the duration 
of the minimum term.  
3.79 As discussed at paragraph 2.12, in England and Wales, section 1(1) of the Murder (Abolition of 
the Death Penalty) Act 1965 provides for a mandatory life sentence for murder.  Under section 269 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003, a court is required, when imposing a life sentence, to make an order specifying 
the minimum term to be served by the offender before he or she may be considered for release by the 
Parole Board.
132
  Where the court is of the opinion that, because of the seriousness of the offence, no 
such order should be made, it must order that the early release provisions are not to apply to the 
offender.
133
  As to how to calculate a minimum term, Schedule 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (as 
discussed at paragraph 3.23ff) sets out the starting points, the circumstances which dictate which starting 
point applies, and the factors which tend to aggravate or mitigate the duration of the minimum term.  The 
Commission considers that the approach adopted in Northern Ireland is preferable to the more 
prescriptive legislative model established in England and Wales, under which the appropriate starting 
points are specified by the Criminal Justice Act 2003.      
3.80 In the view of the Commission, the Northern Irish experience illustrates the benefits of 
permitting sentencing courts to pronounce on the relative culpability of convicted murderers.  Cases such 
as R v Howell
134
 and R v Stewart
135
 (discussed above at paragraphs 3.19 and 3.20) demonstrate that this 
approach enables the courts to incorporate elements of the principles of proportionality and consistency 
when sentencing the offence of murder.  Furthermore, where courts are afforded scope to acknowledge 
the various aggravating and mitigating factors which may characterise murder cases, this plays an 
important role in maintaining public confidence in the sentencing process.    
3.81 The Commission also considers that permitting sentencing courts to pronounce on the relative 
culpability of convicted murderers may reduce two problems associated with the current early release 
arrangements for murder.   The first problem relates to the factors considered by the Parole Board and 
the Minister for Justice in assessing whether an offender is suitable for release.  As discussed at 
paragraph 3.13, in performing this role, the Parole Board and the Minister for Justice take into account a 
number of factors that are comparable, though not identical, to those considered in the sentencing 
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process.  In particular, consideration of the nature and gravity of the offence engages the Parole Board 
and the Minister for Justice in a process that closely resembles a sentencing exercise.
136
  This is an 
unavoidable consequence because the Parole Board and the Minister for Justice should not be blind in 
their analysis to the seriousness of the particular offender’s offence or to the severity of the sentence that 
he or she is serving.  The concerns that this overlaps with considerations that are more appropriate to the 
sentencing process might be alleviated if the Parole Board and the Minister for Justice were to receive 
guidance from the sentencing judge in the form of a recommended minimum term to be served by the 
particular offender.   
3.82 The second problem relates to the possibility that external events may influence the Minister 
for Justice or the Parole Board in their consideration of a case for early release.  As discussed at 
paragraph 3.51, it is arguable that a more consistent and proportionate approach is taken in respect of 
the granting of early release than in respect of sentencing for murder.  This is because the Parole Board 
and the Minister for Justice:  (i) consider each case against broadly the same factors, namely, those listed 
at paragraphs 3.11 and 3.12 (thereby facilitating consistency), and (ii) have regard to the individual 
circumstances of each case under consideration (thereby facilitating proportionality).  This approach may 
be jeopardised, however, where the Parole Board and the Minister for Justice are:  (i) dealing with a case 
in which the sentence has been imposed following the application of an inconsistent and/or 
disproportionate approach, or (ii) influenced by external events.  Such external events might include 
adverse media attention surrounding the circumstances of a particular case or intervening changes in 
sentencing or early release policy.  The Commission considers, however, that this risk would be reduced 
if the Minister for Justice and the Parole Board were to receive guidance from the sentencing judge in the 
form of a recommended minimum term to be served by the offender.   
3.83 The Commission has concluded, therefore, that it would be “appropriate and beneficial” to 
permit sentencing courts to recommend a minimum term to be served by an offender convicted of 
murder.   As noted at paragraph 3.05, Article 13.6 of the Constitution provides that the power to commute 
or remit punishment imposed by any court is vested in the President but may also be conferred by law on 
other authorities.  This was done in the Criminal Justice Act 1951, which confers the right to remit a 
sentence on the Government.
137
  For this reason, any judicial indication at sentencing that an offender 
sentenced to life imprisonment should serve a minimum term is subject to the power of remission of the 
Executive under Article 13.6 and therefore would constitute a recommendation only that the offender 
serve such term.  The Commission considers that this proposed reform would complement its earlier 
recommendation that a Judicial Council be empowered to provide guidance on sentencing.  It is 
suggested that, together, these changes would serve to enhance consistency and proportionality in the 
Irish sentencing process.  
3.84 The Commission recommends that where an offender is convicted of murder, and is therefore 
sentenced to life imprisonment, legislation should provide that the judge may recommend a minimum 
term to be served by the offender.   
(c) The establishment of the Parole Board on an independent statutory basis 
3.85 As discussed above at paragraphs 2.101 to 2.104, it may be questioned whether the 
mandatory life sentence for murder and the accompanying early release arrangements comply with 
Article 5(4) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).  The case-law of the European Court 
of Human Rights has not addressed the question of whether Article 5(4) entitles prisoners serving wholly 
punitive life sentences to regular reviews of their detention by an independent, court-like body.  For this 
reason, in Whelan and Lynch v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform,
138
 the Supreme Court held 
that the non-statutory, advisory nature of the Parole Board does not necessarily conflict with the 
requirements of Article 5 ECHR.  The Commission considers, however, that the establishment of the 
Parole Board on a statutory basis is desirable and welcomes the Government’s stated intention to 
                                                     
136
  O’Malley Sentencing - Towards a Coherent System (Round Hall, 2011) at 222. 
137
  O’Malley Sentencing Law and Practice (Thomson Round Hall, 2
nd
 ed, 2006) at 540.  
138
  Whelan and Lynch v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] IESC 34; [2012] 1 IR 1. 
125 
introduce this reform.
139
  It notes that the establishment of a statutory Parole Board would have the 
benefit of enhancing the consistency and transparency of sentencing outcomes in murder cases.  The 
specification of a recommended minimum term by a sentencing court (as recommended by the 
Commission in this Report) would, in turn, assist the proposed statutory Parole Board in performing its 
functions.     
3.86 The Commission recommends that the Parole Board be established on an independent 
statutory basis, and welcomes the Government’s proposal to introduce legislation bringing about this 
effect. 
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4  
CHAPTER 4 PRESUMPTIVE MINIMUM SENTENCES  
A Introduction 
4.01 In this Chapter, the Commission considers the second type of mandatory sentence identified in 
the introduction, namely, the presumptive minimum sentence.  Two pieces of legislation provide for such 
a sentencing regime in Ireland: the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 and the Firearms Acts.  In Part B, the 
Commission considers the sentencing regime under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, beginning with an 
examination of how this regime operates in practice.  In Part C, the Commission considers the practical 
operation of the sentencing regime under the Firearms Acts.  Part D considers the use of minimum 
sentencing regimes in other common law countries.  The Commission concludes in Part E by examining 
each of these presumptive sentencing regimes against the conceptual framework for criminal sanctions 
and sentencing. 
B Presumptive Minimum Sentences under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 
4.02 There are two offences under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 which attract a presumptive 
minimum sentence.  These are the offences of possessing
1
 and importing
2
 controlled drugs, having a 
value of €13,000 or more,
3
 with intent to sell or supply.  Where a person is convicted of either of these 
offences, the court must impose a minimum sentence of 10 years
4
 unless there are exceptional and 
specific circumstances which would make such a sentence unjust in all the circumstances.
5
  In this 
section, the Commission considers the application of this category of presumptive minimum sentence by 
examining: (1) the elements of the possession and importation offences, (2) the relevant penalty 
provisions, (3) the early release provisions, and (4) the particular situation of drug couriers. 
(1) Elements of the Offences  
4.03 Some of the elements described below are particular to either the possession offence under 
section 15A of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 or the importation offence under section 15B.  Others are 
common to both offences.    
(a) Possession  
4.04 The first element of the offence under section 15A (but not section 15B) is “possession” of a 
controlled drug.  While the term possession has not been definitively defined, the legal understanding of 
the term may be distinguished from the common understanding.  Whereas the common understanding 
might equate “possession” with “custody”, the legal understanding identifies “custody” as being just one 
aspect of a more complex theory.  In this regard, McAuley and McCutcheon observe that possession 
comprises control or dominion over goods and knowledge of their existence.
6
  Thus, a person may, in 
legal terms, possess goods regardless of whether or not he or she has custody of them.  Where a person 
has custody and exercises control over goods, he or she is said to have “actual possession” of the 
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goods.
7
  Where, on the other hand, a person does not have custody of the goods but exercises control 
over them, he or she is said to have “constructive possession” of the goods.  By way of illustration, 
McAuley and McCutcheon refer to the judgment of Davitt P in Minister for Posts and Telegraphs v 
Campbell:
8
 
 “... a person cannot, in the context of a criminal case, be properly said to keep or have 
possession of an article unless he has control of it personally or by someone else.  He cannot be 
said to have actual possession of it unless he personally can exercise physical control over it; 
and he cannot be said to have constructive possession of it unless it is in the actual possession 
of someone over whom he has control so that it would be available to him if and when he wanted 
it...  He cannot properly be said to be in control or possession of something of whose existence 
and presence he has no knowledge.”
9
  
4.05 Thus, the term “possession” is broad enough to describe the range of roles played by those 
involved in the drugs supply chain.  At one end of the scale, there are the high-level offenders who 
manage and direct the supply chain.  These may be described as having constructive possession of the 
drugs as they exercise ultimate control over the supply chain.  At the other end of the scale, there are the 
low-level offenders who, for instance, are coerced into delivering the drugs to their final destination.  
These may be described as having actual possession of the drugs as they exercise physical control over 
the drugs. 
4.06 The Court of Criminal Appeal has considered the issue of possession in a number of drugs 
cases.  In The People (DPP) v Gallagher,
10
 the applicant sought to appeal his conviction on the ground 
that the evidence did not establish that he as a matter of law had ever been in possession of the drugs in 
question.  It was submitted that since the container had been at all times under Garda surveillance, it, 
together with its contents, had been in the custody and control of the authorities and could not in law, 
therefore, be described as being in his possession.  In rejecting this argument, the Court stated: 
 “The word ‘possession’ is a common word of the English language and well known to the law.  
There are many offences concerning unlawful possession such as those relating to firearms, 
stolen goods, pornography, lethal weapons etc.  It is a term which may indeed require particular 
analysis in certain contexts such as where there is an issue of constructive possession.  In this 
case the context is plain.  It is one of actual possession.  Possession having been taken of the 
container on delivery, the men in question opened it and proceeded to unload its contents...  
[T]hey were exercising physical control over the container and its contents.  There could not be a 
clearer case of actual possession.  The fact that the gardaí were involved in a close surveillance 
operation with a view to arresting those involved in the transportation and unloading of the drugs 
does not take away from these objective facts and does not in law mean that those involved did 
not at the time of their arrest have possession of the drugs in question...  Surveillance operations 
based on information and intelligence are part and parcel of policing techniques and it would be 
ludicrous to suggest that such surveillance operations, which closely monitor illegal activity with a 
view to arresting the culprits, could in some way exculpate such culprits from responsibility for 
their actions and in particular mean that they did not have possession of that which was de facto 
in their possession.”  
4.07 In The People (DPP) v Goulding,
11
 the Court of Criminal Appeal considered whether there was 
sufficient evidence to leave the question of possession to the jury.  An independent witness had testified 
to seeing a package being thrown from the passenger side of a car in which the applicant had been the 
front-seat passenger.  The Court of Criminal Appeal concluded that this constituted sufficient evidence. 
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(b) Importation  
4.08 The first element of the offence under section 15B (but not section 15A) is “importation” of a 
controlled drug.  While the term “import” has not been defined by the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, as 
amended, the ordinary meaning of the term is to bring goods or services into a country for sale.
12
  In this 
regard, it may be noted that while it is an offence under section 15B to import controlled drugs, it is not an 
offence under section 15B to export controlled drugs.  This raises an issue as to whether a person 
convicted of exporting controlled drugs worth €13,000 or more, like a person convicted of importing the 
same value of controlled drugs, may attract a presumptive minimum sentence of 10 years.  
(c) Controlled Drug  
4.09 The second element of the offences under section 15A and section 15B is that the possession or 
importation must relate to a controlled drug.  The term “controlled drug” is defined by section 2(1) of the 
Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 as: 
 “... any substance, product or preparation (other than a substance, product or preparation 
specified in an order under subsection (3) of this section which is for the time being in force) 
which is either specified in the Schedule to this Act or is for the time being declared pursuant to 
subsection (2) of this section to be a controlled drug for the purposes of the Act.” 
 There is thus no distinction between different types of controlled drugs.  
(d) Market Value of €13,000  
4.10 The third element of the offences under section 15A and section 15B is that the controlled drug 
must have a market value of €13,000 or more.  The term “market value” is defined as the price that the 
drug could be expected to fetch on the market for the unlawful sale or supply of controlled drugs.
13
 
4.11 Evidence regarding the market value of the drug may be given by a member of An Garda 
Síochána or an officer of customs and excise who has knowledge of the unlawful sale or supply of 
controlled drugs.
14
  In The People (DPP) v Hanley,
15
 the applicant had sought leave to appeal his 
conviction on the ground that the trial judge had erred in admitting evidence from a retired Garda 
regarding the value of the drugs in question.  It was submitted that the effect of section 15A(3) was to 
prescribe the manner in which the value of the controlled drug had to be proved and that was by means 
of a Garda witness giving evidence in accordance with the section.  The Court of Criminal Appeal rejected 
this argument and held that section 15A(3) was an “enabling provision”: 
 “It enables the value of the drugs to be proved by a member of the Garda Síochána or an officer 
of the Customs and Excise who has knowledge of the unlawful sale or supply of controlled drugs.  
But what the subsection does not do is say that such evidence may not be adduced in some 
other manner.  It could be adduced by an admission.  It could be adduced by some other expert.  
Certainly any person who would have knowledge of the illegal drug industry may be in a position 
to satisfy the trial judge that he has the status of an expert and so place himself in a position to 
give evidence.” 
The court found that while the retired Garda witness did not come within section15A(3), he had proved 
himself an expert by providing evidence regarding his knowledge and experience of the sale and supply 
of controlled drugs.  Thus, he had been competent to give evidence. 
4.12 The use of “market value” as the standard for determining whether an offence under section 15A 
or section 15B has been committed, and therefore whether the statutory minimum sentence applies, is 
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problematic in a number of respects.
16
  By and large, these problems stem from the fact that the market 
value of any commodity may fluctuate to a significant degree depending on when and where that 
commodity is sold and how much of that commodity is already on the market.
17
  As a result, evidence 
regarding the market value of drugs is at best an estimate. 
4.13 Thus, it may be argued that “market value” is not capable of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  
However, that section 15A obliges the prosecution to establish this criterion beyond a reasonable doubt 
was recently acknowledged by the Supreme Court in The People (DPP) v Connolly:
18
 
 “... [P]roof of value is an essential ingredient of the offence under section 15A.  It is what 
distinguishes it from the offence of possession for sale or supply of an unquantified and unvalued 
amount of drugs.  Most importantly, it is what has caused the Oireachtas, subject to exceptional 
mitigating circumstances, to mark the offence as one of extreme seriousness such as to require 
imprisonment.  This is, of course, subject to the exceptions mentioned in the section.  The 
ingredient of value must be proved to the satisfaction of the jury beyond reasonable doubt.”
19
 
Given that the market value is not static, it is at least arguable that in most (if not all) cases, there will be a 
reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of the market value being asserted.
20
 
4.14 The fact that the market value may fluctuate to a significant degree gives rise to a second 
problem: the risk of arbitrariness.  It is not difficult to imagine a situation in which two similarly placed 
people, convicted of identical offences under section 15A, are sentenced to different terms of 
imprisonment because the market value in the locality of the first offence is different to the market value in 
the locality of the second.
21
 
4.15 For similar reasons, O’Malley asserts that “market value” is an inappropriate triggering factor.
22
  In 
this regard, he observes that minimum sentences are generally triggered by a factor which is additional 
to, or aggravates, the basic offence.  He asserts that these triggering factors should be clearly defined 
and capable of unequivocal identification.  As market value depends on an estimated street value of the 
drugs, it cannot be clearly defined and is not capable of unequivocal definition.
23
 
4.16 Finally, it has been noted that the threshold of €13,000 has not been adjusted since its 
introduction, with the exception of a slight increase when the Euro was introduced.
24
  This, it is argued, 
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  For a complete analysis, see:  Caulkins “Price and Purity Analysis for Illicit Drug: Data and Conceptual Issues” 
(2005) Heinz Research Paper 25 at 4.  Available at: http://repository.cmu.edu/heinzworks/25 [Last accessed: 
22 May 2013]; and McDermott “Price and Purity of Illicit Drugs”.  Paper delivered at 13
th
 Annual National 
Prosecutors’ Conference, Dublin Castle Conference Centre, 19 May 2012. 
17
  Ni Raifeartaigh “The Criminal Justice System and Drug Related Offending: Some Thoughts on Procedural 
Reform” (1998) 4(1) Bar Review 15. 
18
  The People (DPP) v Connolly [2011] IESC 6. 
19
  Ibid. 
20
  The process by which market value is determined was considered by the Supreme Court in The People (DPP) 
v Connolly [2011] IESC 6; and the Court of Criminal Appeal in The People (DPP) v Finnamore [2008] IECCA 
99. 
21
  Ni Raifeartaigh “The Criminal Justice System and Drug Related Offending: Some Thoughts on Procedural 
Reform” (1998) 4(1) Bar Review 15. 
22
  O’Malley “Further Observations on DPP v Connolly (Part 1 of 3)” 22 February 2011.  Available at: 
www.extempore.ie/2011/02/22/further-observations-on-dpp-v-connolly-part-1-of-3/  [Last accessed: 22 May 
2013].  
23
  Ibid. 
24
  O’Malley Sentencing Law and Practice (Thomson Round Hall, 2
nd
 ed, 2006) at 340. 
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creates a risk of arbitrary and unjust consequences which is mitigated only by the exercise of the limited 
judicial discretion accorded by section 27.
25
 
(i) The People (DPP) v Connolly 
4.17 The process by which market value is determined was considered by the Supreme Court in The 
People (DPP) v Connolly.
26
  The appellant had been charged with an offence under section 15A when 10 
packs containing 10 kilogrammes of drugs were found in his car.  Five of the 10 packs were analysed and 
found to contain amphetamine.  While the purity of the amphetamine was not tested, the forensic 
evidence was that “in general” purities fell between 10 percent and 40 percent.  On cross-examination, it 
was conceded that the presence of as little as 1 percent of amphetamine could trigger the results which 
had been achieved.  The crucial issue was whether the threshold market value of €13,000 had been 
established.  If there had been 10 percent of amphetamine in five of the packs, the value of the drugs 
would have been approximately €72,877.50.  However, if there had only been 1 percent of amphetamine, 
the value would have been €7,287.75 which would not have triggered the statutory minimum sentence. 
4.18 In the Circuit Criminal Court, the appellant sought a direction that there was no case to answer on 
the ground that there was insufficient proof that the drugs were worth €13,000 or more.  The trial judge 
refused the application and sentenced the appellant to 10 years’ imprisonment.  The appellant appealed 
to the Court of Criminal Appeal on the ground that the trial judge had erred in not withdrawing the case 
from the jury.  The Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed the appeal but, pursuant to section 29 of the  
Courts of Justice Act 1929, certified the following question as a question of law of exceptional public 
importance: 
“In a prosecution pursuant to section 15A of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, for the purpose of 
ascertaining the amount of a controlled substance present in a powder in a sealed container or in 
a number of such containers proven by expert evidence to contain that particular controlled 
substance, may the amount of that controlled substance present in the powder be established by 
the oral evidence of an expert as to the range within which amounts of that controlled substance 
in other powders generally fell and, if the answer is in the affirmative, must the prosecution 
disclose to the defence a statement for a report by that expert setting out the facts upon which 
her or his opinion as to that range is based?” [emphasis added.]  
4.19 The Supreme Court considered the limited extent to which the samples had been analysed in so 
far as the purity of the amphetamine had not been tested.  It examined the use of the term “generally” to 
describe the rate at which purity levels fell between 10 percent and 40 percent.  In the absence of any 
clarification as to what “generally” meant, the Supreme Court concluded that “generally” meant “probably” 
and that probability was not enough to exclude the possibility that the percentage of amphetamine 
present could have been as low as 1 percent.  The Supreme Court thus set aside the conviction. 
4.20 O’Malley commends the Supreme Court for having “reached the right decision ... for the right 
reason”.
27
  He notes, however, that: 
 “It is rather frightening in retrospect to realise that a conviction for a s.15A offence could be based 
on the probability as opposed to the actuality of drug purity levels. It is all the more worrying in 
circumstances where conviction carries either a presumptive or mandatory minimum sentence of 
10 years’ imprisonment, a matter to which the Supreme Court rightly drew attention.  The 
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quashing of the appellant’s conviction should be a wake-up call to those charged with furnishing 
the necessary proofs in trials for s.15A and s.15B offences.”
28
 
(ii) The People (DPP) v Finnamore 
4.21 The process by which market value is determined was considered by the Court of Criminal 
Appeal in the earlier case of The People (DPP) v Finnamore.
29
  The applicant had been charged with an 
offence under section 15A when he was found in possession of a number of bags in which amphetamine 
was detected.  The forensic evidence was that tests had been carried out on one of 48 tape-bound plastic 
packs and a sample of loose white powder found in another bag.  The evidence was that amphetamine 
was the “main component” in the plastic pack and a “major component” of the loose white powder.  
Further tests were carried out on 16 of the 48 packs and a sample of the loose white powder.  The 
evidence was that there was a “presence of amphetamine”.  At no point was the purity of the 
amphetamine analysed. 
4.22 The applicant argued that it was not reasonable to ask the jury to accept that on the basis of an 
analysis of a small portion of the drugs found, all the drugs were, beyond a reasonable doubt, the same.  
The Court of Criminal Appeal held: 
 “The question as to what is or is not sufficient analysis, in terms of amount, or the purity of the 
drugs, must depend on the circumstances of each case.  There is no principle or rule of law 
known to this court which requires that in each and every case, every package must inevitably be 
individually analysed before a conviction can be considered safe.”
30
  
 Thus it would appear that an analysis need not be carried out on every pack found in every case.  This 
will, however, depend very much on the circumstances of the particular case.  In Finnamore, for instance, 
the Court appeared to attach weight to the fact that the 48 packs had been “wrapped in a substantially 
identical manner” and placed together while the loose powder was found “without any apparent division or 
distinction between what was taken for analysis and the remainder of the bulk”.  The Court noted, 
however, that in a different case, a more extensive analysis might be required. 
4.23 In The People (DPP) v Connolly,
31
 the Supreme Court distinguished Finnamore on the ground 
that the forensic evidence in Finnamore was that amphetamine was the “main” or “major” component in 
the samples taken.  
(iii) Mens Rea 
4.24 The Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, as amended, provides that mens rea regarding the value of the 
drugs involved is not necessary.
32
  This ensures that the range of actors in the drugs supply chain may be 
found guilty of an offence under section 15A or section 15B.  At one end of the scale, there are the high-
level offenders who undoubtedly know the approximate value of the controlled drugs while, at the other 
end of the scale, there are the low-level offenders who are less likely to know the value of the drugs 
(e) Intent to Sell or Supply  
4.25 The fourth element of an offence under section 15A (but not section 15B) is that the possession 
must be motivated by an intention to sell or supply the controlled drugs.  However, it is rarely, if ever, 
necessary for the prosecution to prove intention as section 15A(2) contains a reverse onus provision.  
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133 
This permits the court to presume, until satisfied to the contrary,
33
 that there was such an intention where, 
having regard to the quantity of the controlled drug or to such other matters as it considers relevant, it is 
satisfied that the controlled drug was not intended for immediate personal use.   
(2) Penalties  
(a) Presumptive Minimum Sentence of 10 Years’ Imprisonment 
4.26 Section 27(3C) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977
34
 provides that where a person is convicted of an 
offence under section 15A or section 15B, the court must impose a sentence of not less than 10 years.
35
  
Section 27(3C) must, however, be read in conjunction with section 27(3A), which provides that the 
maximum sentence for an offence under section 15A is life imprisonment, and section 27(3D), which 
provides that a period shorter than 10 years may be imposed where there are “exceptional and specific 
circumstances” relating to the offence or the offender. 
4.27 The presumptive 10-year minimum should not be used as a benchmark sentence but may be a 
useful guide as to the gravity of the offences under section 15A.  In The People (DPP) v Renald,
36
 the 
applicant sought leave to appeal against a sentence of five years and argued that once exceptional and 
specific circumstances were found to exist, the 10-year minimum became irrelevant.  The Court of 
Criminal Appeal rejected this argument: 
 “Even where exceptional circumstances exist which would render the statutory minimum term of 
imprisonment unjust, there is no question of the minimum sentence being ignored... even though 
that sentence may not be applicable in a particular case, the very existence of a lengthy 
mandatory minimum sentence is an important guide to the Courts in determining the gravity of 
the offence and the appropriate sentence to impose for its commission.  That is not to say that 
the minimum sentence is necessarily the starting point for determining the appropriate sentence.  
To do so would be to ignore the other material provisions, that is to say the maximum 
sentence.”
37
 
This passage has been endorsed by the courts on a number of occasions.
38
  
4.28 The Court of Criminal Appeal has also considered the method by which the courts determine the 
sentence to be imposed in individual cases.  In The People (DPP) v Duffy,
39
 the applicant sought leave to 
appeal against a sentence of six years.  In the Circuit Court, the judge had outlined the method by which 
he would determine the length of the sentence to be imposed.  He indicated that he would first assess the 
length of the sentence on the assumption that there were no mitigating factors.  He would then consider 
the various mitigating factors and reduce the sentence accordingly.  If the result was a sentence which 
was greater than the statutory minimum, that would be the sentence which he would impose.  If, on the 
other hand, the result was a sentence which was less than the statutory minimum, he would consider 
whether he should increase the sentence to the statutory minimum.  The Court of Criminal Appeal upheld 
this approach and found that it was “essentially in harmony” with the law as explained by Murphy J in 
Renald.  It noted that other methods might be equally satisfactory provided that the sentencing judge had 
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taken account of the statutory minimum as he or she was obliged to do.  In subsequent cases, however, 
the Court of Criminal Appeal has tended to advocate the approach adopted in Duffy.
40
  Irrespective of the 
approach adopted, however, it would appear that best practice requires the sentencing judge to set out 
clearly the method by which he or she has determined the sentence to be imposed.
41
 
(b) Exceptional and Specific Circumstances: Mitigating Factors 
4.29 Section 27(3D)
42
 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, as amended, provides that section 27(3C)
43
 
will not apply where the court is satisfied that there are exceptional and specific circumstances relating to 
the offence, or the person convicted of the offence, which would make a sentence of at least 10 years’ 
imprisonment unjust in all the circumstances.  By contrast with ordinary mitigating factors, the 
circumstances contemplated by section 27(3D) must be both exceptional and specific.
44
 
4.30 The extent to which exceptional and specific circumstances may justify a downward departure 
from the statutory minimum is not a precise mathematical calculation.  In The People (DPP) v Rossi and 
Hellewell
45
  the Court of Criminal Appeal thus noted: 
 “Firstly it cannot be assumed that ten years is the appropriate sentence from which any discounts  
are to be calculated.  The maximum period is life imprisonment, not to say that these particular 
offences would have attracted life imprisonment, but it is not correct necessarily to calculate by 
deduction from ten years and secondly it is not an exercise in a mathematical process where you 
take three years for one element and then look for a further calculated discount under the 
headings... .” 
Where there is an overlap between various exceptional and specific circumstances, this should not 
necessarily result in separate reductions of the sentence.
46
  In any case, the sentence imposed should 
always reflect the gravity of the particular offence.
47
 
4.31 Section 27(3D) indicates that exceptional and specific circumstances may include “any matters 
[which the court] considers appropriate”, including whether the person has pleaded guilty to the offence 
and whether the person has materially assisted in the investigation of the offence.  As noted in Chapter 1, 
a guilty plea and material assistance are, in general, considered to be factors which mitigate the severity 
of the sentence rather than the seriousness of the offence. 
(i) Guilty Plea 
4.32 Section 27(3D)(b)(i)
48
 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, as amended, provides that a guilty plea 
may be considered an exceptional and specific circumstance for the purpose of considering whether the 
statutory minimum sentence of 10 years should apply.  The provision recognises, however, that:  (a) the 
stage at which the accused indicates his or her intention to plead guilty;
49
 and (b) the circumstances 
surrounding that plea
50
 may be relevant to the determination of whether or not the statutory minimum 
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should apply.  Thus, it has been noted that an early guilty plea merits more credit than a late guilty plea
51
 
and that an accused who voluntarily pleads guilty will be given more credit than an accused who pleads 
guilty having been caught red-handed.
52
 
4.33 The Court of Criminal Appeal has, however, cautioned against treating a guilty plea, in and of 
itself, as an exceptional and specific circumstance.  In The People (DPP) v Ducque,
53
 the Court observed: 
 “First of all there is nothing exceptional about a plea of guilty, it is one of the commonest 
occurrences in any criminal trial.  Secondly, it seems to be at least implied in the judgment of this 
court delivered by Hardiman J in Botha ... that importance must be attached to the conjunctive 
‘and, if so’ in the statutory provision so that a plea of guilty can only be relevant to an escape from 
the mandatory minimum sentence if there are other circumstances which effectively can render 
the combination of the plea of guilty and those circumstances to be exceptional circumstances.  
These can include the stage at which the accused indicated the intention to plead guilty, the 
circumstances in which the indication was given and whether that person materially assisted in 
the investigation of the offence.” 
 Thus, the courts will, more often than not, consider a guilty plea in addition to other factors such as 
material assistance.
54
  The courts may also consider whether there is some additional factor which 
endows the guilty plea with exceptionality, such as where it is particularly early,
55
 lightens the workload of 
the courts or assists the prosecution’s case.
56
   
4.34 While a guilty plea may result in the imposition of a sentence lower than the presumptive 
minimum, an accused who pleads “not guilty” will not automatically receive a sentence of at least 10 
years.
57
  Similarly, it has been noted that an accused who decides to plead ‘not guilty’ should not be 
penalised with a more severe sentence.
58
  
4.35 In a 2001 Department of Justice report,
59
 McEvoy concluded that section 27 of the Misuse of 
Drugs Act 1977 had been reasonably successful in its operation in so far as it had encouraged a very 
high rate of guilty pleas.  During the period November 1999 to May 2001, in all but one of 55 cases, the 
accused had pleaded guilty.  This he attributed to the fact that a conviction following a “not guilty” plea 
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would probably have resulted in the imposition of a 10-year sentence.  Section 27 had thus saved court 
time and public funds, freed up Gardaí and resulted in a higher rate of conviction.  He noted, however, 
that there was now a “positive disincentive” to test the prosecution case: 
 “In a criminal trial anything can go wrong; difficulties can arise with warrants, witnesses may be 
unavailable for a variety of reasons, there can be a flaw in the chain of evidence, technical errors 
may be made and so forth.  However the consequences of unsuccessfully testing the prosecution 
case in a s.15A charge are so severe, it would seem that one of the practical effects of the 
section has been to discourage the vast majority of accused persons from proceeding to trial 
unless the case against them appears to be obviously flawed.”
60
 
4.36 This view was confirmed in the course of the Commission’s consultation process with 
interested parties, following the publication of the Consultation Paper.    
(ii) Material Assistance 
4.37 Section 27(3D)(b)(ii)
61
 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, as amended, provides that material 
assistance may also be considered an exceptional and specific circumstance for the purpose of 
determining whether the statutory minimum sentence should apply.  Material assistance may take many 
forms.  In The People (DPP) v Davis,
62
 Denham J observed that: 
 “The most basic [form of material assistance] is to admit the offence.  Secondly, an admission 
may be made together with showing the Gardaí drugs, etc, relating to the specific offence in 
issue.  Thirdly, there is a much more significant material assistance where an accused assists the 
Gardaí in relation to other offences and criminality.  This latter is a matter of great public interest, 
and has been given significant weight in other cases.” 
Therefore, an admission or the provision of information regarding the particular offence or other offences 
may be considered material assistance. 
4.38 The Court of Criminal Appeal has cautioned against treating an admission without more as 
material assistance.
63
  In general, therefore, an admission must relate to more than just the accused’s 
own involvement in the offence.
64
   It must, for instance, facilitate the investigation or prosecution of the 
offence by revealing the full extent of the accused’s involvement or the identity of any others involved.
65
  
The Court has indicated that it will have particular regard to situations in which the accused has made an 
admission where, by doing so, he or she has exposed himself or herself to a risk of death or serious 
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injury.
66
  An admission voluntarily given will merit more credit than an admission where the accused has 
been caught red-handed.
67
   
4.39 Similarly, information which facilitates the investigation or prosecution of an offence may 
constitute material assistance.
68
  Information regarding those in charge of the operation is particularly 
sought after.
69
  However, the courts seem to have grown more sympathetic towards those who feel that 
they cannot provide information for fear of retribution.
70
    
(iii) Any Matters the Court considers Appropriate 
4.40 Section 27(3D)(b)
71
 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, as amended, also provides that the court 
may have regard to “any matters it considers appropriate”.  While these matters have not been 
exhaustively defined in the legislation or elsewhere, there are a number of matters to which the courts’ 
attention has been frequently drawn.  These matters may be divided into two categories: (a) those that 
mitigate the seriousness of the offence, and (b) those that mitigate the severity of the sentence. 
4.41 The matters that mitigate the seriousness of the offence include those relating to culpability 
(duress, capacity), harm (type, quantity and value of the controlled drugs) and offender behaviour (level of 
involvement).  The fact that an offender was coerced into carrying or holding drugs may be considered an 
exceptional and specific circumstance.
72
   Similarly, the fact that an offender suffers from an intellectual 
disability, has low intelligence, or is simply gullible and naive, may constitute an exceptional and specific 
circumstance.
73
  Whereas the courts may only have limited regard to the type of controlled drug 
involved,
74
  the courts must consider the value and quantity.
75
  Finally, the fact that an offender had a low 
level of involvement in the commission of an offence may be considered an exceptional and specific 
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circumstance.
76
  In this regard, the Court of Criminal Appeal has distinguished between those who are 
vulnerable and those who willingly engaged in the drug trade for financial gain.
77
 
4.42 The matters that mitigate the severity of the sentence include previous good character, 
rehabilitation and the particular burden of a custodial sentence.  Thus, the fact that an offender was 
previously of good character may be considered an exceptional and specific circumstance.
78
  An offender 
may be treated as being of previous good character where he or she has previous convictions which are 
either minor and unrelated to drug trafficking,
79
 or which date back some time.
80
  The fact that an offender 
has sought to overcome a drug addiction
81
 or is unlikely to re-offend
82
 may be considered exceptional and 
specific circumstances.  Where certain factors would render a custodial sentence particularly burdensome 
for an offender (for example, where an offender is a foreign national
83
 or suffers from ill-health
84
)  these 
may also constitute exceptional and specific circumstances.   
(c) Aggravating Factors 
4.43 Section 27(3D)(c)
85
 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, as amended, provides that the court, when 
deciding whether it would be unjust in all the circumstances to impose the minimum sentence, may have 
regard to: (i) any previous drug trafficking convictions, and (ii) the public interest in preventing drug 
trafficking.   
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4.44 Section 27(3D)(c)(i) provides that the court may have regard to any previous drug trafficking 
offences when determining whether the statutory minimum should apply.
86
  It is unclear what purpose 
section 27(3D)(c)(i) serves other than to emphasise the pre-existing power of the courts to consider 
previous convictions.
87
  Smith observes that a matter of greater concern is the extent to which evidence of 
previous involvement in the drugs trade may be admissible.
88
  In The People (DPP) v Gilligan,
89
 for 
instance, the Court of Criminal Appeal held that the sentencing judge could not have regard to evidence 
of previous misconduct for which the accused had neither been charged nor convicted and which the 
accused had not asked to be taken into account.  The Court noted, however, that the sentencing court 
could not “act in blinkers” and was thus entitled, if not obliged, to consider the facts and circumstances 
surrounding each offence.
90
    
4.45 Section 27(3D)(c)(ii) provides that the court may consider whether or not the public interest would 
be served by the imposition of a sentence of less than 10 years.  This provision clearly echoes the words 
of the Minister for Justice when he stated that the courts should keep in mind the social impact of drug 
trafficking when determining whether or not to impose the statutory minimum sentence.
91
  It has been 
noted, however, that it may be difficult to determine what is in the “public interest”.
92
  Smith, on the other 
hand, observes that the provision suggests that a court should consider that the public interest will not 
always be served by committing an offender to prison.
93
 
(3) Early Release  
4.46 The power to grant early release to those who have been convicted of an offence under section 
15A or section 15B of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, as amended, has been restricted.    It has been 
observed that this reflects the “clear policy” of the Oireachtas that the courts should, in the absence of 
special circumstances, impose a prison sentence of 10 years or longer and that such sentences should 
be served in their entirety less remission.
94
  Section 27(3H),
95
 however, provides that any sentence 
imposed for an offence under section 15A or section 15B is subject to ordinary remission for good 
behaviour which currently stands at one-fourth of the total sentence. 
4.47 Thus section 27(3G)
96
 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, as amended, provides that the powers of 
commutation and remission conferred on the Government by section 23 of the Criminal Justice Act 1951 
cannot be exercised in respect of a person sentenced for an offence under section 15A or section 15B.  
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Furthermore, section 27(3I)
97
 provides that the power to grant temporary release conferred by section 2 of 
the Criminal Justice Act 1960 may not be exercised until such time as the power to grant commutation or 
remission has arisen except “for grave reasons of a humanitarian nature”.  The period of temporary 
release must be for such limited period as is justified by those reasons.  Such reasons might include 
serious illness on the part of the offender or an immediate family member, or the death of a close family 
member.
98
 
4.48 Section 27(3J)
99
 provides that the court may list a sentence for review after the expiry of not less 
than half of the term specified by the court under section 27(3C)
100
 or section 27(3F).
101
  To list a 
sentence for review, the court must be satisfied that the offender was addicted to drugs at the time of the 
offence
102
 and that the addiction was a substantial factor leading to the commission of the offence.
103
  In 
this respect, the legislation acknowledges a difference in the lesser culpability of those who become 
involved in drug dealing in order to feed their own addiction compared to those further up the hierarchy 
who often have no addiction problem.
104
   
4.49 Section 27(3K)
105
 provides that on reviewing the sentence the court may suspend the remainder 
of the sentence on any conditions it considers fit and having regard to any matters it considers 
appropriate.  In The People (DPP) v Finn,
106
 the Supreme Court firmly disapproved of the general practice 
of imposing reviewable sentences but accepted that sentences imposed for offences under section 15A 
might continue to have review elements because of the specific statutory authorisation. 
4.50 In The People (DPP) v Dunne,
107
 the Court of Criminal Appeal held that the review power was 
only available in circumstances where the mandatory minimum sentence had been passed and not where 
the court had imposed a lesser sentence on the ground that there were exceptional and specific 
circumstances.  This could lead to the illogical consequence of a person subject to the statutory minimum 
sentence being in a better position than a person not subject to the statutory minimum.
108
  It has also 
been noted that the purpose of the review provision is rehabilitative and that this mechanism should 
therefore be available to all drug addicts irrespective of the length of the sentence imposed on them.
109
 
4.51 The review power remains following the amendment to section 27
110
 which imposes a mandatory 
minimum sentence of 10 years without exception where the offender is convicted of a second or 
subsequent offence under section 15A or section 15B. 
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(4) Drug Mules 
4.52 The Commission observes that low-level drug mules are more susceptible to being caught under 
section 15A or section 15B of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 than high-level drug barons.  First, it has 
been noted that drug mules are generally vulnerable and desperate people who have been exploited by 
those higher up the drugs chain rather than hardened criminals.
111
  They are thus less likely to be adept 
at evading detection and it has been noted that they are sometimes placed in the direct line of fire in order 
to divert attention from other transportations.  Second, as noted at paragraphs 4.04 to 4.07 and 4.24, the 
legislative provisions dealing with “possession” and “mens rea” are broad enough to capture those 
operating at the lower end of the drugs chain who are more likely to be in actual possession of the 
controlled drugs and less likely to know their market value.  In addition, while drug mules might benefit 
from the exceptional and specific circumstance of a “guilty plea”, they are less likely through lack of 
information or fear to benefit from the exceptional and specific circumstance of “material assistance”. 
4.53 Therefore, it has been observed that the majority of those being sentenced under the 
presumptive sentencing regime are low-level drug mules rather than high-level drug barons.
112
  During 
the public consultation and roundtable discussion, practitioners stated that this is their experience.  From 
its own review of the case law in this area,
113
 the Commission agrees that this is probably the case.   
4.54 The fact that the use of drug mules in the drugs trade is at the very least “popular” has been 
confirmed by the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction.  The Centre has made a 
recent attempt to define the term “drug mule” for use in a European context,
114
  indicating that the current 
understanding of the term is: 
“A drug courier who is paid, coerced or tricked into transporting drugs across an international 
border but who has no further commercial interest in the drugs.”
115
 
C Presumptive Minimum Sentences under the Firearms Acts 
4.55 As discussed in Chapter 1, the Criminal Justice Act 2006 amended the Firearms Acts with the 
result that many firearms offences now carry a presumptive sentence of five or 10 years.  In this Part, the 
Commission considers the application of these categories of presumptive minimum sentence by 
examining:  (1) the elements of the relevant firearms offences, (2) the relevant penalty provisions, and (3) 
the early release provisions. 
(1) Elements of the Offences  
(a) Section 15 of the Firearms Act 1925 
4.56 Section 15 of the Firearms Act 1925, as amended,
116
 provides that it is an offence to possess or 
control any firearm or ammunition:  (a) with intent to endanger life or cause serious injury to property, or 
(b) with intent to enable any other person by means of the firearm or ammunition to endanger life or 
cause serious injury to property, regardless of whether any injury to person or property has actually been 
caused.  
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(i) Possession or Control 
4.57 Neither the term “possession” nor the term “control” is defined by the 1925 Act.  As noted at 
paragraphs 4.04 to 4.07, however, the term “possession” includes actual possession, which denotes 
having custody and control over an article, and constructive possession, which denotes having control but 
not custody.
117
  The fact that the terms “possession” and “control” are separated by the conjunction “or” 
serves to emphasise that either custody of, or dominion over, the firearms or ammunition will suffice for 
an offence under section 15. 
4.58 The term “possession” is thus broad enough to describe the range of roles played by those 
involved in firearms offences.  At one end of the scale there are the high-level offenders who may be in 
charge of operations.  These may be described as having constructive possession as they have ultimate 
control over those who possess the firearms or ammunition on their behalf.  At the other end of the scale 
there are the low-level offenders who may, for instance, have been coerced or tricked into hiding firearms 
or ammunition for someone else.  These may be described as having actual possession of the firearms or 
ammunition as they exercise physical control over the firearms or ammunition. 
(ii) Intent to Endanger Life or Cause Serious Injury to Property or Intent to Enable any other 
Person by means of the Firearm or Ammunition to Endanger Life or Cause Serious Injury to 
Property 
4.59 In addition to possessing or controlling the firearm or ammunition, the offender must intend, 
personally, to endanger life or cause serious injury to property or to enable someone else to do so.  Thus, 
for example, a person transporting firearms or ammunition who has no intention of using those firearms or 
ammunition himself or herself, might still be found guilty of an offence under section 15.   
(b) Section 26 of the Firearms Act 1964 
4.60 Section 112(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1961 prohibits a person from using or taking possession of 
a mechanically propelled vehicle without the consent of the owner.  Section 26(1) of the Firearms Act 
1964, as amended,
118
 provides that a person who contravenes section 112(1) of the Road Traffic Act 
1961 and who, at the time of the contravention, has a firearm or imitation firearm with him or her, is guilty 
of an offence.  Again, it is difficult to determine the exact implications of the elements of this offence as 
the Court of Criminal Appeal has not examined section 26 in recent times.    
(i) Using or Taking 
4.61 Section 3(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1961 provides that the term “use” in relation to a vehicle 
includes park, which means to keep or leave stationary.  Presumably, however, the term also includes 
“driving”, which means to manage and control and, in relation to a bicycle or tricycle, to ride.  In relation to 
a vehicle, at any rate, it is conceivable that an offender could manage and control a vehicle without 
personally operating the vehicle.  Thus, for example, an offender might manage and control a vehicle 
where he or she forces the owner to drive by holding a firearm to his or her head.  
4.62 The term “take” is not defined by the 1961 Act.  A narrow definition of the term might refer to 
taking custody whereas a broader definition might refer to taking possession which, as noted at 
paragraphs 4.04 to 4.07, is not limited to having custody.  The narrow definition of “take” implies that an 
offender must have physical custody of the vehicle whereas the broader definition would allow for 
situations in which an offender does not have physical custody, such as where the offender, at a remote 
location from the vehicle, forces the owner to drive by threatening his or her family with a firearm. 
(ii) Mechanically Propelled Vehicle 
4.63 Section 3(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1961 provides that the term “mechanically propelled vehicle” 
means a vehicle intended or adapted for propulsion by mechanical means.  This includes:  (a) a bicycle or 
tricycle with an attachment for propelling it by mechanical power, whether or not the attachment is being 
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used, and (b) a vehicle the means of propulsion of which is electrical or partly electrical and partly 
mechanical.  It does not, however, include a tramcar or other vehicles running on permanent rails. 
(iii) Having with Him or Her 
4.64 The term “have” is not defined by the 1964 Act.  The fact that the term is used with the words 
“with him or her” suggests, however, that the offender must have actual possession of the firearm or 
imitation firearm at the time when he or she is taking the particular vehicle. 
(iv) A Firearm or Imitation Firearm 
4.65 Section 1(1) of the Firearms Act 1925, as amended,
119
 provides that the term “firearm” means:  
(a) a lethal firearm or other weapon of any description from which any shot, bullet or other missile can be 
discharged; (b) an air gun (including an air rifle and air pistol) with a muzzle energy greater than one joule 
or any other weapon incorporating a barrel from which any projectile can be discharged with such muzzle 
energy; (c) a crossbow; (d) any type of stun gun or other weapon causing any shock or other disablement 
to a person by means of electricity or any other kind of energy emission; (e) a prohibited weapon;
120
 and 
(f) any article which would be a firearm under any of the foregoing paragraphs but for the fact that, owing 
to the lack of necessary component part or parts or to any other defect or condition, it is incapable of 
discharging a shot, bullet or other missile or projectile or of causing a shock or other disablement; and (g) 
except where the context otherwise requires, includes a component part of any article referred to in 
section 1. 
4.66 The term “imitation firearm” is not defined by the Act.  Presumably, however, the term includes 
any article which is calculated, or is reasonably likely, to give the person perceiving it to believe that it is a 
real firearm.  As noted by Finnegan J in The People (DPP) v Clail,
121
 it makes very little difference to a 
person who is confronted in the course of a crime with a weapon that, unbeknownst to him or her, it is 
non-functioning.  The crucial issue is that an imitation firearm may be an equally effective means of 
threatening a person and/or pursuing an ulterior objective. 
(c) Section 27 of the Firearms Act 1964 
4.67 Section 27 of the Firearms Act 1964, as amended,
122
 prohibits the use or production of a firearm 
or imitation firearm
123
 for the purpose of resisting arrest
124
 or aiding the escape or rescue of the person or 
another person from lawful custody.
125
  As the Court of Criminal Appeal has not examined section 27 in 
recent times, it is difficult to determine the exact implications of the elements of the offence.   
(i) Use or Produce 
4.68 Neither the term “use” nor the term “produce” is defined by the 1964 Act.  The ordinary meaning 
of the term “use” is to take, hold, deploy or employ.
126
  In The People (DPP) v Curtin,
127
 the Court of 
Criminal Appeal referred to the “use” of the firearm in terms of it having been discharged.  The ordinary 
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meaning of the term “produce” is to show or provide for consideration, inspection or use.
128
  The fact that 
the terms “use” and “produce” are separated by the conjunction “or” suggests that either use or 
production will suffice for an offence under section 27.  Thus, for instance, a firearm need not be 
discharged but may be merely shown for the purpose of section 27. 
(ii) For the Purpose of Resisting Arrest or Aiding Escape or Rescue 
4.69 The person using or producing the firearm or imitation firearm must be pursuing the objective of 
resisting arrest, aiding his or her escape or rescue, or aiding the escape of another person. 
(d) Section 27A of the Firearms Act 1964 
4.70 Section 27A of the Firearms Act 1964, as amended,
129
 provides that it is an offence for a person 
to possess or control
130
 a firearm in circumstances that give rise to a reasonable inference that the person 
does not possess or control it for a lawful purpose, unless the person does possess or control it for such a 
purpose.  The Court of Criminal Appeal has considered section 27A on a number of occasions but as 
there was a guilty plea in each case, the Court did not have an opportunity to examine the exact 
implications of the elements of an offence under section 27A.
131
   
(i) Firearm 
4.71 The meaning of the term “firearm” has been considered at paragraph 4.65 and will not be 
considered again here.  It is interesting to note, however, that section 27A may be distinguished from 
other provisions of the 1964 Act in so far as it does not refer to imitation firearms. 
(ii) Circumstances that give rise to a Reasonable Inference that Possession or Control is not 
for a Lawful Purpose 
4.72 While the expression is not explained by the 1964 Act, it is clear that what is contemplated is that 
the circumstances surrounding the possession or control would allow a reasonable person objectively to 
conclude that the possession or control is for the purpose of pursuing an unlawful act.  The act of 
possessing or controlling the firearm may not be the unlawful act contemplated by section 27A as there 
may be situations in which the offender is legally entitled to possess or control the firearm. 
(e) Section 27B of the Firearms Act 1964 
4.73 Section 27B of the Firearms Act 1964, as amended,
132
 provides that it is an offence for a person 
to have with him or her, a firearm or an imitation firearm,
133
 with intent to commit an indictable offence or 
to resist or prevent the arrest of the person or another person.  Again, the Court of Criminal Appeal has 
considered section 27B on a number of occasions but as there was a guilty plea in each case, the Court 
did not have an opportunity to examine the exact implications of the elements of an offence under section 
27B.
134
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(i) Have 
4.74 The meaning of the term “have” has been considered at paragraph 4.64 and will not be 
considered again here.  It should be noted, however, that by contrast with section 27 which creates the 
offence of using or producing a firearm or imitation firearm for the purpose of resisting arrest, section 27B 
creates the offence of having a firearm or imitation firearm regardless of whether it is used or produced.  
Thus, the fact that an offender has a firearm or imitation firearm on his or her person may be sufficient for 
the purposes of section 27B. 
(ii) Intent to Commit an Indictable Offence or to Resist or Prevent Arrest 
4.75 While this expression has not been explained in the 1964 Act, it is clear that what is contemplated 
is that the offender should have with him or her, a firearm or imitation firearm for the purpose of 
committing an indictable offence or resisting or preventing an arrest.
135
  Thus, having the firearm is an 
element of the overall plan to commit an offence or to resist or prevent an arrest. 
(f) Section 12A of the Firearms and Offensive Weapons Act 1990 
4.76 Section 12A of the Firearms and Offensive Weapons Act 1990, as amended,
136
 provides that it is 
an offence for a person to shorten the barrel of a shot-gun to a length of less than 61 centimetres
137
 or a 
rifle to a length of less than 50 centimetres.
138
  Thus, the mere act of shortening the barrel of a shot-gun 
or rifle is an offence regardless of whether or not there is other criminal intent.
139
  
(2) Penalties 
4.77 The presumptive sentencing regime under the Firearms Acts is modelled on the presumptive 
sentencing regime under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977.  Thus, many of the observations outlined in 
respect of the presumptive sentence applicable to offences under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 equally 
apply to the presumptive sentence applicable to offences under the Firearms Acts. 
(a) Presumptive Minimum Sentence of Five Years’ or 10 Years’ Imprisonment 
4.78 Under the Firearms Acts, some offences attract a five-year presumptive sentence while others 
attract a 10-year presumptive sentence.  The offences which attract a five-year presumptive sentence 
are:  (i) possession of a firearm while taking a vehicle without authority;
140
 (ii) possession of a firearm or 
ammunition in suspicious circumstances;
141
 (iii) carrying a firearm or imitation firearm with intent to 
commit an indictable offence or resist arrest;
142
 and (iv) shortening the barrel of a shotgun or rifle.
143
  Each 
of these offences is subject to a maximum sentence of 14 years
144
 with the exception of the offence of 
shortening the barrel of a shotgun or rifle, which is subject to a maximum sentence of 10 years.
145
  The 
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  Section 12A of the Firearms and Offensive Weapons Act 1990, as substituted by section 65 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 2006. 
144
  Section 26(2)(a) of the Firearms Act 1964, as amended; section 27A(2)(a) of the Firearms Act 1964, as 
amended; and section 27B(2)(a) of the Firearms Act 1964, as amended. 
146 
offences which attract a presumptive 10-year sentence are:  (i) possession of firearms with intent to 
endanger life;
146
 and (ii) using a firearm to assist or aid in an escape.
147
  These offences are subject to a 
maximum sentence of life imprisonment.
148
   
4.79 As with the presumptive sentencing regime under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, it would appear 
that the courts must have regard to the presumptive sentence even where it does not apply
149
 and to the 
maximum sentence.
150
 
(b) Exceptional and Specific Circumstances: Mitigating Factors 
4.80 Each of the presumptive sentencing provisions under the Firearms Acts provides that the 
presumptive sentence will not apply where there are exceptional and specific circumstances relating to 
the offence or the person convicted of the offence, which would make a sentence of not less than five 
years or 10 years unjust in all the circumstances.
151
  Exceptional and specific circumstances may include 
“any matters [the court] considers appropriate”, including whether the person has pleaded guilty to the 
offence and whether the person has materially assisted in the investigation of the offence.  As noted in 
Chapter 1, a guilty plea and material assistance are in general considered to be factors which mitigate the 
severity of the sentence rather than the seriousness of the offence. 
(i) Guilty Plea 
4.81 Subsection (5)(a)
152
 of each provision provides that a guilty plea may be considered an 
exceptional and specific circumstance for the purpose of determining whether the statutory minimum 
sentence of five or 10 years should apply.  The provision recognises, however, that the stage at which the 
accused indicates his or her intention to plead guilty and the circumstances surrounding that plea may be 
relevant.  Thus, it has been noted that an early guilty plea merits more credit than a late guilty plea
153
 and 
that an accused who voluntarily pleads guilty will be given more credit than an accused who pleads guilty 
having been caught red-handed.
154
  In any case, a guilty plea will usually be considered in addition to 
other mitigating factors such as material assistance.
155
  
(ii) Material Assistance 
4.82 Subsection (5)(b)
156
 of each provision provides that material assistance may also be considered 
an exceptional and specific circumstance for the purpose of determining whether the statutory minimum 
sentence should apply.  Presumably, as observed by the Court of Criminal Appeal in relation to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
145
  Section 12A of the Firearms and Offensive Weapons Act 1990, as amended. 
146
  Section 15 of the Firearms Act 1925, as substituted by section 42 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006.  
147
  Section 27 of the Firearms Act 1964, as substituted by section 58 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006.  
148
  Section 15(2)(a) of the Firearms Act 1925, as amended; and section 27(2)(a) of the Firearms Act 1964, as 
amended. 
149
  The People (DPP) v Fitzgerald [2010] IECCA 53. 
150
  The People (DPP) v McCann [2008] IECCA 129. 
151
  Subsection (5) of each provision and subsection (10) of section 12A of the Firearms and Offensive Weapons 
Act 1990. 
152
  Subsection (10)(a) of section 12A of the Firearms and Offensive Weapons Act 1990. 
153
  The People (DPP) v Barry Court of Criminal Appeal 23 June 2008; and The People (DPP) v Curtin. [2010] 
IECCA 54 
154
  The People (DPP) v Clail [2009] IECCA 13; The People (DPP) v Dwyer Court of Criminal Appeal 9 February 
2009; and The People (DPP) v Walsh Court of Criminal Appeal 17 December 2009. 
155
  The People (DPP) v Barry Court of Criminal Appeal 23 June 2008. 
156
  Subsection (10)(b) of section 12A of the Firearms and Offensive Weapons Act 1990. 
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Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, material assistance may be in the form of an admission
157
 or the provision of 
information.  
(iii) Any Matters the Court considers Appropriate 
4.83 Subsection (5)
158
 also provides that the court may have regard to “any matters it considers 
appropriate”.  While these matters have not been exhaustively defined in the legislation or elsewhere, 
there are a number of matters to which the courts’ attention has been frequently drawn.  As under the 
Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, these matters may be divided into two categories: (a) those that mitigate the 
seriousness of the offence, and (b) those that mitigate the severity of the sentence. 
4.84 The matters that mitigate the seriousness of the offence include those relating to culpability 
(duress, naivety), harm (discharge of firearm) and offender behaviour (level of involvement).  The fact that 
an offender was coerced into committing a firearms offence
159
 or was naive
160
 may be considered 
exceptional and specific circumstances.  Similarly, the fact that the offender did not discharge the weapon 
may be considered an exceptional and specific circumstance.
161
  Finally, the fact that an offender had a 
low level of involvement in the commission of the offence may be considered an exceptional and specific 
circumstance.
162
   
4.85 The matters that mitigate the severity of the sentence include previous good character
163
 and 
personal circumstances, such as the youth of the offender, personal traumas suffered by the offender, 
family support and the possibility of rehabilitation.
164
    
(c) Aggravating Factors 
4.86 Subsection (6)
165
 of each provision provides that the court may, when deciding whether or not to 
impose the statutory minimum sentence, have regard to:  (i) any previous convictions for firearms’ 
offences, and (ii) the public interest in preventing firearms’ offences.   
4.87 The existence of previous convictions for an offence under the Firearms Acts 1925 to 2006, the 
Offences Against the State Acts 1939 to 1998, or the Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005, may 
justify an upward departure from the statutory minimum.  Subsection (3) and subsection (6)(a)
166
 of each 
provision provides that the court may have regard to such previous convictions when determining whether 
the statutory minimum should apply.
167
  The Court of Criminal Appeal will, in any case, take a dim view of 
previous convictions.
168
 
4.88 Subsection (6)(b) of each provision provides that the court may consider whether or not the public 
interest would be served by the imposition of a sentence of less than the presumptive minimum. 
                                                     
157
  In The People (DPP) v Curtin [2010] IECCA 54 for instance, the Court of Criminal Appeal referred to the fact 
that the accused had admitted that he had pressurised his two co-accuseds into taking part in the offence. 
158
  Subsection (10) of section 12A of the Firearms and Offensive Weapons Act 1990. 
159
  The People (DPP) v Barry Court of Criminal Appeal 23 June 2008. 
160
  The People (DPP) v Kelly Court of Criminal Appeal 23 June 2009. 
161
  The People (DPP) v Fitzgerald [2010] IECCA 53.   
162
  The People (DPP) v Barry Court of Criminal Appeal 23 June 2008; and The People (DPP) v Purcell [2010] 
IECCA 55. 
163
  The People (DPP) v Barry Court of Criminal Appeal 23 June 2008. 
164
  The People (DPP) v Kelly Court of Criminal Appeal 23 June 2009. 
165
  Subsection (11) of section 12A of the Firearms and Offensive Weapons Act 1990. 
166
  Subsection (8) and (11)(a) of section 12A of the Firearms and Offensive Weapons Act 1990. 
167
  See: The People (DPP) v Dwyer Court of Criminal Appeal 9 February 2009. 
168
  The People (DPP) v Donovan Court of Criminal Appeal 28 June 2010; and The People (DPP) v Kelly Court of 
Criminal Appeal 29 June 2012.  
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4.89 Factors including the nature of the firearm,
169
 the fact that it was brandished in a crowded place 
and the fact that it was discharged, have justified the imposition of sentences longer than the presumptive 
minimum sentence.
170
  The fact that the offender possessed more than one firearm
171
 and the fact that he 
or she possessed a firearm and drugs have also aggravated the minimum sentence.
172
  
(3) Early Release 
4.90 Like section 27 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, section 27C of the Firearms Act 1964, as 
amended, restricts the power to grant early release to those who have been convicted of an offence 
under the Firearms Acts.
173
  Specifically, section 27C(2) restricts the power to commute or remit 
punishment; section 27C(3) restricts the power to grant remission for good behaviour; and section 27C(4) 
restricts the power to grant temporary release.  By contrast with the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, however, 
section 27C does not permit the court to list a sentence for review. 
D Comparative Analysis  
4.91 In this Part, the Commission considers the use of mandatory and presumptive minimum 
sentences in other common law countries.  
(a) Northern Ireland 
4.92 In Northern Ireland, in addition to the mandatory life sentence for murder, there are presumptive 
sentences for certain firearms offences and public protection but not for drugs offences.
174
 
(i) Firearms Offences  
4.93 The use of firearms is regulated by the Firearms (Northern Ireland) Order 2004, as amended.
175
  
Article 70 stipulates that the courts must impose a minimum sentence of five years on offenders aged 21 
years or over and a minimum sentence of three years on offenders aged less than 21 years, unless there 
are “exceptional circumstances relating to the offence or to the offender which justify its not doing so”.
176
 
4.94 The offences to which the mandatory sentencing regime applies are:  (i) the possession, 
purchase or acquisition of a handgun without holding a firearm certificate or otherwise than as authorised 
by a firearm certificate;
177
 (ii) the possession, purchase, acquisition, manufacture, sale or transfer of 
certain controlled firearms or ammunition;
178
 (iii) the possession of a firearm or ammunition with intent to 
                                                     
169
  The courts do not, in general, distinguish between real and imitation firearms. See: The People (DPP) v Clail 
[2009] IECCA 13.  However, the Court of Criminal Appeal does distinguish between shotguns and other 
firearms on the basis that shotguns come “towards the top end” of the “hierarchy of weapons”.  See: The 
People (DPP) v Walsh Court of Criminal Appeal 17 December 2009. 
170
  The People (DPP) v Fitzgerald [2010] IECCA 53; and The People (DPP) v Curtin [2010] IECCA 54. 
171
  The People (DPP) v Kelly Court of Criminal Appeal 24 November 2008. 
172
  The People (DPP) v Purcell [2010] IECCA 55. 
173
  Section 27C(1) provides that section 27C applies to section 15 of the Firearms Act 1925; sections 26 to 27B of 
the Firearms Act 1964; and section 12A of the Firearms and Offensive Weapons Act 1990. 
174
  The Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 applies to Northern Ireland.  (The Criminal Justice Act 2003 does not apply in 
this regard).  Section 25 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 provides that the punishments applicable to offences 
under the Act are set out in Schedule 4.  Section 25(2) clarifies, however, that the periods and sums of money 
referred to in Schedule 4 are maximum terms of imprisonment and maximum fines.  It would thus appear that 
drug offences in Northern Ireland do not attract mandatory minimum penalties. 
175
  See: Schedule 2 to the Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006. 
176
  Article 70(2) - (4) of the Firearms (Northern Ireland) Order 2004. 
177
  Article 3(1)(a) of the Firearms (Northern Ireland) Order 2004. 
178
  Section 45(1)(a), section 45(1)(aa), section 45(1)(b), section 45(1)(c), section 45(1)(d), section 45(1)(e), 
section 45(1)(g), and section 45(2)(a) of the Firearms (Northern Ireland) Order 2004. 
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endanger life or cause serious damage to property or to enable another person to do so;
179
 (iv) the use of 
a firearm or imitation firearm to resist arrest;
180
 (v) the carrying of a firearm with intent to commit an 
indictable offence or to resist arrest or to prevent the arrest of another;
181
 (vi) the carrying or discharge of 
a firearm in a public place;
182
 and (vii) trespass in a building with a firearm or imitation firearm.
183
 
4.95 The stated purpose of the Firearms (Northern Ireland) Order 2004 is to provide a legislative 
framework for the control of firearms which is effective and proportionate and strikes a balance between 
public safety and the reasonable expectations of legitimate shooting enthusiasts.
184
  The order was 
prepared following the publication of a review conducted by the Northern Ireland Office.
185
  The Review 
was inspired by the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which made a number of changes to the sentencing 
framework in England and Wales, and to a lesser extent by the 2000 Review of the Criminal Justice 
System in Northern Ireland.
186
  The Review examined Northern Ireland’s firearms legislation, the Firearms 
(Northern Ireland) Order 1981, and recommendations contained in the Cullen Inquiry into the 1996 
Dunblane Massacre.
187
   
(ii) Public Protection 
4.96 Two minimum sentencing provisions apply in respect of “dangerous” offenders who are perceived 
to pose a significant risk to members of the public.  
4.97 Article 13 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 requires the imposition of a life 
sentence for a specified “serious offence”,
188
 where the court is of the opinion that there is a significant 
risk to members of the public of serious harm occasioned by the commission by the offender of further 
specified offences.  Under this Article, a life sentence must be imposed:  (a) where the offence is one in 
respect of which the offender would, apart from Article 13, be liable to a life sentence, and (b) if the court 
is of the opinion that the seriousness of the offence, or of the offence and one or more offences 
associated with it, justifies the imposition of such a sentence.
189
   
4.98 Where the serious offence does not fulfil these conditions, the court must impose an 
“indeterminate custodial sentence” if it considers that an “extended custodial sentence” (discussed below 
at paragraph 4.101) would be inadequate for the purpose of protecting the public from serious harm 
occasioned by the commission by the offender of further specified offences.
190
  An indeterminate 
custodial sentence consists of a sentence of imprisonment (or detention, in the case of an offender under 
the age of 21 years) for an indeterminate period.  When imposing this penalty, the court is required to 
specify a period of at least two years as the minimum term required to satisfy the requirements of 
retribution and deterrence.
191
  An offender sentenced under Article 13 will be released on licence when:  
(i) he or she has served this minimum period, and (ii) the Parole Commissioners have directed that he or 
                                                     
179
  Section 58 of the Firearms (Northern Ireland) Order 2004. 
180
  Section 59 of the Firearms (Northern Ireland) Order 2004. 
181
  Section 60 of the Firearms (Northern Ireland) Order 2004. 
182
  Section 61(1) of the Firearms (Northern Ireland) Order 2004. 
183
  Section 62(1) of the Firearms (Northern Ireland) Order 2004. 
184
  Explanatory Memorandum to the Firearms (Northern Ireland) Order 2004. 
185
  Review of the Sentencing Framework in Northern Ireland (Northern Ireland Office, 2004. 
186
  Review of the Sentencing Framework in Northern Ireland (Northern Ireland Office, 2004) at 1-2. 
187
  Public Inquiry into the Shootings at Dunblane Primary School on 13 March 1996 Cm 3386 (1996). 
188
  Schedule 1 to the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 sets out an extensive list of “serious 
offences” for the purposes of this regime.  All of the offences listed are violent and/or sexual offences.  
189
  Article 13(2) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008.  
190
  Article 13(3) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008. 
191
  Ibid. 
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she be released.
192
  This direction may only be given where the Commissioners are satisfied that it is no 
longer necessary for the protection of the public from serious harm that the offender should be 
confined.
193
  Remission may not be granted under the prison rules to an offender sentenced under Article 
13.
194
    
4.99 The fact that Article 13 bears a remarkable resemblance to section 225 of the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003 (which, as discussed at paragraph 2.196, was repealed in 2012) may be explained by reference 
to the findings of the 2000 Review of the Sentencing Framework in Northern Ireland.  The Review 
referred to the fact that section 225 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 had introduced extended and 
indeterminate public protection sentences for offenders convicted of specified sexual or violent offences 
who were assessed as dangerous by the sentencing court.
195
  It observed, however, that the 2003 Act did 
not apply to Northern Ireland and that there remained as a result a gap in Northern Irish law in respect of 
such offenders: 
“The Review identified a gap in provision in Northern Ireland for the management of dangerous, 
violent and sexual offenders who continue to pose a risk to the public at their automatic release 
date.  Under existing provision it is only where offenders have been given a mandatory or 
discretionary life sentence that assessment of the risk they pose to the public enables their 
continued detention in custody.  Consultation respondents considered this an important public 
protection issue which needed to be addressed.  Therefore we now introduce indeterminate and 
extended custodial sentences in Northern Ireland.”
196
 
4.100 Although Article 13 was inspired by section 225 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, it would appear 
that the difficulties associated with the IPP sentence in England and Wales have not materialised in the 
context of the Northern Irish legislation.  In July 2012, Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland 
published its Report on The Management of Life and Indeterminate Sentence Prisoners in Northern 
Ireland.  This Report found that “the legislative basis for managing indeterminate sentenced prisoners in 
Northern Ireland was good, and had been informed by serious pitfalls that arose in England and 
Wales.”
197  The Commission observes that one apparent difference between the two sentencing models 
is that the regime which operates in Northern Ireland requires the court to first consider whether the 
imposition of an “extended custodial sentence” (discussed below) would be sufficient to protect the public 
from serious harm.  Where this is the case, an indeterminate custodial sentence may not be imposed.      
4.101 Article 14 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 requires the imposition of an 
“extended custodial sentence” for a “specified violent offence”
198
 or “specified sexual offence”.
199
  This 
obligation applies where the sentencing court is of the opinion that:  (i) there is a significant risk to 
members of the public of serious harm occasioned by the commission by the offender of further specified 
offences, and (ii) in the event that the specified offence is a “serious offence”, the court is not required by 
Article 13 to impose a life sentence or an indeterminate custodial sentence.
200
   
4.102 Under Article 14, an “extended custodial sentence” is a sentence of imprisonment (or detention, 
in the case of an offender under the age of 21 years) which is equal to the aggregate of:  (a) the 
                                                     
192
  Article 18(3) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008. 
193
  Article 18(4) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008. 
194
  Article 13(7) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008. 
195
  Proposed Draft Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2007 - Equality Screening Forms (Northern Ireland 
Office, 2007) at 7. 
196
  Ibid at 8. 
197
  The Management of Life and Indeterminate Sentence Prisoners in Northern Ireland (Criminal Justice 
Inspection Northern Ireland, 2012) at vi.   
198
  A “specified violent offence” is an offence listed in Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Order.  
199
  A “specified sexual offence” is an offence listed in Part 2 of Schedule 2 to the Order.  
200
  Article 14(1) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008. 
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“appropriate custodial term”, which means a term of at least 12 months, not exceeding the statutory  
maximum, which the court considers appropriate, and (b) a further period for which the offender is to be 
subject to a licence and which is of such length as the court considers necessary for the purpose of 
protecting members of the public from serious harm occasioned by the commission by the offender of 
further specified offences.
201
  The extension period imposed must not exceed five years in the case of a 
“specified violent offence” or 8 years in the case of a “specified sexual offence”.
202
  As a whole, the term 
of an extended custodial sentence may not exceed the statutory maximum sentence for the relevant 
offence.
203
   
4.103 An offender sentenced under Article 14 will become eligible for release only after he or she has 
served half of the custodial sentence imposed by the court.
204
  An offender who has served the entirety of 
the “appropriate custodial term” must be released unless he or she has previously been recalled while on 
licence.  Remission may not be granted under the prison rules to an offender sentenced under Article 
14.
205
   
(b) England and Wales 
4.104 It has been observed that mandatory sentencing in the United Kingdom reflects the attention 
which was paid to recidivist offenders in the 1990s, and which resulted in the enactment of “three-strikes” 
statutes in the United States.
206
  In England and Wales, in addition to the mandatory life sentence for 
murder, there are presumptive minimum sentences for certain repeat drug offences; repeat serious 
violent and/or sexual offences; repeat domestic burglaries; firearms offences; and aggravated knife 
offences.  Those sentencing regimes which apply only in respect of repeat offenders are considered in 
Chapter 5.  In this section, the Commission focuses on those provisions which create a “one-strike” rule 
so that a presumptive or mandatory sentence applies where an offender is convicted for the first time of a 
specified offence.  
(i) Firearms Offences 
4.105 Section 51A
207
 of the Firearms Act 1968, as amended,
208
 prescribes a presumptive minimum 
sentence of five years’ imprisonment for an offender, aged at least 21 years,
209
 who is convicted of a 
specified firearms offence.  These offences are:  (i) possession, purchase, acquisition, manufacture, sale 
or transfer of a firearm;
210
 (ii) using another person to mind a dangerous prohibited weapon;
211
 (iii) 
possession of a firearm with intent to injure;
212
 (iv) possession of a firearm with intent to cause fear of 
                                                     
201
  Article 14(4) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008.  
202
  Article 14(8) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008. 
203
  Article 14(9) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008. 
204
  Article 18(2) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008. 
205
  Article 14(12) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008. 
206
  Mandatory Sentences of Imprisonment in Common Law Jurisdictions (Department of Justice, Canada) at 14. 
207
  Inserted by section 287 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
208
  Section 30 of the Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006. 
209
  Section 51A(4)(a) of the Firearms Act 1968, as modified by Article 2 of The Firearms (Sentencing) (Transitory 
Provisions) Order 2007 (SI 2007/1324).  An offender aged 18, 19 or 20 years will receive a minimum sentence 
of five years’ detention in a young offender institution (section 51A(4)(a), as modified by Article 2 of The 
Firearms (Sentencing) (Transitory Provisions) Order 2007 (SI 2007/1324)).  An offender under the age of 18 
years will receive a minimum sentence of three years’ detention in a young offender institution (section 
51A(5)(ii) of the Firearms Act 1968). 
210
  Section 5(1) and section 5(1A) of the Firearms Act 1968.   
211
  Section 29 of the Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006. 
212
  Section 16 of the Firearms Act 1968. 
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violence;
213
 (v) use of a firearm to resist arrest;
214
 (vi) carrying a firearm with criminal intent;
215
 (vii) 
carrying a firearm in a public place;
216
 and (viii) trespassing in a building with a firearm.
217
  The minimum 
term must be imposed unless there are exceptional circumstances which would justify the court not doing 
so.
218
  It would appear that a guilty plea will not result in a reduction of the sentence imposed for an 
offence under section 51A.
219
  Ashworth observes that this is a feature which renders section 51A “a 
particularly severe provision.”
220
  
(ii) Threats made with offensive weapons or articles with blades or points 
4.106 Section 1A of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953
221
 prescribes a presumptive minimum sentence 
of six months’ imprisonment for an adult offender
222
 convicted of threatening another person with an 
offensive weapon in public.
223
  Under this sentencing regime, the minimum penalty must be imposed 
unless the court considers that there are particular circumstances which relate to the offence or the 
offender which would make the application of the minimum sentence unjust in all the circumstances.
224
   
4.107 Section 139AA of the Criminal Justice Act 1988
225
 prescribes a presumptive minimum sentence 
of six months’ imprisonment for an adult offender
226
 convicted of threatening another person with an 
                                                     
213
  Section 16A of the Firearms Act 1968. 
214
  Section 17 of the Firearms Act 1968. 
215
  Section 18 of the Firearms Act 1968. 
216
  Section 19 of the Firearms Act 1968. 
217
  Section 20(1) of the Firearms Act 1968. 
218
  It has been noted that this ground for not imposing the presumptive minimum term was taken from section 109 
of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, which formerly imposed an automatic life sentence 
for a second serious offence.  By contrast, section 110 or section 111 of the 2000 Act, which impose a three-
year term for a third Class A drug trafficking offence or domestic burglary, permit the court to not impose the 
minimum term if it would be unjust to do so in all the circumstances.  Arguably, the concept of exceptional 
circumstances which would justify the court not imposing the minimum sentence is a lower threshold than 
exceptional circumstances which would make the minimum term unjust in all the circumstances: Current Law 
Statutes (Sweet and Maxwell, 2003) at 44-262. 
219
  Richardson, ed, Archbold 2010 (Sweet and Maxwell, 2010) at 5-261.  
220
       Ashworth Sentencing and Criminal Justice (Cambridge University Press, 5
th
 ed, 2010) at 27 
221
  Inserted by section 142 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. 
222
  Where the offender is 16 or 17 years of age, section 1A(6) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 (inserted by 
section 142 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012) requires the court to impose 
a detention and training order of at least four months.  
223
  Under section 1A of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 (inserted by section 142 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing 
and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012), this offence is committed where an individual: (a) has an offensive 
weapon with him or her in a public place; (b) unlawfully and intentionally threatens another person with the 
weapon; and (c) does so in such a way that there is an immediate risk of serious physical harm to that other 
person.   
224
  Section 1A(5) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953, inserted by section 142 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. 
225
  Inserted by section 142 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. 
226
  Where the offender is 16 or 17 years of age, section 139AA(8) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (inserted by 
section 142 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012) requires the court  to impose 
a detention and training order of at least four months.  
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offensive weapon or an article with a blade or point in a public place or on school premises.
227
  Once 
again, the minimum penalty must be imposed unless the court considers that there are particular 
circumstances which relate to the offence or the offender which would make the application of the 
minimum sentence unjust in all the circumstances. 
4.108 Where an offender pleads guilty to either of these aggravated knife offences, the court may 
reduce the sentence which it would otherwise have imposed.
228
  It may not, however, reduce the 
sentence below 80 percent of the minimum term provided by law.  
4.109 In introducing these sentencing provisions, the then Secretary of State for Justice stated that 
these presumptive penalties were intended “to stop people believing that knife crime will not be punished 
properly in the criminal justice system.”
229
  It remains to be seen whether, in practice, this sentencing 
regime will produce the desired deterrent effect.  Certain commentators have emphasised that in the 
moment of drawing a knife, few offenders consider the legal ramifications of their actions.
230
  Rather, they 
suggest that the lives of many such offenders are so chaotic and violent that they are more fearful of each 
other and the prospect of being stabbed, than of the penal consequences of carrying a knife 
themselves.
231
    
(c) Scotland 
4.110 In Scotland, in addition to the mandatory life sentence for murder, there are mandatory minimum 
sentences for certain drug and firearms offences.  The mandatory minimum sentence prescribed for 
certain drug offences is considered in Chapter 5 as this applies only in respect of repeat offenders.  
(i) Firearms Offences 
4.111 Section B4 of the Scotland Act 1998 provides that the power to legislate in relation to firearms is 
reserved to Westminster.  Thus, the control of firearms is regulated by the Firearms Act 1968, as 
amended by the Criminal Justice Act 2003.  Section 51A
232
 of the Firearms Act 1968 introduces a 
mandatory sentencing regime in respect of certain firearms offences.  It stipulates that the Scottish courts 
must impose a minimum sentence of three years upon offenders aged 16 to 20 years, and five years 
upon those aged over 20 years.  These minimum terms must be imposed unless there are exceptional 
circumstances which would justify the court not doing so.    
4.112 As noted at paragraph 4.105, section 51A(1A)
233
 of the Firearms Act 1968 provides that the 
offences to which these presumptive sentences apply are:  (i) possession of a firearm with intent to 
                                                     
227
  Under section 139AA of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (inserted by section 142 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing 
and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012) this offence is committed where a person: (a) has an article to which 
the section applies with him or her in a public place or on school premises, (b) unlawfully and intentionally 
threatens another person with the article, and (c) does so in such a way that there is an immediate risk of 
serious physical harm to that other person. 
228
  Section 142 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, as amended by paragraph 16 of Schedule 26 to the Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012.  
229
  Hansard, House of Commons, Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill, 2 December 2011, 
Column 1044, Kenneth Clarke MP. 
230
  In particular, see commentary from Michael Turner QC: “Tougher Prison Sentences for Violent Crime in 
Force” BBC 3 December 2012.  Available at: www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-20576580 [Last Accessed: 22 May 
2013].  See also: Hansard, House of Commons Public Bill Committee, Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment 
of Offenders Bill, 12 July 2011, Column 16, Frances Crook, Chief Executive of the Howard League for Penal 
Reform. 
231
  Hansard, House of Commons Public Bill Committee, Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill, 
12 July 2011, Column 16, Frances Crook, Chief Executive of the Howard League for Penal Reform. 
232
  Inserted by section 287 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
233
  Inserted by section 30 of the Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006. 
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injure;
234
 (ii) possession of a firearm with intent to cause fear of violence;
235
  (iii) use of a firearm to resist 
arrest;
236
 (iv) carrying a firearm with criminal intent;
237
 (v) carrying a firearm in a public place;
238
 and (vi) 
trespassing in a building with a firearm.
239
   
(ii) Other 
4.113 Section 206(1) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 provides that no person shall be 
sentenced to imprisonment by a court of summary jurisdiction for a period of less than five days.
240
 
(d) United States of America 
4.114 Most American states have presumptive or mandatory sentencing regimes in respect of drugs 
and/or firearms offences.  Many states apply presumptive or mandatory sentencing regimes in respect of 
other offences as well.  In general, second or subsequent offences will attract enhanced penalties; some 
of these regimes are considered in Chapter 5. 
(i) Alabama 
(I) Drug Offences 
4.115 In Alabama, §13A-12-215 of the Penal Code prescribes a minimum sentence of 10 years for 
selling, furnishing or giving a controlled substance to a person under the age of 18 years.  §13A-12-231 
prescribes various minimum terms, ranging from three years to life imprisonment without parole, for drug 
trafficking.
241
  §13A-12-231(13) stipulates that an additional penalty of five years must be imposed for 
drug trafficking while in possession of a firearm.  §13A-12-250 stipulates that an additional penalty of five 
years must be imposed for selling drugs within a three-mile radius of a school, college or university.  
§13A-12-270 stipulates that an additional penalty of five years must be imposed for selling drugs within a 
three-mile radius of a housing project.  §13A-12-233 prescribes a minimum term of 25 years without 
parole for running a drug trafficking enterprise and life without parole for a second offence.   
(II) Firearms Offences 
4.116 §13A-5-6 of the Penal Code prescribes a minimum sentence of 20 years for the commission of a 
Class A felony with a firearm and 10 years for the commission of a Class B or Class C felony.  §13A-11-
60 stipulates that an additional penalty of three years must be imposed for possession and sale of brass 
or steel Teflon-coated handgun ammunition. 
(III) Other 
                                                     
234
  Section 16 of the Firearms Act 1968. 
235
  Section 16A of the Firearms Act 1968. 
236
  Section 17 of the Firearms Act 1968. 
237
  Section 18 of the Firearms Act 1968. 
238
  Section 19 of the Firearms Act 1968. 
239
  Section 20(1) of the Firearms Act 1968. 
240
  Section 16 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010, which does not appear to have been 
commenced, proposes to raise the term to 15 days. 
241
  §13A-12-232(b) provides that the court may suspend or reduce the mandatory minimum prison term required 
by statute, but only if: (1) the mandatory minimum required by statute is not life without parole; (2) the 
prosecuting attorney files a motion requesting a reduced or suspended sentence; and (3) the offender 
provides substantial assistance in the arrest or conviction of any accomplices, accessories, co-conspirators or 
principals.  In addition, §15-18-8(a)(1) (any prison sentence under 20 years except for Class A and B felony 
child sex offences) permits (but does not require) judges to impose a split sentence in which only part of the 
sentence is served and the rest of the sentence is suspended, if “the judge presiding over the case is satisfied 
that the ends of justice and the best interests of the public as well as the defendant will be served” by splitting 
the sentence.   
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4.117 Minimum sentences are also prescribed in respect of: (i) a fourth or subsequent conviction for 
driving under the influence within a five-year period;
242
 (ii) driving under the influence with a passenger 
under 14 years of age;
243
 (iii) robbery of a pharmacy;
244
 (iv) second or subsequent offences of domestic 
violence;
245
 (v) terrorism;
246
 (vi) certain sexual offences against children;
247
 (vii) hate crimes;
248
 (viii) falsely 
reporting an incident;
249
 and (ix) possession, transportation, receipt or use of a destructive device, 
explosive, bacteriological or biological weapon.
250
  There are also provisions dealing with habitual 
offenders.
251
 
(ii) Maine 
(I) Drugs Offences  
4.118 In Maine, §1105-A of the Penal Code prescribes a variety of minimum sentences, ranging from 
one year to four years, for trafficking a scheduled drug:  (i) with a child under the age of 18 years or with 
the aid or conspiring of a child under the age of 18 years; (ii) in circumstances where the offender has a 
prior conviction for a Class A, Class B or Class C drug offence; (iii) in circumstances where the offender is 
in possession of a firearm; or (iv) on a school bus or within 1,000 feet of a school zone.   
4.119 §1105-B prescribes a minimum sentence of two years for trafficking or furnishing a counterfeit 
drug: (i) to a child under the age of 18 years; (ii) in circumstances where the offender has a prior 
conviction for a Class A, Class B or Class C drug offence; (iii) in circumstances where the offender is in 
possession of a firearm; or (iv) in circumstances where death or serious bodily injury is subsequently 
caused by the use of the drug.  
4.120 §1105-C prescribes a variety of minimum sentences, ranging from one year to two years, for 
furnishing a scheduled drug: (i) to a child under the age of 18 years or with the aid or conspiring of a child 
under the age of 18 years; (ii) in circumstances where the offender has a prior conviction for a Class A, 
Class B or Class C drug offence; (iii) in circumstances where the offender is in possession of a firearm; or 
(iv) on a school bus or within 1,000 feet of a school zone.   
4.121 §1105-D prescribes a variety of minimum sentences, ranging from one year to four years, for 
cultivating marijuana plants: (i) in circumstances where the offender has a prior conviction for a Class A, 
Class B or Class C drug offence; (ii) in circumstances where the offender is in possession of a firearm; 
(iii) with the aid or conspiring of a child; or (iv) within 1,000 feet of a school zone.
252
 
                                                     
242
  §32-5A-191f(h). 
243
  §32A-5A-191(j). 
244
  §13A-8-51(2) and §13A-8-52. 
245
  §13A-6-130 and §13A-6-131. 
246
  §13A-10-152. 
247
  §15-20-21(5); §13A-5-6(4) and (5); §13A-5-110; and §13A-6-111. 
248
  §13A-5-13. 
249
  §13A-11-11. 
250
  §13A-7-44. 
251
  Habitual Felony Offender Act. 
252
  §1252(5-A)(B)-(C) provides that the courts may depart from the mandatory minimum sentences if they find 
substantial evidence for all three of the following elements: (1) Imposition of the mandatory term will result in 
substantial injustice to the defendant; (2) failure to impose the mandatory term will not have an adverse effect 
on public safety; and (3) failure to impose the mandatory term will not appreciably impair the deterrent effect of 
the mandatory sentence.  Then the court must find two additional elements: (1) the defendant is an 
appropriate candidate for an intensive supervision programme, but would be ineligible if given a mandatory 
sentence; and (2) based on the defendant’s background, attitude and prospects for rehabilitation and the 
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(II) Firearms Offences 
4.122 §1252(5) prescribes a minimum sentence of four years for committing a Class A crime while 
using a firearm against a person; two years for committing a Class B crime while using a firearm against a 
person; and one year for committing a Class C crime while using a firearm against a person. 
(iii) Virginia 
(I) Drugs Offences 
4.123 In Virginia, §18.2-248.1(d) of the Penal Code prescribes a minimum sentence of five years for the 
sale or distribution of marijuana, where it is the offender’s third or subsequent felony.  §18.2-248 
prescribes a variety of minimum sentences, ranging from three years to 40 years, for distributing or 
transporting marijuana.  §18.2-255(A,i) prescribes a variety of minimum sentences, ranging from two 
years to five years, for selling a certain amount of marijuana to a minor.  §18.2-255(A,ii) prescribes a 
variety of minimum sentences, ranging from two years to five years, for selling a certain amount of 
marijuana, where the minor assists in distribution.  
4.124 §18.2-248 prescribes a variety of minimum sentences, ranging from 20 years to life, where there 
is a continuing criminal enterprise grossing specified amounts of money.  §18.2-248 also prescribes a 
variety of minimum sentences, ranging from 20 years to life, for the distribution of certain quantities of 
certain drugs as part of a continuing criminal enterprise.  §18.2-248 also prescribes a variety of minimum 
sentences, ranging from three years to 20 years, for the distribution of certain quantities of certain drugs.  
§18.2-248(C) prescribes a minimum sentence of five years for a third or subsequent offence of selling or 
possessing with intent to sell or distribute Schedule I or Schedule II drugs.  §18.2-248(C1) prescribes a 
minimum sentence of three years for a third or subsequent offence of manufacturing metamphetamine. 
4.125   §18.2-248.01 prescribes a variety of minimum terms, ranging from three years to 10 years for 
transporting Schedule I or Schedule II drugs to the Commonwealth.  §18.2-255.2 prescribes a minimum 
sentence of one year for a second or subsequent offence of distributing controlled substances on school 
property.  §18.2-248.5(A) prescribes a minimum sentence of six months for the offence of selling or 
distributing anabolic steroids.  §18.2-248(H) prescribes a minimum sentence of 20 years for the 
distribution of a Schedule I or II drug.
253
 
(II) Firearms Offences 
4.126 §18.2-53.1 prescribes a minimum sentence of three years for using a firearm in the commission 
of a felony and five years for a second or subsequent offence.  §18.2-308.4(B) and (C) prescribe 
minimum sentences of two to five years for possessing or selling certain types of drug while possessing a 
firearm.  §18.2-308.2(A) prescribes minimum sentences of two to five years for possession or 
transportation of a firearm where the offender is a convicted felon.  §18.2-308.2:2(M) prescribes a 
minimum sentence of five years for the provision of more than one firearm to an ineligible person.  §18.2-
308.1(B) prescribes a minimum sentence of five years for the use of a firearm on school property. 
(III) Other 
4.127 Minimum sentences are also prescribed in respect of:  (i) the illicit possession, importation, sale 
or distribution of cigarettes;
254
 (ii) certain types of assault;
255
 (iii) escape from a correctional facility;
256
 (iv) 
                                                                                                                                                 
nature of the victim and offence, imposing the mandatory sentence would frustrate the general purpose of 
sentencing. 
253
  §18.2-248 provides that if the defendant has no prior conviction, did not use violence or the threat of violence, 
the offence did not result in death or serious bodily injury and the defendant was not a central figure in the 
criminal enterprise and provided substantial assistance to the government prior to sentencing, the five and 20 
year mandatory minimums will not apply for manufacturing.  §18.2-248.1 provides that if the individual can 
prove that he or she trafficked marijuana only with the intent to assist an individual and not to profit, he or she 
will be sentenced for committing a class 1 misdemeanour. 
254
  §3.2-4212(D,i) and §3.2-4212(D,ii). 
255
  §18.2-51.1; §18.2-57(A); §18.2-57(B); §18.2-57(C); and §18.2-57(D). 
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identity theft;
257
 (v) certain gang-related offences in a school zone;
258
 (vi) certain types of manslaughter;
259
 
(vii) certain types of sexual offence against children;
260
 (viii) violations of certain protective orders;
261
 (ix) 
certain types of sexual assault;
262
 driving while intoxicated;
263
 (x) operating a vehicle while licence 
revoked;
264
 (xi) reckless driving causing death;
265
 (xii) certain types of hate crime;
266
 and (xiii) certain 
types of vandalism.
267
  There is also a provision dealing with habitual offenders.
268
 
(iv) Federal 
(I) Drugs Offences 
4.128 §841(a), §841(b)(1)(A) and §2D1.1 of the Penal Code prescribe a variety of minimum sentences, 
ranging from five years to life, for manufacturing, distributing or possessing drugs, with intent to distribute.  
The sentences escalate for second and subsequent offences.  §846, §2D1.1, §2D1.2, §2D1.5 - §2D1.13, 
§2D2.1, §2D2.2, §2D3.1 and §2D3.2 stipulate that the mandatory minimum sentence for the underlying 
offence be imposed for attempts and conspiracies to commit any drug trafficking or possession offence.   
4.129 §848(a) and §2D1.5 prescribe a minimum sentence of 20 years for a continuing criminal 
enterprise and 30 years for a second or subsequent offence.  §848(b) and §2D1.5 prescribe a minimum 
sentence of life for acting as principal administrator, organiser or leader of a continuing criminal 
enterprise.  §848(e) and §2d1.5 prescribe a minimum sentence of 20 years for engaging in a continuing 
criminal enterprise and intentionally killing an individual or law enforcement officer.   
4.130 §859 and §2D1.2 prescribe a minimum sentence of one year or the minimum required by 
§841(b), whichever is longer, for distribution of drugs to persons under the age of 21 years.  §860(a) and 
§2D1.2 prescribe a minimum sentence of one year or the minimum required by §841(b), whichever is 
longer, for distribution of a controlled substance near a school or similar facility; three years or the 
minimum required by §841(b), whichever is longer, for a second offence; and the minimum required by 
§841(b)(1)(A) for a third offence.  §861 and §2D1.2 prescribe the minimum required by §841(b)(1)(A) for 
the employment or use of persons under 18 years in drug operations.  §861(b), §861(c) and §2D1.2 
prescribe a minimum sentence of one year for knowingly and intentionally employing or using a person 
under the age of 18 years in drug operations; one year for a second offence; and the minimum required 
by §841(b)(1)(A) for a third offence.   
4.131 §861(f) and §2D1.2 prescribe a minimum sentence of one year for knowingly or intentionally 
distributing a controlled substance to a pregnant individual.  §960(a), §960(b) and §2D1.1 prescribe a 
variety of minimum sentences, ranging from five years to life, depending on whether it is a first or 
subsequent offence, for the unlawful importation or exportation of drugs.  §963, §2D1.1, §2D1.2, §2D1.5-
                                                                                                                                                 
256
  §53.1-203(1). 
257
  §18.2-186.4. 
258
  §18.2-46.2. 
259
  §18.2-36.1(B) and §18.2-36.2(B). 
260
  §18.2-374.1:1(C); §18.2-374.1(B,1); §18.2-374.1(B,2); §18.2-374.1(B,3); §18.2-374.1(B,4); §18.2-374.3(C); 
and §18.2-374.3(D). 
261
  §16.1-253.2. 
262
  §18.2-61(A,iii); §18.2-67.1(A,1); §18.2-67.2(A,1); §18.2-67.5:2; and §18.2-67.5:3. 
263
  §18.2-266; §46.2-341.24; §46.2-357(B,1); §46.2-357(B,2); and §46.2-357(B,3). 
264
  §46.2-301; §46.2-391(D,1); §46.2-391(D,2a, i); §46.2-391(D,2a,ii); and §46.2-391(D,3). 
265
  §46.2-865.1(A,2). 
266
  §18.2-121; §18.2-57(A); and §18.2-57(B). 
267
  §18.2-154. 
268
  §19.2-297.1. 
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§2D1.13, §2D2.1, §2D2.2, §2D3.1 and §2D3.2 prescribe the same mandatory minimum sentence for the 
underlying offence as for attempts and conspiracies to commit any offence of importation or exportation. 
(II) Firearms Offences 
4.132 §924(c)(1)(A)(i) and §2K2.4 stipulate that an additional penalty of five years must be imposed for 
using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.  §924(c)(1)(A)(ii) and 
§2K2.4 stipulate that an additional penalty of 7 years must be imposed for brandishing a firearm during a 
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.  §924(c)(1)(A)(iii) and §2K2.4 stipulate that an additional 
penalty of 10 years must be imposed for discharging a firearm during a crime of violence or drug 
trafficking crime.  §924(c)(1)(B)(i) and §2K2.4 stipulate that an additional penalty of 10 years must be 
imposed for possessing a firearm that is a short-barrelled rifle or shotgun.  §924(c)(1)(B)(ii) and §2K2.4 
stipulate that an additional penalty of 30 years must be imposed for possessing a machinegun, 
destructive device or firearm equipped with a silencer or muffler.   
4.133 §924(c)(1)(C)(i) and §2K2.4 stipulate that an additional penalty of 25 years must be imposed for a 
second or subsequent conviction under §924(c)(1)(A).  §924(c)(1)(C)(ii) and §2K2.4 prescribe a minimum 
sentence of life for a second or subsequent conviction under §924(c)(1)(A), with a machine gun, 
destructive device or firearm equipped with a silencer or muffler.  §924(c)(5)(A) and §2K2.4 stipulate that 
an additional penalty of 15 years must be imposed for possession or use of armour-piercing ammunition 
during a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.  §924(e)(1) and §2K2.4 prescribe a minimum 
sentence of 15 years for possession of a firearm or ammunition by a fugitive offender or addict, who has 
three convictions for violent felonies or drug offences.  §929(a)(1) and §2K2.4 stipulate that an additional 
penalty of five years must be imposed for carrying a firearm during a violent offence or drug trafficking 
crime. 
(III) Other 
4.134 Minimum sentences are also prescribed for:  (i) certain immigration offences;
269
 (ii) identity 
theft;
270
 (iii) sexual offences against children;
271
 (iv) production, possession or use of fire or explosives;
272
 
(v) airplane hijacking;
273
 (vi) obstruction of justice;
274
 (vii) illegal food stamp activity;
275
 (viii) kidnapping;
276
 
(ix) hostage-taking;
277
 (x) bank robbery, racketeering, and organised crime;
278
 (xi) fraud, bribery and white 
collar crime;
279
 (xii) piracy;
280
 (xiii) certain types of assault or battery;
281
 (xiv) interference with civil service 
                                                     
269
  §1324(a)(2)(B)(i) and §2L1.1; §1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) and §2L1.1; and §1326(b)(3) and §2L1.2. 
270
  §1028A(a)(1) and §2B1.6; and §1028A(a)(2) and §2B1.6. 
271
  §1591(b)(1), §2G1.1, §2D2.1 and §2G1.3; §1591(b)(2), §2G1.1, §2D2.1 and §2G1.3; §2251A(a) and §2G2.3; 
§2251A(b) and §2G2.3; §2241(c) and §2A3.1; §2250(c) and §2A3.6; §1466A(a), §1466A(b) and §2G2.2; 
§2251(a), §2251(e) and §2G2.1; §2251(b), §2251(e) and §2G2.1; §2251(c), §2251(e), §2G2.1 and §2G2.2; 
§2251(d), §2251(e) and §2G2.2; §2252(a)(1), §2252(a)(3) and §2G2.2; §2252(a)(2) and §2G2.2; §2252(a)(4) 
and §2G2.2; §2252A(a)(1) to §2252A(a)(4), §2252A(a)(6) and §2G2.2; §2252A(a)(5) and §2G2.2; §2252A(g) 
and §2G2.2; §2257(i) and §2G2.5; §2260(a) and §2G2.1; §2260(b) and §2G2.2; §2260A and §2A3.5; 
§2422(b), §2G1.1 and §2G1.3; §2423(a) and §2G1.3; §2423(e) and §2G1.3; §3599(e)(1); and §3599(c)(1). 
272
  §1245(b); §229A(a)(2); §33(b), §2A2.1, §2A2.2, §2B1.1 and §2K1.4; §844(f)(1), §2K1.4 and §2X1.1; §844(h), 
§2K1.4 and §2K2.4; §844(i) and §2K1.4; §844(o) and §2K2.4; and §2272(b) and §2M6.1. 
273
  §46502(a)(2)(A), §2A5.1 and §2X1.1; §46502(a)(2)(B), §2A5.1 and §2X1.1; §46502(b)(1)(A), §2A5.1 and 
§2X1.1; §46502(b)(1)(B), §2A5.1 and §2X1.1; and §46506(1) and §2A5.3. 
274
  §192; §390; §13a and §2B1.1; §13b; §15b(k); and §195(3) and §2N2.1. 
275
  §2024(b)(1) and §2B1.1; and §2024(c) and §2B1.1. 
276
  §1201(g)(1) and §3559(f)(2). 
277
  §1203(a), §2A4.1 and §2X1.1. 
278
  §225(a), §2B1.1 and §2B4.1; §1956(h) and §2S1.1; and §2113(e), §2A1.1 and §2B3.1. 
279
  §4221 and §2B1.1; §622 and §2C1.1; §447; §220(e); §617; §630; and §8. 
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examinations;
282
 (xv) stalking in violation of a restraining order;
283
 (xvi) treason;
284
 (xvii) failure to report 
seaboard saloon purchases;
285
 (xviii) practice of pharmacy and sale of poisons in China;
286
 (xix) navigable 
water regulation violation;
287
 (xx) deposit of refuse or obstruction of navigable waterway;
288
 (xxi) deposit of 
refuse in New York or Baltimore harbours;
289
 (xxii) violation of merchant marine act;
290
 (xxiii) refusal to 
operate railroad or telegraph lines;
291
 (xxiv) sale or donation of HIV positive tissue or bodily fluids to 
another person for subsequent use other than medical research;
292
 (xxv) and trespassing on federal land 
for hunting or shooting.
293
  As discussed in Chapter 5, there are also provisions dealing with habitual 
offenders.
294
 
(IV) United States Sentencing Commission Report to Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the 
Federal Criminal Justice System (2011)  
4.135 In October 2011, the United States Sentencing Commission prepared a report on mandatory 
sentences pursuant to a congressional directive in section 4713 of the Hate Crimes Prevention Act 
2009.
295
   The Sentencing Commission was thus required to assess the compatibility of mandatory 
minimum penalties with the federal guideline system and to discuss mechanisms other than mandatory 
minimum sentencing laws by which Congress might take action with respect to sentencing policy.   
4.136 In the Report, the Sentencing Commission indicated that while there was a spectrum of views 
among its members regarding mandatory minimum penalties, it uniformly believed that a strong and 
effective sentencing guidelines system best serves the purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act.  The 
Sentencing Commission stated, however, that if Congress decided to exercise its power to direct 
sentencing policy by enacting mandatory minimum penalties, such penalties should:  (1) not be 
excessively severe, (2) be narrowly tailored to apply only to those offenders who warrant such 
punishment, and (3) be applied consistently. 
4.137 The Sentencing Commission observed that certain mandatory minimum provisions apply too 
broadly and/or are set too high to warrant the prescribed minimum penalty for the full range of offenders 
who could be prosecuted under the particular criminal statute.  Different charging and plea practices have 
thus developed in various districts and resulted in the disparate application of certain mandatory minimum 
penalties. 
                                                                                                                                                 
280
  §1651; §1652; §1653; §1655; §1658(b); and §1661. 
281
  §1389. 
282
  §1917. 
283
  §2261(b)(6) and §2M1.1. 
284
  §2381 and §2A6.2. 
285
  §283 and §2T3.1. 
286
  §212. 
287
  §410 
288
  §411 and §2Q1.3. 
289
  §441. 
290
  §58109(a). 
291
  §13. 
292
  §1122. 
293
  §414 
294
  §3559(c)(1). 
295
  Report to Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System (United States 
Sentencing Commission, 2011). 
160 
4.138 The Sentencing Commission asserted that this disparity can largely be traced to the structure and 
severity of mandatory minimum penalties.  It observed that mandatory minimum provisions typically use a 
limited number of aggravating factors to trigger the prescribed penalty, without regard to the possibility 
that mitigating circumstances surrounding the offence or the offender might justify a lower sentence.  For 
such a sentence to be reasonable in every case, it observed, the factors triggering the mandatory 
minimum penalty must always warrant the prescribed mandatory minimum penalty, regardless of the 
individualised circumstances of the offence or the offender.  It noted that this cannot be the situation for 
all cases and thus suggested that Congress should consider whether a statutory “safety valve” 
mechanism, similar to the one available for certain drug trafficking offenders, might be appropriately 
tailored for low-level, non-violent offenders convicted of other offences carrying mandatory minimum 
penalties. 
4.139 By contrast with mandatory minimum penalties, the Sentencing Commission observed that 
sentencing guidelines prescribe proportional, individualised sentences, based on many factors relating to 
the seriousness of the offence and the criminal history and other characteristics of the offender.  It 
concluded that this multi-dimensional approach to sentencing seeks to avoid the problems inherent in the 
structure of mandatory minimum penalties and, for this reason, best serves the purposes of the 
Sentencing Reform Act. 
(e) Canada 
4.140 Under the first Canadian Criminal Code of 1892, mandatory minimum sentences applied in 
respect of six offences, most of which related to corruption.
296
  In recent decades, however, Canada has 
witnessed a marked increase in the use of this mode of punishment.
297
  Minimum sentences are now 
prescribed for certain drug offences, firearms offences, sexual offences committed against children, and 
serious fraud.  In this section, the Commission considers the application of these sentencing regimes to 
offenders convicted for the first time of a specified offence.  The enhanced minimum penalties applicable 
to repeat offenders are addressed in Chapter 5.  
(i) Drug Offences  
4.141  Numerous drug offences attract a mandatory minimum sentence under the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act, as amended.
298
  
4.142 First, a minimum sentence of one year applies where the following offences are committed in 
prescribed circumstances:  (i) trafficking in a substance listed in Schedule I or Schedule II to the Act or 
any substance represented or held out to be such a substance,
299
 and (ii) possessing a substance listed 
                                                     
296
 Crutcher “Mandatory Minimum Penalties of Imprisonment: An Historical Analysis” (2000-2001) 44 Crim. L.Q. 
279 at 280.  
297
  Ibid at 279. 
298
  Section 39 - section 46 of the Safe Streets and Communities Act. 
299
  Section 5(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. 
            Schedule I lists the following substances, as well as their  preparations, derivatives, alkaloids and salts: (i) 
opium poppy; (ii) coca; (iii) phenylpiperidines;  (iv) phenazepines; (v) amidones; (vi) methadols; (vii) 
phenalkoxams; (viii) thiambutenes; (ix) moramides; (x) morphinans; (xi) benzazocines; (xii) ampromides; (xiii) 
benzimidazoles; (xiv) phencyclidine; (xv) piritramide; (xvi) fentanyls; (xvii) tilidine; (xviii) 
methylenedioxypyrovalerone; and (xix) methamphetamine.  The substance referred to in Schedule 2 to the Act 
is cannabis, including its preparations, derivatives and similar synthetic preparations.  Not included are non-
viable cannabis seed, with the exception of its derivatives, or mature cannabis stalks that do not include 
leaves, flowers, seeds or branches; and fiber derived from such stalks.  
 Section 5(3)(a.1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, as inserted by section 39 of the Safe Streets 
and Communities Act, further specifies that this regime will not apply where the subject matter of the offence is 
a substance included in Schedule II in an amount not more than that set out for that substance in Schedule 
VII. 
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in Schedule I or Schedule II to the Act for the purpose of trafficking.
300
  The minimum sentence must be 
imposed where:  (a) the person committed the offence for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in 
association with, a criminal organization; (b) the person used, or threatened to use, violence in committing 
the offence; (c) the person carried, used, or threatened to use a weapon in committing the offence; or 
(d) the person was convicted of a designated substance offence, or served a prison sentence for a 
designated substance offence, within the previous 10 years.
301
  These offences attract an enhanced 
minimum sentence of two years if one of the following aggravating factors is present:  (a) the person 
committed the offence in or near a school, on or near school grounds, or in or near any other public place 
usually frequented by persons under the age of 18 years; (b) the person committed the offence in a 
prison or on its grounds; or (c) the person used the services of a person under the age of 18 years, or 
involved such a person, in committing the offence.
302
 
4.143 Second, a minimum sentence of one year also applies where the following offences are 
committed in specified circumstances:  (i) importing and exporting a substance listed in Schedule I in an 
amount that is not more than one kilogram, or a substance listed in Schedule II,
303
 and (ii) possessing, for 
the purpose of exportation, a substance listed in Schedule I in an amount that is not more than one 
kilogram, or a substance listed in Schedule II.
304
  The court must impose the minimum sentence where:  
(a) the offence was committed for the purpose of trafficking; (b) the perpetrator, while committing the 
offence, abused a position of trust or authority; or (c) the person had access to an area that is restricted to 
authorised persons and used that access to commit the offence.
305
  Where the subject matter of either 
offence is a substance listed in Schedule I, in an amount that is more than one kilogram, a minimum 
sentence of two years applies.
306
 
4.144 Third, the offence of producing a substance listed in Schedule I
307
 ordinarily attracts a minimum 
sentence of two years.
308
  However, if one of the following aggravating factors is present, the court is 
required to impose a minimum sentence of three years:  (a) the person used real property belonging to a 
third party in committing the offence; (b) the production constituted a potential security, health or safety 
hazard to persons under the age of 18 years who were in the location where the offence was committed 
or in the immediate area; (c) the production constituted a potential public safety hazard in a residential 
area; or (d) the person set or placed a trap, device or other thing that is likely to cause death or bodily 
harm to another person in the location where the offence was committed or in the immediate area, or 
permitted such a trap, device or other thing to remain or be placed in that location or area.
309
  
                                                     
300
  Section 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. 
301
  Section 5(3)(a)(i) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, as amended by section 39 of the Safe Streets 
and Communities Act. 
302
  Section 5(3)(a)(ii) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, as amended by section 39 of the Safe Streets 
and Communities Act. 
303
  Section 6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. 
304
  Section 6(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. 
305
  Section 6(3)(a) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, as amended by section 40 of the Safe Streets 
and Communities Act. 
306
  Section 6(3)(a.1)  of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, as amended by section 40 of the Safe Streets 
and Communities Act. 
307
  Section 7(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. 
308
  Section 7(2)(a) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, inserted by section 41 of the Safe Streets and 
Communities Act. 
309
  Section 7(3) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, inserted by section 41 of the Safe Streets and 
Communities Act. 
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4.145 The offence of producing a substance listed in Schedule II
310
 (other than marijuana) attracts a 
minimum sentence of one year if the production is for the purpose of trafficking.
311
  A minimum sentence 
of 18 months applies if the production is for the purpose of trafficking and if any of the aggravating factors 
listed in section 7(3) of the Act (as outlined at paragraph 4.144) apply.
312
  Where the subject matter of the 
offence is cannabis, the Act prescribes minimum sentences ranging from six months to three years.  The 
applicable minimum sentence is determined by the number of plants produced and whether any of the 
aggravating factors listed in section 7(3) of the Act are present.
 313
   
4.146 Section 10 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act provides that a court may delay 
sentencing an offender convicted of any of the foregoing offences in order to enable the offender to 
participate in a drug treatment court program approved by the Attorney General, or to attend a treatment 
program approved by the province under the supervision of the court.  If the offender successfully 
completes such a program, the court is not required to impose the prescribed minimum sentence.   
4.147 Dupuis observes that vigorous debate surrounded the introduction of these minimum 
sentences.
314
  On one side, it was argued that mandatory sentencing for drug offences:  (i) addresses the 
(perceived) problem of judges prioritising the rehabilitation of offenders over crime deterrence and the 
right of law-abiding citizens to go about their lives without fear; (ii) destroys the criminal infrastructure that 
keeps the crime cycle going; (iii) encourages addicts to choose drug treatment programmes rather than 
go to prison; (iv) is an important deterrent and denouncement by society; and (v) incapacitates offenders 
by keeping them off the streets.  On the other side, it was argued that mandatory sentencing:  (i) strips 
judges of discretion in sentencing; (ii) risks turning Canadian prisons into “US-style inmate warehouses”; 
(iii) draws funds away from social programmes; and (iv) has not proven to be an effective deterrent.
315
  
Concerns have also arisen that this sentencing regime will impact most heavily on marginalised groups 
(particularly aboriginal people) who are already disproportionately represented in the Canadian prison 
system.
316
   
(ii) Firearms Offences 
4.148 The Canadian Criminal Code prescribes mandatory minimum sentences for certain offences 
involving firearms and/or other weapons.    
4.149 First, the following offences attract a minimum one-year sentence:  (i) using a firearm in the 
commission of an offence;
317
 (ii) using an imitation firearm in the commission of an offence;
318
 (iii) 
                                                     
310
  Section 7(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. 
311
  Section 7(a.1)(i) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, inserted by section 41 of the Safe Streets and 
Communities Act. 
312
  Section 7(a.1)(ii) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, inserted by section 41 of the Safe Streets and 
Communities Act. 
313
  Section 7(2)(b) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, inserted by section 41 of the Safe Streets and 
Communities Act. 
314
  Dupuis Legislative Summary of Bill S-10: An Act to Amend the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and to 
make related and consequential Amendments to other Acts (Parliament, No 40-3-S10E, 2010) at 15.  
Available at: 
www.parl.gc.ca/About/Parliament/LegislativeSummaries/bills_ls.asp?ls=s10&source=library_prb&Parl=40&Se
s=3&Language=E#fn20.  [Last accessed: 22 May 2013]. 
315
  See also:  McLemore “Why Canada should reject the Bill S-10” (Human Rights Watch, 2011). 
316
  Bernstein and Drake “In Canada’s ‘war on drugs,’ aboriginals are the biggest victims” National Post 6 
November 2012; Everett-Green “Law and Disorder: What Bill C-10 could mean for Canada’s native people” 
The Globe and Mail 17 February 2012; and Sewrattan “Apples, Oranges and Steel: The Effect of Mandatory 
Minimum Sentences for Drug Offences on the Equality Rights of Aboriginal Peoples” (2013) 46(1) UBC Law 
Review 121.  
317
  Section 85(1) and Section 86(3)(a) of the Criminal Code. 
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possession of a weapon obtained by the commission of an offence;
319
 (iv) trafficking of a prohibited or 
restricted weapon;
320
 (v) possession of a prohibited or restricted weapon for the purpose of weapons 
trafficking;
321
 (vi) making an automatic firearm;
322
 and (vii) importing or exporting a prohibited weapon, a 
restricted weapon, or any component or part designed exclusively for use in the manufacture of, or 
assembly into, an automatic firearm, knowing it is unauthorised.
323
 
4.150 Second, the following offences attract a minimum sentence of three years:  (i) possession of a 
prohibited or restricted firearm with ammunition;
324
 (ii) weapons trafficking;
325
 (iii) possession of a firearm, 
prohibited weapon, restricted weapon, prohibited device, any ammunition or any prohibited ammunition 
for the purpose of weapons trafficking;
326
 and (iv) importing or exporting a firearm, a prohibited device or 
any prohibited ammunition, knowing it is unauthorised.
327
  Third, where a firearm is used in the 
commission of the offence, the following offences attract a minimum sentence of four years:  (i) causing 
death by criminal negligence;
328
 (ii) manslaughter;
329
 (iii) attempted murder;
330
 (iv) recklessly discharging a 
firearm;
331
 (v) sexual assault with a weapon (threats to a third party or causing bodily harm);
332
 (vi) 
kidnapping;
333
 (vii) hostage-taking;
334
 (viii) robbery;
335
 and (ix) extortion.
336
  
4.151 Fourth, where a restricted or prohibited firearm is used in the commission of the offence, or if any 
firearm is used in the commission of the offence and the offence is committed for the benefit of, at the 
direction of, or in association with, a criminal organisation, the following offences attract a minimum 
sentence of five years:  (i) attempted murder;
337 
 (ii) recklessly discharging a firearm;
338
 (iii) sexual assault 
with a weapon (threats to a third party or causing bodily harm);
339
 (iv) aggravated sexual assault;
340
 (v) 
                                                                                                                                                 
318
  Section 85(2) and Section 86(3)(b) of the Criminal Code. 
319
  Section 96(1) and Section 96(2) of the Criminal Code.  
320
  Section 99(1) and Section 99(2)(a) of the Criminal Code. 
321
  Section 100(1) and Section 100(2)(a) of the Criminal Code.  
322
  Section 102(1) and Section 102(2) of the Criminal Code.  
323
  Section 103(1) and Section 102(3)(a) of the Criminal Code.  
324
  Section 95(1) and Section 95(2)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code.  
325
  Section 99(1) and Section 99(2)(a) of the Criminal Code.  
326
  Section 100(1) and Section 100(2)(a) of the Criminal Code.  
327
  Section 103(1) and Section 103(2)(a) of the Criminal Code.  
328
  Section 220(a) of the Criminal Code.  
329
  Section 236(a) of the Criminal Code.  
330
  Section 239(a.1) of the Criminal Code.  
331
  Section 244.2(1) and Section 244.3(b) of the Criminal Code.  
332
  Section 272(1) and Section 272(2)(a.1) of the Criminal Code.  
333
  Section 279(1) and Section 279(1.1)(a.1) of the Criminal Code.  
334
  Section 279.1(1) and Section 279.1(a.1) of the Criminal Code.  
335
  Section 344(1)(a)(i) and Section 344(a.1) of the Criminal Code.  
336
  Section 346(1) and Section 346(1.1)(a.1) of the Criminal Code.  
337
  Section 239(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code.  
338
  Section 244.2(1) and Section 244.2(3)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code.  
339
  Section 272(1) and Section 272(2)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code.  
340
  Section 273(1) and Section 273(2)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code.  
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kidnapping;
341
 (vi) hostage-taking;
342
 (vii) robbery;
343
 and (viii) extortion.
344
  Finally, the offences of:  (i) 
sexual assault with a weapon (threats to a third party or causing bodily harm);
345
 and (ii) aggravated 
sexual assault, also attract a minimum sentence of five years.
346
   
4.152 The Commission observes that the operation of this minimum sentencing regime has given rise 
to controversy.  On one side, proponents have asserted that these provisions necessarily respond to a 
growth in gun violence in urban centres, particularly in the context of gang-related activities.
347
  On the 
other side, critics have argued that these provisions are of doubtful deterrent value
348
 and excessively 
constrain judicial discretion.
349
   
4.153 In two recent cases concerning firearms offences, sentencing courts have refused to impose the 
minimum penalties prescribed by the Criminal Code, asserting that these punishments are grossly 
disproportionate.  In the first such instance, the Ontario Superior Court concluded that the three-year 
minimum sentence provided for the possession of a prohibited or restricted firearm with ammunition 
violated the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
350
  In the second instance, the Ontario Court of Justice 
declared the minimum three-year sentence prescribed for the trafficking of a prohibited or restricted 
weapon to be unconstitutional.
351
  Both rulings are currently under appeal.
352
   
(iii) Sexual Offences against Children 
4.154 The Canadian Criminal Code also prescribes mandatory minimum sentences for certain sexual 
offences, where these are perpetrated against children.  
4.155 First, the following offences attract a minimum sentence of 90 days’ imprisonment:  (i) 
householder permitting sexual activity with a child aged 16 or 17 years;
353
 (ii) making sexually explicit 
material available to a child;
354
 and (iii) exposure of genitals for a sexual purpose to a child under 16 years 
                                                     
341
  Section 279(1) of the Criminal Code.  
342
  Section 279.1(1) and Section 279.1(2)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code.  
343
  Section 344(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code.  
344
  Section 346(1) and Section 346(1.1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code.  
345
  Section 272(1) and Section 272(2)(a.2) of the Criminal Code.  
346
  Section 273(1) and Section 273(2)(a.2) of the Criminal Code.  
347
  See:  “Toronto shootings prompt Toews to criticize courts” CBC News 18 July 2012.  Available at: 
www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2012/07/18/pol-cp-toews-toronto-shooting-political-reaction.html [Last 
accessed: 22 May 2013]. 
348
  See, for example:  Editorial “Responding to Gun Violence” (2006) 51(2) The Criminal Law Quarterly 129.  
349
  See, for example:  Submission of the National Criminal Justice Section of the Canadian Bar Association “Bill 
C-2 - Tackling Violent Crime Act” November 2007 at 5. Available at:  www.cba.org/cba/submissions/pdf/07-56-
eng.pdf [Last accessed: 22 May 2013]. 
350
  See:  Humphreys “Tory gun laws in jeopardy after judge rejects ‘outrageous’ mandatory sentence” National 
Post 13 February 2012.  
351
  See:  O’Toole “Ontario judge strikes down mandatory minimum sentence for first-offence gun trafficking” 
National Post 6 July 2012.  
352
  See:  Seymour “Judge refuses to sentence man to ‘grossly disproportionate’ mandatory minimum” Ottawa 
Citizen 1 May 2013.   
353
  Section 171(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.  
354
  Section 171.1(1) and Section 171.1(2) of the Criminal Code.  A minimum sentence of 90 days applies where 
the offender is convicted on indictment.  If convicted summarily, the offender will attract a minimum sentence 
of 30 days.  
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of age.
355
  Second, the following offences attract a minimum sentence of six months’ imprisonment:  (i) 
possession of child pornography;
356
 (ii) accessing child pornography;
357
 (iii) parent or guardian procuring 
sexual activity with a child aged 16 or 17 years;
358
 (iv) householder permitting sexual activity with a child 
under 16 years of age;
359
 and (v) prostitution of a person under 18 years of age.
360
   
4.156 Third, the following offences attract a minimum one-year sentence of imprisonment:  (i) sexual 
interference with a child under 16 years of age;
361
 (ii) invitation to sexual touching to a child under 16 
years of age;
362
 (iii) sexual exploitation of a child aged 16 or 17 years;
363
  (iv) bestiality in the presence of 
a child or inciting a child to commit bestiality;
364
 (v) making child pornography;
365
 (vi) distribution etc. of 
child pornography;
366
 (vii) parent or guardian procuring sexual activity with a child under 16 years of 
age;
367
  (viii) luring a child;
368
 (ix) agreement or arrangement for the commission of a sexual offence 
against a child;
369
  and (x) sexual assault of a child under 16 years of age.
370
 
                                                     
355
  Section 173(2) of the Criminal Code.  A minimum sentence of 90 days applies where the offender is convicted 
on indictment.  If convicted summarily, the offender will attract a minimum sentence of 30 days. 
356
  Section 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code.  A minimum sentence of six months applies where the offender is 
convicted on indictment.  If convicted summarily, the offender will attract a minimum sentence of 90 days.  
357
  Section 163.1(4.1) of the Criminal Code.  A minimum sentence of six months applies where the offender is 
convicted on indictment.  If convicted summarily, the offender will attract a minimum sentence of 90 days.  
358
  Section 170(b) of the Criminal Code.  
359
  Section 171(b) of the Criminal Code.  
360
  Section 212(4) of the Criminal Code.  
361
  Section 151 of the Criminal Code. A minimum sentence of one year applies where the offender is convicted on 
indictment.  If convicted summarily, the offender will attract a minimum sentence of 90 days.  
362
  Section 152 of the Criminal Code.  A minimum sentence of one year applies where the offender is convicted 
on indictment.  If convicted summarily, the offender will attract a minimum sentence of 90 days.  
363
  Section 153(1) and Section 153(1.1) of the Criminal Code.  A minimum sentence of one year applies where 
the offender is convicted on indictment.  If convicted summarily, such an offender will attract a minimum 
sentence of 90 days. 
364
  Section 160(3) of the Criminal Code. A minimum sentence of one year applies where the offender is convicted 
on indictment.  If convicted summarily, such an offender will attract a minimum sentence of six months.  
365
  Section 163.1(2) of the Criminal Code.  A minimum sentence of one year applies where the offender is 
convicted on indictment.  If convicted summarily, such an offender will attract a minimum sentence of six 
months.  
366
  Section 163.1(3) of the Criminal Code.  A minimum sentence of one year applies where the offender is 
convicted on indictment.  If convicted summarily, such an offender will attract a minimum sentence of six 
months. 
367
  Section 170(a) of the Criminal Code.  
368
  Section 172.1(1) and Section 172.1(2) of the Criminal Code.  A minimum sentence of one year applies where 
the offender is convicted on indictment.  If convicted summarily, such an offender will attract a minimum 
sentence of 90 days.  
369
  Section 172.2(1) and Section 172.2(2) of the Criminal Code.  A minimum sentence of one year applies where 
the offender is convicted on indictment.  If convicted summarily, the offender will attract a minimum sentence 
of 90 days. 
370
  Section 271 of the Criminal Code.  A minimum sentence of one year applies where the offender is convicted 
on indictment.  If convicted summarily, the offender will attract a minimum sentence of 90 days. 
166 
4.157 Fourth, the offence of “living on the avails” of the prostitution of a person under 18 years of age 
attracts a minimum sentence of two years.
371
  Fifth, the following offences attract a minimum sentence of 
five years:  (i) incest with a child under 16 years of age;
372
 (ii) aggravated offence of living on the avails of 
the prostitution of a person under 18 years of age;
373
 and (iii) trafficking of a person under 18 years of 
age.
374
  Sixth, where the offender kidnaps, commits an aggravated assault or aggravated sexual assault 
against, or causes death to, the victim during the commission of the offence, the offence of trafficking a 
person under 18 years of age attracts a minimum sentence of six years’ imprisonment
 375
 
4.158 The Canadian Ministry of Justice contends that these provisions ensure that the need to strongly 
deter and denounce the sexual exploitation of children is consistently reflected in sentencing.
376
  The 
Ministry argues that this is achieved by virtue of the fact that “the starting point for any sentence 
calculation must be a sentence of imprisonment... .”
377
  By contrast, however, critics of this sentencing 
regime assert that there is little evidence to suggest that mandatory sentencing effectively deters child 
sexual abuse.
378
  The constraints placed on judicial discretion, and the corresponding risk of 
disproportionate punishment, are also emphasised by these commentators.
379
    
(iv) Fraud  
4.159 Section 380 of the Canadian Criminal Code
380
  prescribes a minimum sentence of two years’ 
imprisonment for any offender who by deceit, falsehood or other fraudulent means, defrauds the public or 
any person (whether ascertained or not) of any property, money, valuable security or service, where the 
total value of the subject-matter exceeds one million dollars.  It has been observed that the introduction of 
this provision reflected a move by the Canadian government to treat white collar crime more seriously.
381
   
(f) Australia 
4.160 In Australia, mandatory sentencing has a long history.
382
  During the 18th and 19th centuries, 
mandatory sentencing was used for a wide variety of offences.
383
 
 
However,
 
during the 19th century, this 
approach was largely abandoned in favour of parliament setting the maximum penalty, with the 
sentencing judge responsible for determining the appropriate sentence for the individual offender.
384
  In 
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  Section 212(2) of the Criminal Code.  
372
  Section 155(1) and Section 155(2) of the Criminal Code.  
373
  Section 212(2.1) of the Criminal Code.  
374
  Section 279.011(1) of the Criminal Code.  
375
  Section 279.011(1) of the Criminal Code.  
376
 Hansard, House of Commons, Bill C-22, An Act respecting the mandatory reporting of Internet child 
pornography by persons who provide an Internet service, 3 December 2010, col 1034. 
377
  Ibid. 
378
  See, for example: Canadian Criminal Justice Association “Brief to the Standing Committee on Justice and 
Human Rights ... An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Sexual Offences Against Children)” (January 2011).  
Available at: www.ccja-acjp.ca/en/c54en.html [Last accessed: 22 May 2013]. 
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  Ibid. 
380
  Inserted by section 2 of the Standing up for Victims of White Collar Crime Act. 
381
  Wong, Aagaard and Shapiro “Minimum Mandatory Jail Sentence for Fraud over C€1 Million” (5 July 2011).  
Available at:  www.blakes.com/English/Resources/Bulletins/Pages/Details.aspx?BulletinID=1355 [Last 
accessed:  22 May 2013]. 
382
  Roche “Mandatory Sentencing” No 138 Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, (Australian Institute of 
Criminology, 1999) at 1. 
383
  Ibid. 
384
  Ibid. 
167 
recent years, it would appear that the use of mandatory and presumptive sentencing is again becoming 
increasingly commonplace.  The Commission notes, as a preliminary observation, that a persistent 
criticism of these sentencing regimes is that indigenous adults are much more likely to be affected than 
non-indigenous adults.
385
  
(i) Commonwealth   
(I) People Smuggling 
4.161 At federal level, only one Act, the Migration Act 1958, provides for mandatory minimum 
sentences.  Under section 236B, the court is required to impose a sentence of at least five years’ 
imprisonment for:  (i) the offence of “aggravated people smuggling” (where the offence is committed in 
relation to at least five people), and (ii) the “aggravated offence of false documents and false or 
misleading information etc. relating to non-citizens” (where the offence is committed in relation to at least 
five people).  A mandatory minimum sentence of 8 years applies for an aggravated offence of people 
smuggling which involves exploitation or the danger of death or serious harm to those smuggled, or 
where (as discussed at paragraph 5.66) one of the foregoing offences is committed on a second or 
subsequent occasion.  Under this sentencing regime, the court is required to fix a minimum non-parole 
period of three years, or five years if the conviction is for a repeat offence.
386
  The prescribed minimum 
penalties will not apply, however, where it is established on the balance of probabilities that the offender 
was under 18 years of age when the offence was committed.   
4.162 The Commission observes that significant controversy surrounds the operation of section 236B of 
the Migration Act 1958.  Many commentators,
387
  including several members of the Australian judiciary,
388
 
have criticised this mandatory sentencing regime on the basis that it has led to the imposition of 
disproportionate sentences on low-level offenders.  
(ii) New South Wales 
4.163 Sentencing in New South Wales is regulated by the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Amendment 
(Standard Minimum Sentencing) Act 2002, which amended the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 
1999.
389
  This legislation does not appear to prescribe mandatory minimum sentences for any offence.
390
  
However, section 54A to section 54D of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Amendment (Standard 
Minimum Sentencing) Act 2002 does create standard non-parole periods for a number of offences, 
including armed robbery but not drug offences.  When sentencing an offender for one of these offences, 
the court must, if it decides that imprisonment is appropriate, be guided by the minimum non-parole 
period.  This arrangement restricts judicial discretion with respect to the duration of custody, while leaving 
a court free to impose a non-custodial sanction.     
                                                     
385
  Ibid at 1-2. 
386
  Same Crime, Same Time Report 103 (Australian Law Reform Commission, 2006) at 539. 
387
  See for example:  Bagaric & Pathinayake “Mandatory Harsh Penalties for People Smugglers in Australia: Time 
for Reform” (2012) 76(6) Journal of Criminal Law 493; Williams “Minimum sentence, maximum injustice” 
Sydney Morning Herald 6 December 2011; “Bid to end Australian mandatory sentencing for people 
smugglers” Radio Australia 20 January 2012.  Available at:  
www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/radio/onairhighlights/bid-to-end-australian-mandatory-sentencing-for-
people-smugglers [Last accessed:  22 May 2013]; and “Lawyers Speak out against mandatory sentencing” 
The New Lawyer 20 August 2012.  Available at: www.thenewlawyer.com.au/comment---debate/lawyers-
speak-out-against-mandatory-sentencing [Last accessed: 22 May 2013].  
388
  See:  Marcus “People smuggler given minimum sentence” ABC News 16 August 2012.  Available at: 
www.abc.net.au/news/2012-08-16/people-smuggler-given-minimum-sentence/4202688 [Last accessed: 22 
May 2013]; Flatley “Judge slams mandatory sentence for people smugglers” Sydney Morning Herald 11 
January 2012; and Dodd “People smuggling laws in the dock” The Australian 23 March 2012.  
389
  Mandatory Sentences of Imprisonment in Common Law Jurisdictions (Department of Justice, Canada) at 29. 
390
  As noted at paragraph 3.35, however, New South Wales has recently introduced an entirely mandatory life 
sentence for the murder of a police officer in certain circumstances.  
168 
(iii) Northern Territory  
4.164 In the Northern Territory, presumptive minimum sentences are prescribed for certain first-time 
violent offences and drug offences.  Imprisonment is also the mandatory penalty for certain sexual 
offences.  As discussed in Chapter 5, the Northern Territory provides enhanced presumptive penalties for 
second or subsequent violent offences, while repeat transgressions of a domestic violence order also 
attract a presumptive minimum sentence.   
4.165 The Commission observes that mandatory sentencing regimes have been a source of particular 
controversy in the Northern Territory.  Most notably, the Sentencing Act 1995, as amended in 1997, had 
prescribed mandatory sentences in respect of a broad range of property offences.  The Act provided for a 
minimum sentence of 14 days’ imprisonment for a first offence; 90 days for a second offence and one 
year for a third offence.
391
  The same amendments also imposed mandatory minimum 28-day terms of 
imprisonment on juvenile repeat property offenders (aged 15 or 16 years) with escalating penalties for 
subsequent offences.  When this sentencing regime was associated with a number of deaths in prison, a 
grass roots campaign led to its amendment and eventual repeal in 2001.
392
 
(I) Violent Offences   
4.166 Under the Sentencing Act, the Northern Territory prescribes a presumptive sentencing regime in 
respect of certain violent offences.  First, where an offender who has not previously been convicted of a 
violent offence
393
 is convicted of a crime classified as a “Level 5”
394
 offence, he or she must receive a 
minimum three-month term of imprisonment.
395
  Second, where an offender is convicted of a crime 
classified as a “Level 4”
396
 offence, he or she must receive a minimum three-month sentence, irrespective 
of whether he or she has previously been convicted of a violent offence.
397
  Third, an offender convicted 
of a “Level 3”
398
 offence, who has not previously been convicted of a violent offence, must receive a 
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  Roche “Mandatory Sentencing” No 138 Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice (Australian Institute of 
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392
  Mandatory Sentences of Imprisonment in Common Law Jurisdictions (Department of Justice, Canada) at 25.   
393
  A “violent offence” is defined by subdivision 1 of Division 6A of the Sentencing Act (as replaced by section 6 of 
the Sentencing Amendment (Mandatory Minimum Sentences) Act 2013) as: (a) an offence against a provision 
of the Criminal Code listed in Schedule 2; or (b) an offence which substantially corresponds to such an offence 
under (i) a law that has been repealed; or (ii) a law of another jurisdiction (including a jurisdiction outside 
Australia).  The offences listed in Schedule 2 include terrorism, manslaughter, attempted murder, common 
assault, unlawful stalking and robbery.         
394
  A “Level 5” offence is defined as including the following offences under the Criminal Code: (a) causing serious 
harm under section 181; or (b) causing harm under section 186; common assault under section 188 (if the 
offence is committed in circumstances mentioned in section 188(2), other than paragraph (k)), assault on a 
worker under 188A; assault on police officer under section 189A; assault on administrator or judge or 
magistrate under section 190; assault on member of aircraft crew under section 191; assault with intent to 
commit an offence under section 193; or assault with intent to steal under section 212, if (i) commission of the 
offence involves the actual or threatened use of an offensive weapon; and (ii) the victim suffers physical harm 
as a result of the offence.   
395
  Section 78D of the Sentencing Act, inserted by section 6 of the Sentencing Amendment (Mandatory Minimum 
Sentences) Act 2013.  
396
  A “Level 4” offence is defined as: an offence against section 188A [assault on a worker] or section 189A 
[assault on administrator or judge or magistrate] of the Criminal Code if: (a) the victim suffers physical harm as 
a result of the offence; and (b) the offence is not a “Level 5” offence.  
397
  Section 78DB of the Sentencing Act, inserted by section 6 of the Sentencing Amendment (Mandatory 
Minimum Sentences) Act 2013. 
398
  A “Level 3” offence is defined as an offence against section 188 of the Criminal Code [common assault] if the 
offence: (a) is committed in circumstances mentioned in section 188(2), other than paragraph (k); and (b) the 
offence is not a “Level 5” offence. 
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custodial sentence in circumstances where the victim suffers physical harm as a result of the offence.
399
  
Any offender convicted of a “Level 2”
400
 offence must also receive a custodial sentence, irrespective of 
whether he or she has previously been convicted of a violent offence.
401
  A sentencing court may not 
suspend a term of imprisonment imposed in accordance with these provisions.
402
 
4.167 The obligation to impose a minimum penalty of a specified period will not apply where the court is 
satisfied that the circumstances of the case are exceptional.
403
  In determining whether the circumstances 
are exceptional, the court may have regard, in particular, to any victim impact statement or victim report 
presented to the court, and any other matters which it considers relevant.
404
  The following circumstances 
may not be regarded as exceptional circumstances:  (a) that the offender was voluntarily intoxicated at 
the time of committing the offence, or (b) that another person was involved in committing the offence, or 
coerced the offender to commit the offence.
405
  Equally, where the offender is under the age of 18 years, 
the court will not be required to impose a prescribed minimum sentence of a specified period upon him or 
her.
406  
Where exceptional circumstances are present or where the offender is under the age of 18 years, 
the court is nonetheless required to specify a custodial sentence and this may not be suspended.
407
   
4.168 In May 2013, the proviso was introduced that a sentencing court may not suspend a minimum 
term prescribed under this regime.
408
  According to the Northern Territory Government, this reform was 
intended to facilitate the protection of vulnerable victims of violent crime.
409
  The Government has argued, 
in particular, that the chief benefit of this amendment was that it would signal to serious and repeat violent 
offenders, as well as victims of crime, that those who perpetrate violent offences will serve actual prison 
time.  It would appear that this amendment was therefore intended to further the particular sentencing 
aims of deterrence and retribution.   
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  Section 78DC of the Sentencing Act, inserted by section 6 of the Sentencing Amendment (Mandatory 
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  See: section 78DH(2) of the Sentencing Act, inserted by section 6 of the Sentencing Amendment (Mandatory 
Minimum Sentences) Act 2013. 
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  See: section 78DI(2)(b) and section 78DH(2)(b) of the Sentencing Act, inserted by section 6 of the Sentencing 
Amendment (Mandatory Minimum Sentences) Act 2013. 
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  Section 78DH of the Sentencing Act, inserted by section 6 of the Sentencing Amendment (Mandatory 
Minimum Sentences) Act 2013. 
409
  Legislative Assembly of the Northern Territory, Sentencing Amendment (Mandatory Minimum Sentences) Bill 
2012, Second Reading, 29 November 2012, Mr Elferink.  See: 
http://notes.nt.gov.au/lant/hansard/hansard12.nsf/WebbySubject/4F84E713E3F06F1F69257B2700054889?op
endocument  [Last accessed: 22 May 2013].   
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4.169 The Commission notes that this presumptive sentencing regime has been criticised by certain 
commentators who maintain that these provisions are liable to impact disproportionately on Aboriginal 
offenders.
410
 
(II) Drug Offences 
4.170 Section 37 of the Misuse of Drugs Act provides that a 28-day presumptive minimum sentence 
must be imposed for a number of drug offences.  The court is not required to impose the sentence if, 
having regard to the particular circumstances of the offence or the offender, the court is of the opinion that 
the penalty should not be imposed. 
(III) Sexual Offences 
4.171 Under the Sentencing Act, a sentencing court is required to impose a custodial term upon an 
offender convicted of a specified sexual offence.
411
  The sentence imposed may be suspended in part, 
but not as a whole.
412
   
(iv) Queensland  
4.172 In Queensland, certain firearms offences attract a mandatory minimum sentence of 
imprisonment.  
 (I) Firearms Offences  
4.173  The Weapons Act 1990, as amended,
413
 provides that where specific aggravating factors are 
present, certain firearms offences will attract a mandatory minimum sentence.   
4.174 First, the offence of unlawfully possessing a firearm will attract a minimum sentence of either 9 
months
414
 or 18 months
415
 (depending on the weapons involved) where an adult offender uses the firearm 
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411
  Section 78BB of the Sentencing Act.  This sentencing regime will be triggered by  the following sexual 
offences, specified under Schedule 3 to the Act: (i) an offence against section 125B [possession of child 
abuse material] or 125C [publishing indecent articles] of the Criminal Code, where the offender is an 
individual;  (ii) an offence against section 127 [sexual intercourse or gross indecency involving child under 16 
years], 128 [sexual intercourse of gross indecency with child over 16 years under special care], 130 [sexual 
intercourse or gross indecency by provider of services to mentally ill or handicapped person], 131 [attempts to 
procure child under 16 years], 131A [sexual relationship with child], 132 [indecent dealing with child under 16 
years], 134 [incest] or 138 [bestiality] of the Criminal Code; (iii) an offence against section 188 [common 
assault] of the Criminal Code, where the circumstance of aggravation specified in section 188(2)(k) exists 
[indecent assault]; and (iv) an offence against section 192 [sexual intercourse and gross indecency without 
consent] or section 192B [coerced sexual self-manipulation] of the Criminal Code.    
412
  Section 78BB(b) of the Sentencing Act.  
413
  Weapons and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2012. 
414
  A minimum sentence of 9 months will apply where an offender unlawfully possesses a category A, B or M 
weapon and uses the firearm to commit an indictable offence.  Weapons are categorised under the Weapons 
Categories Regulation 1997. 
415
  A minimum sentence of 18 months will apply where an offender: (i) unlawfully possesses 10 or more weapons 
at least five of which are category D, E, H or R; (ii) unlawfully possesses 10 or more weapons; or (iii) 
unlawfully possesses a category C or E weapon, and uses the firearm to commit an indictable offence. 
Weapons are categorised under the Weapons Categories Regulation 1997. 
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to commit an indictable offence.
416
  This offence will attract a minimum sentence of either six months
417
 or 
one year
418
 where an adult offender unlawfully possesses the firearm for the purpose of committing or 
facilitating the commission of an indictable offence.
419
  A minimum sentence of one year is also 
prescribed for the unlawful possession of a short firearm in a public place, without a reasonable 
excuse.
420
  Second, the offence of unlawfully supplying weapons will attract a minimum sentence of either 
two and a half years
421
 or three years
422
 where at least one of the weapons is a short firearm and the 
person does not have a reasonable excuse for unlawfully supplying the firearm.
423
  Third, the offence of 
unlawfully trafficking in weapons will attract a minimum sentence of either three and a half years
424
 or five 
years
425
 where at least one of the weapons is a firearm and the offender does not have a reasonable 
excuse for unlawfully carrying on the business.
426
  
4.175 Section 185B of the Corrective Services Act 2006
427
 stipulates that an offender who receives a 
minimum sentence under the Weapons Act 1990 will not be eligible for parole until the prescribed 
minimum term has been served.  
4.176 The introduction of this minimum sentencing regime was proposed in the aftermath of a series of 
shootings in South East Queensland.
428
  It would appear that most of these high-profile incidents were 
related to ongoing feuding between rival motorcycle gangs.
429
   
                                                     
416
  Section 50(1) of the Weapon Act 1990, as amended by section 15 of the Weapons and Other Legislation 
Amendment Act 2012.  
417
  A minimum sentence of six months will apply where the offender unlawfully possesses a category A, B or M 
weapon for the purpose of committing or facilitating an indictable offence.  
418
  A minimum sentence of one year will apply where the offender (i) unlawfully possesses 10 or more weapons 
at least five of which are category D, E, H or R; (ii) unlawfully possesses 10 or more weapons; or (iii) 
unlawfully possesses a category C or E weapon, for the purpose of committing or facilitating an indictable 
offence.  Weapons are categorised under the Weapons Categories Regulation 1997. 
419
  Section 50(1) of the Weapon Act 1990, as amended by section 15 of the Weapons and Other Legislation 
Amendment Act 2012.  
420
  Ibid.  
421
   A minimum sentence of two and a half years will apply if the offender:  (i) unlawfully supplies a category D, H 
or R weapon; (ii) the weapon is a short firearm; and (iii) the person does not have a reasonable excuse for 
unlawfully supplying the weapons.  Weapons are categorised under the Weapons Categories Regulation 
1997. 
422
  A minimum sentence of three years will apply if the offender:  (i) unlawfully supplies five or more weapons at 
least one of which is a category D, E, H or R weapon; (ii) at least one of the weapons is a short firearm; and 
(iii) the person does not have a reasonable excuse for unlawfully supplying the weapons.  Weapons are 
categorised under the Weapons Categories Regulation 1997. 
423
  Section 50B(1) of the Weapons Act 1990, as amended by section 16 of the Weapons and Other Legislation 
Amendment Act 2012. 
424
  A minimum sentence of three and a half years will apply if the offender: (i) unlawfully trafficks a category A, B, 
C, D or E weapon, a category M crossbow or explosives; (ii) at least one of the weapons is a firearm; and (iii) 
the offender does not have a reasonable excuse for carrying on the business.  Weapons are categorised 
under the Weapons Categories Regulation 1997. 
425
  A minimum sentence of five years will apply if the offender: (i) unlawfully trafficks a category H or R weapon; 
(ii) at least one of the weapons is a firearm; and (iii) the offender does not have a reasonable excuse for 
carrying on the business. Weapons are categorised under the Weapons Categories Regulation 1997. 
426
  Section 65(1) of the Weapons Act 1990, as amended by section 17 of the Weapons and Other Legislation 
Amendment Act 2012. 
427
  Inserted by Part 2 of the Weapons and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2012. 
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4.177  According to the Queensland Government, these mandatory sentencing provisions were 
intended to provide a strong deterrent to the unlawful use of firearms.  The Minister for Police and 
Community Safety expressed the view that the pre-existing repercussions of illegal weapons use were 
“weak” and that minimum sentences were required to “send a clear message that trafficking, 
supply, unlawful possession and use of illegal firearms will not be tolerated.”
430
  On the other hand, 
however, the value of these provisions has been disputed by a number of commentators, including the 
Queensland Law Society.
431
  Reiterating its longstanding view that “mandatory sentencing laws are unfair, 
unworkable and run contrary to Australia’s international treaty obligations”, the Society has expressed 
concern that this regime will:  (i) unduly fetter judicial discretion, leading to injustice in individual cases; (ii) 
reduce the proportion of guilty pleas, increasing costs, delays, and the stress to victims and other 
witnesses; and (iii) impact disproportionately on the most marginalised members of society.
432
  The 
Society has also noted that there is a lack of evidence to demonstrate that mandatory sentencing 
provides a deterrent effect, and that these regimes have in fact failed to reduce crime in other Australian 
states and common law countries.
433
   
(v) South Australia 
4.178 South Australia does not appear to prescribe a mandatory or presumptive minimum sentence for 
any offence.  
(vi) Tasmania 
4.179 Likewise, Tasmania does not appear to provide a mandatory or presumptive minimum sentence 
for any offence.  
(vii)     Victoria  
4.180 Victoria prescribes mandatory minimum sentences for certain offences involving the causation of 
fire in a country area. 
(I) Causing a Fire in a Country Area  
4.181 Section 39A of the Country Fire Authority Act 1958 prescribes a minimum three-month sentence 
of imprisonment for the offence of causing a fire in a country area in extreme conditions of weather.  In 
addition, section 39C prescribes a minimum one-year sentence of imprisonment for the offence of 
causing a fire in a country area with intent to cause damage.   
(viii) Western Australia 
4.182 As will be discussed in Chapter 5, Western Australia applies a mandatory minimum sentencing 
regime in respect of repeat burglary offenders.  Where perpetrated for the first time, certain forms of 
assault also attract a minimum sentence in this state.   
(I) Assaults against Public Officers 
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4.183 Section 297 of the Criminal Code provides a mandatory minimum sentence for the commission, 
in prescribed circumstances, of grievous bodily harm against a member of one of a number of specified 
classes of public officer.
434
  Under this section, a sentencing court must impose a minimum sentence of 
12 months’ imprisonment upon an adult offender or three months’ imprisonment or detention, as it sees 
fit, upon an offender aged 16 or 17 years.  The court may not suspend any sentence imposed under this 
regime and must record a conviction against the offender.   
4.184 Section 318 of the Criminal Code provides a mandatory minimum sentence for the commission, 
in prescribed circumstances, of a serious assault resulting in bodily harm to a member of one of a number 
of specified classes of public officer.
435
  Under this section, a sentencing court must impose a minimum 
sentence of six months’ imprisonment on an adult offender, or three months’ imprisonment or detention, 
as it sees fit, on an offender aged 16 or 17 years.  Where the perpetrator was at least 18 years of age at 
the time of the offence and was at, or immediately before or immediately after the commission of the 
offence, armed with any dangerous or offensive weapon or instrument, or in company with another 
person or persons, he or she will attract a minimum sentence of 9 months’ imprisonment.  When 
sentencing an offender under section 318, the court may not suspend any term of imprisonment imposed 
and must record a conviction against the person.   
4.185 It has been emphasised by the Government of Western Australia that since the introduction of 
these mandatory sentencing provisions in September 2009, reported assaults against police officers have 
declined significantly.
436
  Whether this decrease is attributable to the new sentencing regime is, however, 
uncertain.  The Sentencing Advisory Council of Tasmania has observed that shortly prior to the 
introduction of these provisions, the Western Australian police changed their policy regarding single 
officer patrols so that officers were no longer to be rostered, directed or encouraged to patrol alone.
437
  
This has been identified as a factor which may have contributed to the decrease in reported assaults on 
police officers.
438
  The Council has also noted that assaults in public places declined during the years 
2009-2011, matching the pattern regarding assaults against police officers for the same period.
439
  This 
decline in assault offences occurred not only in Western Australia but in Tasmania, and has been 
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attributed by the Tasmanian police to a general decline in all areas of crime throughout Australia during 
this period.
440
  
4.186 In October 2012, the Western Australia Police Union expressed concern that prison sentences 
had only been imposed in 38 percent of the 87 finalised cases involving assaults on public officers.
441
  In 
36 percent of cases, the charge was instead downgraded, resulting in the imposition of a non-custodial 
penalty.
442
  In response to the misgivings expressed by the Police Union, the Criminal Lawyers’ 
Association of Western Australia insisted that the number of downgraded charges accorded with proper 
prosecuting guidelines.  These guidelines require that the public interest and the prospects of conviction 
be considered in each individual case.
443
  The Association maintains that it is inevitable that the 
mandatory sentencing regime will be taken into account in considering whether it is in the public interest 
to pursue a charge.
444
  
(ix) New Zealand 
4.187 As outlined in Chapter 5, New Zealand applies a mandatory sentencing regime in respect of 
certain repeat offences.  However, where committed by an offender for the first time, no offence would 
appear to attract a mandatory minimum sentence.  
(g) Summary 
4.188 A comparative analysis of common law countries that have introduced minimum sentencing 
regimes is of interest.  As illustrated in Chapter 2, it is clear that the enactment of presumptive minimum 
sentences for drugs and firearms offences in this State was, to some extent, influenced by sentencing 
reforms in the United States of America and the United Kingdom, in particular.  Traditionally, it has also 
been the consistent approach of the Commission to engage in comparative analysis when evaluating 
potential options for law reform in this State.   
4.189 Equally, however, the Commission cautions against relying too heavily on the example set by 
other common law jurisdictions.  It should be noted that the rationale for introducing minimum sentencing 
regimes varies from country to country and that these provisions are often the product of circumstances 
and cultural factors specific to the jurisdiction in question.  The Commission notes, therefore, that it is 
important to independently assess any proposed extension of mandatory sentencing to ensure that any 
reform would be consistent with the key sentencing aims and principles identified in Chapter 1.  
E Presumptive Minimum Sentences an d the Conceptual Framework 
4.190 In this Part, the Commission considers presumptive minimum sentences against the conceptual 
framework established in Chapter 1.  Specifically, the Commission considers this category of mandatory 
sentence against:  (1) the aims of sentencing, and (2) the principles of justice. 
(1) Presumptive Minimum Sentences and the Aims of Sentencing  
4.191 The Commission has observed that criminal sanctions pursue one or more of a number of aims 
including deterrence, punishment, reform and rehabilitation and reparation.  The Commission has also 
observed that deterrence and punishment tend to feature more heavily in cases involving more serious 
crimes and, consequently, more severe sanctions.  Likewise, it is ostensibly these aims which feature 
most heavily in cases involving those offences which attract presumptive minimum sentences. 
Specifically, these presumptive sentences seek to:  (i) dissuade by coercive means, the offender from 
committing another drugs or firearms offence and to punish him or her severely for the offence that he or 
she has committed, and (ii) dissuade the public at large from committing the relevant drugs or firearms 
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offences.   It is arguable, however, that these presumptive sentences are not adequately meeting these 
aims.   
(a) Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 
4.192 The Commission observes that, for various reasons, the presumptive sentencing regime under 
the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 may not adequately meet the aim of deterrence.  At one end of the scale, 
there are the high-level offenders who, it would seem, shield themselves from detection and prosecution 
by means of complex and constantly evolving networks of distributors.  It is unlikely that many of these 
high-level offenders would be deterred by the prospect of a presumptive 10-year sentence when they are 
unlikely to be subjected to it.   
4.193 At the other end of the scale, there are the low-level drug mules whose involvement in the drugs 
trade is generally secured by means of exploitation and/or coercion.  It is unlikely that these offenders 
would be deterred by the prospect of a presumptive minimum sentence as many of them will not be in a 
position (through incapacity, foreign nationality etc) to assess the legal consequences of their actions and 
many others will be more afraid of the consequences of refusal.  The Court of Criminal Appeal has 
observed that in addition to these offenders who have been “exploited to work as drug couriers for a 
pittance”, many of those appealing sentences imposed under this regime “are themselves drug addicts 
struggling to escape from the terrors of their addiction.”
445
  This is significant in so far as mandatory 
sentences are understood to have a very limited deterrent impact on those who are seeking to support a 
drug addiction through criminality.
446
  In particular, Mascharka notes that as drug addicts are often 
prepared to risk victimisation, overdose, the transmission of diseases, and toxicity and impurities in the 
drug in order to feed their addiction, they are unlikely to be deterred by the prospect of lengthy 
imprisonment.
447
 
4.194 Admittedly, it may be the case that having once served a sentence for their role as a drug mule, 
some of these offenders will be less willing to perform that role again.  Given that there is a virtually 
limitless pool of vulnerable and desperate potential candidates,
448
 however, it is unlikely that this would 
have a significant impact on the overall rate of drug trafficking.   
4.195 The Commission also observes that the presumptive sentencing regime under the Misuse of 
Drugs Act 1977 may not adequately meet the aim of punishment.  From a retributive perspective, it would 
seem unjust that the range of actors involved in drug trafficking should be subject to the same 
presumptive sentencing regime regardless of their level of moral culpability or involvement.  This regime 
creates a parallel system of sentencing whereby offenders who were in possession of controlled drugs 
worth €13,000 or more are liable to be punished more severely than others involved in the illicit drugs 
trade.  The market value of the drugs is therefore prioritised at the expense of other factors relevant to 
culpability, such as the role, motive and state of mind of the offender.
449
  This regime would appear to 
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create a risk that an individual offender may receive a level of punishment disproportionate to his or her 
culpability.  The courts are permitted to impose a sentence lower than the presumptive minimum 
sentence where there are exceptional and specific circumstances.  This goes some way towards ensuring 
that offenders do not receive disproportionate sentences.   
4.196 Similar observations may be made regarding the denunciatory aspect of this sentencing regime.  
As this regime prioritises the market value of the drugs at the expense of other factors relevant to 
culpability, it creates a risk that an individual offender may be denounced more forcefully than is 
warranted by his or her culpability.   
4.197 The Commission observes that rehabilitation is another aim that is built into the presumptive 
sentencing regime under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977.  As discussed at paragraph 4.48, section 27(3J) 
provides that the court may list a sentence for review after half of the term has expired.  To list a sentence 
for review, the court must be satisfied that the offender was addicted to drugs at the time of the offence 
and that this was a substantial factor leading to the commission of the offence.  It has been noted, 
however, that this provision is limited to the extent that it only applies to offenders who have received the 
minimum sentence of 10 years or more.
450
   
4.198 It is thus questionable whether the presumptive sentencing regime under the Misuse of Drugs Act 
1977 is contributing to the overall aim of the criminal justice system, namely, the reduction of prohibited or 
unwanted conduct.  Indeed, while it is possible that offending rates might be higher in the absence of 
these provisions, it has been noted that recorded levels of drug crime have increased greatly during the 
period in which these presumptive sentences have been in force.
451
  This tends to support the view that 
the objective of reducing drug-related crime is unlikely to be achieved solely through criminal law 
enforcement.   
4.199 The Commission notes that in 2006 the Health Research Board (HRB) examined the nature of 
the link between drugs and crime with a view to informing the development of effective policy 
responses.
452
  The study employed four explanatory models:  (i) the psycho-pharmacological model;
453
 (ii) 
the economic-compulsive model;
454
 (iii) the systemic model;
455
 and (iv) the common-cause model.
456
  This 
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453
   The psycho-pharmacological model proposes that the effects of intoxication cause criminal (especially 
violent) behaviour or that aggression and crime can be caused, for example, by the effects of withdrawal or 
sleep deprivation.  In this regard, the HRB indicated that international evidence was inconclusive and Irish 
research limited. (See: Overview 3: Drugs and Crime in Ireland (Health Research Board, 2006) at 12)  
454
     The economic-compulsive model assumes that drug users need to generate illicit income from crimes such as 
robbery, burglary and prostitution to support their drug habit.  In this regard, the HRB indicated that Irish 
research supports the argument that there is an economic motivation to commit crime to purchase drugs. 
(See: Overview 3: Drugs and Crime in Ireland (Health Research Board, 2006) at 12)  
455
     The systemic model explains drug-related crime as resulting from activities associated with the illegal drug 
market.  In this regard, the HRB indicated that local studies show that there is a connection between local drug 
markets and significant levels of community disturbance and anti-social behaviour. (See: Overview 3: Drugs 
and Crime in Ireland (Health Research Board, 2006) at 12) 
456
       The common-cause model suggests that there is no direct causal link between drugs and crime but that both 
are related to other factors including socio-economic deprivation.  In this regard, the HRB indicated that Irish 
research has consistently revealed that underlying social factors, such as educational disadvantage, poverty 
and inequality contributed to both problematic drug use and crime. (See: Overview 3: Drugs and Crime in 
Ireland (Health Research Board, 2006) at 12)  
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analysis suggested, among other things, that:  (i) well-resourced treatment services, such as methadone 
substitution, can have a positive impact on criminal behaviour; (ii) local policing partnerships which 
acknowledge that fear of retribution is a deterrent to crime-reporting are essential to addressing drug-
related crime in deprived areas; and (iii) addressing socio-economic circumstances is an essential part of 
dealing with the problem of drugs and crime.  The HRB concluded that while activities aimed at supply 
control, combined with efforts to reduce the demand for drugs, remain essential policy goals, the 
development of an Irish crime-reduction strategy needs to appreciate the complexity of the drugs-crime 
nexus.
457
  In particular, it emphasised that while law enforcement activities may have contributed, among 
other things, to the relative containment of illicit drug use, there is little evidence that such approaches 
have halted the expansion of illicit drug markets or reduced associated criminal activities for any 
sustained period.
458
   
4.200 The research conducted by the HRB indicates that policies designed to counter illicit drug 
dependence have a key contribution to make to the reduction of crime.  Of particular interest in this 
respect, is the work of the Misuse of Drugs work sector of the British-Irish Council (BIC).  The 
Commission notes that in January 2012 the Member Administrations of the BIC confirmed their 
commitment to actively encouraging a renewed focus on recovery from drug dependence in future drug 
strategies.
459
  The work sector, which is led by the Irish administration, further agreed that Member 
Administrations will work together to evaluate and share successful approaches to this challenge.  At the 
summit meeting held in January 2012, Ministers discussed drug treatment measures and strategies that 
have been put in place in each administration to facilitate the path of recovery.  The Council noted that a 
more ambitious inter-agency approach was needed involving individual care plans to better address the 
holistic needs of clients.  A discussion paper titled Recovery from Problem Drug Use was also welcomed 
by the various delegations in attendance.  The Commission notes that in 2012 the BIC also considered 
issues such as:  (i) the misuse of prescription drugs; (ii) the misuse of new psychoactive substances; and 
(iii) cycles of problem substance abuse among young people.
460
   
(b) Firearms Acts 
4.201 The Commission observes that there has been little commentary in the literature on presumptive 
sentencing under the Firearms Acts.  Given, however, that it was modelled on the presumptive 
sentencing regime under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, many of the comments made in relation to the 
Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 also apply to the Firearms Acts. 
4.202 The presumptive sentencing regime under the Firearms Acts may not, for instance, adequately 
meet the aim of deterrence.  In this regard, Campbell observes that presumptive sentencing as a means 
of deterring gun crime assumes that the offender has made a rational decision to commit the offence.
461
  
She notes, however, that expressions of masculinity and social deprivation are also contributing factors 
and firearms offenders might respond better to an educational and psychological approach rather than a 
legal approach.
462
  
4.203 In addition, the Commission observes that this sentencing regime may not appropriately pursue 
the aim of punishment.  The Firearms Acts prioritise one aggravating factor, namely, the existence of a 
prior relevant conviction under the Acts, at the expense of other factors relevant to culpability.  In this 
regard, the regime may run the risk of inflicting disproportionate punishment upon a particular offender.  
The Commission acknowledges, however, that the courts may undertake a downward departure from the 
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presumptive minimum sentence on the basis of factors which constitute exceptional and specific 
circumstances.  This goes some way towards ensuring that offenders do not receive disproportionate 
sentences.  
4.204 Similar observations may be made regarding the denunciatory aspect of this sentencing regime.  
As the Firearms Acts prioritise the existence of a prior relevant conviction at the expense of other factors 
relevant to culpability, this regime creates a risk that an individual offender may be denounced more 
forcefully than is warranted by his or her culpability.   
 
(2) Presumptive Minimum Sentences and the Principles of Justice  
4.205 The Commission has observed that sentencing must also comply with a number of external 
constraints that emanate from fundamental principles of justice, namely, the principles of:  (a) 
consistency, and (b) proportionality.  In this section, the Commission considers the presumptive 
sentencing regimes under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 and the Firearms Acts against these principles.  
(a) The Principle of Consistency and Presumptive Minimum Sentences  
4.206 The Commission has observed that the principle of consistency requires a consistent application 
of the aims and principles of sentencing (consistency of approach) rather than uniformity of sentencing 
outcomes (consistency of outcomes).  Consistency of approach thus requires that like cases should be 
treated alike and different cases should be treated differently.  The corollary of this is that inconsistency 
arises where like cases are treated differently and different cases are treated alike.  
(i) Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 
4.207 The Commission observes that there are a number of ways in which the presumptive sentencing 
regime under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 may run the risk of being inconsistent. 
4.208 First, as discussed in Chapter 2, the presumptive 10-year minimum sentence under the Misuse of 
Drugs Act 1977 was introduced (against the backdrop of an escalating drugs problem) to address the 
perceived leniency of the sentencing courts in drug trafficking cases.  Thus, at the outset at least, the 
primary focus of the presumptive sentencing regime for drug trafficking offences was the outcome of the 
sentencing process rather than the approach to the sentencing process.   
4.209 Second, the Commission considers that using the market value of the controlled drugs as the 
triggering factor for the presumptive sentence, may have implications for consistency in sentencing.  It 
has been noted that the factor which engages a mandatory sentencing regime should be clearly defined 
and unequivocal.
463
  By contrast, it has been observed that: 
“[The market value] was, and remains, an unacceptably casual and unscientific manner of 
establishing the nature and quantity of drugs involved in any given case.  By virtue of their 
illegality and the clandestine manner in which they circulate, prohibited substances cannot be 
valued, except in the crudest terms, like other commodities.  Street value may vary over time 
and, also, from one part of the country to another.  There can be no guarantee that the amount 
of drugs (or any particular kind of drug) that could be bought for £10,000 in 1999 would 
approximate to what can now be bought for €13,000.”
464
 
There is therefore a risk that similarly situated offenders may be treated differently on the basis of an 
unreliable evaluation of the controlled drugs they possessed.  In addition, as the market value threshold 
has not changed since 1999, there is a risk that if the market value of drugs inflates over time, which it is 
likely to do, more and more lower-level offenders will be caught by the provision. 
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4.210 Third, the Commission observes that aside from the unreliability of the “market value” threshold, 
the fact that this threshold creates a “sentencing cliff” (whereby a small difference in facts may lead to a 
significant difference in sentence
465
) arguably requires the adoption of a different sentencing approach in 
respect of similarly situated offenders.  An offender convicted of a section 15A or section 15B offence 
involving drugs worth at least €13,000, may expect to receive a minimum 10-year sentence save where 
there are exceptional and specific circumstances.  However, by contrast, where the drugs at issue were 
worth even marginally less than €13,000, an offender may cite any mitigating factors and potentially 
receive a reduction in sentence on the basis of these factors.  This regime may thus require the courts to 
adopt a different sentencing approach in respect of individuals whose conduct and level of culpability are 
virtually identical.  Indeed, the fact that mens rea regarding the value of the drugs is not an element of the 
offence, arguably compounds the risk that similarly culpable offenders may be treated differently.  
4.211 Fourth, at a broader level, inconsistency may result from the fact that judicial discretion is 
constrained in the sentencing of certain drugs and firearms offences, while the sentencing of most other 
offences, including more serious ones, is largely discretionary.
466
  
4.212 Fifth, the Commission observes that the courts’ power to list a sentence for review creates an 
inconsistent system in so far as it only applies to offenders who have received the minimum sentence. 
4.213 The Commission notes, however, that the presumptive sentencing regime under the Misuse of 
Drugs Act 1977 permits the courts to take some account of distinguishing factors in individual cases, at 
least in so far as they constitute exceptional and specific circumstances.  This goes some way towards 
ensuring that different cases are treated differently.   
(ii) Firearms Acts  
4.214 The Commission observes that similar comments may be made in respect of the presumptive 
sentencing regime under the Firearms Acts.  
4.215 Like the regime under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, the presumptive sentencing regime under 
the Firearms Acts was introduced in response to an apparent increase in firearms offences.  Arguably, 
the decision to address the issue by means of more severe sentencing suggests that, at the outset at 
least, the primary focus of the regime was the outcome of the sentencing process rather than the 
approach to the sentencing process.  The Commission notes, however, that the presumptive sentencing 
regime under the Firearms Acts permits the courts to take some account of distinguishing factors in 
individual cases, at least in so far as they constitute exceptional and specific circumstances.  As noted at 
paragraph 4.213, this goes some way towards ensuring that different cases are treated differently. 
4.216 As discussed at paragraph 4.211, however, it may be considered inconsistent that judicial 
discretion should be constrained in the sentencing of certain drugs and firearms offences, while a largely 
discretionary approach is permitted in the context of other offences of equal or greater gravity. 
(b) The Principle of Proportionality and Presumptive Minimum Sentences  
4.217 The Commission has observed that the principle of proportionality comprises:  (a) constitutional 
proportionality, and (b) proportionality in sentencing. 
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 “where mandatory sentencing is applied only to select offences (as is generally the case), it may 
actually interfere with the hierarchy of sanctions.  It may artificially increase the severity of 
sanctions for some types of conduct while not doing so for conduct of similar blameworthiness that 
is not targeted by the regime.”  
 [Sentencing Matters: Mandatory Sentencing (Sentencing Advisory Council of Victoria, 2008) at 12].  
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(i) Constitutional Proportionality and Presumptive Minimum Sentences  
4.218 As discussed in Chapter 3, the Supreme Court has ruled that the Oireachtas is entitled to 
prescribe a mandatory sentence whenever it considers that a mandatory sentence is an appropriate 
penalty.
467
  It thus follows that the Oireachtas is entitled to prescribe a presumptive minimum sentence 
whenever it considers that such a sentence is an appropriate penalty.   
(ii) Sentencing Proportionality and Presumptive Minimum Sentences  
4.219 The Commission has observed that the principle of proportionality in sentencing requires an 
individualised approach to sentencing whereby the court has regard to the circumstances of both the 
offence and the offender.  
(I) Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 
4.220 The Commission observes that there are a number of ways in which the presumptive sentencing 
regime under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 may give rise to disproportionate sentencing. 
4.221 In the first instance, the Commission observes that the presumptive sentencing regime under the 
Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 is a relatively severe system of sentencing.  It creates a “one-strike rule”
468
 
whereby any offender who is found to have been in possession of controlled drugs worth €13,000 or 
more, may expect to receive a sentence of 10 years to life save where there are exceptional and specific 
circumstances.  By international standards, this prescribed minimum term is very long.
469
  Furthermore, 
the severity of this system is compounded by the fact that the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 limits the 
circumstances in which such an offender may be granted early release. 
4.222 Second, those who are in favour of mandatory sentences typically focus on the most serious 
cases, with little regard to the less serious cases to which the sentences also apply.
470
  By constraining 
the ability of the courts to punish offenders on an individualised basis, these regimes create an increased 
risk of disproportionate sentencing.
471
 
  
In particular, the regime under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 
would appear to entail a danger that low-level offenders may be treated like high-level offenders.  Indeed, 
as they are easier to detect, it has been noted that the majority of those being sentenced under the 
presumptive regime are low-level drug mules rather than high-level drug barons.
472
   
(II) Firearms Acts 
4.223 The Commission observes that similar comments may be made in respect of the presumptive 
sentencing regime under the Firearms Acts.  This regime also imposes a relatively severe “one-strike” 
rule and, to the extent that it constrains judicial discretion, creates a risk of disproportionate sentencing.  
(3) Discussion 
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4.224 In Chapter 1, the Commission noted that drugs and firearms offences have a particularly 
deleterious impact on society.  It is therefore understandable that the Oireachtas should wish to increase 
the severity of the sanctions applicable to these offences through the enactment of presumptive minimum 
sentences.  The Commission further recognised that the provision of presumptive minimum sentences 
may be seen to afford individual members of society, who might otherwise feel victimised and powerless, 
an opportunity to express their condemnation of such offences.   
4.225     The Commission observes, however, that having regard to the aims and principles of 
sentencing outlined in Chapter 1, there is a need to ensure that these provisions achieve their stated 
objectives and that, as a result, they facilitate the reduction of crime (the paramount aim of the criminal 
justice system).  From the analysis undertaken in Part E, it would appear that this is not the case; the 
Commission has identified seven problems which characterise the presumptive minimum sentencing 
regimes applicable to drugs and firearms offences. 
4.226 The first problem relates to the category of offenders that are being prosecuted and sentenced.  
In relation to the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, at least, it would appear that many of those coming before 
the courts are low-level drug mules rather than high-level drug barons. 
4.227 The second problem relates to the aims of sentencing, in particular, the aims of deterrence, 
punishment and rehabilitation.  In this regard, the Commission has observed that the presumptive 
sentencing regimes under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 and the Firearms Acts may not adequately meet 
these aims.   
4.228 The third problem is a related problem.  Where the presumptive sentencing regimes are not 
meeting the aims of sentencing, it is questionable whether they are furthering the overall aim of the 
criminal justice system, namely, to reduce prohibited or unwanted conduct.   
4.229 The fourth problem relates to the principles of justice, namely, the principles of consistency and 
proportionality.  In this regard, the Commission has noted that the presumptive sentencing regimes under 
the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 and the Firearms Acts may give rise to inconsistent and disproportionate 
sentencing. 
4.230 The fifth problem relates to the argument that minimum sentences are not a cost-effective 
response to crime.  Regarding mandatory minimum sentences for drug offences, the Rand Corporation 
has noted that for the same amount of money, a more effective method would be to strengthen 
enforcement under the previous sentencing regime or to increase treatment for heavy drug-users.
473
    
4.231 The sixth problem relates to the argument that there is incongruence between the sentences 
applicable to drugs offences and the sentences applicable to firearms offences.  In this regard, Smith 
observes: 
 “[A]s a sentencing procedure [sentencing section 15A offences] can lead to unfairness for those 
who come before the courts.  Whilst it is accepted that the dangers of drugs and their threat to 
society can never be underestimated, it is unclear why those who are caught with firearms are 
only subject to a presumptive mandatory sentence of five years.  Whereas, those vulnerable 
persons in society who are used as couriers are subject to the presumptive 10 year mandatory 
minimum.  It is accepted that exceptional and specific circumstances tend to guide judges away 
from the 10 years in appropriate circumstances, but nonetheless the figure is constantly present 
in [the] sentencing judge’s mind.”
474
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In a broader sense, it would also appear to be inconsistent that certain drugs and firearms offences 
attract a presumptive minimum sentence, whereas many other offences of equal or greater gravity attract 
neither a presumptive nor mandatory sentencing regime.    
4.232 The final problem relates to the argument that mandatory sentencing regimes are too rigid to 
keep abreast of evolving penal philosophy.  As discussed in the Consultation Paper, the views of 
sentencers regarding matters such as the seriousness of a particular offence and the appropriateness of 
various non-custodial and custodial sanctions may evolve over time.
475
  Mandatory sentencing regimes 
are incapable of keeping pace with these developments.  
4.233 In light of this analysis, the Commission recommends that the existing presumptive sentencing 
regimes applicable to drugs and firearms offences be repealed.  In the Consultation Paper, the 
Commission observed that it had not been established that presumptive minimum sentences for drugs 
and firearms offences had succeeded in reducing criminality.  The Commission affirms this view.  As 
these regimes do not appear to further the sentencing aims of deterrence, retribution and rehabilitation, it 
is unlikely that they further the overarching goal of crime-reduction.   
4.234  In addition to the apparent failure of these regimes to reduce criminality, the Commission notes 
that these provisions have, in practice, produced a number of counter-productive results.  First, having 
expanded upon the analysis contained in the Consultation Paper, the Commission considers that these 
sentencing regimes are not consistent with the fundamental principles of justice discussed in Chapter 1, 
namely, the principles of consistency and proportionality in sentencing.  As discussed in Part E, these 
provisions appear to require an inconsistent approach to sentencing in so far as the courts are 
constrained in their ability to treat like cases alike and different cases differently.  Similarly, in constraining 
the ability of the courts to take account of the individual circumstances of each offender, it would appear 
that these regimes create a risk of disproportionate sentencing.   
4.235 Second, in the context of drug trafficking offences, in particular, it would appear that the 
introduction of presumptive minimum sentences has primarily affected low-level “drug mules” rather than 
the most culpable participants in the illicit drugs industry.  As discussed in Part B, during the public 
consultation and roundtable discussion, practitioners stated that high-level offenders have adapted to this 
sentencing scheme and are largely shielding themselves from prosecution through the use of low-level 
offenders as couriers.  This view is consistent with the Commission’s own review of the case law in this 
area and, in particular, with the observations of the Court of Criminal Appeal in the case of The People 
(DPP) v Byrne (see paragraph 4.193 above). It may have initially been thought that some “drug mules” 
would have been in a position to provide valuable evidence in relation to those criminal actors higher up 
the organisational structure.  However, during the consultation process, practitioners stated that this has 
occurred in very few, if any, instances.  This is because drug mules tend not to be members of the 
criminal organisation and are chosen for that very reason.  Indeed, those closely involved with the 
practical application of this sentencing regime noted that there was a strong incentive for drug mules to 
plead guilty rather than run the risk of becoming witnesses for the prosecution.  This is because the 
legislation provides for the non-application of the presumptive minimum sentence where a person pleads 
guilty.  This further aspect of the regime also explains why the majority of those imprisoned under this 
provision are low-level offenders as opposed to influential high-level participants in the illicit drugs trade.   
4.236 In recommending the repeal of these presumptive sentencing regimes, the Commission proposes 
that the development of a more structured, guidance-based sentencing system (as envisaged in the 
recommendations made in Chapter 1) would provide an appropriate alternative to these provisions.  In 
the context of drug-related crime, in particular, the Commission also considers that law enforcement 
efforts may be beneficially supplemented by other initiatives, such as those highlighted in the research 
conducted by the Health Research Board and the Misuse of Drugs work sector of the British-Irish Council 
(see paragraphs 4.199 and 4.200).   
4.237 Having regard to this conclusion regarding the existing presumptive sentencing regimes for drugs 
and firearms offences, the Commission agrees with the view, provisionally adopted in the Consultation 
Paper, that the introduction of additional presumptive minimum sentences would not be an “appropriate or 
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beneficial” response to other forms of criminality.  The Commission notes (as discussed at paragraphs 
2.168 to 2.174) that presumptive sentencing regimes have been proposed in recent years in Ireland in 
respect of a number of offences, such as assaults against emergency workers and aggravated false 
imprisonment.  However, as discussed above, it has not been established that presumptive minimum 
sentences achieve the relevant sentencing aims of deterrence, retribution and rehabilitation.  As a result, 
these regimes are not likely to facilitate a reduction in criminal conduct.  The Commission therefore 
recommends that the use of presumptive minimum sentences not be extended to other offences under 
Irish law.        
4.238 The Commission recommends that the following be repealed:  (i) the presumptive minimum 
sentencing regime applicable to drugs offences under section 27(3C) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, 
and (ii) the presumptive minimum sentencing regime applicable to firearms offences under section 15 of 
the Firearms Act 1925; section 26, section 27, section 27A and section 27B of the Firearms Act 1964; and 
section 12A of the Firearms and Offensive Weapons Act 1990.  The Commission also recommends that 
the use of presumptive minimum sentencing regimes not be extended to other offences.  
4.239 The Commission also recommends that a more structured, guidance-based sentencing system 
(as envisaged in the recommendations made in Chapter 1) would provide an appropriate alternative to 
these provisions.  In the context of drug-related crime, the Commission also considers that law 
enforcement efforts may be beneficially supplemented by other initiatives, such as those highlighted in 
the research conducted by the Health Research Board and the Misuse of Drugs work sector of the 
British-Irish Council. 
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5  
CHAPTER 5 MANDATORY SENTENCES FOR SECOND OR SUBSEQUENT 
OFFENCES 
A Introduction  
5.01 In the Consultation Paper, the Commission observed that in very select situations, legislation 
provides guidance as to how repeat offenders should be sentenced for second or subsequent offences.
1
  
Section 11(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1984,
2
 for example, provides that any sentence imposed on a 
person for an offence committed while he or she is on bail, must run consecutively to any sentence 
passed on him or her for the prior offence.  Section 13(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1976 also provides that 
any sentence passed on a person for an offence committed while he or she is serving a sentence, must 
run consecutively to the sentence that he or she is serving.      
5.02 In this chapter, the Commission focuses on the imposition of presumptive or mandatory 
sentences for second or subsequent offences.  In Ireland, there are three examples of this type of 
sentencing regime; these are prescribed by:  (i) the Criminal Justice Act 2007; (ii) the Misuse of Drugs Act 
1977; and (iii) the Firearms Acts.  Part B to Part D of this chapter examines the practical operation of 
these sentencing regimes.  Part E considers the approaches adopted by other common law countries in 
respect of the sentencing of repeat offenders.  The Commission concludes in Part F by examining 
presumptive and mandatory sentences for second or subsequent offences against the conceptual 
framework for criminal sanctions and sentencing.   
B Presumptive Sentence for a Second or Subsequent Offence under the Criminal Justice Act 
2007  
5.03 Subject to specified conditions, section 25(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2007 prescribes a 
presumptive minimum sentence for the commission of a second or subsequent serious offence listed 
under Schedule 2 to the Act.  In this Part, the Commission considers the application of this regime by 
examining:  (1) the elements which trigger the presumptive minimum sentence, (2) the relevant penalty 
provisions, and (3) the early release provisions.  
(1)  Elements which Trigger the Presumptive Minimum Sentence 
5.04 In this section, the Commission is not concerned with the particular elements of the offences 
listed in Schedule 2 to the Criminal Justice Act 2007.  These offences are not relevant to the operation of 
this presumptive sentencing regime except in so far as a second or subsequent conviction for any such 
offence will trigger the regime.  In this respect, section 25 of the 2007 Act differs from the presumptive 
penalty provisions under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 and the Firearms Acts. 
(i) Age  
5.05 Section 25(1) provides that the offender must be at least 18 years of age on the dates on which 
he or she is convicted of the first and subsequent scheduled offences.  Presumably, this subsection was 
intended to ensure that the presumptive minimum sentence would not apply to juvenile offenders.
3
  The 
reference to the ‘date of conviction’ means, however, that an offender who commits a scheduled offence 
                                                     
1
  Law Reform Commission Consultation Paper on Mandatory Sentences (LRC CP 66-2011) at paragraph 4.04. 
2
  As amended by section 22 of the Criminal Justice Act 2007.  
3
  Fitzgerald “Californication of Irish Sentencing Law” (2008) ICLJ 42 at 45.   
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while under the age of 18 years, but who attains this age by the date of conviction, may still be subject to 
section 25. 
(ii) Prior Scheduled Offence 
5.06 Section 25(1)(a) states that the offender must have been convicted on indictment of an offence 
listed in Schedule 2 to the 2007 Act.  Section 25(4) provides that the prior offence may be one committed 
before or after the commencement of section 25.  Thus, it appears that the provision may in certain 
circumstances apply retrospectively.
4
 
5.07 The offences included in Schedule 2 may be described as serious offences and are particularly 
likely to be committed by those involved in gangland activities.
5
  This is unsurprising in the sense that the 
2007 Act (as discussed at paragraphs 2.209 and 2.210) was intended to respond to the particular 
problems posed by gangland crime.  Nonetheless, it is not a requirement of this regime that the 
scheduled offences be committed in relation to such activities; rather, the presumptive sentence may 
apply regardless of whether there is any such connection.  The Commission considers that this is in order 
as the scheduled offences are, of themselves, serious enough to merit severe penalties. 
(iii) Five Year Sentence of Imprisonment  
5.08 Section 25(1)(b) states that the offender must have been sentenced to imprisonment for at least 
five years for the prior offence.  This provision was intended to distinguish between more serious and less 
serious incidents of the crimes listed in Schedule 2.  In this respect, the Commission notes that it is also 
the case that “serious”
6
 and “arrestable”
7
 offences are defined by reference to a five-year term of 
imprisonment.  The 2007 Act does stipulate, however, that the presumptive sentencing regime will not 
apply where the sentence for the prior offence has been wholly
8
 or partially
9
 suspended, or where the 
conviction has been quashed on appeal or otherwise.
10
 
(iv) Subsequent Scheduled Offence 
5.09 Section 25(1)(c) provides that the offender must be convicted on indictment of a subsequent 
offence listed in Schedule 2 to the 2007 Act.  It is not a requirement of the sentencing regime that this 
offence be connected with gangland activities or to the prior scheduled offence.  Section 25(4) states, 
however, that the subsequent offence must have been committed after the commencement of section 25.  
                                                     
4
  McIntyre “Criminal Justice Act 2007 (Annotated)” (2007) ICLSA. 
5
  The offences listed in Schedule 2 to the Criminal Justice Act 2007 are: (i) murder; (ii) causing serious harm; 
(iii) threats to kill or cause serious harm; (iv) false imprisonment; (v) causing explosion likely to endanger life or 
damage property; (vi) possession, etc., of explosive substances; (vii) making or possessing explosives in 
suspicious circumstances; (viii) possession of firearm with intent to endanger life; (ix) possession of firearms 
while taking vehicle without authority; (x) use of firearms to assist or aid escape; (xi) possession of firearm or 
ammunition in suspicious circumstances; (xii) carrying firearm with criminal intent; (xiii) shortening barrel of 
shotgun or rifle; (xiv) aggravated burglary; (xv) drug trafficking offence within the meaning of section 3(1) of 
the Criminal Justice Act 1994; (xvi) offence of conspiracy; (xvii) organised crime; (xviii) commission of offence 
for criminal organisation; (xix) blackmail; (xx) extortion; and (xxi) demanding money with menaces.  
6
  Section 1 of the Bail Act 1997 defines a “serious offence” as an “offence specified in the Schedule for which a 
person of full capacity and not previously convicted may be punished by a term of imprisonment for a term of 5 
years or by a more serious penalty.”  
7 
 Section 2 of the Criminal Law Act 1997 defines an “arrestable offence” as “an offence for which a person of full 
capacity and not previously convicted may, under or by virtue of any enactment, be punished by imprisonment 
for a term of five years or by a more severe penalty... .” 
8 
 Section 25(5)(a) of the Criminal Justice Act 2007. 
9 
 Section 25(5)(b) of the Criminal Justice Act 2007. 
10 
 Section 25(6) of the Criminal Justice Act 2007. 
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If the subsequent scheduled offence is murder, or a drugs or firearms offence that attracts a presumptive 
minimum sentence under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 or the Firearms Acts, section 25 will not apply.
11
    
5.10 The fact that section 25 refers to the date on which the offender was convicted of the prior 
offence (as opposed to the date on which the offence was committed) reflects the rationale that the 
offender should be addressed by reference to his or her previous interaction with the law.  If reference 
was made to the date of commission, the offender might not have had an interaction with the law and 
therefore might not be expected to have learned from his or her punishment. 
(v)  Within a Period of 7 Years 
5.11 Section 25(1)(c)(ii) provides that the subsequent offence must be committed within 7 years of the 
date of conviction for the first offence.  This excludes any period of imprisonment in respect of the first or 
subsequent offence.  The period of 7 years thus appears to relate to the time during which the offender 
was at liberty following the date of conviction.  
5.12 Alternatively, section 25(1)(c)(ii) states that the offence may be committed during any period of 
imprisonment in respect of the first or subsequent offence.  It thus appears that, in such circumstances, 
the subsequent offence may be committed during a period exceeding 7 years, depending on the length of 
the term of imprisonment. 
(2) Penalty for Subsequent Scheduled Offence 
5.13 In the above circumstances, section 25(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2007 prescribes a 
presumptive minimum sentence of at least three quarters of the maximum term provided by law for the 
subsequent offence.  If the offence carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, a presumptive 
minimum term of 10 years will apply.  The severity of the presumptive penalty will therefore depend on 
the nature of the subsequent offence. 
5.14 Section 25(3) provides, however, that the minimum sentence need not be applied where the court 
is satisfied that its imposition would be “disproportionate in all the circumstances of the case”.  This 
provision appears to impose a lower threshold than the “exceptional and specific circumstances” proviso 
under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 and the Firearms Acts.  As a result, it has been observed that this 
aspect of the sentencing regime “will probably deprive [it] of much of [its] punitive bite”
12
 and that section 
25 is therefore “essentially discretionary”.
13
 
(3)  Early Release 
5.15 The power to grant early release to those convicted of a second or subsequent scheduled 
offence under section 25 of the Criminal Justice Act 2007 has been restricted.  Section 25(13) states that 
the powers of commutation and remission granted to the Government by section 23 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1951 cannot be exercised in respect of an offender sentenced in accordance with section 25.  
Section 25(13) does provide, however, that a sentence imposed under section 25 will remain subject to 
ordinary remission for good behaviour which currently stands at one-quarter of the sentence.  Section 
25(15) states that the power to grant temporary release
14
 may not be exercised until such time as the 
power to grant commutation or remission has arisen, except “for grave reasons of a humanitarian nature”.  
Where temporary release is granted, it will be for such limited period of time as is justified by those 
reasons.  It should also be noted that section 25 does not permit the court to list a sentence for review. 
                                                     
11
  Section 25(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2007. 
12
  O’Malley “Sentencing Recidivist Sex Offenders: A Challenge for Proportionality” (2008).  Paper delivered at 
Conference on Recent Developments in Criminal Law, Trinity College Dublin, December 2008 and 
subsequently published in Bacik and Heffernan, eds, Criminal Law and Procedure: Current Issues and 
Emerging Trends (Firstlaw, 2009) at 106-132.  
13
  Collins “And Throw Away the Key” (2007) 101(7) Law Society Gazette 36 at 38-39. 
14
  This power is granted by section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1960.   
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C Mandatory Sentence for a Second or Subsequent Offence under the Misuse of Drugs 
 Act 1977 
5.16 Section 27(3F) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, as amended,
15
 states that where an adult 
offender is convicted of a second or subsequent offence under section 15A or section 15B of the 1977 
Act, the court must specify a sentence of not less than the statutory minimum sentence.  In this Part, the 
Commission considers the practical implications of this sentencing regime.  
(1) Operation of the Mandatory Sentencing Regime under section 27(3F) of the Misuse of 
Drugs Act 1977  
5.17 The mandatory minimum sentence prescribed by section 27(3F) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 
applies where a person has been convicted of two or more offences under section 15A, two or more 
offences under section 15B, or two or more offences under section 15A and section 15B.  This regime 
does not require that a sentence of at least the presumptive minimum term have been imposed for the 
initial offence.  It is arguable therefore, that the prior crime could be relatively minor.  Furthermore, this 
regime does not stipulate any particular time frame within which the second offence must be committed.  
Therefore a significant period of time could elapse between the first and second offence. 
5.18 The presumptive minimum sentence must be imposed in the case of a second or subsequent 
section 15A or section 15B offence; no exception is permitted.
16
    
5.19 It appears that subsection (3G) to subsection (3K) (discussed at paragraphs 4.47 and 4.49) 
continue to apply in relation to persons convicted of a second or subsequent offence.  While the power to 
grant early release is therefore restricted, the power to list a sentence for review is maintained.  
D Mandatory Sentence for a Second or Subsequent Offence under the Firearms Acts 
5.20 The Firearms Acts, as amended, require the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence upon 
an adult offender who is convicted of a second or subsequent specified firearms offence.
17
  In this Part, 
the Commission considers the practical operation of this sentencing regime. 
(1) Operation of the Mandatory Sentencing Regime under the Firearms Acts 
5.21 The mandatory minimum sentence prescribed under the Firearms Acts applies where a person is 
convicted on a subsequent occasion of a firearms offence which would, in the case of a first conviction, 
attract a presumptive minimum sentence.  This regime does not require that a sentence of at least the 
presumptive minimum term have been imposed for the prior offence.  The prior offence could be relatively 
minor.  Furthermore, this regime does not stipulate a particular time frame within which the subsequent 
offence must be committed.  Thus, in The People (DPP) v Clail,
18
 the Court of Criminal Appeal observed 
that it was obliged to impose the prescribed minimum sentence in circumstances where the prior firearm 
offence had been committed in 1990. 
5.22 The presumptive minimum sentence must be imposed in the case of a second or subsequent 
firearms offence; no exception is permitted.
19
    
5.23 It appears that section 27C
20
 of the Firearms Act 1964 (discussed at paragraph 4.90) continues to 
apply in relation to persons convicted of second or subsequent offences.  The power to grant early 
release is thus restricted. 
                                                     
15
  Section 27(3F) was substituted by section 33 of the Criminal Justice Act 2007. 
16
  Section 27(3E) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 
17
  Section 15(8) of the Firearms Act 1925; section 26(8) of the Firearms Act 1964; section 27(8) of the Firearms 
Act 1964; section 27A(8) of the Firearms Act 1964; section 27B(8) of the Firearms Act 1964; and section 
12A(13) of the Firearms and Offensive Weapons Act 1990, as inserted by section 42, section 57, section 58, 
section 59, section 60 and section 61 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006.  
18
  The People (DPP) v Clail [2009] IECCA 13. 
19
  Subsection (12) of section 12A of the Firearms and Offensive Weapons Act 1990. 
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E Comparative Analysis 
5.24 In this Part, the Commission considers the use of mandatory (and presumptive) sentences for 
second or subsequent offences in other common law countries. 
(a)    Northern Ireland 
5.25 Although Northern Ireland applies a mandatory sentencing regime in respect of certain firearms 
offences and “serious offences”, it does not apply such a scheme in respect of second or subsequent 
offences. 
(b)    England and Wales 
5.26 In England and Wales, there are three examples of presumptive sentencing regimes applicable 
to repeat offenders.  These sentencing regimes are prescribed for certain repeat drug offences, repeat 
domestic burglaries, and for the purposes of public protection.  
(i) Drugs Offences 
5.27 Section 110 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 prescribes a minimum 
sentence of 7 years’ imprisonment for an offender, aged at least 21 years, who is convicted of a third 
Class A drug trafficking offence, committed when he or she was at least 18 years of age.
21
  Where an 
offender is under the age of 21 years and is convicted of a third class A drug trafficking offence, 
committed when he or she was at least 18 years of age, the court must impose a minimum sentence of 7 
years’ detention in a young offender institution.  For the purposes of this regime, one of the prior drug 
trafficking offences must have been committed by the offender after he or she was convicted of the other.  
5.28 Under section 110(2), a sentence of less than 7 years may only be imposed where there are 
“specific circumstances” relating to the offences or the offender which would make it “unjust in all the 
circumstances” to apply the minimum sentence.  While the 2000 Act does not define what is meant by 
“specific circumstances”, section 110(3) obliges the court, where it finds that such circumstances exist, to 
expressly state what these are. 
5.29 Section 152(3) of the 2000 Act permits the court to impose a sentence of not less than 80 
percent of the minimum term prescribed, where the accused has indicated an intention to plead guilty.
22
  
In determining whether to exercise this option, the court is required to take into account the stage at 
which the accused indicated this intention and the circumstances surrounding that indication.
23
  It has 
been asserted, however, that the court is entitled to take advantage of section 152 whenever an offender 
has pleaded guilty, even in circumstances where the intention to plead guilty was not indicated in 
advance of the trial.
24
  Where the court does rely on section 152 in imposing a sentence lower than the 
prescribed minimum, it must indicate how it arrived at that sentence and what allowance has been made 
for the plea.
25
  
(ii) Domestic Burglary  
5.30 Section 111 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 prescribes a minimum 
sentence of three years’ imprisonment for an offender, aged at least 21 years, who is convicted of a third 
domestic burglary, committed when he or she was at least 18 years of age.  Where an offender under the 
age of 21 years is convicted of a third domestic burglary, committed when he or she was at least 18 years 
of age, the court must impose a minimum sentence of three years’ detention in a young offender 
                                                                                                                                                 
20
  Section 27C was inserted by section 61 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006. 
21
  Class A drugs are defined in Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971.  The term “drug trafficking 
offence” is defined by section 1 of the Drug Trafficking Act 1994. 
22
  See also section 144 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
23
  Section 152(1) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000.  
24
  Current Law Statutes (Sweet and Maxwell, 2000) at 6-105. 
25
  Section 152(2) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000.  
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institution.  For the purposes of this regime, one of the prior burglary offences must have been committed 
by the offender after he or she was convicted of the other.
26
  The obligation to impose the minimum 
sentence will apply unless the court considers that there are particular circumstances relating to the 
offences or the offender which would make it unjust in all the circumstances to impose the minimum 
penalty.
27
  
5.31 Once again, section 152(3) of the 2000 Act permits the court to impose a sentence of not less 
than 80 percent of the minimum term prescribed, where the accused has indicated an intention to plead 
guilty.
28
  In determining whether to exercise this option, the court is required to take into account the stage 
at which the accused indicated this intention and the circumstances surrounding that indication.
29
  As 
previously noted, it has been asserted, however, that a court is entitled to take advantage of section 152 
whenever an offender has pleaded guilty, even though the intention to plead guilty was not indicated in 
advance of the trial.
30
  Where a court does rely on section 152 in imposing a sentence lower than the 
prescribed minimum, it must indicate how it arrived at that sentence and what allowance has been made 
for the plea.
31
  
5.32 As discussed at paragraphs 2.200 and 2.201, the presumptive three-year minimum sentence 
was introduced in response to a perception that the courts were imposing unduly lenient sentences for 
burglary offences.  It is debatable, however, whether the enactment of this sentencing regime has 
addressed this perceived problem.  In 2007, for example, 79 percent of offenders convicted of a third 
domestic burglary did not receive the three-year presumptive minimum sentence.
32
  Wasik notes that 
these statistics: 
“indicat[e] that judges are not held in sway to the criminal record [of a repeat burglary offender], 
despite the section’s emphasis on that aspect of the sentencing decision, and that they look at all 
the circumstances before deciding on the appropriate sentence for the new offence.”
33
     
(iii) Public Protection 
5.33 Section 224A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003
34
 applies a presumptive ‘two-strike’ sentencing 
regime in respect of certain serious offenders.  This regime requires a sentencing court to impose a life 
sentence upon an adult offender who is convicted of an offence listed in Part 1 of Schedule 15B,
35
 where 
both the “sentence condition” and “previous offence condition” (discussed below) are fulfilled.  Section 
244A(2) grants the court discretion not to impose the life sentence where there are particular 
circumstances which relate to the offence, the previous offence, or the offender, which would render the 
application of this penalty unjust in all the circumstances.   
5.34 For the purposes of section 224A, the “sentence condition” requires that the second offence 
must be serious enough to justify the imposition of a sentence of at least 10 years’ imprisonment.
36
  In 
                                                     
26
  Section 111(1) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000.  
27
  Section 111(2) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. 
28
  See also: section 144 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
29
  Section 152(1) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000.  
30
  Current Law Statutes (Sweet and Maxwell, 2000) at 6-105. 
31
  Section 152(2) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000.  
32
  Hope “Four-Fifths of Repeat Burglars do not receive Minimum Jail Term, say Tories” The Telegraph 4 
February 2009. 
33
  Wasik “Dimensions of Criminal History” in Roberts and von Hirsch, eds, Previous Convictions at Sentencing: 
Theoretical and Applied Perspectives (Oxford: Hart, 2010) at 176.  
34
  Inserted by section 122 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012.  
35
  Part 1 of Schedule 15B lists 44 offences, many of which relate to terrorism, the use of firearms, homicide, and 
sexual crimes (particularly against children). 
36
  Section 224A(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
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considering whether this condition is met, the court must contemplate the sentence that it would have 
imposed but for section 224A, disregarding any extension period that it would have applied under section 
226A.
37
  Thomas notes that because the sentencing court must be willing to impose a sentence of at least 
10 years having taken account of all relevant considerations (including the offender’s plea), the ‘sentence 
condition’ sets a “very high threshold”
38
 for the imposition of a life sentence. 
5.35 The “previous offence condition” stipulates that the offender must, at the time when the second 
offence was committed, have a prior conviction for an offence listed in any part of Schedule 15B
39
 and 
have received a “relevant life sentence” or a “relevant sentence of imprisonment” for that prior offence.
40
 
Section 224A(5) clarifies that a “relevant life sentence” is one where the offender was not eligible for 
release during the first five years (not taking into account any period spent on remand or bail).  Any 
extended sentence
41
 or other determinate sentence of imprisonment or detention
42
 will be considered 
relevant where the custodial term was at least 10 years.  Section 224A(9) provides that any reduction in 
sentence for the purpose of taking account of time spent on remand, either in custody or on bail, is to be 
disregarded when considering whether the “previous offence condition” has been met.  Thomas suggests 
that very few offenders are likely to satisfy both the “sentence condition” and the “previous offence 
condition” and that, as a result, “the imposition of a new-style automatic life sentence will be a rare event 
indeed.”
43
  
5.36 The presumptive life sentence prescribed by section 224A has been described as a “most 
peculiar provision”.
44
  Although referred to as a ‘mandatory’ provision by the Government,
45
 it is clear that 
a life sentence need only be imposed under this regime where it would be just in all the circumstances of 
the case.  As the courts will always seek to impose a sentence that is just in the circumstances, the 
purpose of this reform has been called into question.
46
   
                                                     
37
  Subject to certain conditions, section 226A permits the imposition of extended sentences upon certain violent 
or sexual offenders who are aged at least 18 years.   
38
  Thomas “The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012: The Sentencing Provisions” 
(2012) 8 Criminal Law Review 572 at 573.  
39
  In addition to the 44 offences listed in Part 1, Schedule 15B lists under Part 2, the crime of murder and any 
offence that was abolished (with or without savings) prior to the Schedule coming into force and which would, 
if committed on the relevant day, have constituted an offence specified in Part 1 of the Schedule. For the 
purposes of section 224A(4), the ‘relevant day’ is that on which the offender was convicted of the offence 
referred to in section 224A(1)(a).  Part 3 of the Schedule further lists an array of offences under service law, 
while Part 4 includes any offence for which the person was convicted in Scotland, Northern Ireland or a 
member state other than the United Kingdom and which, if committed in England and Wales at the time of 
conviction, would have constituted an offence specified in Part 1 or Part 2 of the Schedule.   
40
  Section 224A(4) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.  
41
  Section 224A(6) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
42
  Section 224A(8) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.  
43
  Thomas “The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012: The Sentencing Provisions” 
(2012) 8 Criminal Law Review 572 at 573.  See also: Picton “The Effect of the Changes in Sentencing of 
Dangerous Offenders Brought About by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 and 
the Mystery of Schedule 15B”  (2013) 5 Criminal Law Review 406 at 408.  
44
  Anthony Lloyd “Two strikes and then a mandatory life sentence? No” The Guardian 19 March 2012.  
45
  See:  Hansard, House of Commons, Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill, 1 November 
2011, Column 788.  
46
  Anthony Lloyd “Two strikes and then a mandatory life sentence? No” The Guardian 19 March 2012. 
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5.37 Subject to certain conditions,
47
 section 226A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003
48
 permits the 
application of an extended sentence to an adult offender
49
 who is convicted of a specified violent 
offence
50
 or a specified sexual offence.
51
  Under this regime, an “extended sentence of imprisonment” is a 
sentence the term of which is equal to the aggregate of:  (a) the appropriate custodial term that would 
(apart from this section) be imposed in compliance with section 153(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, 
and (b) a further period (the “extension period”) for which the offender is to be subject to a licence.
52
  
While this sentencing regime does not prescribe a minimum sentence, section 246A of the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003
53
 provides that an offender sentenced under this regime will not be eligible for release 
on licence until he or she has served at least two-thirds of the custodial term imposed, as opposed to 
one-half of the sentence, as had formerly been the case.
54
   
(c)    Scotland 
5.38 In Scotland, certain repeat drug offences attract a presumptive minimum sentence of 
imprisonment.  
 
                                                     
47
  In order for an extended sentence to be imposed, the following criteria must be fulfilled:  (i) the court must 
consider that there is a significant risk to members of the public of serious harm occasioned by the 
commission by the offender of further specified offences; (ii) the court must not be required by section 224A or 
section 225(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to impose a life sentence for the offence; and (iii) “condition A” 
or “condition B” must be met.  “Condition A” is that, at the time the offence was committed, the offender must 
have been convicted of an offence listed in Schedule 15B to the Act.  “Condition B” is that, if the court were to 
impose an extended sentence of imprisonment, the term that it would specify as the appropriate custodial term 
would be at least four years.   
48
  Inserted by section 124 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012.  
49
  Section 226B of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 provides for a comparable extended detention regime which is 
applicable to offenders under the age of 18 years, who are convicted of a specified violent or sexual offence.   
50
  A “specified violent offence” is defined by section 224 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 as an offence specified 
in Part 1 of Schedule 15 to the Act.  Among the offences listed in that Part are: (i) manslaughter;   (ii) false 
imprisonment; (iii) threats to kill; (v) robbery or assault with intent to rob; and (v) attempted murder or 
conspiracy to commit murder.  Section 226A(10) and Section 226B(8) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 clarify 
that references to a “specified violent offence” include an offence that was abolished before 4 April 2005, and 
which would have constituted such an offence if committed on the day on which the offender was convicted of 
the offence. 
51
  A “specified sexual offence” is defined by section 224 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 as an offence specified 
in Part 2 of Schedule 15 to the Act.  Among the offences listed in that Part are: (i) rape; (ii) intercourse with girl 
under 16; (iii) incest; (iv) indecent assault; and (v) keeping a brothel.  Section 226A(10) and Section 226B(8) 
of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 clarify that references to a “specified sexual offence” include an offence that 
was abolished before 4 April 2005, and which would have constituted such an offence if committed on the day 
on which the offender was convicted of the offence.  
52
  The Act specifies that the extension period must be a period of such length as the court considers necessary 
for the purpose of protecting members of the public from serious harm occasioned by the commission by the 
offender of further specified offences.  However, in the case of a specified violent offence, the extension 
period may not exceed five years, while in the case of a specified sexual offence it may not exceed 8 years.  
Furthermore, the term of an extended sentence of imprisonment must not exceed the term that, at the time the 
offence was committed, was the maximum term permitted for the offence. 
53
  Inserted by section 125 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. 
54
  Thomas “The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012: The Sentencing Provisions” 
(2012) 8 Criminal Law Review 572 at 576; and Picton “The Effect of the Changes in Sentencing of Dangerous 
Offenders Brought About by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 and the 
Mystery of Schedule 15B” (2013) 5 Criminal Law Review 406 at 409.  
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(i)    Drug Offences 
5.39 Section 205B of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995
55
 requires the court to impose a 
minimum sentence of 7 years’ imprisonment on a person, aged at least 21 years, who is convicted of a 
third class A drug trafficking offence, committed when he or she was at least 18 years of age.  Where the 
offender is at least 18 years of age but under the age of 21 years, the court must impose a minimum 7-
year term of detention in a young offender institution.
56
  For the purposes of this regime, the age of the 
offender at the time when he or she committed the two prior drug trafficking offences is irrelevant.
57
  
However, one of the two prior offences must have been committed after the offender was convicted of the 
other.
58
  A sentencing court is obliged to impose the prescribed minimum sentence unless it considers 
that there are specific circumstances relating to any of the offences or the offender which would make the 
application of that penalty unjust.
59
  
(d)    United States of America 
5.40 As discussed in Chapter 2, mandatory sentencing regimes for repeat offenders achieved 
renewed popularity in the United States following the onset of the “three-strikes movement” in the early 
1990s.  At present, it appears that at least 26 American states apply some form of mandatory “strike” law 
in respect of offenders convicted of second or subsequent, specified offences.
60
  It has been observed, 
however, that significant variations exist among these sentencing regimes.  Stemen, Rengifo and Wilson 
note that these laws tend to differ in terms of:  (i) the number of prior convictions required to trigger a 
mandatory sentence; (ii) whether both the prior and present offences must involve violence; (iii) the type 
of prior adjudication required to trigger these regimes (for example, states differ as to whether a prior 
conviction is sufficient or whether the accused must have served a term of imprisonment in respect of that 
conviction); (iv) the time limits placed on when these prior adjudications must have occurred; and (v) the 
sentences available under these laws.
61
  
5.41 In considering the operation of these mandatory sentencing regimes, the Commission will 
necessarily focus on a limited number of examples.  Specifically, attention will be given to the approaches 
adopted in Washington (the state which spearheaded the modern ‘three-strikes’ movement) and 
California and Georgia, the states which have made greatest use of these sentencing regimes.
62
  The 
position adopted by the Federal Government in relation to repeat offender laws will also be considered.  
(i)    Washington 
5.42 The Persistent Offender Accountability Act provides that an offender convicted for the third 
time of a designated felony
63
  must receive a sentence of life imprisonment without parole.
64
  This regime 
                                                     
55
  Inserted by section 2(1) of the Crime and Punishment (Scotland) Act 1997.  
56
  Section 205B(2) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995. 
57
  Section 205B(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995. 
58
  Section 205(B)(1)(c) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995. 
59
  Section 205(B)(3) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995. 
60
  Bazelon “Arguing Three Strikes” New York Times 21 May 2010; and Chemerinsky “Cruel and Unusual: The 
Story of Leandro Andrade” (2003-2004) 52(1) Drake Law Review 1 at 5. 
61
  Stemen, Rengifo and Wilson Of Fragmentation and Ferment: The Impact of State Sentencing Policies on 
Incarceration Rates, 1975-2002 (Vera Institute of Justice, 2005) at 107. 
62
  Schiraldi, Colburn and Lotke, Three Strikes and You’re Out: An Examination of the Impact of 3-Strike Laws 10 
Years after their Enactment (Justice Policy Institute, 2004) at 4. The authors note that as of 2004, California, 
Georgia and Florida were the only states to have imprisoned more than 400 people under their three-strikes 
provisions.  
63
  RCW 9.94A.030 provides, at paragraph (32), that more than 20 felonies - and attempts to commit these 
felonies - may qualify as strike offences.  These include various forms of assault (including assault in the 
second degree and assault of a child in the second degree), homicide offences (including first degree and 
second degree manslaughter and controlled substance homicide), sexual offences (including third degree 
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operates retrospectively in so far as offences committed prior to its enactment may constitute ‘strikes’ on 
the record of the offender where they are comparable to any of the designated offences.
65
  Federal 
convictions from other states may also qualify where they relate to conduct similar to that entailed by a 
designated offence.
66
  The Act stipulates that at least one of the prior convictions must have occurred 
before the commission by the offender of any of the other designated offences.
67
   
5.43 Austin et. al assert that Washington is representative of most other states in that its law 
produced a relatively narrow strike zone and requires three strikes in order for a mandatory life sentence 
to apply.
68
  The Commission notes, however, that Washington does impose a ‘two-strikes’ law upon 
certain repeat sex offenders.  This regime applies to those who are convicted of a specified sexual 
offence,
69
 the commission of which was preceded by at least one conviction (whether in the state or 
elsewhere) for another specified sexual offence or for a federal offence, out-of-state offence, or offence 
under prior Washington law, which is comparable to a specified sexual offence.
70
  Where subject to this 
‘two-strikes’ law, an offender must be sentenced to life in prison without parole.
71
   
5.44 It has been observed that low-level offenders have been most affected by the ‘three-strikes’ 
sentencing regime enacted in Washington.
72
  In particular, commentators have highlighted the fact that 
second degree robbery is the most common ‘third-strike’ offence.
73
  As this offence poses little risk of 
physical injury, some commentators, including the Washington Sentencing Guidelines Commission, have 
recommended that this offence (along with certain forms of second degree assault) be removed from the 
list of designated ‘strike’ offences.
74
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
rape and sexual exploitation), and vehicular offences (including certain forms of vehicular homicide and 
vehicular assault).  
64
  RCW 9.94A.570 specifies that a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of release is the penalty 
applicable to ‘persistent offenders’ (as defined by RCW 9.94A.030, see below). 
65
  RCW 9.94A.030, at paragraph (32), sub-paragraph (u).  
66
  Ibid.  
67
  RCW 9.94A.030, paragraph (37)(a)(ii).   
68
  Austin, Clark, Hardyman and Henry Three Strikes and You’re Out: The Implementation and Impact of Strike 
Laws (National Criminal Justice Reference Service, 2000) at 15.  
69
  RCW 9.94A.030, paragraph (37), sub-paragraph (b)(i) lists the relevant sexual offences as follows: (a) rape in 
the first degree; (b) rape of a child in the first degree;  (c) child molestation in the first degree; (d) rape in the 
second degree; (e) rape of a child in the second degree; and (e) indecent liberties by forcible compulsion.  
Where a finding of sexual motivation is made, the following offences also qualify: (a) murder in the first 
degree; (b) murder in the second degree; (c) homicide by abuse; (d) kidnapping in the first degree; (e) 
kidnapping in the second degree; (f) assault in the first degree; (g) assault in the second degree; (h) assault of 
a child in the first degree; (i) assault of a child in the second degree; (j) burglary in the first degree; and (k) an 
attempt to commit any of the foregoing crimes.   
70
  RCW 9.94A.030, paragraph (37)(b)(i) and paragraph (37)(b)(ii).  
71
  RCW 9.94A.570. 
72
  O’Hagan “Three-strikes life terms fewer than expected” Seattle Times 17 August 2004.  
73
  Ibid; and McCarthy Recent Developments on Washington’s “Three Strikes” Law (Office of Legislative 
Research, 2009). 
74
  McCarthy Recent Developments on Washington’s “Three Strikes” Law (Office of Legislative Research, 2009); 
Shapiro “Life in Prison for Stealing $48?: Rethinking Second-Degree Robbery as a Strike Offense in 
Washington State” (2010-2011) 34(3) Seattle University Law Review 935; and Lee and Colgan Washington's 
Three Strikes Law: Public Safety & Cost Implications of Life Without Parole (Columbia Legal Services, 2011). 
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(ii)    California  
5.45 Section 667
75
 of the Penal Code provides that in sentencing an offender who has one prior 
conviction for a violent felony
76
 or a serious felony,
77
 for any subsequent felony, a court must impose a 
term of imprisonment which is at least twice the term already provided as punishment for the current 
felony.
78
  Such an offender must complete at least 80% of his or her sentence before being eligible for 
release
79
 or 85% of his or her sentence where convicted of a violent felony.
80
 
5.46 In its original form, section 667 also required that an offender with two or more violent and/or 
serious felony convictions, who was subsequently convicted of any felony offence, receive an 
indeterminate life sentence with a minimum term calculated to be the greater of:  (i) three times the term 
otherwise provided for the current felony conviction; (ii) 25 years; or (iii) the term provided for the current 
charge plus any applicable sentence enhancements.
81
  The fact that non-violent and/or non-serious 
felony convictions were sufficient to trigger these enhanced penalties, led to controversial sentencing 
outcomes
82
 and contributed to a widespread perception of the Californian ‘three-strikes’ model as the 
most severe in the United States.
83
   
5.47 On 6 November 2012, California chose to modify this particularly contentious aspect of its 
‘three-strikes’ regime.  By a margin of 68.6 percent to 31.4 percent, voters approved Proposition 36 which 
amended the ‘three-strikes’ law so that, ordinarily, an offender with two or more violent and/or serious 
felony convictions will attract a sentence of twice the term provided as punishment for any subsequent 
felony of which he or she is convicted.
84
  In order to trigger an indeterminate life sentence, an offender 
must now be convicted of a serious and/or violent felony and have two prior convictions for serious and/or 
violent felonies.  Alternatively, any felony conviction may still attract an indeterminate life sentence where 
                                                     
75
  This sentencing regime is also provided for by section 1170.12 of the Penal Code. The latter contains a nearly 
identical version of the ‘strike law’ enacted by the legislature, and was enacted by voters under Proposition 
184 on 8 November 1994.  
76
  For the purposes of this regime, more than 23 “violent felonies” are listed in section 667.5(c) of the Penal 
Code.   
77
  For the purposes of this regime, more than 40 “serious felonies” are listed in section 1192.7(c) of the Penal 
Code.   
78
  Section 667(e)(1) of the Penal Code.   
79
  Section 667(c)(5) of the Penal Code.  
80
  Section 2933.1 of the Penal Code.    
81
  Section 667(e)(2A) of the Penal Code.  
82
  See, for example: Lockyer v Andrade 583 US 63 (2003) in which the United States Supreme Court upheld a 
sentence of 50 years’ imprisonment , imposed for a third strike offence which consisted of the theft of five 
children’s video tapes. For critical commentary, see:  Chemerinsky  “Cruel and Unusual: The Story of Leandro 
Andrade” (2003-2004) 52(1) Drake Law Review 1; Grosskreutz “Strike Three: Even Though California’s Three 
Strikes Law Strikes out Andrade, There are no Winners in this Game” (2003-2004) 43 Washburn Law Journal 
429; and Trevino “Andrade v Attorney General of California: Gross Disproportionality in Sentencing - A 
Standard for Reviewing Eighth Amendment Challenges on Cruel and Unusual Punishments” (2004) 29(1) 
Oklahoma City University Law Review 463.  
83
  See, for example:  Goldin “California Three Strikes Law: A Violation of International Law and a Possible 
Impediment to Extradition” (2009) 15(2) Southwestern Journal of International Law 327 at 330; Samaha 
Criminal Law (Cengage Learning, 2010) at 67; and Mackey and Levan Crime Prevention (Jones and Bartlett 
Publishers, 2011) at 240.  
84
  Sankin “California Prop 36, Measure Reforming State’s Three Strikes law Approved by Wide Majority of 
Voters” 7 November 2012. Available at: www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/07/california-prop-
36_n_2089179.html [Last accessed: 22 May 2013]. 
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the perpetrator has a previous conviction for one of the most serious offences in the criminal calendar, 
such as murder, attempted murder, rape, child molestation or a felony involving the use of a firearm.
85
   
5.48 Under the Californian ‘three-strikes’ regime, probation may not be granted for the current 
offence, nor may execution or imposition of the sentence be suspended for any prior offence.
86
  Diversion 
may not be granted to an offender sentenced under this regime nor will he or she be eligible for 
commitment to the California Rehabilitation Centre.
87
 
5.49 Section 667(f)(2) provides that a prosecuting attorney may move to dismiss an allegation of a 
prior conviction for a strike offence in the furtherance of justice or if there is insufficient evidence to prove 
the prior conviction.  If the court is satisfied that there is insufficient evidence to prove the prior conviction, 
it may dismiss or strike the allegation.  Section 667(g) aims to limit the discretion of system officials by 
prohibiting the use of prior felony convictions in plea bargaining.  
5.50 While the Californian ‘three-strikes’ regime has been eased to some extent by the approval of 
Proposition 36, the greatly enhanced penalties imposed on second-strike and third-strike offenders 
continue to render this law severe.  The California State Auditor has estimated that those imprisoned 
under this regime serve sentences which, on average, are nine years longer due to the requirements of 
the law.
88
  Accordingly, certain commentators identify this sentencing scheme as a key contributor to the 
well-documented problem of overcrowding in Californian prisons.
89
  It is notable that, as of April 2009, 
prisoners serving sentences under this regime comprised approximately 25% of the total inmate 
population in Californian penal institutions.
90
   
5.51 In addition to these ‘three-strikes’ provisions, section 667.7 of the Penal Code imposes a 
mandatory sentencing regime on “habitual offenders”.  Under this regime, a “habitual offender” is defined 
as any person convicted of a felony in which he or she inflicted great bodily injury on another person, or 
personally used force which was likely to inflict great bodily injury, and who has previously served two or 
more prison terms for a specified offence.
91
  A habitual offender who has served two prior prison terms 
will receive a life sentence for the current offence and, at a minimum, will not be eligible for parole until 20 
years have been served.  A habitual offender who has served three or more prior prison terms will receive 
a sentence of life imprisonment without parole.    
5.52 Section 667.71 of the Penal Code establishes a mandatory sentencing regime for habitual 
sexual offenders.  A habitual sexual offender is defined as a person who has previously been convicted of 
                                                     
85
  Section 667(e)(C) of the Penal Code.  
86
  Section 667(c) of the Penal Code. 
87
  Section 667(c) of the Penal Code.  
88
  California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation: Inmates Sentenced under the Three Strikes Law and 
a Small Number of Inmates Receiving Specialty Health Care Represent Significant Costs (California State 
Auditor, 2010) at 27. 
89
  See, for example: Grosskreutz “Strike Three: Even Though California’s Three Strikes Law Strikes out 
Andrade, There are no Winners in this Game” (2003-2004) 43 Washburn Law Journal 429 at 454-455; and 
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation: Inmates Sentenced under the Three Strikes Law and 
a Small Number of Inmates Receiving Specialty Health Care Represent Significant Costs (California State 
Auditor, 2010) at 30. 
90
  California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation: Inmates Sentenced under the Three Strikes Law and 
a Small Number of Inmates Receiving Specialty Health Care Represent Significant Costs (California State 
Auditor, 2010) at 21.  
91
  Section 667.7(a) lists at least 20 offences which may trigger this regime.  These include: various homicide 
offences (including murder and manslaughter); sexual offences (including various forms of rape); assault 
offences (including assault with intent to commit murder and assault with a deadly weapon); and violent 
property offences (including robbery involving the use of force or a deadly weapon and carjacking involving 
the use of a deadly weapon).  
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one or more specified sexual offences
92
 and who is convicted in the current proceedings of another such 
offence.  Under this regime, a habitual sexual offender must be punished by imprisonment in the state 
prison for a term of 25 years to life.  
5.53 It has been observed that in the majority of cases, the sentencing regime applicable to habitual 
offenders has been supplanted by the state’s “three-strikes” law.
93
  
(iii)     Georgia   
5.54 Section 17-10-7(a) of the Penal Code prescribes a mandatory sentence for an offender 
convicted of a felony offence, who has previously been convicted of a felony offence in the state or an 
offence in another American state, which, if committed in Georgia, would be a felony.  Under this regime, 
such an offender must be sentenced to the maximum term prescribed for the current offence provided 
that, unless otherwise provided by law, the trial judge may in his or her discretion probate or suspend the 
maximum sentence prescribed for the offence.  
5.55 Section 17-10-7(c) prescribes a mandatory sentence in respect of an offender who is convicted 
of a fourth or subsequent felony, having previously been convicted in Georgia of three felonies, or having 
been convicted under the laws of another American state of three offences which would be felonies if 
committed in Georgia.  This sentencing regime provides that such an offender must be sentenced to the 
maximum term provided for the current offence, and will not be eligible for parole until this maximum 
sentence has been served.  
5.56 Distinct from this general class of felonies are 7 offences which have been designated “serious 
violent felonies” by the Georgia legislature.  The offences of murder; armed robbery; kidnapping; rape; 
aggravated child molestation; aggravated sodomy; and aggravated sexual battery attract a “two-strike” 
sentencing arrangement.  Under section 17-10-7(b)(2) of the Penal Code, an offender convicted of a 
serious violent felony (for which he or she is not sentenced to death) who has previously been convicted 
of a serious violent felony in the state, or who has been convicted in another American state of an offence 
which would be a serious violent felony if committed in Georgia, must receive a sentence of life 
imprisonment without parole.  This sentence may not be suspended, stayed, probated, deferred, or 
withheld.  Such an offender will not be eligible for any form of pardon, parole or early release 
administered by the State Board of Pardons and Paroles, or any sentence-reducing measure under a 
program administered by the Department of Corrections, except as may be authorized by any existing or 
future constitutional provisions. 
5.57 Heyer observes that in terms of the number of offences required to trigger a life sentence 
without parole, “Georgia’s two strikes law is the harshest version of a three strikes law to emerge out of 
the 1990s... .”
94
  The same commentator emphasises, however, that because this regime covers a narrow 
range of offences, and because these serious, violent offences would attract a lengthy sentence 
irrespective of the two-strikes law, this regime has not significantly impacted on Georgia’s overall prison 
population.
95
  
 
                                                     
92
  The following offences are listed under section 667.71: “(a) rape… ; (b) spousal rape… ; (c) rape, spousal 
rape, or sexual penetration, in concert, in violation of section 264.1;  (4) Lewd or lascivious act… ; (5) sexual 
penetration, in violation of subdivision (a) or (j) of Section 289; (6) continuous sexual abuse of a child… (7) 
sodomy… (8) oral copulation, in violation of subdivision (c) or (d) of Section 288a; (9) kidnapping, in violation 
of subdivision (b) of section 207; (10) kidnapping… to commit specified sex offenses… ; (11) kidnapping…  
with the intent to commit a specified sexual offense ; (12) aggravated sexual assault of a child… ; and (13) an 
offense committed in another jurisdiction that includes all of the elements of an offense specified in this 
subdivision.” 
93
  See:  Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Opinion No. 99-322 (22 December 1999) at 2-3.  
94
  Heyer “Comparing the Strike Zones of “Three Strikes and You’re Out” Laws for   California and Georgia, the 
Nation’s Two Heaviest Hitters” (2012) 45 Suffolk University Law Review 1217 at 1237. 
95
  Ibid at 1238.  
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 (iv)    Federal Government 
5.58 At federal level, 18 USC 3559(c) prescribes a mandatory life sentence in respect of an offender 
convicted of a serious violent felony
96
 who has at least two prior state or federal serious violent felony 
convictions, or who has one or more of these convictions plus one or more state or federal serious drug 
convictions.
97
  Other than the first such offence, each serious violent felony or serious drugs offence must 
have been committed after the conviction of the offender of the preceding serious violent felony or serious 
drugs offence.  
5.59 Section 3559(e) also requires that a person convicted of a federal sex offence
98
 in which a 
minor is the victim (who is not sentenced to death for that offence) be sentenced to life imprisonment if he 
or she has a prior federal or state conviction for a sex offence in which a minor was the victim.  In this 
context, a “prior conviction” means a conviction for which the sentence was imposed before the conduct 
constituting the subsequent federal sex offence occurred.   
(e)    Canada  
5.60 In Canada, certain repeat firearms offences attract a mandatory minimum sentence of 
imprisonment.  
(i)    Firearms Offences 
5.61 Under the Criminal Code, an offender will attract an enhanced minimum sentence where:  (a) 
he or she has a prior conviction for a specified firearms offence, or for using a firearm in the commission 
of a specified violent offence, and (b) he or she is subsequently convicted of another such offence.
99 
 
5.62 First, where this constitutes his or her second conviction for a specified offence, an offender 
convicted of one of the following firearms offences will attract a minimum one-year sentence:  (i) 
                                                     
96
  A “serious violent felony” means: (i) a Federal or State offence, by whatever designation and wherever 
committed, consisting of murder...; manslaughter other than involuntary manslaughter...; assault with intent to 
commit murder...; assault with intent to commit rape; aggravated sexual abuse and sexual abuse...; abusive 
sexual contact...; kidnapping; aircraft piracy...; robbery [subject to subsection 3559(c)(3)(A)]...; carjacking...; 
extortion; arson [subsection 3559(c)(3)(B)]; firearms use; firearms possession...; or attempt, conspiracy, or 
solicitation to commit any of the above offenses; and (ii) [subject to subsection 3559(c)(3)(A)] any other 
offense punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years or more that has as an element the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another or that, by its nature, involves 
a substantial risk that physical force against the person of another may be used in the course of committing 
the offense.  
97
   A “serious drug offence” means: (i) an offense that is punishable under section 401(b)(1)(A) or 408 of the 
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 841 (b)(1)(A), 848) or section 1010(b)(1)(A) of the Controlled 
Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 960 (b)(1)(A)); or (ii) an offense under State law that, had the 
offense been prosecuted in a court of the United States, would have been punishable under section 
401(b)(1)(A) or 408 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 841 (b)(1)(A), 848) or section 1010(b)(1)(A) 
of the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 960 (b)(1)(A)).  
98
  The term “Federal sex offence” means an offense under section 1591 (relating to sex trafficking of children); 
section 2241 (relating to aggravated sexual abuse); section 2242 (relating to sexual abuse); section 
2244(a)(1) (relating to abusive sexual contact); section 2245 (relating to sexual abuse resulting in death); 
section 2251 (relating to sexual exploitation of children); section 2251A (relating to selling or buying of 
children); section 2422(b) (relating to coercion and enticement of a minor into prostitution) [subject to section 
3559(e)(3)]; or section 2423(a) (relating to transportation of minors) [subject to section 3559(e)(3)].  
99
  A conviction for any of the offences listed above in paragraphs 5.62 to 5.64 will be recognised as a ‘previous 
conviction’ where an offender is being sentenced for an offence listed in paragraphs 5.62 - 5.63.  However, 
where an offender is being sentenced for using a firearm in the commission of one of the violent offences 
listed in the paragraph 5.64, only a prior conviction for using a firearm in the commission of such an offence 
will constitute a ‘previous conviction.’  
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possession of a firearm knowing its possession is unauthorised,
100
 and (ii) possession of a prohibited 
weapon, device or ammunition knowing its possession is unauthorised.
101
  Alternatively, where this 
constitutes his or her third or subsequent conviction for a specified offence, a conviction for either of these 
possession offences will attract a minimum sentence of two years less a day.  
5.63 Second, where this constitutes his or her second or subsequent conviction for a specified 
offence, an offender convicted of one of the following offences will attract a minimum sentence of three 
years:  (i) using a firearm in the commission of an offence,
102
 and (ii) using an imitation firearm in the 
commission of an offence.
103
  Third, where this constitutes his or her second or subsequent conviction for 
a specified offence, an offender convicted of one of the following offences will attract a minimum sentence 
of five years:  (i) possession of a prohibited or restricted firearm with ammunition;
104
 (ii) weapons 
trafficking;
105
 (iii) possession of a firearm, a prohibited device, any ammunition or any prohibited 
ammunition for the purpose of weapons trafficking;
106
 and (iv) importing or exporting a firearm, a 
prohibited device or any prohibited ammunition, knowing it is unauthorized.
107
  
5.64 Finally, an offender who uses a firearm in the commission of certain violent offences will attract 
a minimum sentence of 7 years where:  (a) this is his or her second or subsequent conviction for using a 
firearm in one of these violent offences, and (b) prescribed circumstances exist.  Specifically, this 
provision will apply where the firearm used is restricted or prohibited or where any firearm is used in 
connection with a criminal organisation.
108
  Where a firearm is thus used in their commission, the 
following offences attract the prescribed minimum 7-year sentence:  (i) attempted murder;
109
 (ii) 
discharging a firearm with intent;
110
 (iii) recklessly discharging a firearm;
111
 (iv) sexual assault with a 
weapon (threats to a third party or causing bodily harm);
112
 (v) aggravated sexual assault;
113
 (vi) 
kidnapping;
114
 (vii) hostage-taking;
115
 (viii) robbery;
116
 and (ix) extortion.
117
   
 
                                                     
100
  Section 92(1) of the Criminal Code. 
101
  Section 92(2) of the Criminal Code.  
102
  Section 85(1) of the Criminal Code.  
103
  Section 85(2) of the Criminal Code.  
104
  Section 95(1) of the Criminal Code.  
105
  Section 99(1) of the Criminal Code.  
106
  Section 100(1) of the Criminal Code.  
107
  Section 103(2) of the Criminal Code.  
108
  Raaflaub Legislative Summary LS-525E: Bill C-10: An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Minimum Penalties 
for Offences involving Firearms) and to Make a Consequential Amendment to another Act (Parliamentary 
Information and Research Service, 2007) at 10.  Available at: 
www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/LegislativeSummaries/39/1/c10-e.pdf [Last accessed: 22 May 2013]. 
109
  Section 239 of the Penal Code.  
110
  Section 244 of the Penal Code.  
111
  Section 244.2 of the Penal Code. 
112
  Section 272 of the Penal Code. 
113
  Section 273 of the Penal Code.  
114
  Section 279 of the Penal Code. 
115
  Section 279.1 of the Penal Code.  
116
  Section 344 of the Penal Code. 
117
  Section 346 of the Penal Code.  
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(f)    Australia  
5.65 Certain Australian jurisdictions prescribe mandatory or presumptive sentences for specified 
repeat offences.  The Commission observes, however, that these jurisdictions tend to differ in terms of 
the offences to which these sentencing regimes are applied.    
 (i)    Commonwealth  
(I)    People Smuggling 
5.66 At federal level, section 236B of the Migration Act 1958 prescribes a mandatory minimum 
sentence for a repeat offence of aggravated people smuggling, and a repeat offence involving the 
aggravated use of false documents or misleading information in relation to non-citizens.  For the purposes 
of this regime, a conviction qualifies as a “repeat offence” if, in proceedings after the commencement of 
section 236B (whether in the same proceedings relating to the offence or in previous proceedings), a 
court:  (i) has convicted the person of another of the foregoing offences, or (ii) has found, without 
recording a conviction, that the person has committed another such offence.  Section 236B specifies that 
an offender to whom this regime applies must receive a minimum sentence of 8 years.  The court must 
also set a non-parole period of five years.  This regime will not apply, however, where it is established on 
the balance of probabilities that the offender was under the age of 18 years when the offence was 
committed.  
 (ii)    New South Wales  
5.67 New South Wales does not impose a mandatory sentencing regime in respect of repeat 
offenders.  The state does, however, grant sentencing courts the discretion to declare an offender to be a 
“habitual criminal”, in which case a minimum penalty will apply.  
5.68 Section 4(1) of the Habitual Criminals Act 1957 provides that a sentencing judge may 
pronounce any person, aged at least 25 years, to be an “habitual criminal” where he or she is convicted 
on indictment,
118
 having, on at least two prior occasions, served separate terms of imprisonment as a 
consequence of convictions for indictable offences.
119
  In these circumstances, a further sentence may 
then be imposed on the offender in addition to that applicable for the current offence.  This additional term 
of imprisonment must be for a period of at least five years and may not exceed 14 years.  The judge may 
pronounce an offender to be a “habitual criminal” if satisfied that it is expedient with a view to his or her 
reformation, or to the prevention of crime, that he or she be detained in prison for a substantial period.  
5.69 The Judicial Commission of New South Wales notes that sentencing courts very rarely 
pronounce offenders to be “habitual criminals” under the 1957 Act.
120
   
 
 
                                                     
118
  Section 4(2) clarifies that this regime may also apply in respect of an offender convicted summarily of an 
indictable offence punishable summarily only with his or her consent (provided that the other necessary 
criteria are fulfilled).  Where such an offender is convicted summarily before a Magistrate, the Magistrate may 
- in addition to passing sentence for the instant crime - direct that an application be made by a registrar of the 
District Court to a judge to have the offender pronounced to be an habitual offender.  
119
  Section 4(3) of the Habitual Criminals Act 1957 clarifies that this sentencing regime may apply regardless of 
whether the previous convictions or terms of imprisonment took place in New South Wales and regardless of 
whether they occurred before or after the commencement of the Act.  The regime may also apply irrespective 
of whether any previous term of imprisonment was served as a consequence of a conviction for an indictable 
offence committed before or after any previous pronouncement of the individual as a habitual offender under 
this Act, or the Habitual Criminals Act 1905–1952.  For the purposes of this regime, “indictable offences” will 
not, however, include indictable offences that were dealt with summarily without the consent of the offender.    
120
  Judicial Commission of New South Wales Sentencing Bench Book at paragraph 2-250.  Available at: 
www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/benchbks/sentencing/purposes_of_sentencing.html#content  [Last 
accessed:  22 May 2013].  
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(iii)     Northern Territory 
5.70 The Northern Territory provides a presumptive sentencing regime in respect of certain repeat 
violent offences, as well as repeat violations of a domestic violence order.  
(I) Second or Subsequent Violent Offences  
5.71 Under the Sentencing Act, enhanced presumptive sentences apply in respect of second or 
subsequent violent offences.  First, where an offender who has previously been convicted of a violent 
offence
121
 is subsequently convicted of a crime classified as a “Level 5”
122
 offence, he or she must receive 
a minimum one-year term of imprisonment.
123
  Second, an offender convicted of a “Level 3”
124
 offence, 
who has previously been convicted of a violent offence, must receive a minimum three-month 
sentence.
125
  An offender convicted of a “Level 1”
126
 offence, who has previously been convicted of a 
violent offence, must receive a custodial sentence.
127
  A sentencing court may not suspend a term of 
imprisonment imposed in accordance with these provisions.
128
 
5.72 The obligation to impose a minimum penalty of a specified period will not apply where the court is 
satisfied that the circumstances of the case are exceptional.
129
  In determining whether the circumstances 
are exceptional, the court may have regard, in particular, to any victim impact statement or victim report 
presented to the court, and any other matters which it considers relevant.
130
  The following circumstances 
may not be regarded as exceptional circumstances:  (a) that the offender was voluntarily intoxicated at 
the time of committing the offence, or (b) that another person was involved in committing the offence, or 
                                                     
121
  A “violent offence” is defined by subdivision 1 of Division 6A of the Sentencing Act (as replaced by section 6 of 
the Sentencing Amendment (Mandatory Minimum Sentences) Act 2013) as: (a) an offence against a provision 
of the Criminal Code listed in Schedule 2; or (b) an offence which substantially corresponds to such an offence 
under (i) a law that has been repealed; or (ii) a law of another jurisdiction (including a jurisdiction outside 
Australia).  The offences listed in Schedule 2 include terrorism, manslaughter, attempted murder, common 
assault, unlawful stalking and robbery.         
122
  A “Level 5” offence is defined as including the following offences under the Criminal Code: (a) causing serious 
harm under section 181; or (b) causing harm under section 186; common assault under section 188 (if the 
offence is committed in circumstances mentioned in section 188(2), other than paragraph (k)), assault on a 
worker under 188A; assault on police officer under section 189A; assault on administrator or judge or 
magistrate under section 190; assault on member of aircraft crew under section 191; assault with intent to 
commit an offence under section 193; or assault with intent to steal under section 212, if (i) commission of the 
offence involves the actual or threatened use of an offensive weapon; and (ii) the victim suffers physical harm 
as a result of the offence.   
123
  Section 78DA of the Sentencing Act, inserted by section 6 of the Sentencing Amendment (Mandatory 
Minimum Sentences) Act 2013.  
124
  A “Level 3” offence is defined as an offence against section 188 of the Criminal Code [common assault] if the 
offence: (a) is committed in circumstances mentioned in section 188(2), other than paragraph (k); and (b) the 
offence is not a “Level 5” offence. 
125
  Section 78DD of the Sentencing Act, inserted by section 6 of the Sentencing Amendment (Mandatory 
Minimum Sentences) Act 2013. 
126
  A “Level 1” offence is defined as “any other violent offence” which does not fall within the scope of the 
definitions provided for “Level 5”, “Level 4”, “Level 3” and “Level 2” offences.  
127
  Section 78DF of the Sentencing Act, inserted by section 6 of the Sentencing Amendment (Mandatory 
Minimum Sentences) Act 2013. 
128
  See: section 78DG(c) and section 78DH(c) of the Sentencing Act, inserted by section 6 of the Sentencing 
Amendment (Mandatory Minimum Sentences) Act 2013. 
129
  Section 78DI of the Sentencing Act, inserted by section 6 of the Sentencing Amendment (Mandatory Minimum 
Sentences) Act 2013. 
130
  Ibid. 
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coerced the offender to commit the offence.
131
  Equally, where the offender is under the age of 18 years, 
the court will not be required to impose a prescribed minimum sentence of a specified period in respect of 
him or her.
132  
Where exceptional circumstances are present or where the offender is under the age of 18 
years, the court is nonetheless required to specify a custodial sentence and this may not be 
suspended.
133
   
(II) Repeat Violations of Domestic Violence Order 
5.73 Section 121 of the Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007  prescribes a presumptive minimum 
sentence of 7 days’ imprisonment for a second or subsequent violation of a domestic violence order by an 
adult.  This minimum penalty does not apply, however, if no harm was caused and if the court is satisfied 
that it is not appropriate to record a conviction and to sentence the person in the circumstances of the 
offence.
134
  Section 122 applies the same presumptive minimum penalty to an offender aged between 15 
and 18 years who breaches a domestic violence order, having previously been convicted of this offence.  
Once again, the presumptive minimum sentence does not apply if no harm was caused and if the court is 
satisfied that it is not appropriate to record a conviction and to sentence the person in the circumstances 
of the offence, including, as a result of the age of the offender. 
(iv) Queensland 
(I) Serious Child Sex Offences 
5.74 Part 9B of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992
135
 prescribes a mandatory sentence for an 
offender convicted of a repeat serious child sex offence.  A “serious child sex offence” is an offence listed 
in Schedule 1A to the Act,
136
 committed against a child under the age of 16 years, and in circumstances 
in which an offender convicted of the offence would be liable to life imprisonment.  Counselling or 
procuring the commission of such an offence also qualifies as a serious child sex offence.
137
  
5.75 This sentencing regime applies where an offender with a prior conviction for a serious child sex 
offence is convicted of a subsequent serious child sex offence.
138
  The offender must have committed 
both the prior and subsequent offences when he or she was an adult.
139
  Such an offender, despite any 
other penalty imposed by the Criminal Code, is liable to a life sentence which cannot be mitigated or 
varied under any law, or is liable to an indefinite sentence which shall continue until a court orders, upon 
                                                     
131
  Ibid. 
132
  See: section 78DH(2) of the Sentencing Act, inserted by section 6 of the Sentencing Amendment (Mandatory 
Minimum Sentences) Act 2013. 
133
  See: section 78DI(2)(b) and section 78DH(2)(b) of the Sentencing Act, inserted by section 6 of the Sentencing 
Amendment (Mandatory Minimum Sentences) Act 2013. 
134
  Section 121(3) of the Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007. This provision came into force on 1 July 2008.  
Under previous legislation there was no proviso regarding the non-application of the presumptive minimum 
sentence. 
135
  Inserted by Part 3 of the Criminal Law (Two Strike Child Sex Offenders) Amendment Act 2012. 
136
  The offences listed in Schedule 1A are: (i) unlawful sodomy; (ii) owner etc. permitting abuse of children on 
premises; (iii) carnal knowledge with or of children under 16; (iv) taking child for immoral purposes; (v) incest; 
(vi) maintaining a sexual relationship with a child; (vii) rape; (viii) sexual assaults; (ix) unlawful anal 
intercourse; (x) incest by man; and (xi) carnal knowledge of girls under 16.   
137
  Section 161D of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992, inserted by Part 9B of the Criminal Law (Two Strike 
Child Sex Offenders) Amendment Act 2012. 
138
  Section 161E of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992, inserted by Part 9B of the Criminal Law (Two Strike 
Child Sex Offenders) Amendment Act 2012. 
139
  Section 161E(1)(a) of the Penalties and Sentence Act 1992, inserted by Part 9B of the Criminal Law (Two 
Strike Child Sex Offenders) Amendment Act 2012. 
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review, that the indefinite term of imprisonment be discharged.
140
  Where an offender is sentenced to life 
imprisonment under this regime, section 181A of the Corrective Services Act 2006 provides that he or she 
must serve a minimum non-parole period of 20 years.  
5.76 The Commission notes that this sentencing regime was introduced in response to a high level of 
public concern regarding the adequacy of sentences imposed upon those who sexually offend against 
children.
141  
In a letter to the Parliamentary Legal Affairs and Community Safety Committee, the 
Queensland Department of Justice emphasised that previous efforts to reflect this outrage and to 
appropriately denounce repeat child sex offenders were perceived to have failed.  In particular, a 2012 
report by the Sentencing Advisory Council illustrated that legislative amendments made in 2003 and 2010 
had not produced the desired effect of increasing:  (i) the proportion of offenders receiving a custodial 
term for sexual offences against children, or (ii) the length of the sentences received by these 
offenders.
142
   
5.77 The provision of mandatory sentences for serious child sex offences has attracted divergent 
views.  On one side, certain child protection advocates have welcomed this legislation on the basis that it 
may serve to incapacitate incorrigible offenders.
143
  On the other side, however, there are those who 
dispute the claim that this regime will enhance child safety.  Among those to express concern regarding 
this reform were the Queensland Police Service who warned that:  (i) because the same mandatory 
sentence would apply in respect of both murder and repeat child sex offences, offenders may be 
incentivised to kill their victims in order to evade punishment; (ii) the regime may prompt a reduction in the 
reporting of child sex offences, particularly in cases where the witness makes a complaint with a view to 
stopping the abuse rather than with the aim of ensuring that the offender is punished; and (iii) the regime 
may lead to more matters being contested in court, thereby worsening the impact on victims.
144
  Other 
criticisms which have been made of this legislation relate to:  (i) the constraints which mandatory 
sentencing regimes place on judicial discretion; (ii) the lack of persuasive evidence that these regimes 
deter criminality; and (iii) the tendency for these sentencing provisions to impact disproportionately on 
minority groups.
145
 
(v)    South Australia  
5.78 South Australia does not appear to impose a mandatory sentencing regime for any repeat 
offence.  In certain circumstances, however, the state does grant sentencing courts the discretion to 
impose a sentence on a repeat offender, which is not proportionate to the current offence for which he or 
she is being sentenced.   
                                                     
140
  Section 161E(2) of the Penalties and Sentence Act 1992, inserted by Part 9B of the Criminal Law (Two Strike 
Child Sex Offenders) Amendment Act 2012. 
141
  See:  Legal Affairs and Community Safety Committee Criminal Law (Two Strike Child Sex Offenders) 
Amendment Bill 2012 Report No 2 (July 2012) at 4.  Available at: 
www.parliament.qld.gov.au/documents/committees/LACSC/2012/CriminalLawChildSexOffenders/rpt2-
July2012.pdf [Last accessed:  22 May 2013]. 
142
  Ibid. 
143
  Ibid at 25-26.  Available at:  
www.parliament.qld.gov.au/documents/committees/LACSC/2012/CriminalLawChildSexOffenders/rpt2-
July2012.pdf [Last accessed:  22 May 2013]. 
144
  Queensland Police Service Submission on the Criminal Law (Two Strikes Child Sex Offenders) Amendment 
Bill 2012 (28 June 2012). Available at: 
www.parliament.qld.gov.au/documents/committees/LACSC/2012/CriminalLawChildSexOffenders/submissions
/016-QPS.pdf [Last accessed:  22 May 2013]. 
145
  See:  Legal Affairs and Community Safety Committee Criminal Law (Two Strike Child Sex Offenders) 
Amendment Bill 2012 Report No 2 (July 2012) at 40-42.  Available at: 
www.parliament.qld.gov.au/documents/committees/LACSC/2012/CriminalLawChildSexOffenders/rpt2-
July2012.pdf [Last accessed:  22 May 2013].   
204 
5.79 Division 2A of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 permits sentencing courts to declare an 
offender to be a “serious repeat offender”
146
 where he or she (whether as an adult or as a youth) has 
been convicted of a “serious offence”
147
 on at least three separate occasions.  The offender must have 
received a sentence of imprisonment (other than a suspended sentence) for those offences or, if a 
penalty has yet to be imposed, a sentence of imprisonment (other than a suspended sentence) must be 
the appropriate penalty.  Alternatively, this declaration may be made in respect of an offender who  
(whether as an adult or as a youth) has committed and been convicted on at least two separate 
occasions of a “serious sexual offence”
148
 against a person under the age of 14 years.  An offence will not 
be regarded as a “serious offence” or a “serious sexual offence” unless the maximum penalty prescribed 
is, or includes, a term of imprisonment of at least five years.  
5.80 If a person is convicted of a serious offence or a serious sexual offence and he or she is liable, or 
becomes liable as a result of the conviction, to a declaration that he or she is a “serious repeat offender”, 
the court:  (a) must consider whether to make that declaration, and (b) if of the opinion that his or her 
history of offending warrants a particularly severe sentence in order to protect the community, should 
make that declaration.  Where the declaration is made or where the offender has previously been 
declared a “serious repeat offender”:  (a) the court is not bound to ensure that the sentence it imposes is 
proportionate to the current offence, and (b) any non-parole period fixed in relation to the sentence must 
be at least four-fifths the length of the sentence.  
(iv) Tasmania 
5.81    Tasmania does not appear to prescribe a mandatory sentence for any repeat offence.  
(v)    Victoria 
5.82 Victoria does not appear to prescribe a mandatory or presumptive sentencing regime for any 
second or subsequent offence.  Part 2A of the Sentencing Act 1991 does, however, permit a sentencing 
court to impose a sentence on an offender who has previously been convicted of two or more sexual 
offences (for which he or she received a sentence of imprisonment or detention in a youth justice centre) 
which is not proportionate to the immediate offence.  The Act specifies that when sentencing such an 
offender, the court must regard the protection of the community as the principal purpose for which the 
sentence is imposed.
149
  
 
 
                                                     
146
  Division 2A also establishes a parallel sentencing regime whereby a youth may be declared to be a “recidivist 
young offender.”  
147
  Section 20A of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 defines a “serious offence” as: (a) a serious drugs 
offence; (ab) an offence against a law of the Commonwealth dealing with the unlawful importation of drugs 
into Australia; (b) one of the following offences: (i) an offence under Part 3 of the Criminal Law Consolidation 
Act 1935; (ii) robbery or aggravated robbery; (iii) home invasion; (iv) damage to property by fire or explosives; 
(v) causing a bushfire; (vi) an offence against a corresponding previous enactment substantially similar to any 
of the foregoing offences; (v) a conspiracy or attempt to commit any of the foregoing offences; (c) an offence 
that is committed in circumstances in which the offender uses violence or a threat of violence for the purpose 
of committing the offence, in the course of committing the offence, or for the purpose of escaping from the 
scene of the offence; or (d) an offence against the law of another State or a Territory that would, if committed 
in this State, be a serious offence.  
148
  Section 20A of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 defines a “serious sexual offence” as any of the 
following serious offences: (i) an offence against section 48, 48A, 49, 50, 56, 58, 59, 60, 63, 63B, 66, 67, 68 or 
72 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935; (ia) an offence against a corresponding previous enactment 
substantially similar to any of the aforementioned offences; (ii) an attempt to commit or an assault with intent 
to commit any of those offences; or (b) an offence against the law of another State or a Territory 
corresponding to any of the aforementioned offences.  
149
  Section 6D of the Sentencing Act 1991.  
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(vii)     Western Australia 
(I)    Domestic Burglary 
5.83 Section 401(4) of the Criminal Code provides that an adult convicted for the third or subsequent 
time of a home burglary must receive a minimum 12-month sentence of imprisonment.  A juvenile 
convicted of this offence for the third or subsequent time must receive a minimum 12-month term of 
imprisonment or detention.  The Aboriginal Justice Council has noted that this mandatory sentence has 
had no impact on burglary rates but has had a disproportionate impact on Aboriginal offenders appearing 
before the courts.
150
 
(g)    New Zealand 
5.84 In New Zealand, a three-stage mandatory sentencing regime applies in respect of repeat 
serious violent offenders.
151
  
(i) Serious Violent Offences 
5.85 Under section 86B of the Sentencing Act 2002, a first warning is issued to an offender who is 
convicted of a “serious violent offence”,
152
 where he or she was at least 18 years of age when the offence 
was committed, and where he or she did not have any previous warnings under the Act.  This first 
warning must alert the offender to the enhanced consequences (detailed below) which he or she will face 
if subsequently convicted of another serious violent offence, committed after that warning.   
5.86 Section 86C applies to an offender who has received a first warning, but not a final warning, and 
who is convicted of a subsequent serious violent offence, other than murder.  Such an offender must 
receive a warning detailing the enhanced consequences which will follow if he or she is subsequently 
convicted of a further serious violent offence, committed after that warning.  Additionally, if the sentence 
imposed on the offender for the current offence is a determinate sentence of imprisonment, the court 
must order that he or she serve the full term of the sentence.  Where the relevant offence is murder, 
section 86E requires the court to sentence the offender to life imprisonment and order that this sentence 
be served without parole, unless it is satisfied that, given the circumstances of the offence and the 
offender, this would be manifestly unjust.  If the court does decline to make this order, it must explain its 
reasons in writing and instead impose a sentence in accordance with section 103 of the Sentencing Act 
2002.  Section 103 stipulates that the minimum term ordered may not be less than 10 years, and must be 
the minimum term that the court considers necessary to satisfy all or any of the following purposes:  (a) 
holding the offender accountable for the harm done to the victim and community; (b) denouncing the 
conduct of the offender; (c) deterring the offender or other persons from committing the same or a similar 
offence; or (d) protecting the community from the offender.   
5.87 Under section 86D, an offender who has received a final warning must, where committed for trial 
for a subsequent serious violent offence, be committed to the High Court for that trial.  If convicted, only 
the High Court (or the Court of Appeal or Supreme Court on an appeal) may sentence him or her for the 
offence.  The sentence which must be imposed for the current offence, other than where the offence in 
question is murder, must be the maximum term prescribed for that offence.  The court must order that the 
offender serve the entirety of this sentence without parole, unless it considers that it would be manifestly 
unjust to make that order, in which case, it must give its reasons in writing.  
5.88 If the relevant offence is manslaughter, the court must order that the offender serve a minimum 
term of 20 years, unless it considers that given the circumstances of the offence and the offender, this 
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  Morgan, Blagg and Williams Mandatory Sentencing in Western Australia and the Impact on Aboriginal Youth 
(Aboriginal Justice Council, December 2001). 
151
  Section 86A to section 86I of the Sentencing Act 2002, inserted by section 6 of the Sentencing and Parole 
Reform Act 2010.  
152      Under section 86A, a “serious violent offence” is defined as including 40 separate offences.  Among those 
listed are various serious sexual offences (including forms of sexual violation and indecent assault); homicide 
offences (including murder and manslaughter); assault offences (including wounding with intent to injure and 
aggravated injury); and property offences (including aggravated burglary and robbery).   
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would be manifestly unjust.  If the court does decline to make this order, it must again explain its reasons 
in writing.  Furthermore, it must instead order that the offender serve a minimum term of 10 years.  If the 
offence is murder, section 86E requires the court to sentence the offender to life imprisonment without 
parole, unless it is satisfied that this would be manifestly unjust, given the circumstances of the offence 
and the offender.  Once again, if the court does decline to make this order, it must give written reasons for 
this and instead impose a minimum sentence of 20 years.  In turn, however, if the court is satisfied that a 
minimum sentence of 20 years would, given the circumstances of the offence and the offender, be 
manifestly unjust, it must instead impose a sentence in accordance with section 103.  If a minimum 
sentence of 20 years is thus not imposed, the court must again give its reasons for this in writing.  
5.89 In New Zealand, the enactment of this “three-strikes” regime proved politically divisive.
153
  On one 
side, proponents of this reform argued that these provisions would serve to protect the community from 
incorrigible individuals who are unwilling to desist from violent offending.
154
  On the other side, the 
concerns most commonly expressed by opponents were that this regime:  (a) was at odds with the 
principle of proportionality in sentencing; (b) was of doubtful deterrent value; (c) was likely to lower public 
confidence in the judiciary; (d) was likely to lead to a substantial decrease in guilty pleas, adversely 
affecting victims; and (e) was likely to disproportionately affect members of the Maori community who are 
already over-represented in the criminal justice system.
155
  In respect of the last of these concerns, it has 
been noted that as of May 2012, Maori offenders accounted for 47% of the male recipients of first strikes 
and 58% of the female recipients of first strikes.
156
 
(h) Summary  
5.90 A comparative analysis of the common law countries that have introduced mandatory (or 
presumptive) sentencing for repeat offences is of interest.  As illustrated in Chapter 2, it is clear that the 
enactment in this State of mandatory minimum sentences for repeat offences was to some extent 
influenced by sentencing reforms in the United States of America and the United Kingdom, in particular.  
Traditionally, it has been the consistent approach of the Commission to engage in comparative analysis 
when evaluating potential options for law reform in this State.   
5.91 Equally, however, the Commission cautions against relying too heavily on the example set by 
other common law jurisdictions.  It should be noted that the rationale for introducing minimum sentencing 
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  The Sentencing and Parole Reform Act 2010 was passed with 63 votes in favour and 58 votes against.  The 
Labour, Green, Maori and United Future Parties opposed the legislation while the National and ACT Parties 
supported it.  Oleson “New Zealand’s Three-Strikes Law”. Presentation delivered at Stockholm Criminology 
Symposium, 13 June 2012.  Overview available at: 
www.criminologysymposium.com/download/18.4dfe0028139b9a0cf4080001588/WED11+Oleson,+James.pdf  
[Last accessed:  22 May 2013]. 
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  Hansard, Questions to Ministers, “Three Strikes Legislation” - Reasons for Government Support, 4 May 2010, 
Vol 662, Page 10653.  
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  See, for example:  Rethinking Crime and Punishment “Submission on the Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill” 
March 2010.  Available at: 
www.rethinking.org.nz/images/newsletter%20PDF/Issue%2070/06%20Final%20Second%20Submission%20S
entencing%20and%20Parole%20Reform%20%20Bill.pdf [Last accessed: 22 May 2013]; New Zealand Law 
Society “Submission on Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill (Revised)” March 2010.  Available at:  
www.lawsociety.org.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/20817/sentencing-and-parole-reform-bill.pdf [Last 
accessed:  22 May 2013]; and New Zealand Human Rights Commission “Submission on the Sentencing and 
Parole Reform Bill” 5 March 2010.  Available at:  www.hrc.co.nz/hrc_new/hrc/cms/files/documents/19-Mar-
2010_15-38-41_Sentencing_and_Parole_Reform_Submission_2__Final.pdf [Last accessed: 22 May 2013]. 
156
  See:  Oleson “New Zealand’s Three-Strikes Law”.  Presentation delivered at Stockholm Criminology 
Symposium, 13 June 2012.  Overview available at: 
www.criminologysymposium.com/download/18.4dfe0028139b9a0cf4080001588/WED11+Oleson,+James.pdf  
[Last Accessed: 22 May 2013]; and Collins “Maori, Pacific offenders high on three-strikes watch” The New 
Zealand Herald 3 December 2012.  
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regimes varies from country to country and that these provisions are often the product of circumstances 
and cultural factors specific to the jurisdiction in question.  The Commission notes, therefore, that it is 
important to assess any proposed extension of mandatory sentencing to ensure that any reform would be 
consistent with the key sentencing aims and principles identified in Chapter 1.   
F Mandatory and Presumptive Sentences for Second or Subsequent Offences and the 
Conceptual Framework 
5.92 In this Part, the Commission considers mandatory and presumptive sentences for second or 
subsequent offences against the conceptual framework established in Chapter 1.  Specifically, these 
sentencing regimes will be evaluated by reference to:  (1) the aims of sentencing, and (2) the principles of 
justice. 
(1) Mandatory and Presumptive Sentences for Second or Subsequent Offences and the 
Aims of Sentencing 
5.93 The Commission has observed that criminal sanctions pursue one or more of a number of aims 
including deterrence, punishment, reform and rehabilitation and reparation.  The Commission has also 
noted that the aims of deterrence and punishment tend to feature more heavily in those cases involving 
more serious crimes and, consequently, more severe sanctions.   Likewise, it is ostensibly these aims 
which feature most heavily in those cases involving second or subsequent offences subject to 
presumptive or mandatory sentences.  These sentencing regimes seek to dissuade the offender by 
coercive means, from committing further offences and to punish him or her severely for committing a 
second or subsequent offence of the type specified.  It is not clear whether these regimes adequately 
meet these aims.  
(a) Criminal Justice Act 2007  
5.94 The Commission observes that the sentencing regime under section 25 of the Criminal Justice 
Act 2007 is unlikely to fulfil the aim of deterrence.  As discussed at paragraph 1.22, some commentators 
maintain that neither mandatory sentences nor lengthy prison sentences in general are effective 
deterrents.  (Indeed, the fact that section 25 seeks to address those who commit a subsequent offence of 
the type already subject to a significant sentence arguably supports the view that in many cases lengthy 
imprisonment does not deter).  Kazemian cites research which she asserts illustrates that incarceration 
has either no effect or undesirable effects on subsequent offending.
157
    
5.95 Section 25 would appear to be consistent with the sentencing aim of punishment.  From a 
retributive perspective, this sentencing regime permits society to punish more severely instances of 
serious repeat offending.  It does not necessarily preclude the courts from differentiating between more 
and less culpable cases of repeat offending.  A particularly culpable repeat offender may be subjected to 
a more severe sentence than the prescribed minimum.  Similarly, a less culpable repeat offender may 
receive a sentence lower than the presumptive minimum where the court considers that it would be 
disproportionate in all the circumstances of the case to apply the minimum penalty.  As noted at 
paragraph 5.14, this proportionality test appears to pose a lower threshold than the “exceptional and 
specific circumstances” criterion applicable under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 and the Firearms Acts.  
5.96  Similar observations may be made regarding the denunciatory aspect of this sentencing regime.  
Section 25 permits society to forcefully denounce instances of serious repeat offending.  In accordance 
with the proportionality test included in this provision, an individual offender need only be denounced in 
accordance with his or her particular level of culpability.   
 (b) Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 
5.97 The Commission considers it unlikely that the mandatory sentence applicable to repeat offenders 
under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 facilitates deterrence.  It has already been noted that in general the 
                                                     
157
  Kazemian “Assessing the Impact of a Recidivist Sentencing Premium” in Roberts and von Hirsch, eds, 
Previous Convictions at Sentencing: Theoretical and Applied Perspectives (Oxford: Hart, 2010) at 241.  
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deterrent effect of mandatory sentencing is questionable.  In the specific context of drug trafficking, 
however, the Commission notes that the effectiveness of such a regime appears particularly doubtful.  
5.98 First, the Commission observes that the prospect of a mandatory sentence for a second or 
subsequent offence is unlikely to deter high-level actors within the drug trafficking trade.  As discussed at 
paragraph 4.235, these offenders appear to have adapted to this penal approach by developing complex 
distribution networks that enable them to evade detection and prosecution.  As these high-level offenders 
are rarely apprehended, it seems unlikely that either the prospect of a presumptive sentence for a first 
offence, or a mandatory sentence for a subsequent offence, will deter them from engaging in this form of 
criminality.   
5.99 Second, as discussed at paragraph 4.194, the Commission observes that even if the prospect of 
a mandatory sentence may deter some low-level offenders from risking a second or subsequent 
conviction, this regime is unlikely to further the goal of general deterrence.  As there will in all probability 
remain a plentiful supply of willing replacements, this sentencing regime is unlikely to impact significantly 
on the overall rate of drug-trafficking.  
5.100 The Commission observes that the sentencing regime for repeat offenders under the Misuse of 
Drugs Act 1977 may not appropriately pursue the aim of punishment.  From a retributive perspective, this 
regime restricts the ability of the courts to punish repeat drug trafficking offenders in accordance with their 
level of culpability.  The most culpable repeat offenders may be punished more heavily through the 
imposition of a sentence greater than the mandatory minimum.  However, by prioritising two aggravating 
factors, namely, the existence of a prior conviction under section 15A or section 15B, and the value of the 
drugs involved, at the expense of any factors which might justify a downward departure from the 
prescribed minimum, this regime risks certain repeat offenders receiving a disproportionate sentence.   
5.101 Similar observations may be made regarding the denunciatory aspect of this sentencing regime.  
This regime prioritises two aggravating factors at the expense of any factors which might justify a 
downward departure from the prescribed minimum sentence.  This creates a risk that an individual 
offender may be denounced more forcefully than is warranted in the circumstances. 
5.102 The Commission observes that rehabilitation is another aim which is built into the mandatory 
sentencing regime under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977.   As discussed at paragraph 4.48, section 27(3J) 
provides that a sentencing court may list a sentence for review after half of the term has expired.  To list a 
sentence for review, the court must be satisfied that the offender was addicted to drugs at the time of the 
offence and that this was a substantial factor leading to the commission of the offence.  This provision 
also stipulates that only an offender who has at least received the minimum 10-year sentence may have 
his or her sentence listed for review.  As the minimum sentence must be imposed in all cases in which an 
offender receives a second or subsequent conviction under section 15A or section 15B, this criterion will 
be fulfilled in every such instance.  The Commission therefore observes that this sentencing regime may, 
to some extent, further a rehabilitative aim.  
 (c) Firearms Acts 
5.103 The Commission considers that the mandatory sentence applicable to repeat offenders under the 
Firearms Acts is unlikely to facilitate deterrence.  It has been noted that in general the deterrent effect of 
mandatory sentencing is questionable.  In the specific context of firearms offences, however, the 
Commission notes that the effectiveness of such a regime is open to particular doubt.  As discussed at 
paragraph 4.202, mandatory sentencing regimes operate on the premise that the decision to offend is 
fully rational.  In the context of firearms offences, however, this approach may be overly simplistic, 
disregarding complex potential contributing factors such as expressions of masculinity and social 
deprivation. 
5.104 The Commission also observes that the sentencing regime for repeat offenders under the 
Firearms Acts may not appropriately pursue the aim of punishment.  From a retributive perspective, the 
Firearms Acts prioritise one aggravating factor, namely, the existence of a prior relevant conviction under 
the Acts, at the expense of any factors which might justify a downward departure from the prescribed 
minimum sentence.  This regime therefore risks certain repeat offenders being punished in a manner 
disproportionate to their level of culpability.  
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5.105 Similar observations may be made regarding the denunciatory aspect of this sentencing regime.  
This regime prioritises two aggravating factors at the expense of any factors which might justify a 
downward departure from the prescribed minimum sentence.  This creates a risk that an individual 
offender may be denounced more forcefully than is warranted in the circumstances. 
(2) Mandatory Sentences for Second or Subsequent Offences and the Principles of Justice  
(a) The Principle of Consistency and Mandatory and Presumptive Sentences for Second or 
Subsequent Offences 
5.106 The Commission has observed that the principle of consistency requires a consistent application 
of the aims and principles of sentencing (consistency of approach) as opposed to uniformity of sentencing 
outcomes (consistency of outcomes).  Consistency of approach thus requires that like cases should be 
treated alike and different cases should be treated differently.  The corollary of this is that inconsistency 
arises where like cases are treated differently and different cases are treated alike.  
(i) Criminal Justice Act 2007 
5.107 The Commission notes that, at first sight, the sentencing regime applicable to repeat offenders 
under the Criminal Justice Act 2007 appears to adhere to the principle of consistency.  First, although this 
regime applies in respect of a broad range of scheduled offences, three specific elements must be 
satisfied in order for the presumptive penalty to apply.  As previously outlined, this regime requires that:  
(i) both the initial and subsequent offence must have been committed by an offender aged at least 18 
years; (ii) the initial offence must have attracted a sentence of at least five years’ imprisonment; and (iii) 
the subsequent offence must have been committed within 7 years of the date of conviction for the initial 
offence.  The inclusion of these requirements goes some way towards ensuring that the regime only 
applies in respect of similar cases.  Second, the fact that a sentencing court may disregard the 
presumptive penalty where its application would be “disproportionate in all the circumstances of the case” 
appears to provide that different cases need not be treated uniformly.  A less culpable repeat offender 
need not be subjected to the same minimum penalty as a more serious offender.  Instead, the court may 
consider any mitigating factors that exist in his or her favour and impose a sentence that more 
appropriately reflects his or her culpability.  
5.108 Nonetheless, the Commission considers that the presumptive nature of this sentencing 
regime conflicts with the principle of consistency.  As discussed at paragraphs 2.209 and 2.210, section 
25 was enacted with a view to punishing more severely those offences typically associated with gangland 
criminality.  It therefore prioritises the realisation of consistent sentencing outcomes at the expense of a 
consistent sentencing approach.  By introducing a specific statutory regime for this particular group of 
offences, section 25 may divert the courts from the key objective of adopting a consistent sentencing 
approach to all instances of repeat offending.  Indeed, from its discussions with interested parties since 
the publication of the Consultation Paper, the Commission is not aware that section 25 has been applied 
in any case to date.  Practitioners have, however, emphasised to the Commission that in accordance with 
the aims and principles of sentencing discussed in Chapter 1, higher sentences are in any event imposed 
on repeat offenders than would be imposed on first-time offenders.  To that extent, section 25, if it were to 
be applied, would arguably bring confusion and add little or nothing to established sentencing practice.  
The Commission therefore considers that the structured, guidance-based sentencing system envisaged 
in the recommendations made in Chapter 1, would provide a more consistent approach to the sentencing 
of repeat offenders.   
(ii) Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 
5.109 The Commission considers that the mandatory sentence applicable to repeat offenders under the 
Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 may conflict with the principle of consistency.  As discussed at paragraph 
2.204, this regime was introduced to ensure that offenders who avoided the prescribed minimum 
sentence upon being convicted of a first section 15A or section 15B offence, would not evade this penalty 
if subsequently convicted under either provision.  It is clear therefore, that the focus of this regime was, 
initially at least, the outcome of the sentencing process rather than the approach to this process.  The 
Commission observes, however, that unlike the presumptive regime under the Criminal Justice Act 2007, 
the regime under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 does not temper this focus by permitting the courts to 
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treat dissimilar cases differently.  Instead, there appear to be three ways in which this sentencing regime 
may produce inconsistency.  
5.110 First, this regime may require the courts to adopt an inconsistent approach to the sentencing of 
similarly situated repeat drug offenders.  This problem stems from the use of the “market value” criterion 
as the triggering element for the regime.  As discussed at paragraphs 4.12 to 4.15, evidence regarding 
the market value of drugs is at best an estimate as the market value of any commodity may fluctuate 
depending on when and where it is sold and how much of that commodity is already available.  
Nonetheless, whether a repeat offender is considered to fall foul of this threshold will determine whether 
the court is free to take into account any mitigating factors which may justify the imposition of a sentence 
of less than 10 years.  There is a risk therefore, that similarly situated repeat offenders may be treated 
differently on the basis of an unreliable evaluation of the drugs in their possession.   
5.111 Second, the Commission reiterates that in addition to the unreliability of this “market value” 
threshold, it creates a “sentencing cliff” whereby a small difference in facts may lead to a significant 
difference in sentence.   Arguably, this mandates the adoption of a different sentencing approach in 
respect of similarly situated repeat offenders.  As previously outlined, a repeat offence involving drugs 
worth at least €13,000 will attract a minimum sentence notwithstanding any mitigating factors.  However, 
by contrast, where the drugs at issue were worth even marginally less than €13,000, a repeat offender 
may cite any relevant mitigating factors and potentially receive a lower sentence.  This regime may thus 
require the courts to adopt a different sentencing approach in respect of individuals whose conduct and 
level of culpability are virtually identical.  Indeed, the fact that mens rea regarding the value of the drugs is 
not an element of the offence arguably compounds the risk that similarly culpable offenders may be 
treated differently.  
5.112 Third, the Commission notes that this regime may require the courts to adopt a sentencing 
approach to certain repeat drug offenders, which is at odds with the approach adopted in respect of other 
recidivist offenders.  In particular, it has been noted that it would appear to be inconsistent that:  
“[t]he sentencing of virtually all other offences, including more serious ones, remains 
discretionary. ...  A person caught in possession of, say, €15,000 worth of cocaine who had 
previously been convicted of a similar offence must now receive a prison sentence of 10 years or 
longer.  Yet, another person appearing in an adjoining court on the same day on a manslaughter, 
rape or robbery charge might well receive a much shorter sentence, even though he had previous 
convictions for similar offences.  Violent offences of this nature usually attract heavy prison 
sentences, but courts are always entitled to exercise leniency when there are clear and 
exceptional mitigating factors.  The repeat section 15A offender may also be able to point to 
exceptional mitigating factors but, unlike the person convicted of a serious violent offence, he can 
receive no leniency on that account... .”
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(iii) Firearms Acts  
5.113 The Commission observes that the regime applicable to repeat offenders under the Firearms 
Acts was introduced to ensure that those who avoided the presumptive sentence when first convicted of a 
specified offence would not evade this penalty if subsequently convicted of such an offence.  It is thus 
clear that the focus of this regime was, initially at least, the outcome of the sentencing process rather than 
the approach to this process.  
5.114 Furthermore, as previously discussed, it is arguably inconsistent that this regime requires the 
courts to adopt a sentencing approach to repeat firearms offenders which is at odds with the approach 
adopted in respect of other recidivist offenders.    
(b) The Principle of Proportionality and Mandatory and Presumptive Sentences for Second 
or Subsequent Offences 
5.115 The Commission has observed that the principle of proportionality comprises:  (a) constitutional 
proportionality, and (b) proportionality in sentencing. 
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(i) Constitutional Proportionality and Mandatory and Presumptive Sentences for Second or 
Subsequent Offences   
5.116 As discussed in Chapter 3, the Supreme Court has confirmed that the Oireachtas is entitled to 
prescribe a mandatory sentence whenever it considers this to be an appropriate penalty.  It follows 
therefore, that mandatory or presumptive sentences for second or subsequent offences do not offend the 
constitutional doctrine of proportionality.   
(ii) Sentencing Proportionality and Mandatory Sentences for Second or Subsequent 
Offences  
5.117 The Commission has observed that the principle of proportionality in sentencing requires an 
individualised approach to sentencing whereby the court has regard to the circumstances of both the 
offence and the offender.   
(iii) Criminal Justice Act 2007 
5.118 The Commission observes that the sentencing regime under section 25 of the Criminal Justice 
Act 2007 does not conflict with the principle of proportionality in sentencing.  This regime expressly 
permits a sentencing court to disregard the presumptive minimum sentence where the application of this 
penalty would be “disproportionate in all the circumstances of the case”. 
(iv) Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 
5.119 The Commission considers that the mandatory sentencing regime under section 27(3F) of the 
Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 poses a particular risk of disproportionate sentencing.  This risk stems from the 
fact that the regime permits of no exceptions to the imposition of the minimum sentence.  Instead, it 
prioritises two aggravating factors, namely, the fact of a previous section 15A or section 15B conviction, 
and the market value of the drugs involved, without regard to the possible presence of any mitigating 
factors which might justify a downward departure from the prescribed minimum.  For such a sentence to 
be proportionate in every case, the aggravating factors which trigger the sentencing regime must always 
warrant the application of the prescribed minimum penalty.
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  It cannot be guaranteed, however, that this 
will be the case in every instance of repeat offending.  
(v)  Firearms Acts  
5.120 The Commission observes that similar comments may be made in respect of the mandatory 
sentencing regime applicable to repeat offenders under the Firearms Acts.  This regime prioritises one 
aggravating factor, namely, the fact of a previous relevant conviction under the Acts, at the expense of 
any mitigating factors which may justify a downward departure from the prescribed minimum sentence.  
Accordingly, this sentencing regime creates a risk of disproportionate sentencing.    
(3) Discussion 
5.121 In Chapter 1, the Commission acknowledged that repeat offending has a particularly deleterious 
impact on society.  It is understandable therefore, that the Oireachtas should wish to increase the severity 
of the sanctions applicable to these offences through the enactment of mandatory minimum sentences.  
The Commission further recognised that the provision of mandatory sentences may be seen to afford 
individual members of society, who might otherwise feel victimised and powerless, an opportunity to 
express their condemnation of such offences. 
5.122 The Commission reiterates, however, that having regard to the aims and principles of 
sentencing outlined in Chapter 1, there is a need to ensure that these provisions achieve their stated 
objectives and that, as a result, they facilitate the reduction of crime (the paramount aim of the criminal 
justice system).  From the analysis undertaken in Part F, it would appear that this is not the case; the 
Commission has identified six problems which characterise the mandatory and presumptive minimum 
sentencing regimes currently applicable to certain repeat offences.  Many of these problems also arise, 
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and have therefore been discussed, in the context of the presumptive minimum sentences applicable to 
certain first-time drugs and firearms offences.  
5.123 The first problem relates to the aims of sentencing, in particular, the aims of deterrence and 
punishment.  In this regard, the Commission has observed that the mandatory sentencing regimes under 
the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 and the Firearms Acts may not adequately meet these aims.     
5.124 The second problem is a related problem.  Where these mandatory sentencing regimes are not 
meeting the aims of sentencing, it is questionable whether they are furthering the overall aim of the 
criminal justice system, namely, the reduction of prohibited or unwanted conduct. 
5.125 The third problem relates to the principles of justice, namely, the principles of consistency and 
proportionality.  In this regard, the Commission has noted that the mandatory sentencing regimes under 
the Criminal Justice Act 2007, Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 and the Firearms Acts may give rise to 
inconsistent sentencing.  The provisions under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 and the Firearms Acts also 
appear to create a particular risk of disproportionate sentencing.  
5.126 The fourth problem relates to the argument that minimum sentences are not a cost-effective 
response to crime.  As discussed at paragraph 4.230, in the context of minimum sentences for drug 
offences, the Rand Corporation has noted that for the same amount of money, a more effective method 
would be to strengthen enforcement under the previous sentencing regime or to increase treatment for 
heavy drug-users.
160
 
5.127 The fifth problem relates to the argument outlined at paragraph 4.231 that there is an 
incongruence between the sentences applicable to drug offences and the sentences applicable to 
firearms offences.  In a broader sense, it would also appear to be inconsistent that certain repeat drug 
and firearms offences attract a mandatory sentence, whereas many other repeat offences of equal or 
greater gravity do not.   
5.128 The final problem relates to the argument that mandatory sentencing regimes are too rigid to 
keep abreast of evolving penal philosophy.  As noted in the Consultation Paper, the views of sentencers 
regarding matters such as the seriousness of a particular offence and the appropriateness of various non-
custodial and custodial sanctions may evolve over time.
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  Mandatory sentencing regimes are incapable 
of keeping pace with these developments.   
5.129 In light of this analysis, the Commission recommends that the existing mandatory and 
presumptive sentencing regimes applicable to repeat offences be repealed.  As discussed above, it has 
not been established that these sentencing provisions have succeeded in reducing criminality.   
5.130  In addition to the apparent failure of these regimes to reduce criminality, the Commission notes 
that these provisions may, in practice, produce a number of counter-productive results.  First, having 
expanded upon the analysis contained in the Consultation Paper, the Commission considers that these 
sentencing regimes are inconsistent with the fundamental principles of justice discussed in Chapter 1, 
namely, the principles of consistency and proportionality in sentencing.  As discussed in Part F, these 
provisions appear to require an inconsistent approach to sentencing in so far as the courts are 
constrained in their ability to treat like cases alike and different cases differently.  Similarly, in restricting 
the ability of the courts to take account of the individual circumstances of each offender, the regimes 
under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 and the Firearms Acts appear to create a risk of disproportionate 
sentencing.   
5.131 In recommending the repeal of these mandatory and presumptive minimum sentencing regimes, 
the Commission proposes that the development of a more structured, guidance-based sentencing system 
(as envisaged in the recommendations made in Chapter 1) would facilitate an appropriate, alternative 
response to the relevant offences.  In the context of drug-related crime, in particular, the Commission also 
considers that law enforcement efforts may be beneficially supplemented by alternative initiatives, such 
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as those highlighted in the research conducted by the Health Research Board and the Misuse of Drugs 
work sector of the British-Irish Council (see paragraphs 4.199 and 4.200).   
5.132 Finally, the Commission agrees with the view, provisionally adopted in the Consultation Paper, 
that the introduction of additional mandatory or presumptive minimum sentences would not be an 
“appropriate or beneficial” response to other forms of repeat offending.  As discussed above, it has not 
been illustrated that mandatory or presumptive sentences for repeat offending achieve their intended 
sentencing aims and, as a result, that these regimes are likely to reduce criminal conduct.  The 
Commission therefore recommends that the use of mandatory or presumptive minimum sentences not be 
extended to other forms of repeat offending. 
5.133 The Commission recommends that the following be repealed:  (i) the presumptive sentencing 
regime applicable to serious repeat offences under section 25 of the Criminal Justice Act 2007; (ii)  the 
mandatory minimum sentencing regime applicable to repeat drug offences under section 27(3F) of the 
Misuse of Drugs Act 1977; and (iii) the mandatory minimum sentencing regime applicable to repeat 
firearms offences under section 15(8) of the Firearms Act 1925; section 26(8), section 27(8), section 
27A(8), and section 27B(8) of the Firearms Act 1964; and section 12A(13) of the Firearms and Offensive 
Weapons Act 1990.  The Commission also recommends that the use of presumptive or mandatory 
minimum sentencing regimes not be extended to other forms of repeat offending.  
5.134 The Commission also recommends that a more structured, guidance-based sentencing 
system (as envisaged in the recommendations made in Chapter 1) would provide an appropriate 
alternative to these provisions.   
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6  
CHAPTER 6 SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS  
6.01 The recommendations made by the Commission in this Report are as follows:  
6.02 The Commission supports the recommendations made in 2000, and reiterated in 2011, that a 
Judicial Council be empowered to develop and publish suitable guidance or guidelines on sentencing, 
which would reflect the general aims of criminal sanctions and the principles of sentencing discussed in 
this Report.  The Commission also recommends that such guidance or guidelines should have regard to: 
(i) the sentencing guidance and guidelines available from decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court 
of Criminal Appeal  (including those discussed in this Report); (ii) the aggravating and mitigating factors, 
and individual offender characteristics, identified in the Commission’s 1996 Report on Sentencing and 
developed by the courts since 1996; and (iii) information in relevant databases including, in particular, the 
Irish Sentencing Information System (ISIS).  [paragraph 1.128] 
6.03 The Commission, by a majority, recommends that the mandatory life sentence for murder be 
retained. [paragraph 3.76] 
6.04 The Commission recommends that where an offender is convicted of murder, and is therefore 
sentenced to life imprisonment, legislation should provide that the judge may recommend a minimum 
term to be served by the offender.  [paragraph 3.84] 
6.05 The Commission recommends that the Parole Board be established on an independent 
statutory basis, and welcomes the Government’s proposal to introduce legislation bringing about this 
effect.  [paragraph 3.86] 
6.06 The Commission recommends that the following be repealed:  (i) the presumptive minimum 
sentencing regime applicable to drugs offences under section 27(3C) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, 
and (ii) the presumptive minimum sentencing regime applicable to firearms offences under section 15 of 
the Firearms Act 1925; section 26, section 27, section 27A and section 27B of the Firearms Act 1964; and 
section 12A of the Firearms and Offensive Weapons Act 1990.    The Commission also recommends that 
the use of presumptive minimum sentencing regimes should not be extended to other offences.  
[paragraph 4.238] 
6.07 The Commission also recommends that a more structured, guidance-based sentencing system 
(as envisaged in the recommendations made in Chapter 1) would provide an appropriate alternative to 
these provisions.  In the context of drug-related crime, the Commission also considers that law 
enforcement efforts may be beneficially supplemented by other initiatives, such as those highlighted in 
the research conducted by the Health Research Board and the Misuse of Drugs work sector of the 
British-Irish Council.  [paragraph 4.239]  
6.08 The Commission recommends that the following be repealed:  (i) the presumptive sentencing 
regime applicable to serious repeat offences under section 25 of the Criminal Justice Act 2007; (ii)  the 
mandatory minimum sentencing regime applicable to repeat drug offences under section 27(3F) of the 
Misuse of Drugs Act 1977; and (iii) the mandatory minimum sentencing regime applicable to repeat 
firearms offences under section 15(8) of the Firearms Act 1925; section 26(8), section 27(8), section 
27A(8), and section 27B(8) of the Firearms Act 1964; and section 12A(13) of the Firearms and Offensive 
Weapons Act 1990.  The Commission also recommends that the use of presumptive and mandatory 
minimum sentencing regimes should not be extended to other forms of repeat offending. [paragraph 
5.133] 
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6.09 The Commission also recommends that a more structured, guidance-based sentencing system 
(as envisaged in the recommendations made in Chapter 1) would provide an appropriate alternative to 
these provisions.  [paragraph 5.134] 
